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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the adaptation and convergence in corporate governance to 
international norms in Pakistan. Pakistan is an underdeveloped but an emerging market 
with inefficient legal, regulatory, judicial, institutional and governance norms. In recent 
times there have been some reforms in the corporate sector of Pakistan but lack of 
infrastructure and a dearth of research were barriers to reform generally. Therefore, this 
thesis seeks to identify corporate governance issues in Pakistan, and discusses analytically 
the possibility and effectiveness of convergence in corporate governance to international 
norms in Pakistan.  
 
To this end, it focuses on three aspects of convergence in corporate governance in 
Pakistan. First, it discusses the prospects and application of convergence in corporate 
governance in Pakistan. Second, it analyses critically, from a comparative perspective, 
three core corporate governance issues in Pakistan. The corporate sector in Pakistan is 
highly concentrated with an underdeveloped capital market and inefficient enforcement 
mechanisms. The conflict between shareholders and management, and shareholders inter 
se are major issues of corporate governance in Pakistan. The former conflict is addressed 
by reducing agency cost and the latter by ensuring minority protection. These conflicts are 
analysed comprehensively through comparative studies. Furthermore, the market and 
judiciary in Pakistan have failed to provide investors with protection. This thesis discusses 
the reform process in the market and judiciary in order to improve enforcement 
mechanisms. In addition, it discusses the possibility of convergence and effectiveness of 
adaptation in these issues. Third, as Pakistan is an ideological country whose constitution 
prescribes Islam as the state religion which, in turn, prescribes Islamic injunctions as basic 
norms, convergence to any foreign corporate governance feature will have to pass the 
litmus test of Islamic norms. Therefore, the thesis also identifies the possibility of filtration 
of foreign governance features through Islamic norms.  
 
The thesis concludes that the corporate sector in Pakistan is underdeveloped with weak 
investor rights and enforcement mechanisms. There is, therefore, a need to enhance 
investor protection in order to improve corporate governance which, in turn, will improve 
the economy of the country. In addition, the conclusion is reached that in convergence to 
Western corporate governance features in Pakistan, Islamic norms may act as a litmus test 
which may not be as problematic as it appears at first sight.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
 
1.1 The concept of convergence 
 
Although convergence in corporate governance started long ago,1 it achieved momentum 
only in recent years after globalization. Efficiency, competition, cross-country investment, 
interdependent economies, interrelated economic interests, the enhanced role of 
international financial institutions and foreign investors are the main stimulants for 
convergence in corporate governance. In this process the least developed jurisdictions are 
converging to the most developed jurisdictions in corporate governance. By contrast, 
although different factors force convergence to the most efficient system of corporate 
governance, the presence of certain barriers such as path dependency; complementary 
institutions; differences in culture, values, ideology, politics and religion; and vested 
interests such as families and groups, result in the persistence of divergence.2 
 
Berle and Means identified an ownership structure of widely dispersed share ownership in 
which the managers control the corporate powers with shareholders being largely 
powerless.3 However, this widely dispersed shareholding which emerged in the United 
States of America (US) is the exception rather than the norm in the world. This widely 
dispersed ownership structure is mostly limited to the US and the United Kingdom (UK). 
In most of the jurisdictions there is concentrated ownership where families, states and 
groups dominate the corporate sector. Historically different corporate governance systems 
have developed around the world due to specific political, social, economic, cultural and 
religious norms. In the new global world the convergence in corporate governance is 
taking place more rapidly than before. The features of corporate governance are being 
transplanted from one jurisdiction to another in order to improve the governance 
mechanism. This results in the merging of different systems. The question whether this 
convergence process will ultimately lead to a single model where other models disappear is 
unresolved. Hansman and Kraakman argue that the US system of a standard shareholder-
oriented model (SSM) is more likely to succeed over its rival systems–managerial-
                                                 
1
 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 17. 
2
 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and 
Ownership’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 168-170; John C. Coffee, Jr, ‘The Future as History: The 
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications’ (1999) Northwestern 
University Law Review 641-708. 
3
 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MacMillan, New York 
1932). 
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oriented, labour- or stakeholder-oriented, state-oriented, family or unconstrained control 
shareholder models due to its inherent adaptability to all types of ownership structures.4  
 
Recently, despite the presence of different corporate structures, convergence in corporate 
governance is taking place around the world. Gilson classifies convergence into three basic 
forms which may take place in competitive globalization.5 First, according to him, formal 
convergence occurs where the legal framework of a given country is changed according to 
some other legal framework. Second, functional convergence occurs where formal legal 
change is not possible but the system is flexible enough to respond to changed 
circumstances. In this process the system starts functioning differently without change in 
the legal framework. Third, contractual convergence takes place where firms adopt a 
regulatory framework of some other jurisdictions under the terms of a contract. 
 
Formal convergence can be further divided into three forms, namely (1) de jure, (2) de 
facto and (3) formal convergence with functional diversity.6 In de jure convergence the 
rules of two systems become the same. It is possible that in de jure convergence of rules 
the corporate governance features in the home jurisdiction may not function in the same 
way as they do in the host jurisdiction. However, when the convergence of rules follows 
the functioning of the corporate governance feature in the same way, then such 
convergence will be de facto convergence. By contrast, if both systems work differently, 
then this will be formal convergence with functional diversity. 
 
Corporate governance has been compared to a product market where only efficient 
governance features survive.7 More efficient features may replace less efficient features 
through convergence in order to improve the corporate governance mechanism of a given 
country. This process may continue indefinitely, and may remain incomplete and transitory 
in nature.8 The process of convergence can be successful if resistance from barriers to 
                                                 
4
 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law’ in Abdul A. 
Rasheed and Toru Yoshikawa (eds), The Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promise and Prospects 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012). 
5
 Ronald J. Gilson, ‘Globalising Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function’ (2001) 49 (2) 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 356-7. 
6
 Abdul A. Rasheed and Toru Yoshikawa, The Convergence of Corporate Governance: Promise and 
Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 3; Iain MacNeil, ‘Adaptation and Convergence in 
Corporate Governance: The Case of Chinese Listed Companies’(2002) 2 (2) Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 340. 
7
 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fisher, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1991) 4-8. 
8
 Franklin A. Gevurtz, ‘The Globalisation of Corporate Law: The End of History or a Never-Ending Story? 
(2011) 86 Washington Law Review 475. 
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convergence in a given system is avoided. Therefore, it is important to adapt foreign 
corporate governance features according to local conditions to avoid such resistance.  
 
1.2 Research objectives, issues and questions 
 
This research seeks to identify weaknesses in corporate governance in Pakistan and 
different measures to improve it. It aims to carry out a three-fold exercise. First, it attempts 
to identify the prospects of the process of convergence in a new world scenario in general 
and in Pakistan in particular. Second, it examines the application of the theory of 
convergence in corporate governance in Pakistan. Third, it highlights the problems of 
corporate governance in Pakistan, and different ways, means and measures to improve it 
through the application of the theory of convergence under prevailing circumstances in the 
country. In pursuit of this third objective, it analyses four core issues of corporate 
governance in Pakistan, namely (1) agency cost, (2) investor protection, especially 
minority shareholders protection, (3) enforcement problems, and (4) the role of religion in 
convergence to international norms in corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
The main research question is to establish the extent to which convergence to international 
norms may help to improve corporate governance in Pakistan. In other words, the main 
objective of this research question is to see the possibility and effectiveness of convergence 
in corporate governance in Pakistan in order to improve it according to international 
norms. This question is subdivided into five further questions: 
 
1. The extent to which convergence in corporate governance is taking place and its 
future prospects (Chapter Three) 
2. The extent to which  the agency cost in corporate governance in Pakistan may be 
reduced by the application of convergence theory (Chapter Four A) 
3. The extent to which the minority rights may be improved in corporate governance 
in Pakistan by the application of convergence theory (Chapter Four B) 
4. The extent to which the enforcement mechanism in corporate governance in 
Pakistan may be improved by the application of convergence theory (Chapter 
Five) 
5. Whether Islamic influence has a convergent or divergent effect on international 
norms in corporate governance in Pakistan (Chapter Six). 
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1.3 Research methodology 
 
The research is undertaken mostly with reference to both primary and secondary sources. 
In doing so, four different types of research methods are used: (1) explanatory, 
(2) descriptive, (3) prescriptive and (4) comparative. Explanatory, descriptive and 
prescriptive methods are applied when examining the international norms and corporate 
governance issues in Pakistan. In particular, a comparative approach is used widely in the 
thesis to highlight corporate governance issues in Pakistan.  
 
Pakistan is a least developed country in the world and is classified as an emerging market. 
Some reforms have been undertaken during the past three decades that started the process 
of convergence in Pakistan. Some reforms were undertaken due to different factors, which 
include, but are not limited to, the efforts of international financial institutions, 
globalization, competition and efficiency. However, the presence of strong path 
dependency forces such as families, groups and the state put up barriers to such 
convergence despite the fact that these reforms may benefit all, including the 
aforementioned groups. These limited reforms could not improve corporate governance to 
an optimal level. The major problem was the scarcity of research on corporate governance 
in Pakistan which misled the role players about the potential benefits to themselves that 
improved corporate governance would bring about. Therefore, the purpose of this study is 
to shed light on the problems of corporate governance related to Pakistan and to suggest 
improvement.  
 
In pursuit of this objective, the corporate governance features of different countries will be 
examined. Since Pakistan is a common law country, other common law countries that have 
similar political, cultural, social and religious norms will be compared. However, Pakistan 
is a former British colony that has adopted the legal, regulatory and judicial system it 
inherited from its British rulers soon after independence. The present corporate laws mimic 
the laws made by the then British rulers for their colonies. Therefore, the main focus of this 
comparative study will be on the UK system of corporate governance.  
 
Moreover, Pakistan is an Islamic country whose constitution prescribes Islamic injunctions 
as basic norms. Islam guides its subjects in each and every field, including business 
matters. Therefore, every foreign corporate governance feature has to pass the Islamic test 
of acceptability before converging to a system of corporate governance in Pakistan. 
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Therefore, the present comparative study will be shadowed by Islamic norms. In this 
methodology the objective is not to check each and every foreign corporate governance 
feature in the light of Islamic norms. Instead, the discussion will be limited to an overall 
Islamic methodology with respect to the acceptability of foreign corporate governance 
features in terms of Islamic norms.  
 
The primary sources upon which this research is based comprise mainly the provisions of 
statutes, regulations and codes that are especially relevant to corporate laws in Pakistan. 
Other primary sources consulted were case law and the annual reports of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), the stock exchanges of Pakistan, Transparency 
International, the Federal Tax Ombudsman and the major listed companies in Pakistan, 
including those who have foreign listing on overseas stock exchanges.  
 
Secondary sources researched include books, law journals and other publications in legal 
and related fields, online articles and the top-ranked newspapers in Pakistan.  
 
1.4 Structure 
 
This research is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One is the introduction to the thesis. 
Chapter Two defines and explains relevant terms and the context of the thesis, which forms 
the basis of subsequent issues to be raised in the thesis. Chapters Three to Six are core 
chapters, each of which starts with an issue which is further divided into several related 
sub-issues. Each issue begins with a critical analysis and concludes with recommendations 
on how to improve the issue in the light of the theory of convergence.  
 
Chapter Three discusses the theory of convergence in corporate governance and its 
application in Pakistan. It discusses the forms and prospects of convergence in corporate 
governance in the country. It analyses a few issues in respect of corporate governance in 
Pakistan, while others that require comprehensive discussion are analysed in Chapters Four 
and Five. Chapter Three also examines analytically the internal and external factors that 
restrict or enhance the process of convergence in Pakistan.  
 
Chapter Four deals with the specific application of the theory of convergence in Pakistan. 
The chapter is sub-divided into two parts. The first part discusses agency costs and the 
second part analyses critically investor protection, specifically minority shareholder 
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protection in Pakistan. It also examines the possibility and effectiveness of convergence in 
corporate governance in Pakistan in order to improve it.  
 
Chapter Five is a critical analysis of the problem of enforcement of corporate governance 
in Pakistan. The objective is to improve the enforcement mechanism in Pakistan in the 
light of the theory. In essence, it discusses three core aspects of corporate governance: (1) 
legal, (2) judicial and (3) stock market, which require reform in order to improve 
enforcement mechanisms in corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
Chapter Six examines the effect of religion on possible convergence in corporate 
governance to international norms in Pakistan. As Pakistan is an ideological country whose 
constitution prescribes Islam as the state religion, the import of any foreign corporate 
governance feature will have to pass the litmus test of Islamic norms. In essence, this 
chapter discusses the role of Islam in corporate governance convergence in Pakistan. It has 
two aspects. The first aspect is to determine the possibility of convergence within the 
Muslim world which, in turn, may affect Pakistan in its convergence in corporate 
governance to the Muslim world. The second aspect is to look at the role of Islam in 
convergence to a Western form of corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
Chapter Seven concludes with a summary of the important recommendations made in the 
thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  THE NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the nature and objectives of corporate governance. It is 
a foundation chapter and focuses more on explaining terms and the context of the thesis. In 
particular, the objective of this chapter is to analyse and discuss the nature and objectives 
of corporate governance in Pakistan. In addition, the objective is to examine and analyse 
why the present corporate governance system in Pakistan has developed, and what the 
problems are that face good corporate governance in Pakistan. This process will help to 
develop corporate governance issues in Pakistan for discussion in the following chapters.  
 
2.2 Corporate governance 
 
The word governance is a generic term and corporate governance is a specific application 
of governance. In generic terms, it may be political, economic or organizational 
governance. Corporate governance is a subset of governance which deals specifically with 
governance in the organizational structure of corporations. The word governance signifies 
two things: (1) power and (2) accountability. Therefore, the concept corporate governance 
signifies: (1) who has decision-making power acting on behalf of the organization; and (2) 
when this power is exercised, how is it subject to accountability. 
 
Corporate governance can be linked to the point in history when the first enterprise came 
into being to conduct commercial activities; in other words, it is as old as the creation of 
the first economic activity in the form of a partnership. The issue remained part of policy 
in the form of statutes in history, including company law, but drew the specific attention of 
policymakers in the recent past when there were serious financial crises even in well-
governed jurisdictions.1 Since that time, there has been a special focus on legislation and 
non-statutory codes.  
 
Corporate governance can be defined either in a broad or a narrow sense. In its broader 
sense it includes broader categories of interest such as the interests of employees, creditors 
                                                 
1
 Ronald J. Gilson, ‘Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?’ (1996) 
74 Washington University Law Quarterly 327. 
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and the public, besides those of shareholders and directors. For example, corporate 
governance has been defined in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in its 
broader sense: in its preamble, it defines the concept as ‘corporate governance includes a 
set of relationships between company’s management, board, shareholders and other 
stakeholders’.  
  
In the narrow sense, the focus is on the idea of shareholder value. In this sense, corporate 
governance is essentially applied to ensure that a company acts on behalf of its 
shareholders and increases the value of their investment. Therefore, in this sense the entire 
decision-making and accountability process has the end result of shareholder value, which 
is both profit maximization and an increase in share value. For example, R. La Porta, F. 
Lopez-ed-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny (LLSV) have defined the term in its 
narrow sense. 2 According to them, corporate governance is ‘a set of mechanisms through 
which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders.’ The 
corporate governance mechanism thus provides an assurance to investors that they can get 
a return on their money, either in the form of a dividend or interest with capital return.3  
 
The present version of the UK Corporate Governance Code does not contain a definition of 
the concept corporate governance. However, the same concept was defined in the old 
version of the code known as the Cadbury Code, which was issued in 1992. The Cadbury 
Code defined the concept as follows:  
 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to 
satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The 
responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing 
the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business 
and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject 
to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting.4 
 
The Code of Corporate Governance in Pakistan (hereinafter ‘the Code’) does not 
provide any definition of the term. However, the Manual of Code of Corporate 
                                                 
2
 LLSV, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 4. 
3
 A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 (2) The Journal of Finance 
738. 
4
 ‘Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: The Cadbury Code’ 1992. 
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Governance in Pakistan5 only refers to the definitions given by the Cadbury Report, 
OECD Principles, Kenneth Scott of the Stanford Law School and the International 
Chamber of Commerce. The objectives of the Code are vague. They include both a 
shareholder value governance system and a stakeholder governance mechanism. The 
code does not provide the clear objectives it intends to achieve.  
 
2.3 Theory of the firm 
 
Corporations under state control were first organized through a charter from the sovereign. 
This concession theory of the firm states that the creation of a firm was due to an official 
grant from the state.6 This theory has become redundant,7 mostly due to the right of the 
entrepreneur to create an incorporated body as opposed to a privilege granted by the 
sovereign and, consequently, the involvement of private capital, and also the self-
regulatory nature of firms.  
 
A firm has been described as a form of political democracy or private government;8 in 
other words, firms are sometimes called mini democracies9 in which shareholders are the 
voters and the managers are the elected representatives of the shareholders.10 This political 
theory of the firm is also old-fashioned.11 A firm is not primarily designed as, or 
compatible with, a democracy.12 The hierarchical structure of firms requires discipline and 
obedience to economic policies from the top,13 which is considered a barrier to democratic 
control.14 The theory is also at odds with basic democratic principles in many respects. The 
presence of different voting rights in firms where shareholders have either enhanced voting 
rights, say for instance, four votes per share, or have shares without voting rights is 
undemocratic in its very nature.  
                                                 
5
 The SECP issued the Manual of Corporate Governance to explain the code and its objectives.  
6
 Mark M. Hager, ‘Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organisational “Real Entity” Theory’ (1989) 
50 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 579. 
7
 Jennifer Hill, ‘Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder’ (2000) 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 
20.  
8
 Earl Latham, ‘The Body Politic of the Corporation’ in Edward S. Mason (ed), The Corporation in Modern 
Society (Harvard University Press, New York 1960) 218. 
9
 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘“Legal Departures”: New Directions’ (1994) 10 (1) Company Director: The 
Journal of the Australian Institute of Company Directors 20. 
10
 R. M. Buxbaum, ‘The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance’ (1985) 73 California Law 
Review 1671. 
11
 Hill (n 7) 20. 
12
 Charlotte Villiers, European Company Law: Towards Democracy? (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
Aldershot 1998) 194. 
13
 W. Ebenstein, Today’s Isms (3rd edn, Prentice Hall, 1961) 162. 
14
 Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1959) 
138. 
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A firm was not regarded as a separate entity from its owners until the case of Salomon v 
Salomon was decided. 15 In this case the House of Lords held that ‘the company was duly 
formed and registered and was not the mere “alias” or agent of or trustee for the vendor’. 
Lord Halsbury L.C. said that ‘once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated 
like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself’. Before 
this case, it was not clear what the difference was between a company and a partnership as 
far as legal personality was concerned. After the Salomon case the company was 
considered a separate legal entity independent from its shareholders. This real entity theory 
prescribes that a firm exists independently from its members;16 shareholders do not own 
the firm by merely holding shares.17 This theory further states that the firm is not a 
collection of persons, but rather a collection of capital. The corporate vote that is 
associated with one share, one vote does not represent a person, but rather a share and 
persons are irrelevant.18 The real entity theory, however,  legitimize big business, 
centralized management and the passivity of shareholders in corporate governance.19 
 
The aggregate theory, in contrast, prescribes shareholders as owners. Beach J. in Re Humes 
Ltd held that ‘the books and property of the corporation really belong to shareholders and 
the reality cannot be overthrown by the fiction of law that a corporation is an artificial 
person or entity separate from its members’.20 This theory is close to the classical view of 
the firm in which a firm was regarded as being close to a partnership, and there was no 
separation of ownership and control.  
 
According to contract theory, a firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a 
nexus of implicit and explicit contracts between different actors, including shareholders, 
directors and other stakeholders.21 Bainbridge has different views on the contractual nature 
of the firm and says that the firm is not a nexus of contracts in itself, but rather a nexus of 
contracts in which the nexus is provided by the board of directors.22 
 
                                                 
15
 Salomon v Salomon [1897] ACHL 23, 30.  
16
 Hager (n 6) 580. 
17
 Re Humes Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 67. 
18
 Hager (n 6) 652. 
19
 Morton J. Horwitz, ‘Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory’ (1985) 88 West 
Virginia Law Review 223. 
20
 Re Humes (n 17). 
21
 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Management Behaviour, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 (4) Journal of Financial Economics 8-9. 
22
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 
New York 2008) 24. 
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The real entity theory and contract theory of the firm negate the aggregate theory. The real 
entity theory postulates that the firm is a legal entity separate from its members and that 
mere shareholding does not make them the owners of the property of the firm. In contrast, 
the contract theory describes a firm as nothing but a nexus of contracts between different 
stakeholders. Its focus is on all stakeholders, who are connected through a web of 
contracts, instead of shareholders alone who are considered owners under the aggregate 
theory.  
 
The contract theory also rejects the legal concept of the firm. According to this theory, a 
firm is not primarily a separate legal entity, but rather a nexus of contracts between 
different stakeholders which focuses on their interests by virtue of contracts between them.  
  
As far as the contract theory of the firm is concerned, the constitution of a firm prescribes a 
standard contract in which the rights and liabilities of the parties are determined. However, 
contracts never dominate the firm as far as its legal personality is concerned. A contract 
cannot hold property nor can it sue or be sued, which are the main characteristics of the 
legal concept of a firm. The contract theory may well change the whole scenario of 
corporate governance but it has to encompass the range of conflicting firm components in 
order to be accepted by all its critics.23  
 
2.4 Theories of corporate governance  
 
Academics have presented several theories regarding corporate governance. In each theory 
the power and prevalence of the interests of relevant groups are given priority over others.  
 
The stakeholder primacy theory recognizes the interest of all stakeholders, including 
shareholders, managers, directors, creditors and employees. This theory states that the 
interest of the entire stakeholder body should prevail and they should have some role in 
matters of governance. Proponents of this theory state that the firm is an economic 
institution that has both social service and profit-making functions. According to them, the 
function of a firm is not confined to profit maximization for the shareholder, but extends to 
securing jobs for employees and better-quality products for consumers, and to performing 
                                                 
23
 William W. Bratton, Jr, ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspective from History’ (1988-
89) 41 Stanford Law Review 1527. 
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its corporate social responsibility.24 There is currently an academic debate on whether the 
function of the firm is to increase shareholder wealth or on whether the managers are 
bound to serve in the interest of all stakeholders and society as a whole. The former is 
called property theory, while the latter is termed entity theory.25 In property theory there is 
a dispute about the wealth maximization of the shareholders. The Michigan Supreme Court 
in Dodge v Ford Motor Company held that the directors were supposed to work for the 
benefit of the company’s shareholders. 26 They are bound to maximize the wealth of 
shareholders instead of the employees or society. However, there is a conflict as to whether 
profit maximization is the basic objective of the firm and whether the directors have any 
legal duty imposed on them to maximize the profit of the shareholders.27 At least in the UK 
there is no legal duty on the directors to maximize the wealth of the shareholders. In recent 
times the entity theory is also gaining some academic attention.28 However, debate over the 
social role of the firm is unresolved.29 Nevertheless, companies in the modern era spend 
some money on their social responsibilities.  
 
According to the shareholder primacy theory, shareholders are real owners and residual 
risk bearers. They are residual risk bearers in the sense that their investment is locked in 
and they cannot take their money back from the company, except that they can sell their 
shares in the market. Furthermore, they are paid last, and sometimes even paid nothing, 
when the company becomes insolvent. Therefore, this theory suggests that the managers 
should focus the interests of the shareholders.30 
 
Keay argues that both shareholder primacy and stakeholder primacy have major 
shortcomings. 31 According to him, shareholder primacy is not applicable in commercial 
terms due to the control and powers of the management over the firm. He argues that 
stakeholder primacy is defective in the sense that it is difficult to define who the 
stakeholders in the company are and how the management is to balance the interests of the 
                                                 
24
 E. Merrick Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) Harvard Law Review 1148. 
25
 William T. Allen, ‘Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation’ (1992) Cardozo Law 
Review 264-6. 
26
 Dodge v Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
27
 S. Worthington, ‘Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement (Part 2)’ (2001) 22 (2) 
Company Lawyer 307.  
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 Lynn A. Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 Southern California 
Law Review 1209. 
29
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wide constituency of stakeholders. He further argues that resolving shareholder 
opportunism may lead to the more serious problem of stakeholder opportunism. He has 
presented an alternative theory, namely, the entity maximization and sustainability (EMS) 
theory. According to him, managers must focus on the success of the company as a whole 
and the wealth maximization of the company as an entity. He further argues that all the 
people and groups who have invested in the company should benefit from the company.  
 
The problem with the EMS theory is that it focuses on the same wide constituency of the 
stakeholder model. Keay differentiates between the EMS theory and the stakeholder 
theory. He explains that the managers in EMS will prefer the interest of the entity at the 
cost of any of the stakeholders instead of creating a balance between the interests of 
different stakeholders.32 Nevertheless, the problem will still remain for the managers as 
they have to decide whose interest is to prevail when there is a conflict of interest between 
different stakeholders, even in those cases where the managers are supposed to act with the 
sole objective of ensuring the success of the company.  
 
The fact that the shareholder may suffer more in the case where the company fails and may 
also benefit more if the company succeeds, implies that they can be the best monitors of 
the company. Therefore, their interest, as far as monitoring of the company is concerned, 
should prevail over other stakeholder. Though some scholars are doubtful that there is any 
legal duty on the directors to maximize the wealth of shareholders,33 nonetheless, one of 
the objectives of the company is to maximize the wealth of the shareholders. Investment in 
the company, in most cases, is primarily meant to enhance it. Therefore, it can be said that, 
at least, there is moral duty on the directors and management to maximize the wealth of 
shareholders. As the moral duty cannot be enforced, therefore, the essence of shareholder 
primacy theory may be, at least, to give more powers of accountability to the shareholders.  
 
Proponents of the director primacy theory believe that the directors have sovereignty over 
the company and that the company is controlled by the directors who have the ultimate 
right of fiat. Shareholders have powers of accountability in the form of votes attached to 
the shares. The directors pursue shareholders’ interest by maximizing their wealth. 
Bainbridge is the main advocate of the director primacy theory. 34 He claims, though, that 
this does not explain everything about corporate governance but that it is more relevant 
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than any other prevailing theory. However, the problem with this theory is that giving more 
powers to directors may lead to self-dealing at the cost of the company and its 
shareholders. Shareholders have powers of accountability in the form of votes but it is not 
feasible and cost-effective to call all the shareholders, at least of public listed companies, 
for every decision, which provides directors with opportunities to act in their own interests 
instead of that of the company.  
 
According to the team production theory, presented by Blair and Stout, the directors of 
public corporations act to maximize the joint welfare of all stakeholders of the firm, 
including shareholders, managers, employees, creditors and the local 
community.35According to them, the function of the firm is not limited to resolving the 
agency problem between shareholders and the managers. The authors also presented a 
model to resolve the conflict of interest between different stakeholders. According to this 
model, all the stakeholders will relinquish their rights over the assets. Control over the 
assets will be exercised by a mediating hierarchy in which the board of directors will sit at 
the top. This hierarchy will have absolute authority over the use of assets and with the 
protection of law over interference by team members. The mediating hierarchy will work 
for the benefits of the team as a whole instead of only the shareholders as owners. The 
function of this mediating hierarchy will be to coordinate the activities of the team 
members, distribute the benefits accrued from the production and to mediate internal 
disputes over the allocation of such benefits. This theory is equivalent to stakeholder 
theory, as both have the common objective of safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders. 
In addition to this, this theory also proposes more powers to the directors which may allow 
them to proceed with self-dealing at the cost of other team members.  
 
The shareholder primacy theory can be justified vis-à-vis other theories. As far as the 
stakeholders such as creditors and employees are concerned, their interest is protected 
through various contracts with the firm, whereas shareholders are exposed to the 
incomplete contractual nature of corporate law. Furthermore, the interest of creditors and 
employees is protected through various bankruptcy and employment laws, and mutual 
contract between the firm and other stakeholders. Creditors do invest capital but their 
capital is not locked in as is the shareholders’ capital investment. The creditors can take 
back their capital under different circumstances. They are also given priority over the 
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shareholders at the time of liquidation. Employees, however, invest human capital in the 
company but their matters are dealt with under other regulations which do not fall within 
the ambit of company law. Employees are also supposed to act under the control of the 
management to maximize profit for the shareholders. This creates a conflict of interest 
between the employees and the shareholders. This hierarchical relationship between the 
employees and management regards employees as having their place outside the 
company.36 Shareholders are residual claimants and therefore they may suffer more in the 
case of failure of the company as they are paid last after fulfilling all the liabilities of the 
company. As the success and failure of the company affect shareholders more than any 
other stakeholder, shareholders may therefore be given an enhanced role in the governance 
in the form of accountability of the management. Keay admits that although there are some 
deficiencies in the shareholder primacy theory, it is more workable than the stakeholder 
primacy theory.37 
 
Moreover, the director primacy theory may not solve the problems in concentrated 
structures such as Pakistan where the conflict is not between shareholders and the 
directors, but rather between shareholders inter se: majority and minority shareholders. 
Since the controlling shareholders also control the directors, there is therefore a need to 
solve the problems between shareholders. In fact, there is a need to strike an appropriate 
balance of the distribution of power and accountability between shareholders and the 
directors, and shareholders inter se. This may lead to good governance and objectives that 
corporate governance may intend to achieve.  
 
2.5 Objectives of corporate governance 
2.5.1 Accountability 
 
Accountability is linked to power. In the modern form of companies, especially companies 
in the public domain, it is not feasible to give powers to shareholders to decide in each and 
every matter of the company. Therefore, the powers are delegated to a group of people 
selected by the shareholders. When the power is given to the board of directors, then they 
must be made accountable. Since shareholders are real owners, the board must therefore be 
accountable to the shareholders. The removal of a non-performing director is one 
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mechanism of accountability; for example, in the UK the directors control all the powers of 
a company yet, at the same time, there is an easy process for their removal. A director can 
be removed at any time by a simple resolution of shareholders. Accountability is not only 
linked to directors, but also to controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders may also 
expropriate company funds by virtue of their position; for instance, they may enter into a 
contract with the company that is not at arm’s length, in other words, they may approve a 
contract that is not according to market value and that favours them at the cost of the 
company and, consequently, the minority shareholders. Therefore, the whole concept of 
accountability in corporate governance is directly linked with the powers of shareholders to 
hold directors and controlling shareholders accountable. 
 
Fiduciary duties, court overview through petition of aggrieved shareholder and shareholder 
actions are other forms of accountability that are present in the form of the formal legal 
framework.38 Furthermore, accountability can exist outside the legal framework; for 
instance, codes make provision for accountability that is not implemented in a formal legal 
way. The code requires disclosure which helps shareholders to take actions and also 
facilitates dissident shareholders, if they are not satisfied with management, to exit through 
the sale of their shares in the market. The takeover is a form of accountability in the sense 
that the successful bidder may remove non-performing directors.  
 
2.5.2 Financial performance 
 
Whether good governance will improve financial performance is an unresolved and a 
difficult question. There are different indicators for performance of firms and stock 
exchanges. Stock price, return on capital (ROC)39 and return on asset (ROA)40 may be 
evidences for firm performance, whereas stock market indices may be evidences for stock 
market performance.  
 
No doubt, financial performance is evidence of the success of companies and good 
corporate governance has always been linked to better financial performance. However, 
empirically, it is difficult to show what the connection or what the causality is. Many 
                                                 
38
 These accountability mechanisms will be discussed in Chapter Four, section B.  
39
 In simple terms, ROC means the return that a shareholder may get, either in the form of a dividend or share 
increase after a certain period and provides a percentage of shareholders’ capital. 
40
 In simple terms, ROA, or return on investment (ROI), shows how much the assets of a company are 
profitable, in other words, how efficient the management is in generating profit from the assets of the 
company. 
17 
 
studies have been conducted into the effect of a particular component of corporate 
governance on financial performance in which some components have been shown as 
positively related to financial performance and some negatively related. Furthermore, 
specific measures of governance may show some correlation with financial performance, 
but the relationship of the overall governance mechanism with financial performance is 
unresolved.41 It is also difficult to establish to what extent an individual, specific 
governance feature has affected overall financial performance. Besides these governance 
mechanisms, there are other factors that may affect financial performance. There are 
endogenous and exogenous forces that affect the firm’s performance; for instance, the 
share price of a firm may be affected by other factors such as overall political, economic or 
security issues. A series of domestic and global incidents may affect share prices in the 
market, and may also affect the market index. These external factors that affect 
performance are exogenous factors. In the realm of endogenous forces is the overall 
corporate governance structure of the company, for example, the way in which the board of 
directors is structured; the distribution of powers between shareholders and the directors; 
an effective market mechanism for disciplining non-performing companies; statutory 
governance mechanisms; and enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, determining and 
establishing the relationship between particular corporate governance features and 
financial performance is problematic as it is not easy to separate the effect of both 
exogenous and endogenous forces; in other words, it is difficult to establish a causal link 
between financial performance and overall governance components.42  
 
MacNeil and Li argue that investors are more concerned with performance than 
compliance with good governance practices. If companies are performing, then investors 
may ignore compliance with specific governance features.43 However, caution is required 
in adopting such an approach to underdeveloped markets such as Pakistan. No doubt, 
financial performance is important to investors but if performing companies follow good 
governance practices, it may act as a disciplining mechanism for other companies. This 
may create a culture of compliance to good governance practices which in turn may boost 
investment. In addition, as discussed earlier, since a direct linkage between specific 
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governance features and financial performance cannot be demonstrated, compliance with 
overall good governance practices in underdeveloped markets such as Pakistan is therefore 
important as this may enhance investors’ confidence. This, in turn, provides investment 
and incentives for poorly performing firms and stock markets to perform.  
 
2.6 Structures of corporate governances 
 
2.6.1 Dispersed ownership or market-based governance structure 
 
In this structure shareholders are dispersed. Therefore, any action on the part of 
shareholders is problematic in the sense that it is not feasible to call, gather, discuss and to 
convince all the shareholders at the same time. It is also costly and sometimes impractical 
to do so. Therefore, problems with collective action and the apathetic attitude of 
shareholders is a basic feature of this kind of structure.44 The majority of shareholders who 
have small equity ownership are not interested in corporate actions as they feel that the 
cost incurred by such action may exceed potential benefits. This allows managers to 
manipulate corporate decision-making. They control the agenda of meetings and the proxy 
mechanism, which further weakens shareholders control.45 These problems led the market 
to play its role in corporate governance. The development of dispersed ownership is not a 
universal phenomenon,46 and is mainly limited to the US and the UK. In the rest of the 
world there is a dominance of concentrated ownership structures with families, the state 
and groups holding and controlling the corporate sector. These groups, families and states 
are considered the best monitors of management due to their control over the firms. 
However, this does not mean that the dispersed ownership structure is an inferior monitor 
of the performance of mangers.47 Over time, different mechanisms have developed in such 
governance systems in which the managers are monitored and held accountable. The role 
of the market is very important in this regard. A developed and active market can punish 
non-performing firms and their managers. Takeovers, institutional investors, minority 
rights, enforcement mechanisms and strong regulators are powerful features of the market 
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to protect investors, and to monitor and hold managers accountable. Therefore, a dispersed 
ownership structure is also known as a market-based governance mechanism.  
 
There are different views on the development of such a system, particularly in the UK and 
the US. Roe argues that it was not economic efficiency but rather political forces and 
historical developments that led to dispersed ownership in the US.48 This is not, however, 
the main explanation of dispersed ownership elsewhere, at least not in respect of the 
evolution of the UK system of dispersed ownership.49 The strong legal protection of 
investors provides greater security of property rights against political interference and, 
empirically, such protection is associated with effective corporate governance which is 
reflected in dispersed ownership and a developed market.50 Cheffins argues that the law 
was not the main factor in the evolution of the dispersed ownership structure in the UK. 51 
According to him, alternative institutional structures also played their role. He further 
argues that the financial and social environments; the tradition of self-regulation; and the 
independent, professional and impartial judiciary were the main factors that contributed to 
this structure in the UK.52 In the absence of this institutional structure in the UK, the legal 
environment can be the driving force for effective corporate governance where investors 
can invest with confidence even with small investments. Legal protection against 
expropriation by insiders gives investors confidence and they spread their finance without 
any reluctance, which leads to dispersed ownership structures. This phenomenon also 
stimulates the development of the capital market.53 If investors are not provided with 
strong legal protection, they will be reluctant to be minority shareholders and will prefer to 
be block holders as protection against expropriation.54 Different writers have described 
different reasons for the evolution of dispersed ownership. However, legal protection is 
still a dominant force in such a development. 
 
Market discipline plays an important role in jurisdictions with dispersed shareholdings. 
The way the UK Code of Corporate Governance is implemented in the UK shows the role 
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of market discipline. This code is annexed to the listing rules but does not form part of it. 
The code is part of soft law and not part of the legal framework. The code is introduced on 
a self-regulatory basis, and is based on the ‘comply or explain’ principle. This is applicable 
to companies that have a premier listing on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).55 The 
listing rules of the LSE require conformance with the code. Companies are required to 
comply with the code or explain themselves in the case of non-compliance. United 
Kingdom Listing Authority (UKLA) listing rules, however, require that certain information 
associated with the code be disclosed, and non-compliance may be sanctioned in the form 
of public censure, fine or suspension in terms of the UKLA Listing Rules regulated by the 
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000. As the ‘comply or explain’ principle is designed 
on a self-regulatory basis, there is therefore an assumption that the market will monitor the 
compliance with the code or accept non-compliance, provided the reasons for non-
compliance forwarded by the companies are reasonably justified. The market may 
discipline companies for non-compliance in the form of a reduction in the share price of 
the company which may consequently increase the cost of capital.56 
 
2.6.2 Concentrated ownership or block-holder governance structure 
 
In concentrated governance systems, shareholders control firms through different 
techniques. Firstly, they may control a firm through 51% or more shareholding. Secondly, 
they may hold shares with enhanced voting rights whereby they control the firm by holding 
fewer shares but more voting powers. Thirdly, they may control the firm through a 
pyramid structure57 whereby they hold the most shares in the holding company and fewer 
shares in subsidiary companies, and exercise their control through the holding company. 
Fourthly, they may control the firm through cross-shareholdings whereby they control 
different groups of companies with different family members through shareholding in 
different companies or they control a company through controlling another company who 
has shareholding in the first company. In simple terms, cross-shareholding is a subset of 
the pyramiding structure. Concentrated shareholding is a worldwide phenomenon, 
including in continental Europe and Asia. Financial intermediaries such as banks and other 
financial institutions may play an important role in such a system. When investors feel that 
they are not secured through direct investment, they invest through financial intermediaries 
such as banks. Banks play an important role as a trustee.  
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There are many reasons for the development of such systems. One of the reasons is that if 
legal and governance systems do not provide investors as minority shareholders with 
protection, these shareholders control firms in the form of concentration of ownership.58 
Expropriation and private rent-seeking by controlling shareholders and managers is more 
common in such a system. However, there are advantages to such a system. From the 
investors’ perspective, shareholders can have better direct monitoring of management. 
From the management’s perspective, the managers of such firms focus on the long-term 
benefits of the investment as against the market-centred system where managers focus on 
the short term to avoid market sanctions.59 
 
2.6.3 The governance structure of state-owned enterprises  
 
This is, in fact, a subset of concentrated ownership but it is different in the sense that the 
state is the controlling shareholder as well as the regulator. The system is less likely to be 
efficient as it is hardly possible for a regulator to regulate and punish itself. In socialist 
economies and some underdeveloped countries, including Pakistan, substantial parts of the 
economy are run through state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Politicians retain control of 
firms, either directly through state ownership or indirectly through regulations. They are 
sufficiently powerful to resist any reform and preserve the status quo, which may be less 
efficient60 but beneficial for them.  
 
This phenomenon has been changing over the past 30 years or so for many reasons. The 
failure of socialism, the financial crisis in Asia and the recession almost all over the world 
triggered the attention of host countries and international bodies to improve governance 
structures of poorly performing countries. International financial institutions provided a 
series of loans to developing countries with a reform agenda as a condition of a loan. The 
reform agenda includes the corporatization of SOEs.61 These reforms reduced state control 
over these enterprises which used to be run bureaucratically. In Pakistan, though the state 
had transferred some of its shareholding to the general public, it still has significant control 
over the newly corporatized enterprises.  
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2.6.4 The governance structure of family-based enterprises  
 
This is another subset of concentrated ownership. In this structure, families hold and 
control a major part of the economy and therefore tailor the governance structures that 
benefit them. Chaebol in Korea and Keiretsu in Japan are examples of this form of 
governance structures. 62 Chaebol is a Korean enterprise group controlled by a single 
family, who control firms through different forms of pyramiding, interlocking shareholding 
and substantial amounts of share ownership. This structuring of firms has a negative effect 
on corporate governance. These families perform the dual role of management and 
monitoring, which causes poor internal governance. These path dependency63 forces resist 
reforms64 that could check and monitor their powers.65 This phenomenon is also common 
in developing countries, including Pakistan, where families hold, and even control, listed 
firms.  
 
These families are normally involved in politics or have direct connections with 
politicians. They use their relations to preserve the status quo as poor governance benefits 
them. In such a system some shareholders have control that is disproportionate to their 
ownership. They control the management and thereby control the whole firm. The directors 
normally belong to the family or close associates and remain on the board at their pleasure.  
 
2.6.5 Which system is better? 
 
There is no ideal system, as all systems have merits and demerits. Concentrated ownership 
is considered more vigilant than dispersed ownership as controlling shareholders have 
enough equity to monitor, control and to hold managers accountable.66 However, they may 
receive private benefits of control at the cost of the minority shareholders. They may act in 
a dual character and this provides them with opportunities to expropriate the funds of the 
firm as they are the looters as well as the monitors. In the state-owned governance 
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mechanism, the state acts both as a regulator and regulatee. It is less likely that the state 
will punish itself. Similarly, families are controlling shareholders in family-owned 
structures. In most cases these families and politicians have common interests as families 
are directly involved in politics or finance political parties to act for their benefit. In this 
situation it is less likely that they will favour reform agendas whose objective is to 
introduce good corporate governance. There are some advantages to the concentrated 
system. Firstly, the controlling shareholders are good monitors of managers as they can 
remove non-performing managers. Secondly, as the families finance firms mostly from 
their own resources and have substantial equity, they may therefore focus on return on 
Asset (ROA) and return on capital (ROC). This may, in turn, benefit the minority 
shareholder as well.  
 
However, the managers in a dispersed shareholding system have more opportunities to 
expropriate the funds of the firms as small dispersed shareholders do not have incentives to 
monitor the activities of the managers. The benefit may not be commensurate with the cost 
that may be incurred for such monitoring. However, dispersed shareholding is the result of 
a developed market. This developed and active market can monitor the managers, and can 
punish them through market forces.67 
 
2.6.6 Religion 
 
Normally, religion has nothing to do with corporate governance issues but if a country is 
ideological, then religion may have an effect on its corporate governance. Roe believes that 
the development of corporate governance systems of a particular country depends upon its 
political and ideological conditions.68 The culture and ideology of a country also determine 
the choice of corporate law and governance mechanisms.69 Islam is regarded as a practical 
religion which determines and guides its subjects in each and every field of life. Islam is 
not restricted to a few rituals, but it extends to the whole life of Muslims. It has also 
established broad principles for conducting business and business ethics.  
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The constitution of Pakistan is Islamic. Religion is dominant in the social, cultural, 
business and politics affairs of the country. The Constitution of Pakistan recognizes Islam 
as the state religion.70 Furthermore, the constitution provides two safeguards for protecting 
the Islamic spirit of the country. Firstly, it provides that all existing laws shall be brought 
in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Qur’ān and Sunnah. 
Similarly, it provides that no law shall be enacted that is repugnant to such injunctions.71 
To check conformity of laws with the injunctions of Islam, it established different 
institutions72 that ensure compliance with these provisions of the constitution. Under the 
directions of these institutions, the government is required to take the necessary steps to 
bring the law into conformity with the injunctions of Islam.  
 
Pakistan, being an Islamic state, may drive its corporate governance mechanism from 
Islamic norms. However, historically, this remained only a weak force. Pakistan inherited 
its corporate laws from British rule due to colonial influence but historical circumstances 
developed the corporate sector, which differs from that of Britain. Nevertheless, owing to 
recent developments around the world in general and Pakistan in particular Islamic norms 
may still play a role in the corporate sector of Pakistan.73  
 
2.7 Historical development of the corporate sector in Pakistan 
 
The company law of Pakistan74 is based on colonial company law introduced by the British 
rulers before independence. The Indian Companies Act, 1913 was promulgated by the 
British rulers for British India (i.e., the subcontinent, including Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh). The Indian Companies Act, 1913 (as amended in 1936) was adopted as 
company law in Pakistan after independence in 1947 with necessary minor amendments.75 
The Companies Ordinance, 1984 (the Ordinance) which mimicked to the Companies Act, 
1913 was promulgated on 8 October 1984.76 The companies who continued to work with 
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their headquarters in Pakistan after 15 August 1947 were to be treated as companies 
registered under the Ordinance.77 
 
Ali Cheema et al. have discussed the historical development of the corporate sector in 
Pakistan.78 The private sector was the main agent for industrialization in Pakistan after 
independence. Specific families were the main beneficiaries of the state’s financing 
policies with generous fiscal incentives, cheap imports of capital goods and subsidized 
credit, which resulted in 44 monopoly houses that controlled 48% of the gross fixed assets 
of the large-scale manufacturing sector in 1970.79 There was no separation of ownership 
and control in these monopoly houses. The democratic government of 1972–73 had a 
manifesto of nationalization and reduction of industrial concentration in the private sector. 
After coming to power, it nationalized many industrial units, which resulted in 11 out of 
the top 26 monopoly houses losing more than 50% of their assets80 and in the public sector 
large-scale manufacturing investment increased from 13% in 1972–73 to 78% by 1976–77. 
The government also nationalized the banking sector, which created political control over 
the entire financial sector. However, in the 1980s and 1990s the role of the private sector 
was revived by several governments who took power from one another. Families and the 
state still control the corporate sector in Pakistan. This historical background reveals the 
reasons for the concentration of ownership and underdevelopment of capital markets in 
Pakistan.81  
 
The Ordinance mimicked the Companies Act, 1913. The provisions relating to minority 
rights were retained in the Ordinance because they were in the Companies Act, 1913. The 
minority protection provisions could not create dispersed ownership, which might have 
developed the capital markets in Pakistan.82 Specific social, cultural, political and 
economic conditions led to the concentration of ownership and underdeveloped capital 
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markets. Corruption, weak enforcement and bad rule of law were the main hindrance in the 
development of institutions.  
 
Privatization and corporatization have been the main agenda of the Government of 
Pakistan since the 1990s. Globalization, international financial institutions, overseas listing 
and foreign investors have been the main factors in promoting corporate governance83 and, 
consequently, reforms were made in the corporate sector. These reforms focused on the 
restructuring of the regulator, stock exchanges and divestiture by the state of its 
shareholding in state-owned enterprises. In 2010 the minister for privatization said that the 
government planned to divest its 26% equity stakes in 80 SOEs through public–private 
partnerships (PPPs). He further explained that out of these 26% shareholdings, 12% would 
be given to 500,000 employees of these entities under the Benazir Employees Stock Option 
Scheme (BESOS) amounting to Rs100 billion (approximately US$1.190 billion or £0.781 
billion) free of cost.84 In a recent move the Cabinet committee on privatization decided to 
privatize 31 state-owned organizations by floating 26% shares in the market through an 
initial public offering and strategic disinvestment to the private sector. The committee also 
decided that the administrative control of some of the organizations would be handed over 
to the private sector. Furthermore, the decision was made to privatize 65 more SOEs by the 
end of 2013. These privatization processes fall under the agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as a condition of loan.85  
 
Corruption has hindered rapid privatization. The Supreme Court cancelled some key 
privatization processes due to corruption; for example, the privatization of steel mills (a 
major SOE) by the government was cancelled due to corruption and irregularities in the 
transaction and undervalued assessment of the assets of the enterprise.86 Despite these 
privatization processes since the early 1990s, the state still dominates in SOEs and families 
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in family-owned companies. Nevertheless, the process of privatization and divestiture may 
increase public shareholdings in SOEs and family-owned enterprises. 
 
2.8 The nature of the corporate sector in Pakistan 
  
The corporate sector in Pakistan is highly concentrated, with families and the state holding 
the majority of shareholdings in this sector. Families are dominant in the corporate 
structure both in private87 and in public companies. According to statistics, more than 50% 
of private companies are held by two members, most of whom are husbands and wives, in 
order to fulfil the minimum requirement for the members of a private company under the 
Ordinance.88 There are groups and families who hold more than 75% of the shareholding 
in listed companies, which is more than the minimum requirement to take any decision in 
the members’ meeting.89 A significant number of listed companies are held by families as 
well. These families hold their control either directly by holding the majority shareholding 
or through an indirect method such as pyramiding, cross-shareholding or interlocking 
management. Families retain their shares so as to keep control of the companies, which 
creates a liquidity problem in the market. Pyramiding, interlocking and cross-shareholding 
are complicated phenomena that are not easily understood by general investors. These 
families also maintain control by appointing their family members or at least some persons 
in whom they have confidence as executive and non-executive members to the board of 
directors. These people normally lack the requisite qualifications and experience. Major 
policy decisions are taken by these families by themselves without going to a formal 
meeting of the board or shareholders. This concentration of control is maintained for the 
sake of getting private benefits, keeping cash flow in their own hands, and controlling the 
board and the management in the company.  
 
The state is the second largest stakeholder after families in the corporate sector in Pakistan. 
State-owned companies include both incorporated and unincorporated companies. Many 
SOEs operate listed as well as private companies. During the past two decades the state 
corporatized many SOEs and others are on the agenda. As far as the top 40 listed 
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companies on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE)90 are concerned, the state91 owns 14 of 
the top 40 listed companies. SOEs account for 52.8% of the capitalization of the total 
capitalization of the top 40 listed companies on the KSE.92 SOEs are politically motivated 
and every government, after coming into power, takes control of these companies. The 
directors and management of the boards of directors remain in their positions at the 
pleasure of the state. The government’s focus is not on the qualifications and experience of 
the directors, but rather the political affiliation of the persons for appointment to the 
boards.  
 
Though family- and state-owned corporations are important sources for corporate growth 
in Pakistan, control maximization discourages such growth and capital market 
development. Most of the smaller and family-owned companies in Pakistan have little 
awareness of the potential benefits of improved corporate governance.93 This is one reason 
for the lukewarm response to reforms or improved governance, at least at firm level. The 
strong family and state control of public companies is a serious governance problem. These 
companies resist reforms of corporate governance and also threaten to delist their 
companies.94 There was substantial delisting after the promulgation of the Code of 
Corporate Governance in 2002 and revision in 2012. 
 
Multinational companies are the third major stakeholders in the equity market in Pakistan. 
As far as the top 40 listed companies in the KSE are concerned, there are 5 multinational 
companies that constitute 17% of the capitalization in the top 40 listed companies on the 
KSE.95 The presence of foreign companies, both as listed and non-listed private 
companies, in the corporate sector in Pakistan is a healthy sign for the economy of the 
country. They are a major source of foreign direct investment in the country. This 
encourages the state to play its role to improve its overall corporate governance with an 
empowered and effective regulator. There can be further foreign direct investment if 
corporate governance is improved. Major foreign companies are from the UK and the US. 
The foreign companies belong to those countries where there are strict disclosure 
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requirements and mature governance structures, hence these foreign companies can set an 
example for local companies in terms of disclosure, and managerial and other matters. 
 
2.8.1 Voting in the corporate law of Pakistan 
 
The ‘one share, one vote’ principle is only a default rule under the company law of 
Pakistan and companies can issue enhanced voting shares as well as shares without voting 
rights,96 which help family members to control the board and the management. Differential 
voting rights is a commonly recognized legal technique to control firms. Although it is a 
legal technique, different stakeholders do not consider it to be good; for example, in the 
UK companies are allowed to issue shares other than one share, one vote but they do not 
issue such shares because this is not liked by the influential institutional shareholders in the 
UK. In Pakistan this is allowed and the companies, including listed companies, do issue 
such shares. This may dilute the shareholding of the minority shareholders.  
 
2.8.2 The judiciary and enforcement mechanism in Pakistan 
 
Shareholders’ rights are considered to be an important determinant of good corporate 
governance and necessary for the development of a market.97 Minority shareholders’ rights 
are not properly protected in Pakistan. Some rights are provided in the law but the issue is 
their enforcement. Corruption, inefficiency, cost, inordinate delays in decision-making, 
judges’ lack of expertise and political influence over the judiciary are important hurdles to 
effective enforcement of shareholders’ rights in Pakistan.98  
 
2.8.3 Institutional investors and corporate governance in Pakistan 
 
Other substantial shareholders are the banks and institutional investors but they have a 
minor role in corporate governance. Institutional investors are represented on boards of 
directors and some banks have members on the board due to an agreement of loan 
according to the provisions of the Ordinance. The institutional investor industry is 
underdeveloped in Pakistan. It is not playing the role that is being played by the 
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institutional investors in the UK. There is a need for the role of institutional investors in 
Pakistan to be activated and enhanced.99 
 
2.8.4 Compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
 
Compliance with the Code is a major problem. The Code contains many mandatory 
provisions relating to board structure, auditing and disclosures, which challenge the 
discretionary powers of families and the state. Therefore, they are reluctant to observe the 
Code in its true spirit. There is a lack of understanding of the potential benefits to 
observing the Code. Compliance with the Code is only in form and not in substance. There 
is merely box ticking rather than material observance of the Code in its true sense. When 
the issue of non-compliance with the Code was raised with a senior officer of the SECP, 
his reply was that the Code could not be implemented in the true sense because most of the 
listed companies in the public sector are either family-controlled or controlled by groups. 
100
 Family members are elected to the board both as executive and non-executive directors. 
As far as independent directors are concerned, they appoint any family member with a few 
shares as independent director. Since major children are regarded as independent, these 
families issue few shares in the name of such major children and appoint them as 
independent directors to fulfil the requirement of the Code.  
 
2.9 Sources of corporate governance 
 
2.9.1 Company law 
 
Company law is the main source of corporate governance. It provides for the rights and 
liabilities of shareholders, directors and other stakeholders. Company law is the basic 
legislation that provides rights to shareholders, power to directors, the division of power 
between shareholders and directors, the power of issuing shares, and voting powers. 
Company law applies to all companies, including public and private ones. However, 
application is restricted, to some extent, with reference to the nature of a company. Private 
companies are exempted from certain provisions due to the limited activities by a certain 
number of shareholders and less involvement of the general public. In public companies 
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the general public is involved. Therefore, stricter conditions are provided in company law 
to safeguard their interest.  
 
Jurisdictions have undertaken different approaches to the nature of the provisions in 
company law; for instance, in the UK there is a flexible approach, with a mixture of default 
and mandatory rules. The default rules have automatic application unless changed by a 
shareholders’ resolution. The mandatory rules are not subject to change by the resolution 
of shareholders. As to the nature of a particular rule, every rule is mandatory unless there 
are good reasons to believe that a rule is a default rule.101  
 
In Pakistan there is a rigid approach in company law.102 However, there are also a few 
examples of the default nature of the rules; for instance, companies may dis-apply the 
application of pre-emptive rights for the specific allotment of shares, through special 
resolution.103  
  
2.9.2 Securities laws 
 
Securities laws are applicable only to those public companies who wish to collect finance 
from the general public. Some public companies do not go to the public for financing; they 
rather rely on internal financing and bank loans. Securities law, therefore, does not apply to 
them. These laws are important in corporate governance because they provide certain 
safeguards to the investors. These safeguards may include the manner in which the public 
offering is dealt with and also the manner in which the trading of shares is controlled, for 
instance, in the form of the prohibition on insider trading.  
 
2.9.3 The company constitution  
 
2.9.3.1 The articles of association 
 
The articles of association provide the internal regulation of companies. In the context of 
the UK, this is a contract between the company and shareholders, and shareholders inter 
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se, which defines the nature of the relations between the parties.104 Many jurisdictions 
provide model articles of association that can be adopted by any company instead of filing 
their own articles. In UK company law the articles form the constitution of the company. 
In Pakistan the articles have secondary importance after the memorandum of association. 
The memorandum of association is the constitution of a company. In Pakistan the articles 
include provisions that deal with the internal matters of the company. Companies have the 
option of registering their own articles and thereby exclude the model articles. If no articles 
are registered, then the model articles apply.  
 
The areas in which the articles can deal with corporate governance matters include voting 
rights; variation in rights and privileges; election and removal of directors; the powers of 
directors; and the objects that a company can undertake. Therefore, the articles are an 
important source of governance issues in company matters. In recent years the articles of 
association have played an important role at international level. When a company wants to 
raise capital through an overseas stock exchange, there is the matter of the difference in 
corporate and securities laws operating in both jurisdictions which may create a hurdle to 
raising capital overseas. One solution to this problem would be the formal convergence of 
both systems, whereby both systems become the same. However, this is not an easy task 
due to the different natures of securities and corporate laws. Another solution is an ad hoc 
arrangement through the medium of contract. Companies who wish to enlist overseas may 
amend their articles of association to fulfil the requirements of overseas stock 
exchanges.105 For example, some Chinese listed companies raise capital through the stock 
exchanges in Hong Kong, the UK and the US and, consequently, amend their articles of 
association to include mandatory provisions required by the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the stock exchange concerned.106 Similarly, some Pakistani 
companies have also raised finance through global depository receipt (GDR) and American 
depository receipt (ADR) listing in the UK and the US respectively, and through bonds 
from some other stock exchanges.107 So, the articles are important documents that deal not 
only with internal matters, but can also be used as a tool to raise finance from overseas 
markets.  
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2.9.3.2 The memorandum of association 
 
The memorandum of association is the constitution of the company in many jurisdictions, 
including Pakistan. The memorandum, inter alia, provides the objects that companies may 
have. If a company conducts a business other than mentioned in the memorandum, the 
directors may be punished for this violation. In the history of UK company law the 
memorandum of association remained an important document until the Companies Act, 
1985.108 The present company law in the UK (i.e., the Companies Act, 2006) provides that 
only the names of subscribers will appear in the memorandum.109 Company law further 
stipulates that the provisions of the memorandum of association of the companies 
incorporated before the present Act will be considered part of the articles.110 
 
In Pakistan the memorandum of association is still a very important document which 
provides the main functions, rights and privileges of the members. The Ordinance provides 
strict rules for alteration to the memorandum. It requires a special resolution and 
subsequent approval of the regulator for amendment to the memorandum.  
 
2.9.4 Listing rules 
 
Listing rules are applicable only to those companies who enlist their securities on a stock 
exchange; in other words, listing rules provide conditions under which public companies 
access the organized capital market and raise capital from the public. The listing rules, 
although applicable to a limited number of companies, play an important role in corporate 
governance. Many rights and obligation are provided in listing rules, especially disclosure, 
which is important for investors, both existing and potential.  
 
The role of listing rules is more significant in global convergence, especially when 
overseas companies with different corporate cultures list on foreign stock exchanges. 
Listing rules can fill the gaps that may arise due to the different corporate laws applicable 
to domestic and overseas companies. They can also work to provide a level playing field to 
both foreign and domestic companies by lowering the competitive disadvantages to 
domestic companies; for instance, if foreign companies are not required to comply with 
certain provisions under the corporate laws of a country of incorporation that are 
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mandatory for domestic companies under that country’s corporate laws, then listing rules 
may require such foreign companies to comply with those provisions. This may create a 
balance of obligations between domestic and foreign companies.  
 
Many rights and obligations for which provision is not made in corporate law may be 
provided for in listing rules because these rules are applicable to public companies in 
which the public have an interest. The listing rules may provide a vehicle for the 
development of international corporate regulations;111 for instance, the LSE requires many 
obligations from overseas companies who have a premium listing on it. These obligations 
include ‘a ban on restrictions on transfer of shares by overseas companies’, ‘pre-emption 
rights’, ‘transactions between controlling shareholders and the company should be at arm’s 
length’, a ‘continuing obligation of dissemination of information to investors’, and 
‘directors’ continuing obligation which includes their pay and privileges, shareholding, and 
insider trading’.112 In this way the listing rules may provide level playing fields to both 
domestic and overseas companies by filling in the gaps in the corporate laws of both 
jurisdictions. 
 
2.9.5 Codes of corporate governance 
 
Codes of corporate governance have been included in the corporate arena as a form of soft 
law in most of the major jurisdictions, including the UK, but some countries, including 
Pakistan, have made the code part of listing regulations. In developed markets the codes 
have been introduced due to market pressures and in developing countries due to global 
pressure, including from international financial institutions. The codes of developed 
countries provide guidelines to developing jurisdictions in the form of best practices 
developed in their markets in the form of convergence. The best practices of developed 
jurisdictions such as the US and the UK are the driving force behind the development of 
the codes in different countries. As the codes are part of soft law and developed on a self-
regulatory basis, they are therefore easy to change without the involvement of formal legal 
procedure. Therefore, rapid changes have been observed in the codes in different 
jurisdictions in recent years.  
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The codes may solve the problems in areas that are not addressed by the regulations. In 
particular, it may resolve the issues of deficiencies in the working of boards of directors 
and minority shareholder protection. In this way, the codes may supplement the existing 
legal framework, especially in those areas in which states are reluctant or unable to include 
and enforce governance practices through state legislation for political reasons. The state 
may include these governance practices in its legal framework once they have matured and 
been accepted by the business community.113  
 
Enforcement is a major issue due to the lack of statutory status of the codes. Market 
discipline plays a major role in their enforcement; for instance, in the UK market discipline 
ensures conformance with the code through the ‘comply or explain’ principle.114 As 
compliance with code is voluntary, therefore, reputation may play its role and may be the 
driving force behind compliance with the code. In recent years many credit rating 
companies have used compliance with the code as a tool for rating companies. Therefore, 
companies may comply with the code to enhance their reputation as well as their credit 
rating. Compliance with the code has significantly increased in recent years but that is not 
yet at an optimum level. In Pakistan the code is part of the listing regulations but in 
practice it is not implemented as part of listing regulations.115 
 
2.10 Elements of corporate law that support good corporate governance 
 
Company law is the main source for shareholders’ rights, powers of directors, the division 
of power between shareholders and directors, voting procedures, the issuing of shares, and 
voting powers attached to these shares. These elements of corporate law are the basic 
features of corporate governance.  
 
2.10.1 Shareholders’ rights generally 
 
Academic debate about the proper role of shareholders and the managers of firms, and the 
question as to whose interest is to prevail over the other in corporate governance has been 
waged over almost eight decades. Debate started with the Berle and Means theory of 
separation of ownership and control in their classic work of 1932. They described how the 
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dispersed shareholders phenomenon had put power in the hands of the managers and how 
shareholders became largely powerless.116 Berle also argues that corporate powers are 
meant for the interest of shareholders.117 Smith augmented these views and considered that 
the only function of a firm was to maximize the wealth of its shareholders.118 This property 
model119 regards shareholders as owners as well as residual claimants.120 Therefore, 
managers should pursue those policies that enhance the wealth of shareholders. Dodd does 
not agree with the wealth maximization norms of a firm. 121 He argues that a firm has many 
other functions besides the wealth maximization of its shareholders, such as jobs for 
employees, better quality products for customers and, more importantly, to perform its 
social responsibility for the welfare of society. This entity model denies the sole function 
of a firm as being to maximize the wealth of shareholders.  
 
Bainbridge is the main advocate of directors’ primacy norms. He argues that market 
competition and efficiency benefits require that the status quo of directors’ primacy that is 
prevalent in the existing corporate law and shareholders’ intervention through votes should 
not be more than a default rule.122 He further argues that the director primacy theory is 
better at explaining everything than any other prevailing theory in the market.123 However, 
Bebchuk advocates for more powers to shareholders.124 He does not agree with the 
justifications given in favour of directors’ primacy norms. Proponents of the directors’ 
primacy theory say that because the managers of firms are well informed about the state of 
affairs of their firms, they can take better decisions for their firms.125 They further argue 
that the firms’ structure requires centralized management, otherwise shareholders may use 
their powers against the interest of the firms. However, there are more chances that the 
managers who have more powers may proceed with obtaining private benefits of control 
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and establishing empire building at the cost of shareholders. Therefore, empowering 
shareholders may reduce agency costs, which may be beneficial to both shareholders and 
the firm in terms of its performance. 
 
Velasco takes an intermediate position and argues for ensuring existing shareholders’ 
rights instead of increasing them without intruding on the existing structure of directors’ 
primacy norms. 126 He further argues that the law has failed to ensure even the existing 
limited fundamental rights127 of shareholders. According to him, this is basically due to the 
dysfunctional role of the law. Therefore, there is a need to make the role of shareholders 
more meaningful for the proper functioning of corporate governance. Stout forwarded a 
third argument in favour of shareholder primacy. 128 She does not consider shareholders as 
residual claimants and owners as proper argument for shareholder primacy. According to 
her, following the interest of shareholders will reduce agency cost, which otherwise would 
be high if the managers were to consider the interests of all the stakeholders. 
 
Shareholders’ rights can be divided into four broad categories: (1) decision-making rights, 
(2) appointment and removal rights, (3) financial rights, and (4) intervention rights. These 
are basic shareholder rights in the shareholder primacy norms systems prevalent in the UK 
and many common law countries.129 These rights are normally provided in company law. 
However, some rights are also provided through listing rules, securities laws and non-
statutory codes.  
 
Decision-making rights include the right to make decisions in general meetings of 
shareholders on some key issues such as amendment to the constitution; the issuance of 
new capital; approval of certain transactions between the company and shareholders, and 
between the company and the directors; investment in associated and subsidiary 
companies; loans to directors; formal approval of dividends declared by the directors; long-
term service contracts of the directors; substantial property transactions, unless the 
company is in the process of winding up; related party transactions; and other important 
transactions.  
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Appointment and removal rights are those rights that provide powers to shareholders to 
appoint and remove the members of the board of directors. Owing to the inherent problem 
of public companies not being able to call all shareholders for every decision, company 
law provides the board with basic powers to run the day-to-day affairs of the company. The 
members on the board may either be the owners themselves or professionals hired by the 
company to run its business. These members on the board are elected by shareholders in 
general meeting and may also be removed by these owners when they feel that an 
incumbent is not performing. These powers granted to shareholders to hold the board of 
directors accountable are very important. Some jurisdictions provide shareholders with 
strong powers to remove directors, for example, in the UK shareholders can remove a 
director by an ordinary resolution without showing any cause.130 In some jurisdictions such 
as Pakistan the removal of a director is very difficult.131  
 
Financial rights include the right of equal treatment in voting, cash flow (such as dividend 
rights) and pre-emption. Voting rights provide indirect control to shareholders as they can 
appoint and remove the directors, and can also take major business decisions. Equal 
treatment in cash-flow rights allows all shareholders a right to dividends according to their 
stake in the capital of the firm. However, some jurisdictions, including Pakistan, allow 
preference shares which allow the holders of such shares to have more rights than ordinary 
shareholders, for instance, a right of preference in dividends. Pre-emptive rights provide 
safeguards against dilution. Pre-emptive rights affect the voting powers and the financial 
interests of the existing shareholders. These rights mean that the existing shareholders have 
a priority to subscribe to a new issue of shares on a pro rata basis. If existing shareholders 
are not interested, then the directors can issue these shares to the general public or to other 
existing members. Pre-emptive rights are important for minority shareholders. If they are 
not offered a new issue of shares, it may dilute their voting powers. They may also lose 
potential benefits in new shares in the form of a lower share price that may normally be 
less than the market value.  
 
Intervention rights provide an opportunity to shareholders to intervene in decisions of the 
board or other controlling shareholders in general meeting, either through the regulator or 
court. The rights are provided according to the nature of the corporate governance structure 
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of the given jurisdiction. In the US context, where directors’ primacy norms are more 
common, such an intervention is disputed in the sense that it is considered harmful to the 
overall interest of companies.132 It is argued that the board of directors must act free from 
intervention from the shareholders or court oversight because this causes harm to the 
efficient working of firms.133 The stance of the US courts is that there should be 
accountability only in those cases where directors abuse their powers.134 In the UK context, 
where shareholder primacy norms are prevalent, shareholder intervention is facilitated in 
the sense that they have rights to contest directors’ decisions by calling a general meeting 
with 5% voting powers; propose a resolution in a general meeting; add agenda items for 
general meetings, and put an obligation on companies to answer questions raised by the 
members at the meeting.135 Shareholders also have rights to intervene in the decisions of 
the management or the controlling shareholders through the regulator or courts. More 
common rights are the unfair prejudice remedy and derivative action. However, these are 
more minority protection rights than simply shareholders’ rights. There are also other 
rights such as information, disclosure and inspection rights. These rights facilitate 
shareholder intervention in cases of abuse of powers either by the management or by the 
controlling shareholders.  
 
The rights of shareholders form an important part of corporate law as this determines the 
nature of corporate governance. Rights may be classified into corporate, individual and 
class rights. Corporate rights belong to the company such as the right to own the property 
of the company, the right to sue and the right to enter into contracts. Individual rights 
belong to individual shareholders such as the right to information, disclosure rights, 
inspection rights, litigation rights, dividend rights, liquidity rights, equal treatment and 
voting rights, the right to receive financial statements, and the right to transfer shares. 
Class rights belong to a particular class of shareholders. If shareholders hold shares of one 
class, they are class shareholders and the rights attached to them shall be class rights. The 
Companies Act, 2006 defines class shares as ‘class shares means shares having uniform 
rights’.136 For instance, preference shareholders who hold a 5% preference dividend or 
shares that confer enhanced voting rights belong to the same class.  
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Enforcement of these rights depends upon the nature of the ownership of the rights. 
Corporate rights can be enforced by the company itself through the board of directors, 
whereas individual rights may be enforced by the individual concerned and class rights by 
the members of the respective class of shareholders. Corporate rights may also be enforced 
by an individual shareholder under certain circumstances such as through derivative action. 
Corporate law provides the rights and mechanism of their enforcement.  
 
2.10.2 Minority rights 
 
Shareholder rights are an important element of the accountability structure of corporate 
governance.137 These rights determine the relationship between shareholders inter se, 
between shareholders and the management, and between shareholders and other 
stakeholders such as creditors and employees.138 The objective of a corporate governance 
structure is to keep the interests of the shareholders as a class but it can also be to address 
the agency problems between shareholders and the management, and between the majority 
and the minority shareholders. It can also resolve and settle the interests of the minority 
shareholders. These interests can be ensured by either reducing the powers of the majority 
shareholders or by providing minority shareholders with certain rights in order to pre-empt 
or challenge the abuse of power by managers and controlling shareholders.  
 
There is a trade-off between giving more power to the minority shareholder and 
shareholders as a class. Giving more powers to shareholders as a class may create 
problems for the minority shareholders and giving more powers to the minority 
shareholders may create agency problems between shareholders and management.139 If 
more powers are given to the minority shareholders or the powers of majority shareholders 
are curtailed, then this may create a problem between shareholders and the management 
which, in turn, may create a deadlock. However, if more powers are given to shareholders 
as a class to reduce the managerial agency problem, then this may create problems between 
majority and minority shareholders. In this case, the majority may capture the whole 
management and use their powers for their own private benefit of control and may 
expropriate the funds of the firm at the cost of minority shareholders. Therefore, it is 
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important to strike an appropriate balance between the powers of the majority, minority 
and management.  
 
Minority rights, more or less, come from shareholders’ rights. Both dispersed and 
concentrated ownership systems have the inherent problem of minority protection. The 
dispersed ownership structure causes higher agency costs as compared to the concentrated 
ownership system because it is hardly possible for dispersed shareholders to collaborate 
and take any decision, and exert pressure on management to adopt good governance. This 
problem is exacerbated in the present era of globalization because it is not feasible for 
foreign and domestic investors to collaborate and take any action due to cost and lack of 
coordination. However, there are more minority protection problems in concentrated than 
dispersed ownerships structures. As the managers are appointed by the shareholders, the 
majority therefore control the management. They may appoint themselves or close 
relatives or friends as managers who may work for such majority. Therefore, a 
concentrated ownership system is considered to be more exposed to expropriation of the 
funds of the firm at the cost of minority shareholders. The majority, with the connivance of 
management, may use the resources of the firm for their own benefits and obtain private 
benefit of control. Minority shareholders are at the mercy of the majority unless the system 
provides them with protection. Therefore, minority protection is more important in a 
concentrated ownership system.  
 
The shareholders rights in general and minority protections in particular are concerned 
with the division of power between shareholders and the management and shareholders 
inter se. Therefore, there is a need for an appropriate balance of power between these 
actors.  
 
2.10.3 Division of power between shareholders and the directors 
 
Shareholders, directors, employees, creditors and customers all have an interest in the 
success of a firm. As far as controlling the firm and running it in a professional manner are 
concerned, shareholders and directors are the main actors. The question of balance of 
power and control between two actors in a firm is a difficult task. The structure, power, 
composition, appointment and removal of directors from the board enhance shareholders’ 
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control over a firm.140 As shareholders are not supposed to be well versed in running the 
affairs of the firm, the directors, who are normally expert and professional in running the 
firms, are therefore delegated the powers by shareholders. At the same time, the 
shareholders can watch and take action against the acts of the directors in case of any gross 
negligence, irregularity and abuse of powers by the directors. The appointment, removal of 
directors, approval of major transaction and ex post facto approval of certain matters by the 
general meeting is the mechanism shareholders use to control the firm indirectly. This 
accountability mechanism tries to create a balance in power between the directors and 
shareholders; in other words, the authority is delegated to the directors, and shareholders 
have accountability authority to check the performance of the directors. Each jurisdiction 
deals with this issue in a different manner. Some jurisdictions, such as the US and 
Pakistan, give more powers to the directors, while others, such as the UK, give more to the 
shareholders.  
 
2.10.4 Procedure and power to issue shares 
 
The authority to issue shares and to enhance the share capital is important in the context of 
corporate governance. The actual authority lies with shareholders and it is exercised by the 
directors through delegated powers. This authority may be delegated through a resolution 
of shareholders or provided in the articles. Private and public companies are dealt with in 
different ways due to the involvement of public interest in public companies. Company law 
requires more disclosures from a public company than a private company at the time of 
issuance of shares and enhancement of capital. The disclosure involves the issuance of a 
prospectus by public companies. The prospectus includes detailed provisions relating to 
information about the company, performance of the company, reasons for raising further 
capital, expected projects and performance. A further safeguard is normally provided in the 
form of the regulator’s approval. This procedure and power to issue shares is important 
because a further issue of shares may have implications for the shareholders’ rights which 
may affect the governance structure of the firm.  
 
2.10.5 Voting rights 
 
Incomplete contract theory states that corporate law provides a standard contract which is 
not complete in itself as legal rules are not sufficiently detailed. The fiduciary duty and 
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structural rules are also not enough to provide a detailed contract. This creates gaps in the 
contract which are filled by voting power attached to the shares. Shareholders are more 
affected by this incomplete contractual theory. The way in which the contract works makes 
it unfeasible and impossible in most cases to negotiate the terms of the contract. People 
become shareholders by purchasing shares from the market. However, other stakeholders, 
such as creditors and employees, are not exposed to incomplete contracts as are 
shareholders. They negotiate the terms and conditions of the contract: they may bargain for 
the best possible contract to safeguard their interests. Therefore, the incomplete contractual 
nature of a firm necessitates that someone must have residual power in the form of voting 
powers. As the shareholders take more risk, they must, therefore, be given more control 
through voting.141  
 
Shareholders are residual claim holders as they are paid last, that is, after all the other 
stakeholders have been paid. Therefore, shareholders should have some control in the firm 
to safeguard their interests. Their voting rights provide this safeguard. Other stakeholders, 
such as creditors, bondholders and preferred shareholders, may also control the firm in the 
case of financial difficulty when their investments are exposed to more risk. The terms and 
conditions of the contract and bankruptcy laws provide creditors with the right to control 
the firm in cases of financial difficulty.142 However, the shareholders still remain the 
residual claim holders, even if control is shifted to the creditors. In most cases, 
shareholders may get nothing at the end of the liquidation proceedings. This incomplete 
contract theory and residual claim-holding status of the shareholders highlight the 
importance of voting rights for shareholders.  
 
Voting powers have many benefits. Firstly, they provide decision-making powers to 
shareholders. Shareholders can take decisions at a general meeting which provides a sense 
of participation. Secondly, they provide the shareholders with accountability powers, 
which may improve the efficiency of the firm.143 Thirdly, recent academic literature 
regards legal protection as an important tool for protecting minority shareholders.144 The 
voting rights may provide a substitute for legal protection as this presents them with an 
opportunity to take up the matter at a general meeting instead of first going to a court of 
law. Fourthly, voting powers increase the value of shareholding, which can be cashed at a 
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higher price than the shares without voting powers.145 Fifthly, voting may provide control 
over the firm and an incentive to resell the shares at an attractive price. This may give 
shareholders control premium at the time of selling their controlling shares.  
 
Voting rights are important in governance as differential voting rights may enhance or 
decrease control over the firm. Shares with enhanced voting rights allow the holders of 
these shares to have more control over the firm than cash-flow rights. This provides them 
with an opportunity to obtain the private benefits of control. Similarly, shares without 
voting rights do not allow the holders of such shares to have any say at general meetings. 
For instance, UK company law allows shares with enhanced voting rights but this is not 
common because of the role played by institutional investors146 who hold about 39.9%147 
of the stakes in quoted companies in the UK. Institutional investors do not like enhanced 
voting rights and insist on one share, one vote.148 As they have enough shares, they are 
therefore in a position to exert pressure on firms to avoid enhanced voting shares.  
 
However, the company law in Pakistan allows the issuance of shares other than one share, 
one vote and companies do issue shares other than one share, one vote. This may be 
because of the minor role that institutional investors play in corporate governance. 
Families and the state use these techniques to control firms, while employing investment 
from outside. The controlling shareholders can enhance their control by issuing shares with 
enhanced voting rights to themselves or shares with fewer or without any voting rights to 
others.  
 
Small investors are not normally interested in voting rights, and are more interested in 
dividends and an increase in capital. The reason for such an apathetic attitude on the part of 
small investors is that casting a vote is normally not feasible for them because of the cost 
involved and they also feel that their vote might not have any effect.149 However, investors 
may be interested if it is feasible for them to cast their votes and the cost is minimized. 
Nevertheless, voting plays an important part in governance as it provides shareholders with 
an accountability mechanism in order to safeguard their interests. 
                                                 
145
 Coffee, Jr (n 54) 644 (see f. n. 12 at 644). 
146
 MacNeil (n 129) 422. 
147
 This includes shares held by insurance companies (13.4%), pension funds (12.8%), unit trusts (1.8%), 
investment trusts (1.8%) and other financial institutions (10%). 
148
 See office for National Statistics, ‘Share Ownership Survey 2008’ 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pnfc1/share-ownership---share-register-survey-report/2008/index.html> 
Accessed 17.08.2013. 
149
 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper and Row, New York 1957).  
45 
 
2.10.5.1 Pre-emptive rights 
 
Pre-emptive rights have been regarded as an ownership right that protects owners from the 
risk of dilution in voting and financial interests. MacNeil considers this a misconceived 
notion. 150 He argues that fiduciary duties over the issuance of shares at the best price 
protect the financial interests of shareholders. The absence of pre-emptive rights may allow 
companies to raise capital along more efficient, and the best possible terms and conditions. 
Company law provides shareholders with safeguards through pre-emptive rights. However, 
this is not a universal phenomenon as many jurisdictions do not provide pre-emptive rights. 
The US has largely abandoned these rights,151 while the UK has provided them as a default 
rule in new company law provisions, which means that companies may dis-apply them 
through special resolutions for a specific allotment of new equity securities.152 However, 
the strict requirements153 and limited scope for their dis-application contained in the 
guidelines of the Pre-emption Group154 show the importance attached to these pre-emptive 
rights. Nevertheless, US states have largely abandoned pre-emptive rights and the default 
nature of these rights in the UK shows non-acceptance of this class of rights as a minority 
protection device by the main jurisdictions. However, some caution is required before 
abandoning pre-emptive rights in underdeveloped jurisdictions such as Pakistan. Firstly, 
the fact that companies are separate entities and that the directors have a duty to act in the 
best interest of the company should determine that the issuance of new capital should be 
negotiated on the best possible terms, even if it is to be issued to existing shareholders. 
Secondly, the presence of a developed and efficient market is important in this regard. 
Trading of shares in an efficient market may be close to the real value of the shares as 
compared to an inefficient market where manipulation by brokers and other interested 
parties may inflate the share price to obtain an undue advantage. In this way, an efficient 
market helps existing as well as potential investors to purchase a new issue of shares with 
the real value of premium155 which the issuer may demand in case of a new issue of shares. 
Thirdly, there is a need for a developed fiduciary duty with an efficient judiciary to dis-
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apply pre-emptive rights. In the absence of these safeguards, abandoning pre-emptive 
rights may provide the majority with an opportunity to exploit minority shareholders to 
dilute their shareholding. The reasons for which pre-emptive rights are being abandoned in 
major jurisdictions may not be applicable to underdeveloped jurisdictions such as Pakistan. 
The dominance of the state and families in the corporate sector of Pakistan may lead to the 
misuse of the dis-application of pre-emptive rights. For instance, these owners may issue 
new shares at less than the market price to a party with whom they have personal interests 
or even to the general public, which may cause existing shareholders to suffer. An 
inefficient judiciary may be another problem encountered in the dis-application of pre-
emptive rights. A remedy in a dispute involving the new issuance of shares without pre-
emptive rights may be problematic for shareholders in such a judiciary. 
 
2.10.5.2 The cumulative voting system  
 
The cumulative voting system (CVS) is an important aspect of voting rights for minority 
shareholders. The CVS is beneficial to shareholders in proxy contests for the election of 
directors.156 Shareholders can elect one or more directors to serve on the board of directors 
through this system, which is not otherwise feasible for them. There are certain benefits to 
appointing members to the board of directors. It provides them with an opportunity to have 
access to information, to work for, and safeguard the interests of, minority shareholders, 
and to collaborate with independent directors to shape or, at least, to discuss the issues in 
the meeting of the board of directors.157  
 
There are proponents as well as opponents of the CVS. Both describe its advantages and 
disadvantages. As far as the benefits of the CVS are concerned, it is argued that this 
provides minority shareholders with representation and, hence, the firm may perform 
better. 158 If the CVS is eliminated, it may reduce the powers of minority shareholders to 
elect their member to the board, which may decrease the value of the firm.159 It may also 
lower agency cost in a sense that a minority representative may act as arbitrator in case of a 
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conflict of interest between the management and shareholders.160 Opponents of the CVS 
describe it as being useless. 161 They argue that it may create problems regarding decisions 
at board meetings. They describe other methods of disciplining management that are less 
costly, for instance, the takeover market.162 The takeover market can discipline 
management in a sense that a successful bidder, after controlling the firm, can remove the 
incumbent managers who are not performing. Therefore, management may try to increase 
the value of the firm and act in the best interest of shareholders. The takeover market may 
be a good technique to discipline management but there are some issues with this kind of 
discipline. It may be used as a last resort to discipline management and also requires a 
large shareholding to gain control of a firm, which may be a costly method. The other 
problem with this technique is the absence of the liquid market. For the effective operation 
of the takeover market, there is a need for a liquid market. In concentrated ownership 
structures families or the state holds the majority voting to avoid a takeover. If shares are 
not in the market, then it is not possible to get control of a company without the consent of 
the family concerned or the state. Therefore, a takeover may not be a feasible option in 
underdeveloped, illiquid and concentrated ownership structures. This may work well in a 
dispersed ownership structure with a developed and liquid market.  
 
As regards voting in the CVS, it is against the general principal of one share, one vote. The 
cumulative effect of voting is that some shareholders can add more weight to the election 
of directors when they accumulate votes and cast all their votes in favour of a single 
candidate. This is a side effect of the potential benefits of minority protection. 
Shareholders have to pay this cost for the potential benefits of the system.  
 
Shareholders are the equity providers and are the residual risk bearers. Therefore, their 
rights are required to be protected through law. The provision of these rights is to ensure 
that shareholders are in a position to monitor the performance of the directors and can take 
timely action to avoid the company failing to remain a going concern. The financial 
performance of a firm benefits all, but shareholders suffer more in the case of poor 
financial performance or where the firm does not remain a going concern. So, it is 
important that shareholders should be given enough powers and rights to secure their 
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interests. Appointing representative on the board is an important element for safeguarding 
their interests. The CVS is a mechanism by which minority shareholders can elect directors 
to the board which is not otherwise possible for them through a regular voting system. This 
can be explained by the following example: 
 
Example 
 
Suppose a company has 2,000 shares, and the majority shareholders have 1,500 and the 
minority 500 shares respectively. Suppose four directors are to be elected in an election of 
directors in which the majority shareholders have four candidates (i.e., A, B, C and D) and 
the minority have one candidate (i.e., X). The following is a practical example of how both 
the regular voting system and the CVS will operate, and how one is beneficial to the 
minority shareholders and not to other shareholders.  
 
Method 1 (regular voting system) 
  
In this method each share will have one vote and a shareholder who has one share can give 
one vote to each of the four directors but cannot give four votes to one candidate. So, a 
minority candidate will suffer in the following results under this system: 
 
Table 2.1: Results of a regular voting system 
Name of 
candidate Total votes Remarks 
A 1,500 If the majority give all 1,500 of their votes to their candidate 
B 1,500 If the majority give all 1,500 of their votes to their candidate 
C 1,500 If the majority give all 1,500 of their votes to their candidate 
D 1,500 If the majority give all 1,500 of their votes to their candidate 
X 500 If the minority give all 500 of their votes to their candidate 
 
According to these results, all the candidates of the majority shareholders will be elected 
and the candidate of the minority shareholders will not be elected. 
 
Note: The majority who have only 51% voting rights can select all their candidates. For 
example, if in the case above the majority had a 51% shareholding, the majority would 
have 1,002 votes and the minority who have 49% shares would have 998 votes. In that case 
49 
 
A, B, C and C could have obtained 1,002, 1,002, 1,002 and 1,002 votes respectively, 
whereas X would only have 998 votes. In that case X would not have been elected.  
 
Method 2 (cumulative voting system) 
 
In this system, one share will have votes equal to the number of shares multiplied by the 
number of directors to be elected. Now, since four directors are to be elected, there will, 
therefore, be 8,000 votes (8,000 = 2,000 x 4). In this system, since four directors are to be 
elected, a shareholder who owns one share will have four votes. A shareholder may cast all 
his or her votes in favour of one candidate or divide them between different candidates. 
The above result will be changed in the following way: 
 
Table 2.2: Results of a cumulative voting system 
Name of 
candidate 
Total 
votes Remarks 
A 2,002 If the majority give such number of their votes to elect their 
candidate 
B 2,001 If the majority give such number of their votes to elect their 
candidate 
C 999 If the majority give such number of their votes to elect their 
candidate 
D 998 If the majority give such number of their votes to elect their 
candidate 
X 2,000 If the minority give all 2,000 of their votes to elect their candidate 
 
According to these results, A, B, C and X will be elected. The candidate of the minority 
shareholder is elected onto the board which was not possible through the regular voting 
system. 
 
However, the potential benefits of the CVS can be achieved only if the one share, one vote 
voting system is mandatory in the system. The majority shareholders with enhanced voting 
rights may have multiple voting powers as compared to minority shareholders who have 
one share, one vote. This may help the majority shareholders who have enhanced voting 
shares to appoint all their candidates.  
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There are other tactics to frustrate the CVS too. A staggered board structure may be used 
for this purpose. On such a board, the directors are classified into different classes and 
election is not held for all directors at any one time. For example, if four directors are to be 
elected in a company, they are divided into two classes and the election for each class is 
held after a certain period. Suppose a minority shareholder who holds 25% of shares may 
elect one director through the CVS; provided the election of all directors is held at one 
time. However, if elections for each class are held on two different occasions, then the 
minority will not even be able to elect their representative through the CVS. Suppose there 
is an election of two directors in a company. Now suppose there are 2,000 shares with the 
majority shareholders holding 1,500 and the minority 500 shares. Suppose A and B are the 
candidates of the majority, and C is the candidate of the minority shareholders. The 
majority will, therefore, have 3,000 votes, whereas the minority will have 1,000 votes 
(since two directors are to be elected under the CVS, one share will carry two votes). The 
majority can divide their votes in such a manner that 1,600 votes go to candidate A and 
1,400 to B, whereas the minority can cast a maximum of 1,000 votes for their candidate C. 
In this case A and B, the nominees of the majority, will be elected. Similarly, the majority 
will be able to elect their candidates in the second category of directors in the next 
elections, which may be held after a certain period. So, it is necessary that a system that 
provides the CVS must prohibit staggered board structures.  
 
Another safeguard that would protect the effectiveness of the CVS is that the 
representative of minority shareholders must have some protection against abuse of 
majority power. Therefore, the removal of a director must be made difficult, otherwise the 
majority can remove a minority director at their whim. It is, therefore, important to provide 
protection against the removal of a director where the CVS is adopted. 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the nature and objectives of corporate governance in general and in 
Pakistan in particular. The presence of different cultural, social, political and religious 
norms influences the evolution of different corporate governance structures around the 
world. In Pakistan the ownership structure is highly concentrated, with families and the 
state controlling the corporate sector. Although the corporate law of Pakistan is British-
based, the ownership structure in Pakistan is significantly different. Historically, cultural 
and political reasons led to a concentrated ownership structure in Pakistan.  
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The objective of corporate governance may be better financial performance, accountability 
and the safeguarding of the interests of all the stakeholders. Different theories have 
emerged, each emphasising the prevalence of the interest of one stakeholder over others. 
No doubt, managers should focus on the success of the company as a whole, as per the 
entity maximization and sustainability theory, but the fact that the shareholders benefit 
more from the success of the company and also suffer more in cases of the failure of the 
company suggests that they can be the best monitors of the company. Therefore, the 
shareholders may be given more accountability powers to monitor the activities of 
management so that they may act in the best interests of the company. This may lead to 
good corporate governance and better financial performance. In the context of Pakistan the 
shareholder primacy theory is more relevant than any other theory. As the corporate sector 
is highly concentrated and dominated by families and the state, it is therefore necessary to 
give more accountability powers to the minority shareholders in the form of rights and 
their protection.  
 
In addition, the underdeveloped market, corruption, out-dated laws, an inefficient 
judiciary, and a weak regulator and enforcement mechanisms are the major problems in 
Pakistan. These issues do not allow the development of confidence among investors and 
the corporate sector is therefore highly concentrated with an underdeveloped capital 
market. They remain major problems that need to be addressed. These issues are discussed 
in the chapters that follow. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  CONVERGENCE THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN 
PAKISTAN 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Two discussed the nature and objectives of corporate governance. The intention 
was to highlight the problems of corporate governance in Pakistan. Chapter Three 
discusses the mechanisms of adaptation and convergence which may help to suggest 
reform measures for improving corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
In the recent era of globalization the features of corporate governance are being 
transplanted from more developed to less developed jurisdictions after being adapted to 
local conditions. This phenomenon has fostered the merging of different corporate 
governance systems around the world. This chapter is dedicated to examining the process 
and prospects of transplantation, and convergence in corporate governance (hereinafter 
convergence theory).  
 
Convergence in corporate governance in Pakistan gained some momentum in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries when there was an economic meltdown in the 
context of the global recession and world economic sanctions following India’s and 
Pakistan’s nuclear testing in 1998. During this economic distress some factors were 
indigenous, while others were exogenous. The global recession, world security issues and 
war against terrorism after the 9/11 attack on the US were exogenous factors, whereas bad 
political, economic and corporate governance, and weak enforcement mechanisms were 
indigenous factors in this economic climate. Global competition, efficiency, international 
organizations, international investors and foreign listings were involved in improving 
corporate governance in Pakistan. Consequently, the process of law-making and standard 
setting took place in Pakistan. The introduction of a code of corporate governance was a 
major initiative in this process. However, these reforms were not enough to improve 
corporate governance and economic efficiency in the country.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the prospects, possibility and effectiveness of  
convergence in order to improve corporate governance in Pakistan. To this end, the 
discussion in this chapter is limited to an overview of some general  issues in  corporate 
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governance in Pakistan while others issues that require more comprehensive discussion 
have been left for detailed analysis in later chapters.  
 
3.2 Convergence theory 
 
The term convergence has been used, applied and conceptualized by different writers in 
different ways. Some define it as ‘a process which develops over time’.1 Others consider it 
‘as an ideal which nations and firms are moving towards or away from’.2 Convergence in 
corporate governance started long ago and is still in progress.3 The first example in this 
regard may be quoted as convergence in features of corporate personality. The historical 
development of corporations shows that this phenomenon of convergence can be traced 
back centuries. With some exceptions,4 the corporate form, which developed with the 
passage of time, has gained consensus as regards its characteristics. The model form of the 
company has five basic characteristics: (1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) 
transferable shares, (4) centralized management with board structure and (5) investor 
ownership.5 These characteristics have converged over time. Similarly, convergence in 
codes of corporate governance around the world may be quoted as a recent example.  
 
In the context of globalization convergence in corporate governance has been fostered 
where features of one system are transplanted to another. However, convergence in 
corporate governance is possible when a feature of one system is detachable and capable 
of transfer from one system to another.6 If a feature is not detachable, then adoption may 
create problems. One option may be a wholesale convergence but this may be 
counterproductive in case of lacunae in the host system. If institutions are not meant for 
foreign, transplanted laws, then misfit transplantation may be problematic.7 Legal 
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transplantation from a country with a similar legal heritage8 or that has a similar 
ownership structure may be beneficial. For instance, if a concentrated ownership system 
borrows laws from a system that is meant for dispersed ownership,9 this may not be an 
effective transplantation. If the system is alien to the transplanted feature, then there may 
be enforcement problems. Therefore, for effective convergence, the feature of corporate 
governance of home jurisdiction should be detachable and adapted to the recipient system. 
If there is wholesale convergence of corporate governance, then legal, regulatory, judicial 
and all other supporting institutions should be adapted according to the home jurisdiction 
governance mechanism. This may be a costly process, and political, institutional, cultural, 
ideological and religious factors may also create barriers in this convergence.10 Therefore, 
partial convergence is more feasible and more likely than wholesale convergence. Partial 
convergence is already taking place, at least at the codes of corporate governance level.11  
 
3.3 Kinds of convergence 
 
Gilson describes three forms of convergence that may take place in corporate governance. 
According to him, formal convergence is change in the legal framework.12 Harmonization 
in company and securities laws in the European Union (EU) through various directives 
from the European Commission is an example of formal convergence at a broader level. 
Transformation of transition economies from socialist economies to capitalist economies 
(e.g., Poland and the Czech Republic), and Communist China’s transformation to mixed 
socialism and capitalism are examples of formal convergence at country level. However, 
at individual country level there are plenty of examples where some rules are changed and 
converged to other jurisdictions. According to Gilson, formal convergence will require 
political support and a legislative process that may not be feasible for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, resistance may be very strong to changing the existing structure. Secondly, the 
cost of change may be very high. Different interest groups may be politically strong 
enough to resist formal convergence as the status quo may benefit them. Gilson argues 
that functional convergence occurs where formal legal change is not possible and the 
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system is flexible enough to respond to changed circumstances.13 In functional 
convergence, the legal framework is not changed but the governance mechanism functions 
differently. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code is an example of this 
functional convergence. In this case there is no change in the legal framework but the 
firms function differently. The code is appended to, but does not form part of, listing rules. 
The code is subject to the ‘comply or explain’ principle. Companies are asked to comply 
or otherwise explain non-compliance. The code operates through market discipline where 
non-compliant companies have to suffer a share price decrease and increased cost of 
capital. However, MacNeil has observed that the possibility of formal convergence 
accompanied by functional diversity exists.14 This means that there may be a formal 
change in the legal framework, not necessarily a wholesale change, but the recipient 
system operates differently from the system from where the rules have been borrowed; for 
example, in China, there is formal convergence in corporate governance but it operates 
differently from that in the West.  
 
According to Gilson, contractual convergence may take place on an ad hoc basis in those 
circumstances where an existing governance mechanism lacks the flexibility to adapt to 
new circumstances without formal change, and a political barrier restricts the capacity to 
make formal legal institutional changes;15 for example, a company may contract with 
investors to incorporate certain provisions in their articles of association to safeguard the 
interests of the investors to their satisfaction. Secondly, contractual convergence may also 
occur, for example, through security design. In this case special provisions may be made 
in the articles of association to issue shares to specific investors with special voting rights 
or preference in dividends. Thirdly, it may occur when a company enlists its securities 
overseas. In this case the company has to follow the rules and regulations of the overseas 
stock exchange. Fourthly, contractual convergence may occur when a company changes 
its seat of incorporation. In this case the company has to follow the rules of foreign 
incorporation with assets and functioning at domestic jurisdiction. Individual firms may 
borrow these provisions or practices from other jurisdictions and they may incorporate 
them into their articles of association. This will show convergence on the basis of contract. 
It will take the form of an ad hoc arrangement by the individual firms without the 
involvement of political forces to make any formal or functional change in the regulatory 
framework.  
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Contractual convergence is, in fact, a subset of functional convergence. Contractual 
convergence changes the functions of companies without changing their formal legal and 
regulatory structure. Contractual convergence is converted into functional convergence as 
soon as companies start functioning but contractual convergence is limited at firm level, 
whereas functional convergence operates in the whole jurisdiction. The issue with 
contractual convergence may be the problem of enforcement; for instance, if a company 
changes its articles of association through a contract and a dispute arises, there may be a 
problem with the settlement of the issue and enforcement of the contract. The judiciary 
may not be acquainted with this problem and may, therefore, not be in position to interpret 
the rules and to solve the problem. Furthermore, the regulator may not be familiar with the 
kinds of problems that may arise due to contractual or functional convergence. This means 
that contractual convergence may be problematic for those countries where the judiciary is 
inefficient.  
 
Khanna et al. have discussed other forms of convergence such as de jure and de facto 
convergence. 16 De jure convergence occurs where two countries adopt similar rules. If 
these countries implement the rules in a similar way in practice, then this will be de facto 
convergence. However, if they do not implement in the same way in practice, then this is 
decoupling or formal convergence with functional diversity;17 for example, Pakistan and 
the UK have both introduced codes of best practice in their jurisdictions. This is de jure 
convergence. The code in the UK is introduced on a self-regulatory basis and is enforced 
through market discipline. However, the code in Pakistan is part of listing regulations and 
is enforced through the regulator. Therefore, implementation and the functioning of the 
codes in both jurisdictions are different. This is decoupling or formal convergence with 
functional diversity. Had the codes in both countries been implemented on a self-
regulatory basis, then this would have been de facto convergence.  
 
3.4 Factors that compel convergence  
 
Globalization has been the main stimulant for convergence in corporate governance in 
recent years. In economic terms, globalisation may refer to integration of economies 
around the world through trade, transplantation of governance norms and financial flows.  
Until 1980, market forces operated within national borders but technological advancement 
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has made it easier for these forces to operate beyond their national borders.18 To attract 
more trade and investment from overseas investors, and as a result of interdependence of 
economies and common financial interests the jurisdictions are merging in governance 
norms. This phenomenon has facilitated transplantation of governance norms of more 
developed countries to less developed countries.  
 
In this era of globalization, jurisdictions are converging in corporate governance as a 
result of three main pressures: (1) mimetic, (2) normative and (3) coercive pressures. In 
the mimetic process a jurisdiction may copy a successful feature of corporate governance 
from some other jurisdiction without performance implication in order to improve the 
firms’ legitimacy in the eyes of the firms’ stakeholders. However, this may lead to 
inefficiency. Normative pressure is when jurisdictions are forced to improve investors’ 
protection, disclosure and accounting standards. Coercive pressure is generated when a 
company lists its securities overseas. Companies who list overseas are required to comply 
with listing regulations. This requirement forces them to conform to the listing rules of the 
host country’s stock exchange.19  
 
Globalization has fostered capital market integration through a number of means such as 
overseas listings; overseas initial public offerings (IPOs); overseas mergers and 
acquisitions; overseas venture capital financing; issuance of overseas bonds and debt 
securities; and overseas investment. In the past this phenomenon was not possible for a 
number of reasons such as regulatory barriers. However, capital markets have integrated, 
to some extent, in the present global order.20 Overseas listing to raise capital from 
overseas stock exchanges has become the norm. The companies may raise finance by 
issuing shares, bonds or other debt securities. Therefore, convergence takes place in order 
to fulfil the requirements of an overseas stock exchange on which a firm intends to list or 
from which it intends to raise capital. In mergers and acquisition, the acquirer may keep 
some of the governance practices of the acquired company and continue with the practices 
of the acquirer country’s jurisdiction. In cases of investment in shares, the foreign 
investor, especially institutional investors, pressurize the country to improve its 
governance practices. Therefore, the country has to improve the governance structure to 
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the satisfaction of these investors.21 Major jurisdictions22 have converged in corporate law 
due to cross-border investments.23 
 
The recent past has also seen a proliferation of codes of corporate governance in many 
countries due to globalization. Different countries have developed codes of corporate 
governance based on codes issued by developed countries and modelled largely on the 
OECD principles of corporate governance.24  
 
Globalization of capital markets has been the major factor in  forcing different 
underdeveloped and developing jurisdictions to converge to advanced jurisdictions.25 
Convergence of national legal systems may also be attributed, to some extent, to economic 
and political affiliations and interdependency.26 The economies of different countries have 
become interdependent in the global world. The economic failure of one country may 
affect the economy of other countries. In recent years there were examples of the possible 
economic failure of countries for which other countries have provided bailout packages; 
for example, Abu Dhabi provided a substantial amount of money in the form of a bailout 
package to Dubai; the EU and the IMF to Greece; and the IMF, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB) to Pakistan on a number of occasions. This 
interdependence also motivates the WB, ADB and IMF to exert pressures on recipients of 
loans to improve their corporate governance practices, which led the convergence to good 
practices and corporate governance of advanced jurisdictions.27  
 
Integration of product markets is also considered a driving force for convergence in 
corporate governance. Countries endeavour to attract foreign firms to invest in their 
countries and operate in their product market. This forces countries to offer attractive 
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packages and the best regulatory framework. Other competing countries mimic this in 
order to attract foreign investment, which leads to convergence in rules and regulations.28 
 
Furthermore, harmonization of accounting rules has fostered convergence. This 
phenomenon is also influenced by globalization. In the past companies of different 
countries had to follow their own accounting standards, and foreign investors or issuers 
had difficulty in understanding disclosure from the accounting practices of the host 
country. This was one of the barriers to foreign investment. Globalization has forced 
countries to adopt similar accounting and disclosure standards. The harmonization of these 
standards by international standards committees has led to increased overseas investment 
and convergence, at least, in accounting and disclosure standards across the globe.29  
 
Efficiency is another important factor in the evolution of corporate governance structures. 
Corporate governance is like a product market where competition is the main driving 
force. In this competition, companies are forced to adopt the most efficient structure in 
order to compete with rival companies in production by reducing cost, otherwise they will 
suffer as a result of the competition. In similar fashion, companies are forced to adopt an 
efficient governance structure, otherwise they will fail in the competition. This efficiency 
consideration is the main stimulant for convergence to corporate governance structure.30  
 
Colonization also remained an important factor for convergence of national legal systems 
to colonial nations. For instance, Pakistan’s legal system is based on the British legal 
system introduced during colonial time and converged in most of the corporate 
governance features. It is an easy task for host nations to converge to a system on which 
their system is based. This transplantation may provide compatibility with the guest 
corporate governance feature. Convergence can take place more easily in such 
circumstances. This process is still in progress and, to some extent, has forced 
convergence for colonial nations such as Pakistan.  
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3.5 Factors that compel divergence  
 
Although efficiency and globalization are strong factors that are pushing convergence, 
they may not always be driving forces.31 Jurisdictions may converge even to an inefficient 
governance system; for instance, integration of European markets may lead to an 
inefficient convergence of corporate governance due to the presence of different cultural 
and governance mechanisms. A misfit foreign governance feature may produce 
inefficiency of the whole system.32 Although major jurisdictions have converged over 
most of the features of corporate governance despite the fact that these features are 
fundamentally of a different nature,33 there are still some features where there is 
divergence in these jurisdictions. This may partially be attributed to path dependencies, 
and differences in culture, ideology and politics.34 These factors cause divergence of 
different systems. This divergence still exists in the world despite efforts at global level. 
For instance, the EU’s efforts to converge and harmonize in corporate governance within 
the union have not obtained an optimum level and the future is uncertain, especially after 
the recent debt crisis in Europe. Similarly, in the UK, the laws of England and Scotland 
have different characters despite long-term union.35  
 
3.5.1 Path dependency 
 
The extent to which different systems of corporate governance have developed and the 
extent to which they persist despite the fact that alternative efficient governance is 
available can be attributed in some respects to the path dependency theory. Path 
dependency is a pre-existing condition that directs later developments in a particular 
direction. This does not allow deviation and tries to preserve the status quo. Put another 
way, in every system there are certain characteristics that limit its ability to develop and to 
converge to other systems.36 Path dependency is a major force that shapes a particular 
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governance structure and resists any change.37 It impedes, or at least limits, the process of 
convergence even if other systems are efficient. Roe argues that the current circumstances 
of a governance structure in a particular country are partly dependent upon pre-existing 
circumstances that drive it in a particular way.38 He explains the effect of path dependency 
on the establishment of a governance structure. According to him, the initial ownership 
structure affects the development of the subsequent ownership structure. The initial 
ownership structure also influences the development of rules of corporate laws that 
determine a particular path, which determine subsequent governance structures.39 
Similarly, Coffee argues that the initial starting point is important in corporate governance 
and this determines subsequent developments. 40 The initial starting point might have been 
established by historical accident or political compromise irrespective of the efficiency 
consideration;41 for example, co-determination in Germany, lifetime employment in 
Japan42 and dispersed ownership structure in US43 are all determined by political 
considerations, irrespective of efficiency considerations. Path dependency determines a 
particular path from which it is not easy to divert. This may limit prospects for global 
convergence to a single system of corporate governance.44 
 
Roe classifies path dependency into three categories: (1) weak, (2) semi-strong or 
(3) strong. These categories may resist the convergence process accordingly. Weak path 
dependency may resist it less and can converge easily to several efficient possibilities. In 
the case of semi-strong path dependency, it is still possible to converge but the cost of 
change may be unwise. In the case of strong path dependency, change may be difficult as 
society might have become stuck due to the lock-in effects arising out of path 
dependency.45  
 
In the context of Pakistan there could be two major sources of path dependency. First, the 
sources of path dependency are the families and interest groups who are dominant in the 
country. They may resist reforms that may restrict their opportunities of private benefits of 
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control. Second, the sources of path dependency may be political forces. The state is the 
second largest stakeholder in the corporate sector after families. The political forces may 
act as a barrier to reforms as this may limit their prospects of enjoying the benefits of 
control which they may acquire after coming into power and controlling state 
shareholding in SOEs. These families and politicians have close links. The families in 
Pakistan are directly involved in state politics or have substantial influence in politics. 
They finance different political parties so that they may act in their interests. This situation 
may make one sceptical about imminent and radical reforms in the country. However, 
competition, economic efficiency and global pressures through international financial 
institutions may be strong forces that may compel convergence to international norms and 
thereby act as stimulant in reforming the corporate sector of Pakistan. This process may be 
successful if reforms are made piecemeal, systematic and through a pragmatic approach. 
 
3.5.2 Complementarities 
 
Efficiency may be a driving force to compel convergence in corporate governance but it is 
not always possible to transplant features of a system into another system that has a 
fundamentally different nature. A feature of corporate governance that is efficient in one 
place may not be efficient in another. Corporate governance features can work efficiently 
in host jurisdictions only when other complementary institutions and practices are 
compatible with the new feature;46 for example, the corporate governance feature of 
market discipline that operates through a takeover code may be efficient in dispersed 
ownership structures with developed and liquid markets. Under this market discipline, if a 
company is not performing, successful bidders may take control of the company and 
remove non-performing incumbent managers. For the takeover code to be effective, a 
developed and liquid market is necessary. If this takeover code is applied in concentrated 
ownership structures with an underdeveloped and illiquid market, then this may not even 
work. Bidders may not be able to get enough shares to control the company and remove 
managers sponsored and controlled by the controlling shareholders. Convergence can take 
place when systems are synchronized but mere efficiency may not be enough for 
convergence. Legal rules transplanted from home jurisdictions cannot work in the same 
way in host jurisdictions. Transplanted legal rules can work effectively if they are adapted 
to local conditions or the local conditions are conducive to such transplantation.47 If 
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features of corporate governance cannot be adapted to local conditions, such plantation 
will not survive even if copied from a well-recognized model.48 Transplantation can work 
effectively if transplanted rules or governance features are developed to find solutions to 
the problems in the host country after they have been adapted to local conditions.49 
Therefore, for effective convergence, it is necessary that the features of one system be 
adapted according to the nature, values, culture, religion and requirements of the recipient 
system.  
 
As discussed earlier, an efficient corporate governance feature in one jurisdiction may not 
be efficient in another that has a different environment and circumstances. This hypothesis 
is based on the presence of complementarity institutions in every system. ‘The 
complementarity is an attribute of elements of a given system such as a corporate 
governance system, a financial system, organizational or production system of a firm or 
the system that constitutes the strategy of a firm’.50 The complementary elements are 
structured in a system so that they fit together in a way that increases their mutual value 
and reduces mutual disadvantage or cost. If a feature of corporate governance is not fit for 
a particular system, then this may not increase efficiency but rather create a problem. 
Complementary institutions such as the stock market, ownership structure, professional 
bodies, financial institutions and practices may play a major role in convergence to foreign 
corporate governance features. Put another way, if existing complementary institutions do 
not support a particular foreign corporate governance feature, this transplantation may be 
counterproductive. Bebchuk and Roe argue that in every system there are unique 
institutions, practices and professional communities that facilitate the efficient working of 
a particular system as these institutions develop according to the initial ownership 
structure in that particular system. 51 These complementary institutions determine the 
subsequent governance structure. Any transplantation of corporate governance feature that 
is not compatible with existing institutions may not work efficiently; for example, 
adopting an independent outside board in a crony capitalist system may not be efficient 
where firm’s competitors have a management and board of directors that have close links 
with politicians and policymakers. Similarly, adopting a takeover code from a developed 
and liquid market in an underdeveloped and illiquid market may not work efficiently. 
Complementary institutions may cause barriers to any convergence to a foreign 
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governance feature. Therefore, for effective transplantation, foreign governance features 
must be adaptable to the recipient system which is compatible with existing governance 
institutions.52  
 
3.5.3 Politics, private rent seeking and control premium 
 
The extent to which private rent-seeking opportunities and control premium by the 
managers and controlling shareholders can act as barriers to reform and, consequently, 
limit the process of convergence is debatable. Coffee argues that opportunities for 
extracting private benefits and control premium by the managers and controlling 
shareholders put barriers in the way of convergence as existing inefficient structures may 
benefit controllers. 53 According to him, the objective of reform is to protect minority 
shareholders and this may decrease the incentive for control which they enjoy in existing 
structures and under inefficient rules. They may resist any reforms whose objective is to 
provide more protection with the connivance of political actors. 
 
In the context of Pakistan families and the state have control in most of the corporate 
sector. These families are directly involved in politics or have close relations with 
politicians. The control of these families in ownership and management provide them with 
opportunities for rent seeking and control premium. They may resist any reform whose 
objective is to enhance enforcement mechanisms and to provide the minority shareholders 
with protection. This may reduce their incentive to gain corporate control despite the fact 
that it may increase their cash-flow rights in the form of dividends. There is a trade-off 
between an existing structure where they can obtain the benefits of their controlling 
position, and reforms where they may get enhanced value for their shares as they have 
more cash-flow rights. Good governance enhances economic efficiency and, consequently, 
increases firm value. The controlling shareholders may have more benefits in the form of 
dividends as they have more stakes in the firm. However, the side effect of such reforms 
may be enhanced accountability, disclosure and an enforcement mechanism, which may 
decrease their potential to expropriate funds and their incentive to control firms through 
management and the directors. Politicians are supposed to compete in global competition 
and to improve economic efficiency in their own countries. Corporate governance is like a 
product market where competition is a driving force. A firm whose cost of production is 
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high compared to that of competing firms may not survive, so too, a firm who chooses the 
wrong terms, as opposed to those selected by other competing firms.54 So, any governance 
mechanism that is less efficient and unable to compete with other mechanisms may be 
extinguished by competitive forces. In this scenario politicians will be forced to reform 
even if they have a stake in the corporate arena. Abrupt and radical change in the 
corporate sector may create unrest among, and an outcry from, interest groups. Systematic 
and piecemeal reforms may counter this resistance. Once interest groups realize the 
potential benefits of reforms, they may welcome them.  
3.5.4 Difference in culture, ideology and politics 
 
The development of corporate governance systems of a particular country depends upon 
its political and ideological conditions.55 The culture and ideology of a country also 
determine the choice of corporate law and governance mechanism; for instance, in 
German culture there is trend of codetermination, and American culture resists hierarchy 
and centralized authority more than in French culture.56 Pakistan’s culture is a family-
controlled business structure.  
 
As far as political ideology is concerned, it also influences the determination of a 
particular governance structure; for instance, a communist system will focus on a state-
controlled governance mechanism. A social democracy may empower its employees more 
than capitalist countries. This has led owners in social democracies to control firms 
through concentrated ownership.57 Capitalist countries may focus on general public 
ownerships which may direct towards a dispersed ownership structure such as in the UK 
and the US. Coffee says that it is not necessarily only economic self-interest that acts as a 
barrier to convergence. Rather, national cultural traditions, nationalism and xenophobia 
may also hinder foreign governance norms; for instance, the French may vote against any 
law whose objective is to introduce an Anglo-American model without good reason.58  
 
Similarly, if the ideology of any country is religion, then religion can also play its role and 
resist any convergence to a foreign governance feature; for instance, Pakistan is an 
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ideological country where religion may have a role in the governance mechanism. 
Therefore, religion may play its role in determining the country’s governance 
mechanism.59 This ideological norm may direct a country in convergence to a particular 
governance mechanism. If a particular governance feature or whole structure is not 
compatible with the host culture and its ideology, then this may not converge and even if it 
is converged it may not be efficient. Therefore, the difference in culture, ideology and 
politics has an important role to play in corporate governance and may act as barriers to a 
foreign governance feature.  
 
3.6 Unique convergence in corporate ownership and corporate governance 
 
Globalization and competition are compelling convergence around the world. Ultimately, 
prime facie, features of corporate governance from different countries may merge 
together, on the basis of efficiency, to form a uniform corporate governance system 
around the world. However, there is disagreement on unique convergence to corporate 
governance. There are two rival systems operating in the world: (1) the concentrated 
ownership structure, which is dominant in continental Europe, Asia and most other parts 
of the world and (2) the dispersed ownership structure, which is dominant in the US and 
the UK. Both have merits and demerits.60 The extent to which convergence may take 
place, where the one system dominates over another system or, to put it another way, 
whether one system will converge to another in the sense that one pattern will be followed 
and another will disappear, is the topic of recent academic debate.61 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman predict that the American system of corporate governance based 
on shareholder value will dominate ultimately because of its worldwide acceptance.62 
However, some writers do not acknowledge this claim: Bebchuk and Roe maintain that 
there are practical difficulties in the unique convergence of corporate governance towards 
a single system. 63 Path dependency, and differences in culture, ideology and politics are 
major hurdles to cross in such convergence. Gilson observes that difference in 
governance, political institutions and possible response in changed circumstances across 
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countries and even within the same country may lead to substantial variation in national 
systems. This may lead to a hybrid form of convergence in corporate governance.64 
Bratton and McCahery believe that the presence of unique institutional and cultural factors 
operating at the national level limits the process of convergence to foreign governance 
systems. 65 The features of a national system are tied together in a complex web and it is 
difficult to separate one from the other. This interdependency limits the process of 
convergence. Convergence can occur only when the features of one system are detachable 
and are capable of transfer from one system to another system, and are compatible with 
the host jurisdiction. Schmidt and Splindler believe that the presence of dynamic corporate 
governance features around the world makes it less possible that there will be a rapid 
convergence to a unique and efficient system universally. 66 Path dependency and 
difference in complementary institutions, for example, the nature of ownership structures, 
stock markets, judicial systems, the composition of board structures, the role of 
stakeholders in corporate decisions and the nature of corporate laws (mandatory or 
enabling) in different systems may cause barriers in any possible convergence even to an 
efficient single governance system. In their latest work, Hansmann and Kraakman affirm 
their previous position on the dominance of the standard SSM. 67 They believe that the 
SSM is more likely to succeed over its rival systems: manager-, labour-, stakeholder- and 
state-oriented models, and family or unconstrained controlling shareholder models – due 
to its inherent adaptability to all types of ownership structures. Between these two extreme 
views some scholars have cautious view and stand in the middle: Coffee argues that two 
rival systems, namely (1) concentrated ownership and (2) dispersed ownership, will 
coexist. They are like ‘giant tectonic plates’ that grate, push and even override each other 
but cause friction whenever they meet. According to him, in the same way the formal 
convergence of one system to another may create social friction and unrest. The best way 
to avoid such friction is self-selection and migration by the management of firms through 
functional convergence.68 He predicts convergence in securities regulations rather than in 
corporate laws. The driving forces behind such a convergence in securities regulations 
may be globalization that has stimulated cross-country investment and raising funds in the 
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form of overseas listing.69 According to this view, formal unique convergence to one 
pattern may not be an imminent possibility. Some scholars have put forward the 
hybridization hypothesis.70 These scholars believe that economic institutions are not 
immutable and they are subject to change without complete change in the system. Foreign 
practices are incorporated in the system through the medium of adaptation so that they can 
fit into local institutional contexts. This process may lead to hybrid convergence rather 
than unique convergence to a system. Rasheed and Yoshikawa confirm this hybridization 
hypothesis. 71 According to them, the recent changes in the world show that most countries 
are converging, to some extent, to the shareholder model of the US but, at the same time, 
they are not willing to surrender their existing governance system. The process involves 
the adoption of certain corporate governance practices with careful adaptation and 
tailoring to local needs without abandoning most of the existing features of corporate 
governance. This process led to hybrid convergence.  
 
In the light of the above discussion, unique convergence in corporate governance is less 
likely in the near future. The features of corporate governance of different systems may 
converge due to competition, efficiency or globalization. Most probably the partial 
convergence of corporate governance features may occur. Convergence in corporate 
governance is an on-going process that may remain incomplete and transitory in nature.72 
Put another way, convergence may occur in a way that a feature of corporate governance 
of one system converges to another system, possibly on the presumption of being most 
efficient, and may be discontinued or abolished, and revert to the old system if the feature 
is not compatible with existing infrastructure or simply fall into oblivion. Alternatively, 
the system may again converge to the corporate governance feature of some other system. 
This process may continue indefinitely. This all depends on the quality of adaptation and 
compatibility of the recipient system to the new feature of corporate governance.  
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3.7 The application of theory in Pakistan 
 
As discussed above, convergence in corporate governance started long ago but this 
phenomenon has been intensified in the recent past especially after the recent financial 
crisis and globalisation of capital markets. Historically, convergence in corporate 
governance in Pakistan started soon after independence in 1947 through the adoption of 
British based corporate laws and subsequent imitation of these laws in developing its own 
laws. Pakistan is an underdeveloped but an emerging market which has taken billions of 
dollars in loans from the IMF, WB and ADB; therefore, the process of convergence 
intensified in the recent past through pressure from these international financial 
institutions to reform its corporate sector as condition for loans. This process may also be 
stimulated through further reforms in the near future due to different factors such as 
international financial institutions, inter related economies, overseas investment, 
competition, globalisation and integration of capital markets. At the same time, as 
discussed above, some factors such as dominant families, groups and the state may resist 
such reforms. The extent to which these factors compel or resist reforms will be discussed 
in this part of chapter three and remaining chapters. The objective of this part is to explore 
the possibility and effectiveness of reforms in order to improve corporate governance in 
Pakistan with discussion limited to few issues while those issues which require 
comprehensive discussion are left for the remaining chapters.  
 
3.7.1 Process of law making and standards setting in Pakistan 
 
There was a recession in Pakistan in the late 1990s, following the nuclear explosion on 
28 May 1998, post-explosion world sanctions and the global financial crisis. The 
corporate sector was dominated by families, groups and the state. Bad governance and 
corruption were common. The weak regulator was unable to perform and reform the 
corporate sector. The regulator, who was directly under government control, was staffed 
with employees who were not professionals. Corruption and inefficiency among 
employees were common. The government was unable to reform the corporate sector. 
Firstly, the families and groups involved were politically strong enough to resist reform 
that could restrict their expropriation and exploitation from the prevailing bad governance. 
Secondly, the government was not economically strong enough to carry out the reforms 
that were being undertaken in other countries.  
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During the 1990s the WB and the ADB focused on the support of government in the 
financial sector in Pakistan. The WB supported the government in the privatization of 
nationalized banks, whereas the ADB did so in capital market development under the 
Capital Markets Development Programme (CMDP). The focus of the programme was on 
establishing an effective regulator for better investor protection and the stock markets.73 
 
To the extent that it reformed the regulator, the government established the SECP which 
appears to be following the US style of regulator.74 It was given financial and 
administrative autonomy for the supervision and regulation of the capital market and other 
corporate entities, and replaced the former Corporate Law Authority (CLA) which was a 
wholly government owned department. The CLA was attached to the Ministry of Finance 
and its budget was allocated by the government through its resources. Employee pay was 
according to an official pay scale which was not attractive to professionals who could 
command good salaries in the private sector. Most of the officials at the CLA did not have 
professional qualifications. They were not aware of the technicalities of the corporate 
sector and they were corrupt as well. The purpose of creating the SECP was to minimize 
government control, attract professionals from the private sector and to make the SECP a 
strong regulator with all the administrative, functional and financial autonomy required, 
and to give it decision-making powers. However, the government still controls the SECP 
but now this control is indirect, compared to the control exercised by the CLA. Members 
of the Policy Board,75 the Commission76 and the Chairman of the SECP77 are appointed by 
the government.  
 
The Government of Pakistan passed the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
Act, 1997 (the SECP Act) which describes the constitution, structure, powers and 
functions of the SECP. The SECP became functional from 1 January 2000 and many 
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powers were given to it afterwards. Initially, the role of SECP was limited and included 
the regulation of the corporate sector and the capital market but with the passage of time 
its role was enhanced and now its functions include regulating the issues surrounding 
securities; stock exchanges; market abuse; takeovers; mutual funds; and the supervision 
and regulation of insurance companies and non-banking finance companies (including 
investment banks, discount houses and housing finance companies).78 It also includes the 
regulation of a specialized type of non-banking finance institution (including mudarabah79 
and leasing companies80), private pensions, and oversight of external service providers to 
the corporate and financial sectors (including chartered accountants, credit rating agencies, 
corporate secretaries, stock exchange brokers and agents, and insurance surveyors). 
 
The purpose of the SECP was to develop fair, efficient and transparent regulatory 
frameworks based on international legal standards and best practices for the protection of 
investors, especially minority shareholders and to develop an efficient and dynamic 
regulatory body that fostered principles of good governance in the corporate sector.81 
However, the reforms were not welcomed by the business community and led to 
substantial delisting after the issuance of the code in 2002 and revision in 2012. As 
reforms are meant to provide more protection to the investors, especially the minority 
shareholders, which limits the possibility of expropriation by the controlling shareholders, 
they resist such reforms. However, there was pressure on the government to adopt reforms 
because it was the recipient of loans from international financial institutions.  
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Figure 3.1: Companies delisted and merged during 1999–201382 
 
Table 3.1: Companies delisted on the KSE during 1999–2013 
S. No. Year Delisted Merged 
Aggregate 
(delisted + 
merged) 
Total after 
delisting and 
mergers 
1 1999–2000 7 0 7 754 
2 2000–2001 12 7 19 747 
3 2001–2002 24 16 40 711 
4 2002–2003 8 8 16 701 
5 2003–2004 18 39 57 661 
6 2004–2005 11 3 14 662 
7 2005–2006 6 8 14 658 
8 2006–2007 8 8 16 658 
9 2007–2008 5 8 13 652 
10 2008–2009 6 3 9 651 
11 2009–2010 3 4 7 652 
12 2010–2011 11 0 11 639 
13 2011–2012 51 2 53 590 
14 2012-2013 25 0 25 569 
  
Table 3.1 shows that a substantial number of companies delisted during 2002–2004 and 
2012-2013. The Code was issued in 2002 and revised in 2012. In 2012 the voluntary 
provisions of the Code were also converted into mandatory provisions which had more 
adverse effects than the initial issuance of the Code in 2002. 
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After attaining autonomy and independence from direct government influence, the SECP 
issued many laws, rules and regulations for almost every sector that came under its 
control. These include, but are not limited to, insider trading, institutional investment, non-
banking finance companies, takeovers, insurance, stock exchange regulations, disclosure, 
brokerage and frequency of directors’ meetings. This process converged to many 
international good practices of corporate governance, especially those of the UK and the 
US. 
 
As a second step in these reforms, the government disinvested its shareholding in some 
SOEs and issued its shares to the general public. This persuaded many family-owned 
companies to raise capital through IPOs, which led to the involvement of the general 
public in the capital market. Although the market is still dominated by families and the 
state, this phenomenon highlighted a number of governance issues such as minority 
shareholder rights, agency problems and enforcement.  
 
The series of reforms attracted the general public to become involved in equity investment 
in the form of shares. Lack of proper monitoring by the regulators allowed the market 
players to create a bubble which burst in March 2005. The general public suffered 
substantial losses. The market crash of 2005 further highlighted the importance of 
corporate governance in the market. A dearth of research on corporate governance could 
not provide appropriate policies for the government and policymakers to resolve these 
issues at an optimum level through reforms.  
 
The following major amendments were made in the corporate law of Pakistan: 
 
i. In 1995 s. 86 of the Ordinance was amended, which limited the pre-emptive rights 
of the shareholders. A public company was given power to raise capital without 
issuing rights shares. 
ii. In 1999 s. 90 of the Ordinance was amended to allow the company to issue shares 
with different rights and privileges. The regulator promulgated the Companies 
(Variation in Rights and Privileges) Rules, 2000. This amendment changed the 
old common law rule of one share, one vote, and allowed the issuance of shares 
with enhanced voting rights or without voting rights. It also allowed the issuance 
of preference shares. 
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iii. In 2007 a new s. 178A was inserted to allow the acquirer of a listed company 
having not less than 12.5% voting powers to ask the commission to require a fresh 
election of directors. This provision was meant to provide the acquirer with an 
opportunity to put his or her nominee on the board of directors. 
iv. In 2002 s. 193 of the Ordinance was amended and the frequency of directors’ 
meeting was increased from twice a year to, at least, quarterly meetings. 
v. In 2002 s. 196 of the Ordinance was amended, which increased the powers of 
directors by allowing them to write off bad debts and to compromise law suits. 
vi. In 1999 a new s. 197A was introduced, which prohibited the directors from 
distributing gifts to the members. This provision was meant to discourage 
directors from inducing members to vote in favour of their election or to vote for 
resolutions of their choice or to pass accounts without any objection. 
vii. In 2001 s. 204A was inserted to bind the listed companies to employing a 
company secretary. The company secretary is required to conduct secretarial, 
administrative and other ordinary duties.83 
viii. In 2007 a further amendment was made to s. 204A which required listed 
companies to appoint a share registrar. The objective of this provision was for an 
independent share registrar to conduct share transfer and transmission in a fair 
and professional manner. This may be helpful to avoid the fraudulent and bogus 
transfer and transmission of shares. 
ix. In 2007 a new s. 234A was inserted to give members who had 20% or more 
voting powers the right to ask for a special audit of the listed company. 
x. In 1999 s. 236 (2) (f to h) was inserted to enhance the duties of directors. 
According to these provisions, the directors of public companies are required to 
mention in directors’ report, which should form part of the balance sheet and 
annual report, the earning per share, reasons for the company’s loss in the 
financial year, a reasonable indication of future prospects of profit, information 
about defaults in payment of debts and the reasons for these defaults. 
xi. Similarly, in 2007 s. 236 (5) and s. 237 were amended so that the directors of 
holding companies are required to prepare the consolidated financial statements 
with their subsidiaries and also to make them part of directors’ report. 
xii. In 2002 s. 245 was amended to enhance the frequency of reports issued by listed 
companies. Listed companies are required to prepare and transmit quarterly 
reports to the members and to the regulators. 
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xiii. In 2002 the members were given powers to remove the auditors of the company 
through special resolution under s. 252 of the Ordinance. 
xiv. In 2002 s. 254 (3) (f) of the Ordinance was amended to prohibit auditors of listed 
companies from holding shares in the audit client or any associated company, and 
to disclose their interest, if any, held by them before they were appointed. They 
are required to disinvest within 90 days from the date of their appointment. 
 
These amendments provided some rights to the shareholders but, at the same time, some 
important rights were limited; for example, the limitations imposed on pre-emptive rights 
and permission to companies to issue shares with enhanced weighted voting and divided 
rights. These are important rights that have been curtailed in recent years. Nevertheless, by 
giving some rights to the minority shareholders the reform process has started. Some basic 
rights are still missing, such as derivative rights, and some rights are out-dated and require 
re-examination, such as the unfair prejudice remedy.84  
 
A major amendment was made to the securities law relating to insider trading provisions. 
S. 15A to 15E was inserted in the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, which 
enhanced the scope of insider trading. Before this amendment, insider trading was a 
criminal offence resulting in three years’ imprisonment and a fine but now it is only a civil 
offence with a fine set at a high amount. The objective of this conversion may be twofold. 
Firstly, criminal offences require strict compliance with the provisions of the law of 
evidence and the establishment of evidence beyond doubt. Therefore, it gives the benefit 
of doubt to the culprit and it is sometimes difficult to establish this kind of crime. 
Secondly, the intended objective may be to convert the power of cognizance from the 
court to the SECP. Under the law, any provision that provides punishment of 
imprisonment must be tried by a court and any provision in which the penalty is a fine 
falls within the jurisdiction of the SECP.  
 
Some judicial powers were transferred from the courts to the SECP through amendments 
to the Ordinance. Some powers were also transferred through the SECP Act, 1997. The 
purpose was to dispose of the cases without delay. However, the final disposal power is 
still with the court because the decisions of the SECP are appealable in the high courts, 
which did not resolve all the problems.85  
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The Central Depository Act, 1997 established the book entry system for the transfer of 
securities and therefore maintained the electronic version of securities of the companies, 
which helped to convert the physical shares into electronic forms to make the transaction 
more transparent. This helped to reduce manipulation by stockbrokers, and to stop unfair 
movement of the shares and the market. Many listed companies have not yet transferred 
physical shares into electronic form.  
 
The Listed Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting Shares and Takeovers) 
Ordinance 2002 was passed to regulate substantial acquisitions and takeovers. The 
Ordinance provides disclosure obligations on the acquirer. This ordinance requires the 
acquirer to inform the company concerned and the stock exchange when its voting shares 
exceed 10%.86 However, when such acquirer intends to enhance its voting shares or 
control over 25% of the listed company, the acquirer must make a public announcement in 
this regard.87 Similarly, when an acquirer, who already holds or controls more than 25% 
but less than 51% of the shares of a listed company, intends to exceed it, another public 
offering must be made.88 These requirements will be beneficial to the extent that it will 
restrict stealth acquisition of listed companies.  
 
The Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 was amended to integrate, corporatize and 
demutualize stock exchanges in Pakistan. Provision was made in Section 32E of the 
Ordinance 1969 for stock exchanges in Pakistan to be integrated, corporatized and 
demutualized by the end of 2006 or a time specified by the SECP but the process has not 
yet been completed. 
 
3.7.2 Development of a code of corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance has remained the focus of developed countries, especially the US 
and the UK, since the early 1980s. In recent years, there were global financial crises. 
These crises triggered the importance of corporate governance reforms all over the world. 
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The 1992 Cadbury Report was the major initiative in corporate governance in the UK.89 
The UK issued its first code based on the Cadbury Committee report on financial aspects 
of corporate governance in 1992. Since then there have been four new versions of the code 
which were issued in 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2010. Many developments have come about 
through reforms around the world which saw laws and regulations being changed through 
the development of codes of corporate governance in different countries. To improve 
investors’ protection, and to enhance disclosure, accounting standards and the presence of 
institutional investors in global markets pushed the development of codes of corporate 
governance in those areas in which legislatures either failed to legislate or were slow in 
responding to new developments.90 These codes were developed and diffused around the 
world more rapidly because they can be introduced through functional changes without 
the requirement of changing the basic legal framework. Institutional and market pressures 
were stimulants for development and diffusion of codes around the world. Regulators, 
stock exchanges, governments, directors associations, managers associations, professional 
associations, and investors associations were involved in promoting codes of corporate 
governance around globally.91  
 
The reform process started in Pakistan after the international financial crisis. As part of 
these reforms, the SECP issued the code of corporate governance in 2002. In Pakistan the 
SECP, in conjunction with the chartered accountants of Pakistan and the Institute of 
Corporate Governance, started working on forming a code of corporate governance in 
early 2000. The first code of corporate governance was introduced in March 2002. 
Globalization, international financial institutions, competition and economic efficiency 
and the development of codes in both developed and developing countries were the 
stimulants for the development of the Code. The Code was based on the UK Code of 
Corporate Governance, the King Report in South Africa and principles of corporate 
governance published by the OECD.92 The Code consists of best practices designed to 
provide a framework through which companies are directed and controlled. The objective 
was to safeguard the interests of the different stakeholders and to promote confidence in 
the market. In order to ensure compliance, the focus was on the best practices of common 
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law countries, especially those of the UK93 as the legal framework of Pakistan is based on 
that of the UK. The focus of the Code was on composition, qualification, the decision-
making process and practices of the board of directors. Some provisions, such as the 
requirement that companies facilitate minority representation on the board and 
representation of independent directors from institutional investors were voluntary.  
 
As per international practice,94 after almost ten years had elapsed, the SECP started 
revising the Code to incorporate further developments and to address shortcomings in 
previous versions of the Code. It, therefore, issued the draft Code of Corporate 
Governance for public opinion. The final revised version of the Code was issued in 
April 2012 with important amendments bearing in mind new developments and 
requirements since the publication of the first Code. It turned voluntary provisions of the 
previous code into mandatory provisions.  
 
Wymeersch has discussed the problems experienced with the enforcement of the Code. 95 
He argues that market pressures to improve corporate governance were the main driving 
force behind the introduction of the codes. The codes fill in the gaps left by the state 
legislature in providing shareholders with rights.96 Market forces had developed those 
good practices of corporate governances which had not been foreseen by the legislature.97 
Efficiency considerations are another major force in developing codes of corporate 
governance around the world.98 Wymeersch further argues that the degree of acceptance 
and application of the codes is better documented than many state-imposed regulations. 
99According to him, as market sanctions are the main force for implementing the codes, 
economic and financial penalty would be more effective. To avoid public law 
encroachment in the early stages, he emphasizes a stronger enforcement mechanism 
without abandoning the self-regulatory nature of the Code. He suggests that once these 
practices are accepted, applied, implemented and effectively enforced, they can be 
incorporated in the form of public law. Therefore, the nature of the Code has led many 
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jurisdictions to introduce best practices through codes in their country to fill in the gaps in 
corporate governance. This worldwide acceptance of a code of corporate governance 
fosters convergence of corporate governance at least at functional level.100  
 
In Pakistan, the enforcement of the Code is a major problem.101 The Code is part of listing 
regulations but it is not being implemented as part of these regulations. There is no 
evidence of any action being taken by regulators for non-compliance with the Code. The 
annual reports of the major companies show that stereotype reporting is included in these 
reports. The boxes are merely ticked without material observance of the Code. A major 
problem is that the management is not used to alien governance practices, especially those 
adopted from developed markets which operate in different circumstances. The UK, which 
offers strong incentives to enforce, has not yet converted the Code into listing regulations 
and it is therefore not advisable to make the Code part of listing regulations ab initio in 
Pakistan. Therefore, phased implementation of the Code may be a better idea. It is better 
to make this voluntary and then, in time, when abiding by the Code becomes the norm it 
can be made part of listing regulations and even part of company law. 
 
The other problem of enforcement is the penalty mechanism. As the Code is part of listing 
regulations, any non-compliance with the Code is dealt with under other violations of 
listing regulations. Compliance with the listing regulations is also not effective as the only 
penalty for non-compliance is delisting, which is too harsh under the circumstances when 
there is no substantial non-compliance. The regulator is also not interested in taking action 
in the form of delisting in the case of non-compliance. Firstly, there are already only a few 
companies listed on the stock exchange and delisting will further reduce the number. 
Secondly, many companies were listed on stock exchanges just to obtain certain benefits, 
for instance, tax incentives or to comply with business licensing requirements. Thirdly, 
delisting affects the shareholders who are not involved in non-compliance. Enforcement 
can be effective if there are other penalties besides delisting for non-compliance, for 
instance, a fine imposed on the management for non-compliance. The penalty should be 
commensurate with the quantum of non-compliance. This would at least ensure 
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compliance with the listing regulations. As to the Code, it should not be made part of 
listing regulations in the early stages of reform.  
  
3.7.3 International corporate interaction with Pakistan: An inward focus 
 
A recent phenomenon of globalization has seen corporate interaction between countries. 
This process pushes countries to improve their corporate governance and this, in turn, 
stimulates the importation of foreign good practices and thereby convergence of different 
corporate governance features. Foreign investors and international financial institutions 
have been the main actors in this process, especially in the context of underdeveloped and 
emerging markets such as Pakistan.  
 
3.7.3.1 The role of international financial institutions in Pakistan 
 
In the recent past there have been financial crises all over the world primarily due to the 
failure of appropriate monitoring. There were corporate scandals even in major 
jurisdictions, including the UK and the US. Recent years have seen high-profile financial 
scandals and corporate failures such as WorldCom and Enron in the US, Maxwell in the 
UK, Parmalat in Italy,102 Satyam in India103 and the Taj company scandal in Pakistan.104 
These scandals triggered the importance of corporate governance reforms all over the 
world. 
 
Crises in Asia and Russia in 1997 were a huge global trigger for international 
organizations to create minimum standards for corporate governance.105 The focus of 
financial institutions was on the developing countries due to weakness in their corporate 
sector. Developing countries such as Pakistan have been the main recipients of loans and 
they have, therefore, introduced a series of reforms in Pakistan.  
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Corporate governance failure was considered a major reason for these crises as identified 
by the WB and the IMF, and therefore these institutions tried to prescribe a minimum 
standard for their assessment criteria and for this purpose they looked to the OECD for the 
formulation of minimum standards.106 
 
In developing countries the focus of corporate governance is a recent phenomenon, 
especially after the financial crisis in Asia in 1997–8 and after the involvement of 
financial institutions such as the IMF, the WB and the ADB in bailing out countries from 
the crisis through huge loans and through conditions of corporate governance reform as 
part of the programme. One of the factors that caused these crises was deficiencies in 
corporate governance and it was the first time the importance of corporate governance was 
realized. Before it was only regarded as a policy issue.107 The recession in some Asian 
countries was blamed partly on weak corporate structures.108 It was, therefore, necessary 
to improve the corporate governance structure of particular countries. This attracted the 
attention of international financial institutions and they exerted their influence to improve 
corporate governance structures.  
 
The flow of international capital for economic restructuring in developing countries by 
international financial institutions, the WB and IMF has highlighted the importance of 
transparency and disclosure which are core in corporate governance. Corporate 
governance was not given much importance in developing countries for a long time as 
compared to developed countries.109 These institutions undertook a series of reforms in 
developing countries. They provided assistance in the form of loans and technical help, 
and set standards that formed part of the conditions of the loans.  
  
A recession, bad governance and economic meltdown during 1990s were stimulants for 
international financial institutions to focus on Pakistan as these institutions had advanced 
billions of dollars in the form of loans to Pakistan. The economic failure of Pakistan was 
significant for these institutions as these loans might become bad debts that could never be 
recovered. In Pakistan, the WB and the ADB focused on the support of government in the 
banking, finance and corporate sectors. The WB supported the government of Pakistan 
with the privatization of nationalized banks, whereas the ADB supported capital market 
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development under the CMDP. The focus of the programme was the establishment of an 
effective regulator for better investor protection and the stock markets.110  
 
The ADB was the major contributor in the form of a series of loans for corporate 
governance development in Pakistan. The main focus of the bank was on restructuring the 
apex regulator of the corporate sector. The ADB gave Pakistan a US$250 million loan 
under the CMDP in November 1997. The loan covered different aspects of capital 
development, including strengthening of securities market governance, institution, 
regulation and supervision. Besides this, the ADB provided a technical assistance (TA) 
loan of US$5 million for capacity building of the securities market in Pakistan.111 The 
ADB extended a US$600,000 TA grant on 7 August 2001. This was in addition to an 
earlier loan of US$250 million at the request of the Government of Pakistan. The objective 
of this TA grant was to extend the capital market reform processed earlier, enhancement 
of corporate governance standards, the creation of international best practices and capacity 
building.112 
 
In August 2002 the ADB approved a loan of US$260 million for Pakistan titled ‘Pakistan: 
Financial (Nonbank) Markets and Governance Program (FMGP); Strengthening Pension, 
Insurance and Savings Systems; Strengthening Regulation, Enforcement, and Governance 
of Nonbank Financial Markets’. The focus of this project loan was on improving corporate 
governance standards, transparency in disclosure, and enforcement for market participants 
and governance of the SECP.113  
 
In July 2007 the ADB granted Pakistan a loan of US$400 million with a TA grant of 
US$1 million titled ‘Second Generation of Capital Market Reform Program’. The focus of 
this programme was on the development of institutional investors with the objective of 
long-term capital formation, improved efficiency of securities market to increase the 
supply of corporate securities, and strengthening the governance of the capital market to 
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improve transparency and investors’ protection.114 The SECP promulgated different rules 
and regulations for the registration, formation, licensing and functioning of institutional 
investors in Pakistan. As a first step, it amended the Companies Ordinance, 1984 to 
empower the SECP to incorporate non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) and to 
regulate them.115 The State Bank of Pakistan was used to regulate the NBFCs before this 
amendment and promulgation of rules. The SECP introduced rules116 for the establishment 
and regulation of NBFCs, and then issued regulations in 2007117 which were replaced with 
the regulations of 2008118 to regulate institutional investors, inter alia,119 collective 
investment schemes.120 Collective investment schemes include both closed end scheme 
(CESs) and open end schemes (OESs). According to these regulations, a closed end fund 
means an investment company or a CES. An investment company is similar to any other 
trading company with its shares traded on the stock market, and individual investors can 
purchase and sell their shares in the secondary market. The objects of these companies are 
to invest their funds in the securities of other companies. The investment company must 
be registered as a notified entity121 before public subscription under the regulations. These 
companies have to comply with regulations that provide certain restrictions with regard to 
operations, functions, structures and investment decisions by these investment companies. 
An asset management company (AMC)122 is appointed by an investment company with 
the approval of the regulator to manage itself. A custodian123 other than an AMC and an 
investment adviser are appointed by the investment company with the approval of the 
regulator for the custody of all assets held and owned by it. To avoid conflict of interest, 
the custodian, AMC and investment company must be independent.124 These are given tax 
exemptions under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001. This favours the investors because it 
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provides a high percentage of return due to the tax benefits associated with these funds. 
Investment companies may change the AMC with the prior approval of the regulator.125 
 
A CES and an OES are constituted by way of a trust deed under the Trust Act, 1882 for a 
definite or indefinite period, and are managed by the AMC. Both CESs and OESs are 
registered with the SECP as notified entities under the regulations before public offering. 
The AMC appoints trustees for CESs and OESs which must be a body corporate. To avoid 
conflicts of interest, provision is made in the regulations that trustee must be independent 
of the AMC. The functions of trustee are to hold and control the assets of the funds 
beneficially for unit and certificate holders of OESs and CESs respectively. The trustee 
stands in a fiduciary relationship with unit holders and certificate holders as the case may 
be. The AMC is involved in the management of funds regarding investment decisions and 
pricing in OESs. The AMC may change trustee and propose a new trustee with the prior 
approval of the regulator.126 The basic difference between CESs and OESs is the capital 
structure of these funds. In OESs capital can be changed on an ongoing basis, whereas in 
CESs it cannot be changed. Unit holders in OESs can redeem their investment at any time 
and certificate holders in CESs cannot redeem their funds, rather, they can trade in the 
secondary market. These rules and regulations regulate the fund industry, and encourage 
the investors to invest through intermediaries which may be less risky and more attractive 
for individual investors than direct investment.  
 
The international financial institutions focused on the improvement of corporate 
governance of the economic entities, especially the listed companies. These listed 
companies represent a substantial part of the economy and therefore contribute a major 
portion of the gross domestic product (GDP) in Pakistan. These institutions provided aid 
in the form of loans to the government of Pakistan. In this way they secure not only the 
loan that is given for the development of corporate governance, but also all other loans 
that are given to the country for overall economic growth.  
 
International financial institutions have played an important role in the development of 
corporate governance in developing countries. These institutions imposed conditions for 
reform and improvement in corporate governance while extending loans to the recipient 
countries. These institutions have developed assessment criteria for good governance 
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which is helpful for these institutions to assess and set goals for improvement in their own 
corporate governance.  
 
Globalization is another factor that forces these international financial institutions to exert 
pressures on the recipients of loans to improve their structures. The economic failure of 
one country may affect the economy of other countries.127 This interdependence also 
motivates these institutions to focus on good practices and corporate governance, 
especially the recipient of the loans as a common object of these institutions.  
 
Pakistan has been the main recipient of loans from these institutions128 and, as a result, 
there was radical change in the corporate structure of the country129 with special focus on 
the improvement in corporate governance through series of loans and, consequently, the 
imposition of conditions for improvement in governance from these institutions as a 
condition of the loans. Adaptation and convergence in the corporate sector were the main 
phenomena in Pakistan due to pressure from international financial institutions to improve 
governance and, consequently, there were reforms in the financial sector and securities 
markets.  
 
The objective of these institutions was focused on securing their lending through 
improvement in corporate governance as good governance and a better economy can 
ensure the repayment of loans.  
 
3.7.3.2 Adoption of international standards 
 
The International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) provides international 
standards for securities markets. IOSCO is the primary international cooperation forum for 
securities market regulatory agencies. Its members represent almost 95% of the world’s 
securities markets. The objective of IOSCO is to cooperate in developing, implementing 
and promoting adherence to internationally recognized standards of regulations. It also 
aims to enhance investor protection and investor confidence through strengthened 
                                                 
127
 See text to n 27. 
128
 Recently, the IMF extended a loan amounting to US$5.3 billion under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
on 4 July 2013. The IMF instructed the Government of Pakistan to introduce reforms that include, but are 
not limited to, the privatisation of public sector enterprises and to improve corporate governance. For this, 
see the IMF website available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13249.htm> Accessed 
16.07.2013. 
129
 See text to n 85 in Chapter Two.  
86 
 
information exchanges both at global and regional levels. Moreover, it cooperates in 
enforcement against misconduct, and in maintaining fair, efficient and transparent 
markets, and in seeking to address systemic risk.130  
 
IOSCO adopted its principles known as ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulations’, which are internationally recognized benchmarks for securities markets. In 
2002 it adopted the ‘Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding’ (IOSCO MMoU) for 
the purpose of facilitating cross-border enforcement and exchange of information among 
international securities regulators. The ‘IOSCO Principles Assessment Methodology’ for 
the objective assessment of the level of implementation of IOSCO principles within its 
members’ jurisdictions was adopted in 2003. In 2005 the IOSCO MMoU was endorsed as 
the benchmark for international cooperation among securities regulators.131 
 
Pakistan’s apex regulator, the SECP, is an ordinary member of IOSCO and its main stock 
exchange, the KSE, is an affiliate member of IOSCO. The SECP, besides being a member 
of the IOSCO, also signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) in 2005 to address issues 
specific to these institutions. The purpose of this is to cooperate with each other through 
mutual assistance, and to facilitate the exchange of information for investor protection and 
promotion of market integrity. The objective of this cooperation is to assist each other in 
preventing insider trading, market manipulation, and other fraudulent, deceptive and 
manipulative practices, and in supervising and monitoring stock markets and compliance 
with the relevant laws and regulations. Similar bilateral MoUs were also signed between 
the SECP and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka, the Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan, the 
Maldives Monetary Authority, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the 
Securities and Exchange Organization of Iran for mutual bilateral cooperation for good 
governance in securities market.  
 
Globalization has increased the importance of this kind of cooperation. At a multilateral 
level there is IOSCO and at regional level there are instances of regional bilateral 
cooperation such as the Pakistani authority mutually cooperating with other states. 
Overseas investment in securities, foreign listing and the attraction of foreign capital have 
                                                 
130
 See IOSCO website at <https://www.iosco.org/about/> Accessed 10.11.2013. 
131
 See IOSCO website at <https://www.iosco.org/about/> Accessed 10.11.2013. 
87 
 
increased the importance of these bilateral agreements and international cooperation 
through IOSCO.  
 
3.7.3.3 The role of international investors 
 
An effective corporate governance system attracts not only domestic investors, but also 
encourages foreign investors to invest. Investment from foreign investors not only 
prospers domestic companies, it also helps to promote the economic growth of a 
country.132  
 
Foreign investment may either be in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) or foreign 
portfolio investment (FPI). In FDI, a foreign individual or overseas company invests by 
buying an existing company  or sets up a subsidiary company in the host country. On other 
hand, in FPI, a foreign individual investor or an overseas company buys shares or bonds  
in a target company in the host country.  These investments have implications for the 
governance regime of the host country.  
 
FDI may further be divided into two forms: investment through a private company or a 
public listed company. If FDI is through establishing a private subsidiary company then 
the governance regime of the host country may have minimum effect as the subsidiary 
company may follow the governance norms of the home country where its holding 
company is registered. This is made possible by the flexible nature of the default rules that 
typically govern private companies. On the contrast, if FDI is through establishing a 
public listed company then the governance regime of the host country will have 
implications for the subsidiary company as the companies in the public domain have to 
observe the governance regime of the host country. In Pakistan, the FDI through public 
listed companies is significant. As discussed in chapter two, multinational companies are 
the third major stakeholders on the stock exchanges of Pakistan. The foreign companies, 
including private and public listed, are mostly from the UK and the USA.133 Therefore,  
these companies may set standards  for the domestic companies for observance of good 
governance. As discussed in chapter two and three, the code of corporate governance in 
Pakistan converged largely to the UK code of corporate governance. Therefore, observing  
good practices, borrowed from the UK may not be an issue for the companies having their 
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parent company in the UK. This will act as a bonding for domestic companies to observe 
the code and thus facilitate convergence. Similarly, subsidiaries of US public listed 
companies will already be part of a group subject to a well-developed governance regime. 
 
So far as  FPI is concerned, foreign investors may have more concern regarding good 
governance in the host country. As the foreign investor may not have direct influence in 
management, therefore they may be more interested in getting maximum return on their 
investment. Therefore, international investors invest their money when they feel that their 
money is secured and may give them healthy returns. This would only be possible when 
the host country is a safe haven for their investment, both in respect of good governance 
and internal security. These investors may not be involved in direct pressure on the host 
country to improve governance owing to less voting rights. They exert indirect pressure on 
the host countries to improve their governance. This indirect pressure motivates the host 
countries to improve their governance to attract these investors to invest. If a host country 
fails to provide good governance they may move to those jurisdictions where they might 
get better protection and returns. This phenomenon is significant for those jurisdictions 
such as Pakistan which is an underdeveloped  and emerging market.  
 
In Pakistan security has been a main concern for the past two decades, especially after the 
9/11 attacks on the US. These events not only affected the US, but Pakistan and the rest of 
the world as well. Pakistan was indirectly affected by these events. FPI decreased 
substantially in Pakistan after the 9/11 incidents and subsequent security measures. 134 A 
study also confirms that international direct investment in Pakistan is directly affected by 
international and domestic factors such as economic, governance and security issues.135 
 
No doubt, security is an important concern for foreign investors but bad corporate 
governance is a severe and primary issue as far as investment is concerned. In the past few 
months the security situation in Pakistan has been improving but the issue is still 
improvement of corporate governance. As discussed earlier, the government and the 
regulator took some steps, but they were not enough to attract investment even from 
domestic investors. These steps are not as good as they look on paper. Much more work 
remains to be done.  To attract foreign investment, better corporate governance is 
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necessary. This pressurizes government and the regulator to enhance their corporate 
governance standards for healthy foreign investment. As international institutional 
investors have more leverage to invest in any country, they can, therefore be more 
effective in pursuing the home jurisdiction to improve corporate governance than 
individual investors. 
 
Table 3.2: Foreign Portfolio Investment in Pakistan during 1996-2013136 
S. No. Year US $ million 
1 1996 205.2 
2 1997 267.4 
3 1998 221.3 
4 1999 27.3 
5 2000 73.5 
6 2001 (140.4) 
7 2002 (10.1) 
8 2003 22.1 
9 2004 (27.7) 
10 2005 152.6 
11 2006 351.5 
12 2007 1,820.4 
13 2008 19.3 
14 2009 (510.3) 
15 2010 587.9 
16 2011 364.6 
18 2012 (60) 
19 2013 119.6 
 
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 below show that  FPI decreased after the 9/11 incidents and 
subsequent security issues in the back drop of the war against terrorism in Pakistan. In the 
year 2007, a general election was announced in Pakistan which saw some positive 
investment but in late 2007 a key political figure was assassinated by the terrorists which 
deepened the security issues in Pakistan and there was again a negative impact on foreign 
investment in 2008 and ensuing years in Pakistan. In addition to this, in the year 1999, the 
military takeover created political and democratic uncertainty in the country. This was a 
major reason for the decrease in FPI in 1999 and 2000. 
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Figure 3.2: FPI in Pakistan during 1996-2013 
 
Table 3.3: Foreign Companies in Pakistan as on 30.06.2013137 
S. 
No. Name of Country 
Number of 
Companies 
1 US 158 
2 UK 119 
3 France 25 
4 Germany 23 
5 China 38 
6 Japan 37 
7 Australia 21 
8 Middle Eastern Countries 63 
9 Far Eastern Countries 116 
10 Other European Countries 129 
11 Other Asian Countries 15 
12 Other Countries 94 
 
Table 3.3 shows that the US and the UK have the largest number of companies as 
compared to other countries. 
 
Although International investors do not exert pressure on host nations to improve their 
governance, they have sufficient incentive to indirectly influence the host nations to 
improve their governance. Therefore, in the context of Pakistan, international investors 
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may play an effective role in forcing the  government to adopt best practices and improve 
its governance structure. This phenomenon may encourage the process of adaptation and 
convergence to take place in Pakistan in order to improve corporate governance. 
Therefore, in the context of Pakistan there is a need to improve the corporate governance 
system with investor protection, especially minority shareholders; lowering agency cost; 
improving enforcement mechanism; and enhancing disclosure standards that could satisfy 
foreign investors. These factors will be discussed in the ensuing chapters. 
 
3.7.3.4 Institutional investors and corporate governance in Pakistan 
 
Institutional investors are playing an active role in capital markets in the advanced 
jurisdictions of the world. Investment through investment funds138 has become more 
popular in recent times. This form of investment is attractive for both private and 
institutional investors because they offer a degree of diversification that is often not 
feasible for individuals to replicate in direct investment. It also provides broad market 
access to individual investors because some issues of securities are offered only to 
institutional investors such as, for example, ADRs and GDRs. They are cost-effective 
because they provide economies of scale in respect of dealing, custody and transfer of 
securities as the fund benefits from operating on a longer scale.139 They also solve 
liquidity problems, at least in OESs, which is a major problem in markets of concentrated 
ownership jurisdictions such as Pakistan. 
 
The role of institutional investors in Pakistan is very limited and the fund industry is 
underdeveloped. In developed jurisdictions such as the UK and the US, institutional 
investors play an effective role in the market in disciplining the management of portfolio 
companies. Institutional investors can solve the collective action problem. They possess 
sufficient stocks to press the management of portfolio companies to improve corporate 
governance. The managers of institutional investors are normally professional and expert, 
and can negotiate with the management of portfolio companies to continue with good 
practices. Institutional investors can help to develop capital markets due to their position. 
A developed market is considered an important factor for the development of a corporate 
governance regime. Institutional investors have not yet played their due role in the 
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 ‘Investment fund’ may be defined as ‘an arrangement under which individual contributes to a common 
fund managed on their behalf by a professional investment manager’ for this definition see MacNeil (n 120) 
112. 
139
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improvement of corporate governance in Pakistan. There is still a need for reform in this 
sector, especially with reference to their role in negotiating with the management of 
portfolio companies. The UK Stewardship Code may provide guidelines in this regard. 
This code was issued to regulate and make more effective the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance. This code aims to enhance the quality of engagement 
between institutional investors and portfolio companies, and is expected to improve the 
long-term returns to shareholders and to discharge fiduciary obligations to ultimate 
beneficiaries.140 It is, therefore, necessary to enhance the role of institutional investors in 
Pakistan so that they can help to improve corporate governance.141 
 
3.7.4 Internationalization of Pakistani companies: An outward focus 
 
3.7.4.1 Foreign listing by Pakistani companies 
 
Globalization has increased the phenomenon of raising capital overseas through foreign 
listing. This process encouraged the convergence in corporate governance. Companies 
who wish to raise capital from overseas stock exchanges are required to fulfil specific 
foreign requirements. The companies have to incorporate certain terms in their articles of 
association, and have to run the companies according to the terms and conditions of the 
foreign exchange. This led to contractual convergence as this is a contract between issuer 
and stock exchange. This phenomenon is common at global level, especially those stock 
exchanges that are developed and liquid markets, such as the UK and the US stock 
exchanges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
140
 Iain MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’ (2010) 5 
Capital Markets Law Journal 419. 
141
 The role of the institutional investor in Pakistan will be discussed in Chapter Four, at 4A.3.3.1. 
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Table 3.4: Issuance of securities by Pakistani companies on overseas stock 
exchanges142 
Name of stock exchange Type of securities Number of companies 
London Stock Exchange GDR 6 
Singapore Stock Exchange Bonds 3 
Luxemburg Stock Exchange Bonds  1 
Luxemburg Stock Exchange Islamic bonds 1 
Luxemburg Stock Exchange GDR 3 
New York Stock Exchange ADR 2 
 
Pakistani companies started raising capital from overseas stock exchanges through issuing 
securities, including GDRs, and bonds, including Islamic bonds.143 The targets of 
Pakistani companies, so far, have been the LSE, Singapore Stock Exchange, Luxemburg 
Stock Exchange and New York Stock Exchange. As per Table 3.2, six Pakistani 
companies have listed GDRs on the LSE. The companies are required to follow the 
requirements of listing of GDRs introduced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 
irrespective of the requirements of domestic stock exchanges.144  
 
Similarly, other Pakistani companies also have to follow the requirements of other stock 
exchanges. There is the likelihood that in future Pakistani companies would be issuing 
premier listings on the LSE as well as issuing securities on other developed stock 
exchanges. This will then further require these companies to enhance their corporate 
governance, at least to satisfy the requirements of overseas stock exchanges through their 
articles of association. This phenomenon will stimulate the contractual convergence with 
the possibility of functional or formal convergence following.  
 
3.7.5 Convergence Theory and Pakistan 
 
The recent financial crisis and major corporate scandals all over the world highlighted 
corporate governance weakness which triggered actions from the jurisdictions to improve 
corporate governance in order to avoid further corporate failures. Each jurisdiction had 
                                                 
142
 Data have been taken from the website of the SECP and from Annual Reports of the SECP until up to 
2012-13.  
143
 The SECP’s approval is required for companies intending to raise capital overseas under s. 62A of the 
Ordinance read with s. 20 (5) (a) of the SECP Act, 1997. 
144
 See text to n 132 in Chapter Five. 
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different factors and causes which pushed governments to improve corporate governance 
norms. This phenomenon stimulated a series of reforms around the globe but at the same 
time some factors restricted or limited these reform processes. In the context of Pakistan, 
the global financial crisis, economic meltdown after nuclear explosion and subsequent 
world economic sanctions, 9/11 incidents and bad political, economic, institutional and 
corporate governance were main factors which triggered state to reforms. In the context of 
Pakistan, the international financial institutions were the main forces which exerted 
pressures on the state to reform the system whereas dominant families were the main 
forces which acted as barriers to these reforms. As discussed earlier, Pakistan has been the 
main recipient of the loans from IFIs; therefore, these institutions attached conditions to 
these loans to reform the system. The apparent objective of these reforms by these 
institutions is to ensure their loans with interest are paid back. As good governance 
improves the overall economy of the country; therefore, this ensures that the loans are paid 
back. The economies of countries are interdependent in the new global world; therefore, 
economic failure of one country may affect other countries. In this backdrop, these IFIs 
push recipient of loans to reform their system. This phenomenon has been more visible in 
Pakistan. Therefore, there have been some reforms in the last three decades due to 
pressure from these IFIs. In future, these institutions can still be a strong force to compel 
the state to converge in corporate governance due to heavy reliance of loans by the state 
from these institutions. 
 
Different kinds of convergence are evident in the Pakistani context. In the process of law 
making and standard setting in Pakistan, formal convergence was dominant where 
company law, securities laws and listing rules were amended to improve corporate 
governance in Pakistan.  The issuance of a code of corporate governance in Pakistan is 
also an example of formal convergence. The code in Pakistan is made part of the listing 
regulations as opposed to the UK, where it is implemented on a self-regulatory basis. 
Therefore, it shows a formal convergence with functional diversity.  
 
In recent years, some Pakistan companies have raised finance from overseas stock 
exchanges; therefore, contractual convergence was also visible in the Pakistani context 
through ‘bonding’ to foreign systems of regulations.  
 
In the context of Pakistan, there are different factors which caused hurdles in the 
convergence in corporate governance. Path dependent forces such as families and state, 
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complementary institutions and political, cultural and ideological norms all caused barriers 
to convergence. In particular, the dominant families in Pakistan are a strong force to 
compel divergence and to retain the status quo. In recent reforms, the dominant families 
have shown a negative attitude to the reforms. The issuance of a code in 2002 was a major 
breakthrough for reforms but resulted in substantial delisting from the stock markets in 
Pakistan. These families have economic and political dominance and therefore may 
represent a barrier to reform in the future as well. In this scenario, for successful reforms, 
there is a need to overcome the resistance from these forces. Therefore, the reforms can be 
successful if they are implemented in a piecemeal and pragmatic approach. The 
convergence theory can be helpful in this regard.  
 
In Pakistan, convergence theory can help to resolve these problems by implementing the 
theory systematically and through a pragmatic approach. Convergence may take place in 
three forms: Formal, functional and contractual. However, there are some advantages to 
contractual and functional convergence as compared to formal convergence. Firstly, it can 
avoid possible resistance to formal change in a legal and regulatory framework. Any 
change that may be introduced through formal ways may be resisted by path dependency 
sources such as families, groups and politicians as the status quo may benefit them. 
Secondly, functional and contractual convergence can be economically efficient as it can 
reduce the cost of change that may be caused by formal changes in the rules and 
regulations. Companies can adopt some good foreign practices to attract capital through 
alteration in their articles. Once this practice is successful, then other companies may 
follow, and this may lead to formal action by the regulator and legislature, which will not 
cost too much for the regulator to introduce through the legal framework. Thirdly, 
functional convergence can be used on a trial basis as a test case. If it is successful, it can 
be incorporated in a formal way and if it does not work, then change will not cost too 
much. This may also provide managers, regulators, policymakers and other corporate 
actors with opportunities to assess the compatibility of the new governance feature and, 
once it is successful and corporate actors become familiar with this change, it may be 
formally incorporated. Functional and contractual convergence may therefore provide 
policymakers with a road map for formal convergence.  
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MacNeil says that contractual convergence may be the precursor to functional or formal 
convergence.145 In the same way, as discussed above, functional convergence may be the 
precursor to formal convergence. It is possible for functional changes to be introduced in a 
particular country, for instance, through a code of corporate governance on a voluntary 
compliance basis, and once this is successful, then it may be incorporated into the formal 
legal system. To put it simply, it can be said that contractual convergence leads to 
functional convergence which, in turn, leads to formal convergence. 
 
Therefore, functional and contractual convergence may overcome resistance from path 
dependency forces in Pakistan. In addition, these functional and contractual changes may 
provide a roadmap to the policy makers, regulator and the state which may lead to formal 
changes in the legal and regulatory framework. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the process of convergence in corporate governance in a new 
global world and its implication for Pakistan. Globalization, competition and efficiency 
have fostered convergence through different forms of convergence: formal, functional and 
contractual. This phenomenon fosters the merging of different corporate governance 
systems but, at the same time, there are forces that restrict such convergence. Therefore, 
unique, imminent convergence of corporate governance is less likely in future. The 
presence of different barriers indicates that partial convergence with mixed features of 
different jurisdictions is more likely, that is, a hybrid convergence.  
 
 The convergence in corporate governance in Pakistan gained some momentum in the 
early 1990s when there was an economic meltdown in Pakistan in the context of the global 
recession. The state undertook some reforms but they were not enough to make a 
breakthrough. Most of these steps were good on paper only. Some changes were made in 
the regulatory and legal framework but most of them were too restrictive in nature to 
provide investors, especially minority shareholders, with rights.  
 
A major initiative was the introduction of the Code but it was not successful due to weak 
compliance and enforcement. The problem was the nature of the Code itself. The Code 
was implemented through listing regulations which provide non-listing as the only penalty 
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for non-compliance. The introduction of the Code as a soft law on a self-regulatory basis 
may be a good idea in the context of Pakistan where the corporate world is not 
accustomed to good corporate governance practices, especially foreign corporate 
governance features. Phased implementation may be a good idea. Alternatively, as the 
Code is part of listing regulations, enforcement of listing regulations must, therefore, be 
ensured through penalties which must be commensurate with the quantum of non-
compliance. This will ensure compliance both with the listing regulations in general and 
the Code in particular.  
 
Path dependency, complementarity institutions and families and interest groups, ideology, 
politics and religion are  barriers in convergence in corporate governance in the context of 
Pakistan.  
 
This situation may lead to scepticism about the imminence of radical reforms in the 
country. However, global and economic competition, efficiency and global pressures 
through international financial institutions and international investors may be strong forces 
that may compel convergence to international norms, and thereby act as stimulant in 
reforming the corporate sector in Pakistan. This process may be successful if reforms are 
made piecemeal, systematic and through a pragmatic approach.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: AGENCY COST AND MINORITY PROTECTION IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Two discussed the nature and objectives of corporate governance. The intention 
was to highlight corporate governance issues in Pakistan. Chapter Three discussed 
convergence theory and its application in Pakistan. The focus of the chapter was on 
discussing and analysing the process, mechanism and prospects of convergence in 
corporate governance in general, and in Pakistan in particular. The intention was to 
formulate mechanisms for improving corporate governance in Pakistan. The following 
chapters will discuss the specific application of the theory of convergence in corporate 
governance in Pakistan. Chapter Four is limited to a discussion of agency problems and 
minority shareholder rights which are major corporate governance issues in Pakistan.  
 
The agency problem is in the form of a triangle in which the managers, majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders are the three angles. Berle and Means claimed a 
century ago that the corporate world was controlled by the managers. The Berle–Means 
Model (BMM) was based on the presumption of dispersed ownership structures where the 
managers had control over the firms and the shareholders were mostly powerless. 
Therefore, the managers had opportunities to exploit the funds of their firms at the cost of 
the shareholders. This created a conflict between shareholders and the managers. 
However, the BMM is an exception rather than the norm in the corporate world. The 
BMM is mostly limited to the US and the UK. Concentrated ownership structures 
dominate the corporate world with families, groups and states controlling the corporate 
sector. In most of the corporate world, dominated by concentrated ownership, a majority–
minority conflict is more visible and common than the manager–shareholder conflict of 
the BMM. Nevertheless, conflict also exists between the managers and shareholders in 
concentrated ownership. Small and minority shareholders do not have enough stock to 
take any action against the managers in general meetings.  
 
However, the majority have direct control of the managers as they act as managers 
themselves or appoint family members, close relatives or friends as directors in family-
owned enterprises. In SOEs, political affiliation may be the basic criteria for appointment 
as directors. Majority shareholders are in a position to pressurize the managers to act for 
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their benefit. Therefore, in concentrated ownership, main agency conflict exists between 
the minority and the other two angles of the triangle, namely the managers and controlling 
shareholders. In this respect, there are two agency problems: (1) between the managers 
and shareholders, and (2) between the minority and majority shareholders.  
 
The first part of this chapter discusses the agency problem of the first kind, namely 
between the managers and shareholders. In this part the focus is on exploring the causes of 
the agency problem and the mechanism to reduce such agency cost in the context of 
Pakistan. This part of the chapter will discuss in detail the extent to which convergence to 
a mechanism of reduction in agency cost may take place in corporate governance in 
Pakistan.  
 
The second part of the chapter will deal with the agency problem of the second kind, 
namely between the minority and majority shareholders. 
 
4A Agency cost in corporate governance 
 
4A.1 The nature of agency cost 
 
An agency relationship is a contract in which one or more persons delegate decision-
making authority to one or more other persons to act on their behalf. The former are called 
principals, while the latter are called agents. In simple terms, an agency cost signifies the 
cost incurred by the principal in monitoring the activities of its agents. In the corporate 
world it means the cost incurred by the investors for monitoring the activities of the 
managers who run the firms. In a firm the shareholders are the principal, whereas the 
managers are agents. The shareholders as principals elect the managers as their agents and 
delegate decision-making authority to them. Investors invest money, whereas managers 
hold the control, which results in the creation of the agency problem. In public companies 
the separation of ownership and control creates an agency problem between the 
shareholders and the managers, which increases the cost of investment. As the managers 
use other people’s money, they are, therefore, not expected to use the money with the 
same vigilance as if it were their own. Therefore, negligence on the part of the managers is 
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expected in the affairs of the company.1 Therefore, controlling the agency cost is an 
important factor in the survival of the organizational form.2  
 
Jensen and Meckling3 have defined agency cost in the following way: 
 
Agency cost = the monitoring expenditure by the principal4 + the bonding 
expenditure by the agent5 + the residual loss6 
 
This definition covers all aspects of cost that may be incurred in the agency relationship. 
This definition is, to some extent, wide in the sense that it includes loss suffered by the 
decisions of the agents. In business, decisions are made by the agents, but this does not 
provide a guarantee that every decision will produce the desired results. In business even 
prime facie good decisions may not produce better results. This may be due to different 
external factors that are difficult to foresee beforehand. Nevertheless, bad decisions due to 
the incompetency of an agent may incur extra cost for the principal.  
 
The problem with agency cost is that it is difficult to make and enforce corporate contracts 
without cost.7 This is basically due to the very nature of the corporate sector in which 
companies operate. Companies are run by professional managers, whereas investments are 
made by investors who are not normally involved in the management of the companies in 
which they invest. Shareholding changes hands in public companies on a daily basis. 
Shareholders cannot negotiate the terms of their contract with the company in which they 
hold shares. They become shareholders by merely purchasing shares from the market. It is 
not possible to amend corporate contracts frequently with the change of hands. To control 
agency cost through meetings of shareholders and enforcement is another costly problem 
in the corporate sector. Therefore, agency problems remain in the corporate form and good 
corporate governance tries to control or, at least, reduce it. Statutory laws, common laws 
and human ingenuity in drafting contracts determine the magnitude of the agency cost. In 
                                                 
1Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Edwin Cannan ed, Volume 
II, Methuen and Co., London 1904) 233.  
2
 Eugene F. Fama, and Michael C. Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residuals Claims’ (1998) 26 Journal of 
Law and Economics 345.  
3
 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Management Behaviour, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 (4) Journal of Financial Economics 5-6. 
4
 The cost incurred by the principal to monitor the activities of the agent.  
5
 The bonding expenditure means expenditure of resources by the agent guaranteeing that he or she will not 
take certain action that will harm the principal or to ensure that he or she will compensate for such actions.  
6
 The loss incurred by the principal for divergence of decisions by the agents which otherwise would have 
benefitted the principal. 
7
 Fama and Jensen (n 2) 327. 
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order to reduce agency cost and to enhance good corporate governance, there have always 
been incentives to reduce this cost.8 The legislature tries to solve this problem through 
statutory and non-statutory regulations. Non-statutory regulations include the codes of 
corporate governance, which are normally implemented on a self-regulatory basis. This 
reduced agency cost is important for running firms successfully. 
 
4A.2 Causes of agency cost 
 
4A.2.1 Separation of ownership and control 
 
The modern concept of a company, in which there is a separation between ownership and 
control, creates agency problems. This problem arises largely because the interests of the 
agents are not always aligned with those of the principal. The agents may take such 
decisions as are not in the interest of the principal. The agency problem also arises due to 
the incomplete contractual nature of the corporate form of a company as a principal cannot 
specify ex ante, in a strict sense, the terms and conditions for employment of its capital. 
This problem arises more in public and big private companies than in small private 
companies. In small private companies there is practically no separation of ownership and 
control. The shareholders and the managers are the same people, and ownership and 
control are both vested in the same person.  
 
The BMM provides the managers with an opportunity to expropriate the funds of the 
company at the cost of the shareholders9 but that does not mean that management is in 
complete control of the company and free to expropriate the profits of the company at 
their pleasure.10 In modern times, a good corporate governance regime could provide 
different techniques for reducing agency cost. Nevertheless, the agency problem is more 
prominent in dispersed shareholding than concentrated shareholding. In dispersed 
ownerships there is a separation between ownership and control. The shareholders are 
dispersed and the company is run by professional managers who are normally not owners. 
They run the company in a way that provides them with opportunities to extract private 
benefit of control. However, the nature of the agency problem is different in concentrated 
ownership. In this form of ownership, the controlling shareholders can put pressure on the 
                                                 
8
 Jensen and Meckling (n 3) 1. 
9
 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (MacMillan, New York 
1932). 
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 H. Demsets and K. Lehn, ‘The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences’ 93 (6) 
(1995) Journal of Political Economy 1155. 
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managers to work for the maximization of the wealth of the firm and may remove 
managers who do not work in the best interests of the firm. However, if shareholders own 
blocks of shares but not enough shares to remove directors or the removal of directors is 
difficult, the agency problem still remains. Another aspect of the agency problem in 
concentrated ownership is conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders. 
Majority shareholders control the board of directors who focus on the interests of majority 
shareholders, and minority shareholders are normally at the losing end. This problem is 
actually between those who have and those who do not have control. 
  
In Pakistan, families and the state control the corporate sector. There are different aspects 
to the agency problem in Pakistan. Here control and ownership are vested in the same 
people. In family-owned enterprises the directors and top management are family 
members themselves, relatives or persons they hold in their confidence. Similarly, people 
who have political affiliation are directors in SOEs. As the controlling shareholders 
control the managers, the actual agency problem exists between the majority and minority 
shareholders. Nevertheless, the agency problem exists between the managers and the 
shareholders, especially the minority shareholders.  
 
4A.2.2 Incentives for private rent seeking and expropriation 
 
In the modern form of the company, managers have substantial discretion to run the 
company, which provides them with opportunities to obtain the private benefit of control 
and to expropriate company funds. This discretion can be due to a number of different 
factors. Firstly, an incomplete contract between the managers and investors provides 
managers with discretionary powers. Investors cannot force managers ex ante to manage 
their finance, which leads to the discretionary powers of the managers to employ the 
investment. Secondly, lack of expertise on the part of the investors to become involved in, 
monitor and to decide a particular course of action in the managers’ business decisions 
leads to problems. Thirdly, it is not feasible to involve all shareholders in the day-to-day 
affairs of the company. Fourthly, the courts have shown their reluctance to involve 
themselves in the routine matters of firms unless there is massive violation on the part of 
the managers. In the US though, the courts have a more extensive role compared to others 
but even there there is the so-called ‘business judgment rule’ that keeps courts out of the 
affairs of firms in most cases. Fifthly, the involvement of dispersed and poorly informed 
investors who do not know how to exercise the control rights that the law has granted 
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them is also problematic. Sixthly, the cost of taking action through general meetings is 
also relevant. Seventhly, the cost of taking action through courts is an important factor that 
provides managers with discretionary powers. In many cases the shareholders may not be 
interested in approaching the courts due to the cost and time involved. Eighthly, the 
controlling shareholders are themselves involved in the management. They act as 
managers or appoint their family members, relatives or close friends as managers. They do 
not take any action against managers and it is also not expected that they will take action 
against themselves. Therefore, this provides managers with unchecked discretion. The 
outcome is that the managers and controlling shareholders have the right to control the 
allocation of funds in firms. As a result, they have an opportunity to obtain private benefits 
from this control and to expropriate the funds as they wish.  
 
The private benefits of control and expropriation can take place in a number of ways. 
Related party transactions, empire building, tunnelling of funds and executive 
compensation are basic techniques used to obtain benefits. In related party transactions, 
the managers and controlling shareholders enter into transactions, on behalf of the 
company they run, with other companies, which they hold, at less than the market price, 
giving those companies that they hold the benefit and thus benefiting even more indirectly 
themselves. These transactions may include the selling of products at a lower price made 
by the company they run to the companies they own. The managers even sell the assets of 
the company that they run to the company they own at less than the market price.  
 
In empire building, the managers and controlling shareholders are more concerned with 
expanding the business by either establishing more business units or incorporating new 
firms under their control. They are more interested in resource control and in enhancing 
their interest and less in the real allocation of business funds and the interests of investors. 
Instead of distributing profits to the shareholders, they further invest and thereby create 
their empire. They undertake such projects that benefit them, which may cost the 
shareholders. They may pursue such projects even if they come at a higher cost to the 
investors than benefits to the managers or the controlling shareholders.11  
 
In the tunnelling of funds, the managers and controlling shareholders transfer the funds of 
the company they control to the company they own through secret methods. This may take 
                                                 
11A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 (2) The Journal of Finance 
744. 
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a number of forms: extending loans to the company they own at an interest rate that is 
lower than market value or on soft terms and conditions, transferring assets and resources 
to such companies. Some related party transactions may also be involved in this activity.  
 
Executive compensation is another factor that constitutes the expropriation of the funds of 
a company. Managers may pay excessive amounts to themselves as pay and privileges. To 
avoid criticism, action from the shareholders and interference from courts, they sometimes 
try to avoid direct personal benefits but consume perquisites such as luxury cars and 
company aeroplanes.12 They also enjoy other privileges, including but not limited to, 
taking expensive trips; renting costly buildings for their personal residences and offices; 
and hiring more staff than required, which they fund by utilising the funds of their firm. 
Another form of expropriation may be the hiring of family members, relatives and friends 
for highly paid jobs. Not only do these managers compromise merit, they divert company 
funds to their own at the cost of the company. Managers who persist in a job when they 
are no longer required13 or offer resistance when they are poorly performing are the 
costliest manifestation of the agency problem.14 In short, they use their control rights to 
pursue those projects that benefit them personally instead of the investors or firms.15 
 
The owners are normally the monitors of the managers but if managers have substantial 
ownership, they also become monitors. This concentration of ownership and monitoring 
aggravates the situation which normally arose in concentrated ownership structures. The 
controlling shareholders have a duty to monitor managers but if the person whose duty it 
is to monitor is also involved in sophisticated forms of stealing, then the situation is 
worsened. The separation of management and monitoring is therefore essential in 
concentrated ownership structures. However, Holderness and Sheehan do not believe that 
the concentration of ownership by majority shareholders is primarily meant to expropriate 
corporate resources. According to them, these shareholders concentrate shareholding 
merely to control the firm and not to expropriate it. The authors argue that had that been 
the case, the firms with concentrated ownership would not have survived.16 Wessel wrote 
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in the Wall Street Journal that the American economy and stock market had performed 
better than any other on earth.17 He negated the general presumption of stealing by 
American executives from the shareholders and rigging of the stock market. According to 
him, had this been the case, the American economy would not have surged. These 
presumptions are partially correct. Firstly, the expropriation may be limited to the extent 
that it reduces the profit margin. The firms may have earned more profit had there been 
less or no expropriation. Secondly, the expropriation is also not limited to executives. The 
majority shareholders are also implicated in activities involving the exploitation of funds. 
Thirdly, the agency theory presented by Jensen and Meckling suggests that the controlling 
shareholders and corporate managers expropriate the minority shareholders. They act in 
their own interest at the cost of other minority shareholders.18 Fourthly, LLSV state that in 
family-owned firms the controlling shareholders are not only the best monitors of the 
firms, but are also part of the management who have incentives to expropriate minority 
shareholders. The cash-flow rights of these controlling shareholders mitigate the 
incentives of expropriation but do not eliminate it.19 Therefore, the investors’ rights can be 
protected if the problem of managers and controlling shareholders expropriating funds is 
addressed.  
 
In Pakistan the expropriation of funds is a common phenomenon. The corporate sector in 
Pakistan is highly concentrated with families and the state controlling it. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, families and the state are the largest stakeholders in this sector in Pakistan, 
with a shareholding of more than 75% in many listed firms. In order to maintain control, 
they rarely sell their shares in the market. A very small number of shares are traded on the 
stock market which creates liquidity problems. An illiquid market is problematic for 
takeovers, which is the main tool for shifting control. They also maintain control by 
pyramiding, cross-shareholding, interlocking management and by issuing shares with 
differential voting rights. These families and the state have control in excess of their cash-
flow rights. This provides an opportunity to dominate the board of directors and also top 
management which provides them with opportunities to expropriate at the cost of the 
minority shareholders.  
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4A.3 Reduction of agency cost 
 
If agency cost is not reduced, then there is the danger that firms will fail and be liquidated 
at the end. Agency cost is like product cost where those firms survive competition who 
produce products at the lowest price and sell to customers at the lowest price. Profit is 
earned after all costs have been subtracted. If the cost is increased and products become 
costly, the survival of the firm becomes difficult. In the same way, the reduction of agency 
cost is important for the survival of firms. If agency cost is very high, it may reduce the 
profit margin for the investors. This will discourage investment and organizational forms 
may not be successful.20 Different factors have been considered in reducing agency cost.  
 
4A.3.1 Ex ante and ex post mechanisms 
 
There may be different strategies to resolve the agency problem. This may be either ex 
ante or ex post. In an ex ante mechanism, the information is available to investors through 
different disclosures which provide new investors with opportunities to know beforehand 
whether or not to invest in a particular company. The disclosure may include the directors’ 
reports, annual financial statements and other periodical statements. In an ex post 
mechanism, the mangers are given powers to run the company and if the management is 
not performing, then the shareholders may take different actions such as removing the 
directors, participating in decision-making in general meetings and taking action against 
directors through the courts.  
 
4A.3.2 Separation of control and monitoring 
 
Separating control from monitoring is an ex ante strategy for controlling the agency 
problem. Shareholders delegate the powers to take decisions in the day-to-day affairs to 
the managers. As the interests of the managers and the shareholders are not always 
identical, it exacerbates agency problems. The large shareholders are considered the best 
monitor of the management.21 However, if they involve themselves in the management, 
control and management will be vested in the same persons. Therefore, it is not expected 
                                                 
20
 Fama and Jensen (n 2) 345.  
21
 The separation of management and monitoring model was presented by Shleifer and Vishny in A. Shleifer 
and R. W. Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’ (1986) 94 (3) The Journal of Political 
Economy 461-88. 
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that they will monitor themselves. However, if monitoring is separated from both the 
control and management, agency problems may be reduced to some extent.  
 
This problem is more severe in Pakistan where there is concentration of ownership with 
families and the state dominating the corporate sector. They control the firms and 
therefore control the management. Therefore, if the monitoring of management were to be 
separated from both the control and management, it may solve the problem to some 
extent. Different strategies may be employed for this purpose. Firstly, the enhanced role of 
independent directors may be useful. As the independent director does not have a direct 
interest in the firm, he or she may monitor management independently. Secondly, 
allocating some seats to the directors representing minority shareholders may also solve 
this problem. Minority shareholders do not have controlling powers to expropriate. 
Therefore, they may work for the welfare of the whole firm and may act as monitors. 
There are certain benefits to appointing members to the board of directors. This provides 
them with an opportunity to gain access to information; work and safeguard the interests 
of minority shareholders; and to collaborate with independent directors to discuss the 
interests and concerns of the minority shareholders in the meeting of the board of 
directors.22  
 
Thirdly, active institutional investors may play an important part in monitoring the 
management and pursuing good governance. There is, therefore, a need to enhance the 
role of institutional investors in Pakistan.  
 
4A.3.3 Shareholder activism and institutional investors 
  
Shareholders activism is a common problem in dispersed ownership structures. 
Shareholders are dispersed, which makes monitoring and disciplining management a 
difficult task. In concentrated ownership systems there are block holders or majority 
shareholders but there may also be small and minority shareholders who do not have 
enough stocks to pursue management in the interest of good corporate governance. 
Therefore, shareholder activism may also be an issue in these systems. Institutional 
investors may solve the agency problem.  
 
                                                 
22
 Luca Enriques, H. Hansmann, and R. Kraakman, ‘The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders 
and Non-Shareholder Constituencies’ in R. Kraakman et al (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach’ (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009). 
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Rapid changes in ownership due to high-speed stock trades on stock exchanges and the 
lack of coordination in taking collective action are major problems. The issue of rapid 
change in ownership structure can be solved by institutional investors. Institutional 
investors hold investments in portfolio companies and issue units to their investors. 
Unit/certificate holders may change hands but shareholding in targeted companies remains 
constant, at least, in closed-end funds due to the very nature of institutional investors.23 
This provides managers with the leverage to hold investments in portfolio companies for 
longer periods. In this way, they can exert pressure on the management to improve 
corporate governance. 
 
Cost is another problem that hinders collective action. Where an individual shareholder 
intends to discipline management by taking action, for example, derivative action, it may 
be too expensive weighed up against the potential benefit to such shareholder. This may 
also not be an attractive course of action for individual shareholders because they have to 
share the benefit with other investors. Institutional investors may be the answer to this 
problem. The cost of activism may be reduced if action is taken through institutional 
investors as the cost will be shared by all the unit/certificate holders or shareholders of the 
institutional investors. They will be willing to pay the cost incurred as this will benefit 
them. There are two benefits to action through institutional investors. First, the corporate 
governance of the targeted firms will be improved and that will be beneficial not only to 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the institutional investors, but to the shareholders of the 
targeted firm as well. Second, ‘positive externalities’ will be generated that will send the 
right message to other companies to improve their corporate governance mechanism.24  
 
Institutional activism can replace discipline imposed on managers through the threat of 
hostile takeovers.25 Hostile takeover is a threat for incumbent managers who are not 
performing because the successful bidder may remove such managers. More engagement 
on the part of the institutional investors may urge managers to perform better and improve 
the governance mechanism. Therefore, monitoring by institutional activism provides 
managers with the incentive to focus on the long-term prospects of the firm.26 
                                                 
23
 Closed End Schemes and Open End Schemes are discussed in detail in Chapter Three at 3.7.3.1.  
24
 Iain MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’ (2010) 5 (4) 
Capital Markets Law Journal 424. 
25
 Roberta Romano, ‘Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of 
Corporate Governance’ (2001) 18 (2) Yale Journal on Regulation 174-252. 
26
 Junghoon Park, ‘Governance of and by Institutional Investors’ (5th Roundtable on Capital Market Reform 
in Asia, Ministry of Finance and Economy, Republic of Korea ,Tokyo, November 19-20 (2003) available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/19388822.pdf> Accessed 22.08.2013. 
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However, there are some disadvantages to institutional activism. Institutional investors 
have to hold enough shares and for a longer period to exert pressure on the management to 
improve its governance structure. The problem with holding shares for long periods for 
the sake of disciplining management is that it may create a liquidity problem in the 
market. Liquidity has to be sacrificed in order to get the potential benefits of activism.27  
 
The requirements of diversification may be a barrier to an institutional investor 
accumulating sufficient shareholding to justify the cost of the activism or to hold enough 
shares to call a general meeting of shareholders to take any action. Insider trading rules 
and takeover regulations may be a problem in this collaboration and activism. The rules of 
a particular country may also be deciding factors. In the UK perspective, there are legal 
constraints to such activism.28 The market abuse regime, under the Financial Services and 
Market Act, 2000 provides limitations on activism by constraining the ability of an 
investor to deal in shares if the investor can be considered to have become an insider as a 
result of an intervention. This act may be unintended, for example, when the shareholders 
collaborate, engage and negotiate with the company, the management of the targeted 
company may give some information which may be considered insider information. After 
becoming an insider, they will be prohibited from selling or buying their shares. Another 
problem in such collaboration are takeover laws. If any institutional investor buys shares 
to hold enough stock to take action, this may be problematic in terms of these laws. After 
reaching the 30% threshold, they have to bid for the whole targeted company. The 
regulatory authorities in the UK tried to explain the extent of market abuse in these 
circumstances but that complicated the situation.29 Therefore, activism may be 
problematic under the market abuse regime of a particular country.  
  
There are different views regarding the effect of institutional investors’ activism on the 
performance of the targeted firms. Romano believes that, empirically, there is no positive 
effect on the performance of the targeted firms; rather, sometimes there is a negative effect 
on the share prices of the targeted firms after such activism.30 Park argues that the 
managers of the funds are not considered expert enough to engage and solve the problem 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 F. Curtiss, I. Levine, and J. Browning, ‘The Institutional Investor’s Role in “Responsible Ownership”’ in 
I. MacNeil and J. O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 309. 
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 MacNeil (n 24) 428-9. 
30
 Romano (n 25) 174-252. 
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of the portfolio companies through such activism. 31 According to him, the activism also 
detracts them from their primary role for which the funds are formed; for instance, if a 
pension fund is involved, they will focus more on the managers of the targeted firms 
instead of on the welfare of the pensioners.  
 
Bainbridge argues that institutional investor activism has not and cannot solve the 
problems of corporate governance. 32 He believes that such activism will not solve the 
agency problem; it will only shift its focus. The problem that existed between the 
shareholders and the management of the targeted company will be shifted to a new point 
between shareholders and the management of the investment company. The shareholders 
will still suffer and the agency problem will remain. This assumption is correct but the 
potential benefits of activism may be greater than the disadvantage of the agency problem. 
Institutional investors hold the stock of different companies and may, therefore, play their 
role in improving the governance of the targeted companies. If they improve the 
governance of all the companies, the impact of the activism may be greater than the 
agency problem in the investment company.  
 
Conflict of interest is also a major problem in institutional investor activism.33 There are 
different forms of conflict of interest; for instance, an investment manager will be 
reluctant to take action against a portfolio company if such company has client relations 
with the bank or financial institution that is the holding company of the investment 
manager.34 Conflict of interest may also be visible in the situation where the manager of 
the fund is also a director in the portfolio company by virtue of his personal shareholding 
in the target company. Such a manager is not expected to take any action against himself 
as part of the board of directors.  
 
Irrespective of the aforementioned problems, the role of institutional investors has been 
regarded as being significant in recent years, especially after the recent financial crisis. 
Institutional investors have been blamed for their passive role in monitoring the board of 
directors of the financial institutions that contributed to the crisis.35 They had the potential 
                                                 
31
 Park (n 26). 
32
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to discipline management and to improve overall corporate governance structures but they 
failed to take appropriate action even when this was in the interest of their clients.36  
 
The UK Stewardship Code was issued in this regard to regulate and make more effective 
the role of the institutional investor in corporate governance. The objective of the code is 
to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and portfolio 
companies.37 The code does not emphasize public activism directly but provides a series 
of negotiations by creating a ladder according to which intervention is escalated. There are 
different stages in such an intervention, including confidential discussion with the firm. If 
this is not successful, then other options are: holding additional meetings with 
management; expressing concerns through the firm’s advisers; meeting with the 
chairperson, senior independent director or with all independent directors; and intervening 
jointly with other institutions on particular issues.38  
 
Institutional investors can play their role in improving governance in portfolio companies 
in a number of ways: they can conduct private negotiations with the management of the 
portfolio companies; they may appoint directors on portfolio companies and thereby 
monitor the performance of targeted companies; or they can also act as shareholders in 
general meetings to persuade the management to follow good corporate governance 
practices. 
 
4A.3.3.1 Institutional investor activism in Pakistan 
 
Institutional investment is in the process of being developed in Pakistan. Institutional 
investors are less active in Pakistan compared to the UK. They have not played their due 
role in corporate governance in Pakistan. Different types of institutional investors are 
functioning in Pakistan where some operate under state control and others act in the 
private sector. The National Investment Trust Limited (NITL)39 and Investment 
                                                                                                                                                   
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> 
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Corporation of Pakistan (ICP)40 are the largest investors working under state control, while 
most of the AMCs, international joint ventures, brokers, provident and private pension 
funds, and the mudaraba are small fund managers who work in the private sector. 
 
Pakistan has a small and growing fund industry. This industry holds approximately 5% of 
total market capitalization. Institutional investors may play a major role in corporate 
governance. They have sufficient voting powers to sit on the board of portfolio companies. 
Institutional investors other than brokers can sit on corporate boards. Brokers are 
prohibited from becoming directors of a listed company under the code of corporate 
governance. Similarly, banks can appoint their nominee as a director of a client company 
as a condition of a loan contract under the company law of Pakistan. For example, NITL, a 
major investment trust in Pakistan, can appoint members on many corporate boards and 
thus can play a major role in improving corporate governance.41 
 
The SECP issued detailed regulations for licensing, registration and the internal conduct of 
business for institutional investors in Pakistan but there are no statutory or non-statutory 
regulations for institutional investor activism. There is no guidance on engagement of 
these institutions in corporate governance with portfolio companies. Lack of regulations or 
guidance may be a hurdle in improving corporate governance in portfolio companies in 
particular and overall corporate governance in general.  
 
The operation of major fund managers, for example, NITL and ICP which are under state 
control, is yet another problem for the development of institutional investment in Pakistan. 
                                                                                                                                                   
holders as on 30.06.2013. The trust operates five different funds under its control. The trust was constituted 
under the Trust Deed dated 12.11.1962, executed between the NITL as the management company and the 
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also in the Arab Emirates Investment Bank (AEIB) in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
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The state is the owner of the ICP as well as holds more than 58% shareholding of the 
NITL, a management company of different funds operating under its control.42 Direct state 
control presents the usual governance problems. The state’s appointment of directors 
through its executive orders may compromise merit. Political affiliation may be the major 
qualification for the appointment of directors in these entities.  
   
There is a need to pay more attention to institutional investors in Pakistan. The fund 
industry requires development. The inactive role of institutional investors, especially those 
under state control, is one of the main reasons for the underdevelopment of the industry. 
The fund industry can develop in Pakistan, provided few steps are taken. First, by 
privatising state-owned fund management companies such as the NITL and ICP, the 
competition can attract professionals from the private sector to run these institutions in a 
professional manner. This may benefit the entity itself and improve the corporate 
governance of portfolio companies. Second, a soft law code, patterned on the stewardship 
code in the UK, may guide the institutional investor in active engagement in corporate 
governance issues of the portfolio companies through dialogue with the board of directors.  
 
4A.3.4 Legal protection 
 
One important strategy to reduce agency cost is to provide investors, especially minority 
shareholders, with legal protection. In the absence of legal protection, managers and the 
controlling shareholders can expropriate the minority shareholders. Agency cost can be 
reduced if expropriation is made difficult by an ex ante mechanism such as a disclosure 
strategy or an ex post mechanism such as providing minority shareholders with a remedy 
to sue directors and controlling shareholders.43 In Pakistan the lack of protection of 
minority shareholders exacerbates the agency problem. Legal protection may reduce the 
incentives of expropriation by the controlling shareholders and management. The 
mechanism of legal protection may be provided through statutory and non-statutory 
regulations, the judicial system and the market.44 
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 See NIT website available at 
<http://www.nit.com.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=5> Accessed 
12.01.2014.  
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4A.4 Conclusion  
 
This part of Chapter Four discussed the problems associated with agency cost in Pakistan. 
There are different reasons for these problems: the extent of minority shareholding; the 
separation of ownership and control; incentives for private rent seeking; and expropriation 
by the managers and controlling shareholders are the main reasons. The corporate sector 
in Pakistan is highly concentrated, and families and the state control the sector. They have 
the discretion and incentives to control in order to expropriate company funds at the cost 
of minority shareholders. Though the separation of ownership and control is a problem 
experienced in dispersed ownership, the agency problem is also visible in the conflict 
between the management and the shareholders in concentrated ownership. There are 
different techniques to solve or, at least, reduce the agency problem in the context of 
Pakistan. They may be ex ante or ex post mechanisms. Firstly, the separation of control 
and monitoring through representation on the board of directors by minority shareholders 
and institutional investors may reduce the agency problem in Pakistan. Non-executive and 
independent directors can also play an effective role in this regard.  
 
Secondly, the institutional investor industry is underdeveloped in Pakistan due to lack of 
proper regulations and the excessive role the state plays in this regard. The privatization of 
state-owned funds may foster competition, which may help to develop the industry. 
Thirdly, the legal protection of minority shareholders makes expropriation difficult for the 
managers and controlling shareholders. If minority protection is ensured, it may help to 
develop corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
*** 
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4.B Minority protection in corporate governance in Pakistan 
 
4B.1 Introduction 
  
The second part of this chapter discusses the agency conflict of the second kind, that is, the 
conflict between minority and majority shareholders. This conflict may be reduced by 
providing minority shareholders with protection against majority shareholders. As the 
managers are either under the control of the majority or the majority themselves act as 
managers, the protection of minority shareholders is also required against expropriation by 
the managers. The objective of this part of Chapter Four is to explore different mechanisms 
that can provide minority shareholders with protection in the context of Pakistan. Minority 
protection will be discussed keeping in mind the prevailing corporate structure in Pakistan 
and the possible convergence to international norms in order to improve the sector. The 
focus of this chapter will be on minority rights that include pre-emptive rights, cumulative 
voting rights, conflict of interest of the fiduciaries, derivative action, unfair prejudice 
remedy, and the just and equitable winding up of companies as minority protection devices 
in the context of Pakistan. 
  
4B.2 The LLSV theory  
 
Recent academic literature has discussed key issues of corporate governance: the nature of 
a particular system, either dispersed or concentrated share ownership; the development of 
capital markets; investor protection, especially minority shareholders; the raising of 
external finance; extra-legal institutions; and, more importantly, the causes and 
consequences of these issues. However, minority protection has remained the focus of 
recent academic discussion.  
 
LLSV discuss corporate governance of different legal families in a comparative study with 
reference to investor protection provided by these families and the extent of their market 
development.1 There are basically two legal families: (1) the common law and (2) civil law 
category. The civil law family is further divided into three subfamilies: (1) the French civil 
                                                 
1
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law, (2) the German civil law and (3) the Scandinavian civil law category.2 Common law is 
based on judge-made law that is subsequently converted into legislation, and civil law, 
which is based on Roman law, is law that is basically part of scholar- and legislature-
created traditions.3 Most countries of the world have adopted legal structures of these legal 
families due to colonization and occupation.4  
 
The basic difference between the two systems is the role of judges and the fiduciary duty 
developed by the case law.5 A judge in the common law system has more discretion than a 
civil law judge in deciding cases where the statute is silent. In most cases where the 
legislation does not provide a direct remedy, common law judges apply this discretion in 
favour of minority shareholders.6 This may be the main reason for the development of 
fiduciary duties and minority protections in common law countries as compared to civil 
law countries.   
 
LLSV identified an anti-director index, in other words, a shareholders rights index 
comprising six key shareholder rights: (1) one share, one vote, (2) proxy by mail, (3) 
shares not blocked before a meeting,7 (4) cumulative voting/proportional representation (5) 
oppressed minority, and (6) pre-emptive rights to new shares. The authors assigned one 
point in cases where the mechanism of shareholder protection was available in the 
corporate law, otherwise zero. They took a sample of 49 countries, including 18 from 
common law jurisdictions, 21 from French civil law, 6 from German civil law and 4 from 
Scandinavian civil law countries. They compiled the data and observed that the common 
law provided outside investors with better protection, whereas the German and 
Scandinavian countries fell in the middle, while the French civil law provided investors 
with the least amount of protection.8  
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Coffee argues that it is not correct to say that the civil law system does not afford investors 
protection, rather, it provides investor protection that is inherent in the system of 
concentrated ownership.9According to him, the system does not specifically provide that 
protection that is known to dispersed ownership or in the market economy; for example, 
the civil law system does not provide mechanisms to control expropriation, self-dealing 
and private rent seeking by the managers which are inherent in the dispersed ownership of 
the common law system, but they do provide other protection, such as voting rights. 
According to him, both systems support a particular pattern of ownership: common law 
supports the dispersed form, whereas the civil law supports concentrated ownership. 
However, it is difficult to generalize this hypothesis for two reasons. First, expropriation, 
rent seeking and self-dealings are not the features of dispersed ownership but are common 
in both dispersed and concentrated ownership structures. Second, there are many common 
law systems in the world that have concentrated ownership. Therefore, it is not the legal 
family that determines a particular system of ownership, rather, other factors may shape a 
particular system. Politics, historical development and social norms may have been the 
main factors for the development of a particular system of ownership. The US and the UK 
are exceptions, having dispersed ownership structures, whereas in the rest of the world, 
concentrated ownership is dominant. Dispersed ownership was also considered a 
consequence of the advancement of technology, which necessitated big firms.10 These big 
firms required huge capital which was not possible when a few individuals were involved. 
Therefore, dispersed ownership was an ultimate consequence. There are certain advantages 
to dispersed ownership in this kind of firm because the managers are hired on the basis of 
their professional and managerial skills instead of their ability to finance the firms or on 
the basis of their relations with controlling members.11  
 
Another aspect of the LLSV theory is the link between minority protection and the 
development of capital markets. LLSV argue that investor protection is essential for the 
development of the capital market.12 If outside investors are protected, they may spread 
their finance in the market. This provides investors with the luxury of diversification. The 
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diversification is more beneficial in the sense that it provides less risk in the market. This 
phenomenon provides liquidity in the market that causes its development. This is evident 
from the fact that dispersed ownership is primarily in those jurisdictions where there is 
strong protection of minority shareholders. Therefore, the development of capital market is 
directly proportional to the dispersed ownership. However, if investors are not secure, they 
will protect themselves through blocks and that causes the concentration of ownership. 
Therefore, the concentration of ownership is inversely proportional to the development of 
the capital market. However, concentrated ownership is not the cause of an inferior 
corporate governance system per se, rather, it may be beneficial in the sense that large 
investors are well placed due to their shareholding to pressurize the management into 
working for the benefit of the firm. However, the problem with this kind of ownership 
structure is that the majority may be involved in the expropriation of the minority 
shareholders. Therefore, concentrated ownership and minority protection are 
complementary for an efficient corporate governance system.13 
 
A further aspect of the LLSV theory is the link between the developed capital market with 
minority protection and the capacity of entrepreneurs to raise finance from outside 
investors.14 The raising of finance is easier in countries where the legal protection of 
minority shareholders is strong than in those countries where the legal protection of 
minority shareholders is weak.15 When financiers feel that their investment will not be 
expropriated by the insiders, they will not hesitate to invest.16 Another aspect of the 
developed market is that it provides liquidity which is beneficial to investors because they 
may exit at any time when they are not satisfied with the performance of the firm.  
 
4B.3 Critique of the LLSV theory  
 
Scholars of corporate law have criticized the LLSV theory. Roe is the main critic. He 
argues that the anti-director rights index of the LLSV theory which is core to the 
indication, measurements and effectiveness of a particular jurisdiction, seems to be 
defective and a crude measure of minority protection and development of the market.17 It is 
interesting to note the insight into, and application of, this index in the context of Pakistan 
which is a common law country. In the light of the provisions of minority shareholder 
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rights, the true picture is not presented. The anti-director index for Pakistan is 5, which is 
the highest amongst all countries. This is equal to the UK and the US, and better than 
Australia, France, Germany, Belgium, Japan and almost all the continental European 
countries. However, in reality, if one compared market development and economic growth 
there is a vast difference between Pakistan and other developed countries. The other aspect 
of the LLSV theory is that Pakistan, being a common law country, should have better 
enforcement and be more investor-friendly than civil law countries. In reality, Pakistan is 
not an investor-friendly jurisdiction. Most private and public companies are controlled by 
families and the state. The stock market of Pakistan is narrow and illiquid. Economic 
growth is very low. The enforcement mechanism is weak, and the judicial system corrupt 
and inefficient. In Pakistan corporate law does provide investors with some rights, but 
these rights are not sufficient to protect them due to the weak enforcement mechanism. 
Investors’ rights in corporate law are present in Pakistan through colonization.18  
 
Roe further argues that the LLSV theory may be useful in explaining the cases of transition 
and developing economies, but it is the only tool and not the central institution for 
developed economies.19 It is, however, difficult to generalize Roe’s theory. Each 
jurisdiction has its own factors and characteristics that develop a particular pattern of 
shareholding and development of the market. It is also difficult to distinguish between 
developed and developing countries with reference to the reasons and causes of dispersed 
ownership and developed markets on the basis of the index. According to the LLSV anti-
directors rights index, Germany and Japan have 1 and 4 points respectively. Both have 
concentrated ownership despite the fact that Germany has only 1 point and Japan 4 points. 
As far as transition economies are concerned, Poland and the Czech Republic privatized 
state-owned firms. Both have a common Slavic culture, historical background and 
corporate law but had different approaches to privatization. The Czech Republic created 
dispersed share ownership with mass privatization without focusing on securities 
regulation, whereas Poland had a system of phased privatization with strict control over 
securities regulations. The outcome of these differences was that there was more 
expropriation and rent seeking in the Czech Republic than in Poland. It was not the 
corporate law, but rather the securities regulations that provided investors with 
protection.20 In the context of developing countries, Pakistan and India have similar 
cultural and historical backgrounds, and have concentrated ownership in their corporate 
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sector. The LLSV index shows that both have 5 points on the anti-director rights index, 
which is better than many developed countries. These two countries have strong minority 
rights in corporate law but the ownership structure is concentrated.  
 
Coffee is another critic of the LLSV theory. He observed that LLSV had overstated the 
importance of corporate law and understated the importance of securities laws which are 
an important factor in the development of the capital markets.21 He argues that the 
provisions of minority protection are not sufficient for the development of capital markets, 
instead, the standards of securities regulations determine the development of the markets. 
Common law countries whose system is more favourable for dispersed ownership differ 
widely on corporate law and have converged functionally at the level of securities 
regulations. According to him, corporate law is not the main factor in dispersed ownership 
and minority protection is only of secondary importance. However, there are many other 
factors that are important for the development of capital markets. Politics, the judiciary and 
non-legal institutions also shape a particular system of corporate governance.22 In addition 
to this, extensive disclosure requirements are also important factors in the development of 
capital markets.23  
 
Cheffins also disagrees with the LLSV theory regarding the role of corporate law in the 
development of capital markets. He argues that, at least in the context of the UK, corporate 
law was not the main factor for capital market development. 24 According to him, in the 
context of the UK system of corporate governance, other factors such as market-based 
mechanisms were more important. He describes extra-legal institutions such as financial 
professionals, stock market self-regulation, listing regulations and reputational concerns as 
the main factors for the development of dispersed ownership and the capital market in the 
UK. However, he does not deny the importance of corporate law in those countries that do 
not share a common financial and social environment with the UK.25  
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4B.4 Minority protection and its importance 
 
Who should make decisions in directors and shareholders’ meetings? Should all decisions 
be made through consensus or majority decisions? Majority decisions have their own 
benefits in the corporate world. If consensus is required from all the shareholders or 
control is shifted in favour of the minority, then this may be more problematic. Consensus 
is not feasible in the modern form of companies and this may create a deadlock in the 
smooth running of companies. However, this majority rule may harm the interests of the 
minority in some circumstances. This harm may be due to failure of corporate law or to the 
majority’s abuse of power. The company’s constitution and general corporate laws 
sometimes fail to curb this harm because the majority acts within the ambit of these laws 
and causes harm to the minority. Voting rights through which majority rule operates also 
fail to curb the abuse of the majority, and commercial law only reacts in circumstances 
when there is clear violation of law.26 State intervention and well-designed corporate and 
securities law can save minority shareholders from abuse of their rights. Though such 
abuse on the part of the majority and mangers’ opportunism cannot be stopped without 
interventionist rules, relying on such a strategy in every matter may deprive the majority of 
their legitimate rights and place hurdles in the effective running of companies. 
Nevertheless, the law must be responsive to opportunism by majority shareholders and 
managers in public companies.27  
 
An important aspect of governance that highlights the importance of minority protection is 
efficiency considerations. It is argued here that if the minorities are protected, then this 
may also be beneficial to the majority.28 If minority rights are not protected, then 
minorities will protect themselves by buying shares at highly discounted prices. The 
company might also lose a premium in an IPO which it would otherwise have received had 
there been more protection for minority shareholders. This will raise the cost of the capital 
of the company.29 This cost will ultimately transfer back to the majority. The majority have 
more cash-flow rights; therefore, they will suffer more than minority shareholders.  
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In addition to this, minority protection is important for the efficient operation of the 
market. If a system provides protection to the investors, they do not hesitate to become 
minority shareholders and to disperse their investment.30 It provides investors with the 
luxury of diversification, which causes dispersed share ownership.31 This dispersed 
ownership structure is considered investor-friendly as it provides liquidity in the market. 
Liquidity is important for the efficient operation of the market because it performs two 
important functions. First, it provides investors with an exit option when they are not 
satisfied with the management. Second, it also provides a corporate rider with an option to 
take control of the firm. The takeover threat can force managers to perform otherwise the 
successful bidder may remove non-performing incumbent directors after taking control. 
 
Therefore, given this background, it can be concluded that minority protection is important 
for an efficient governance mechanism.  
 
4B.5 Importance of minority protection in Pakistan  
 
Minority protection is a key factor in the context of Pakistan due to the concentration of 
ownership. According to LLSV theory, minority rights must be protected in order to 
improve corporate governance and develop capital markets. As discussed earlier, minority 
rights are not properly protected in Pakistan. Therefore, corporate law in Pakistan must 
converge in some of the minority rights in order to improve corporate governance and 
develop capital markets.  
 
However, in Pakistan there is confusion among scholars with regard to the concept of 
minority shareholders and importance of their protection in the Pakistani context. Mumtaz 
has discussed the impact and effectiveness of the code of corporate governance in Pakistan. 
She concludes that the code is based on Anglo-Saxon Model whose thrust is on a dispersed 
ownership structure with its focus on minority protections. She argues that the family-
controlled corporate sector of Pakistan suggests that there is no need to protect minority 
shareholders as the ratio of their shareholding is very low. According to her, they will not 
have any positive effect on the productivity of the firm, even if their interests are protected. 
Therefore, the code must be adapted to local conditions in order to be effective in 
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Pakistan.32 As far as protecting minority shareholders are concerned, her conclusion is 
defective for a number of reasons. Firstly, the corporate sector of Pakistan is dominated by 
families but there are other major stakeholders in the corporate structure of Pakistan that 
include the state and multinational companies. Although the state has a dominant 
shareholding in state-controlled companies, in the past three decades there has been a trend 
to privatize and divest. This phenomenon created general public and substantive private 
sector shareholdings in state-owned companies. Multinational companies, however, do 
have some major shareholding in the form of the managers but there are many outside 
investors in these companies.33 Secondly, family-owned enterprises also have substantial 
shareholding in the public domain. This phenomenon of family divestiture came about due 
to the trend on the part of the state to privatize and divest themselves of state-owned 
enterprises, and a market boom which provided an opportunity for family-owned 
enterprises to raise finance from outside investors. Thirdly, Mumtaz confused the 
definition of minority shareholders: it is not just a specific percentage of shareholders who 
will be considered minority shareholders in every matter; for instance, 5%, 10% or 
20% shareholders will not remain minority shareholders in each and every matter. This is a 
phenomenon that changes with the passage of time and on a case-by-case basis. This is 
explained in the following example: suppose there are four shareholders, namely A, B, C 
and D with 25% shareholding each. Suppose in one matter B, C and D collude with one 
another and decide in a matter that is against the interest of A. A is a minority shareholder 
in this case. It is quite possible, after some time, for A, B and C to collude with one another 
and make a decision that is against the interest of D. In this case D is a minority 
shareholder. Similarly, it is possible for B and D to become minority shareholder in other 
cases. A minority shareholder is, therefore, not a particular person or group of persons; 
rather, it is a phenomenon that changes with the passage of time. So, even in a family-
owned firm it is quite possible for one family member to have a dispute with other 
members on a particular matter and need some protection from the abuse of the majority. 
Fourthly, as discussed earlier, minority protection is more important in concentrated 
ownership structures than in dispersed ownership structures. Fifthly, it is widely accepted 
that minority protection is an important element for the development of the markets and 
particularly for better corporate governance.34  
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The inherent problem with minority protection in a concentrated ownership structure such 
as in Pakistan increases the importance of minority shareholder rights, and their 
enforcement through regulator, judiciary and extra-legal institutions. The corporate law of 
Pakistan provides some minority rights but most of the important rights are still missing. 
Most minority shareholder rights have been transferred in corporate law of Pakistan due to 
colonization. However, some important minority rights that are provided in the corporate 
law of Pakistan are inefficient, out-dated and need restructuring or improvement.  
 
The implication of the LLSV theory regarding the link between minority rights and the 
development of capital markets and corporate governance is significant in the context of 
Pakistan. The LLSV theory states that for the development of capital markets and good 
governance, the protection of minority rights is important. Therefore, according to this 
theory, to improve corporate governance and develop capital markets in Pakistan, there is a 
need to protect minority rights in corporate laws in Pakistan. The ownership structure in 
Pakistan is highly concentrated where families, groups and state dominant the corporate 
sector. As discussed earlier, the minority rights are important in concentrated ownership 
structure such as Pakistan. However, the minority rights are not properly protected in 
Pakistan. Most of the standard minority rights are either missing or out-dated and 
inefficient to protect minority shareholders.35 Families and politicians are strong forces 
which may resist reforms whose objective is to improve good governance which could 
challenge their discretionary powers and to provide protection to the minority shareholders. 
This situation makes us sceptical about possible convergence in minority rights through 
reforms in corporate governance.  
 
In this context,  an important question arises whether there will be reforms in Pakistan to 
protect minority shareholders in order to develop capital markets and overall corporate 
governance. There may be strong resistance in convergence in corporate governance in 
minority rights through reforms from path-dependent forces such as families and political 
forces.. However, the possibility exists that the state may proceed to provide minority 
protection with reforms for a number of reasons. Firstly, in the recent past, the state has 
divested some of its shareholdings in state owned enterprises through corporatisation, 
privatisation and disinvestment in the series of reforms through pressure from IFIs. The 
state has also plans to disinvest in major state owned enterprises in the future due to an 
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agreement with IFIs as a condition of loans.36 Corporatisation, privatisation and 
disinvestment may be a problem for the state in case of bad corporate governance. The 
state will not get good prices for its shareholding in cases of privatisation and 
disinvestment. One option for the state is to improve corporate governance through 
improving minority protection. According to LLSV theory, the provisions of the protection 
of minority shareholder rights will help to develop capital markets and the minority 
shareholders will be willing to pay higher prices for the state shares that the state intends to 
disinvest. Secondly, minority protection provisions may be beneficial to the state itself 
because divestment may ultimately convert the state into a minority shareholder, and 
minority shareholder protection will benefit the state as well.37 Thirdly, family-owned 
enterprises that are considered a main opponent to reform may also favour minority 
protection mechanisms once they realize the potential benefits of improved corporate 
governance. The developed market with a minority protection mechanism can enhance the 
share value of firms and create an opportunity for them to raise external finance with lower 
costs of capital. They can also sell some of their shareholdings to the general public at a 
higher price and the minority shareholders may pay such enhanced price once they feel that 
their investment is safe and their rights are protected. 
  
4B.6 Minority protection mechanism  
   
Minority shareholders’ protection mechanisms may be divided into two parts: (1) minority 
rights and (2) their enforcement. The discussion in this section will be limited to minority 
rights that include pre-emptive rights; cumulative voting rights; conflict of interest of the 
fiduciaries; derivative action; the unfair prejudice remedy; and winding up under just and 
equitable principles in the context of Pakistan. The enforcement of these rights will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
The objective of this part is to examine the possibility and effectiveness of convergence in 
minority rights in order to improve corporate governance in Pakistan. As discussed earlier, 
there are strong prospects of convergence in minority rights in Pakistan in order to improve 
corporate governance in Pakistan due to the factors discussed above. In addition, the 
discussion will also focus on the kind of convergence which might take place in improving 
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corporate governance in Pakistan. As discussed above, functional and contractual 
convergence has certain advantages as compared to formal convergence. Therefore, the 
functional and contractual convergence may dominate the process of convergence in 
prevailing circumstances in Pakistan. In Pakistan, there are strong barriers to possible 
formal convergence from path dependent forces such as families, groups and state. 
Therefore, in order to overcome possible resistance from these path dependent forces, 
functional and contractual convergence may be useful to improve minority rights in 
Pakistan.38Therefore, functional and contractual convergence will remain the focus of 
discussion in this part to improve minority rights in Pakistan. In other words, the 
discussion in this part will be limited to assessing how and up to what extent minority 
rights may be improved for efficient corporate governance in Pakistan. 
 
4B.6.1 Pre-emptive rights 
 
Pre-emptive rights were discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Pre-emptive rights provide 
minority shareholders with protection against dilution. In Pakistan pre-emptive rights are a 
default rule in company law39 and companies can exclude these rights by special 
resolution. As discussed in Chapter Two, pre-emptive rights are more important in 
underdeveloped and emerging markets such as Pakistan. There is threat of minority 
shareholder dilution if pre-emptive rights are made a default rule. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, families and the state dominate the corporate sector in Pakistan. They have more than 
75% shareholdings even in listed companies. Therefore, they may dilute the minority 
percentage in shareholding and voting rights with a series of allotment of shares without 
pre-emptive rights. Therefore, there is a need to make pre-emptive rights mandatory in 
order to safeguard the interests of the minority shareholders in Pakistan. 
 
4B.6.2 Cumulative voting system 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the cumulative voting system (CVS) can be advantageous to 
minority shareholders in certain circumstances. However, it is not common in major, 
advanced jurisdictions.40 In the US the CVS was mandatory until the twentieth century,41 
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US states have abandoned it with the passage of time. Until 1982, only 24% of firms that 
had the CVS in their charters were listed on the New York Stock Exchange.42 Now most of 
the states have abandoned this rule and only a couple have it in their corporate system. The 
company laws of the UK and France provide firms with the option to adopt the CVS but 
firms rarely do so in their charters for the election of directors.43 As regards Germany, 
cumulative voting is not prohibited, but most of the companies opt out of this system. 
Some even dispute that it is permissible in German corporate governance, at least for listed 
companies.44 Japan provides the CVS as a default rule but almost all companies also opt 
out of it in their constitution.45 As far as other developing and emerging economies are 
concerned, the CVS is mandatory in the company law of Vietnam. The commercial law of 
China, India, Thailand and Korea support this system. Chinese Taipei is considering 
amending its company law to incorporate it as mandatory provision.46  
 
In Pakistan the CVS is present in company law as a mandatory rule for companies that 
have share capital.47 An interesting aspect of the CVS in Pakistan is a survey48 conducted 
by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) and sponsored by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) with the help of the SECP and the Pakistan 
Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG). A questionnaire was sent to local listed 
companies, large49 local public non-listed companies and financial sector institutions. The 
survey, inter alia, includes the use of the CVS as a minority protection device. The 
objective of the survey was to know the extent to which the companies were following 
good corporate governance practices in line with codes of corporate governance and 
international good practices, and to provide regulators with an opportunity to focus on 
intended reform activities in this regard. The survey response states that 81% of companies 
do not have the CVS as a minority protection device. This shows lack of interest and 
awareness on the part of the companies in Pakistan with regard to overall governance 
mechanisms in general and minority protection in particular. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
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in a straight voting system, it is not possible for minorities to appoint any member to the 
board. The Code emphasizes the fact that the management of listed companies should 
facilitate minority shareholders in contesting the election of directors. Non-compliance 
with the CVS shows minority shareholders are not being facilitated to contest the election 
of directors which is, in fact, non-compliance with the Code.50 It is interesting to note that 
despite the fact that the CVS is mandatory under the Ordinance, it is not being 
implemented even by the listed companies. The regulator and the stock exchanges should 
ensure compliance with the Code and provisions of the company law in order to protect 
minority shareholders.  
 
Another problem is the presence of one share, one vote as a default rule in the company 
law. This can frustrate the potential benefits of the CVS. Shareholders who have more than 
one vote per share can outweigh the possibility of minority shareholders electing a member 
to the board of directors. Therefore, the CVS can be effective only if one share, one vote is 
made mandatory.  
 
Advanced jurisdictions are abandoning the CVS or have made it a default rule available as 
an option to firms. The majority of firms in these jurisdictions have opted out of this rule. 
This shows that it is not regarded as an important element for minority protection. 
However, this conclusion has to be hedged by observations that these are advanced 
jurisdictions with developed capital markets and a strong judicial system for the 
enforcement of shareholder rights in general and minority rights in particular. Similarly, if 
minority shareholders have other remedies, such derivative actions or the unfair prejudice 
remedy, this may provide some sort of substitute for membership on the board of directors. 
If the system supports other disciplinary mechanisms, then the minority may feel 
comfortable even without the CVS.  
 
In Pakistan, where there is an undeveloped market, there are fewer chances for the 
minority shareholders to resolve their issues through market discipline. The market is not 
developed enough to sanction a firm for its wrongdoings. The KSE, the main stock 
exchange in Pakistan, is small in size but has a high turnover, with high fluctuations in 
prices mainly due to the manipulation by brokers and controlling shareholders. They 
manipulate prices with mutual trading and derive benefits from such fluctuation. Insider 
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trading is common phenomenon.51 Lack of liquidity creates a problem for minority 
shareholders because they do not have exit options.52 The market is not developed enough 
to play its role in sanctioning defaulting firms.  
 
The nature of the ownership structure is the main factor that affects cumulative voting. The 
US and the UK are developed markets with dispersed ownerships; therefore, the CVS may 
not be effective in these jurisdictions because controlling shareholding is not common. 
This issue is important in concentrated ownership structures with block holders. As the 
ownership structure in Pakistan is concentrated, there are, therefore, fewer chances for the 
minority to elect a member to the board of directors as opposed to the majority block 
holders.  
 
If a director is elected by the minority shareholders to the board through the CVS, this 
necessitates some safeguard from removal by the majority. S. 181 of the Ordinance 
provides this safeguard. The section stipulates that a director cannot be removed if in the 
resolution of removal of a director there are such number of votes against the resolution 
that are equal or more than the minimum number of votes that were cast to elect a director 
at the last AGM. This can be explained by the following example: 
 
Example 
 
Suppose five directors (i.e., A, B, C, D, E and F) were elected at the last AGM with the 
following number of votes: 
Table 4B.1: Results of a resolution to remove a director 
Name Votes 
A 40,000 
B 35,000 
C 30,000 
D 25,000 
E 20,000 
F 15,000 
 
Suppose there is a resolution to remove director B. Suppose at the meeting 90,000 votes 
are in favour of the resolution to remove B but there are 15,000 votes against the 
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resolution. B will not be removed in this case because at the last election of directors, 
15,000 votes were enough to elect director F.  
 
The problem with this provision is that the shareholders cannot remove any director who is 
not performing. A director who has shareholding in his own name or who has the backing 
of the majority shareholders cannot be removed by the resolution even if that director is 
not performing. This is the cost that shareholders have to pay for the CVS. One option may 
be to go to court to remove the non-performing incumbent director. This amounts to 
interference in the functioning of companies. The British courts declared repeatedly that 
they would not take on the management of the business of companies.53 The shareholders 
are the best monitors of the directors’ conduct and can, through a shareholder resolution, 
remove a director, but the difficulty is that the removal of directors adds costs which the 
shareholders have to pay. This restricts the accountability of the directors.  
 
One solution may be the possibility of frequently electing directors, at least in listed 
companies in Pakistan. The recent change in the UK corporate governance code provides 
re-election of directors of FTSE350 companies every year. This limits the need to resort to 
the removal of directors.54 The trade-off between the minority shareholders’ rights to elect 
a director to the board of directors through the CVS and the strict requirement of removing 
a director from the board can be settled by the annual re-election provision in Pakistan. The 
functional convergence in frequent election of directors on the pattern of FTSE 350 may 
resolve the problem of accountability of directors at least in listed companies in Pakistan. 
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4B.6.3 Conflict of interest of the fiduciaries 
4B.6.3.1 Introduction 
 
A conflict of interest between controlling shareholders, directors, corporate officers and the 
company may arise in two different situations. First, it may arise when insiders55 have an 
interest in any transaction in which the company is involved as a party. This may occur 
when a transaction is entered into between a company and its insiders or between a 
company and a third party in which such insiders have a direct or indirect interest; for 
example, if a contract is concluded between a company and a third party, and the insiders 
are owners or major shareholders of the third party. Second, a conflict of interest may arise 
in a situation where the insiders identify a business opportunity but they exploit it for their 
personal benefit without offering it to the company first. The former is called a related 
party transaction, whereas the latter is a corporate opportunity. Both a related party 
transaction and corporate opportunity may not be in the interest of the company and, 
consequently, not in the interest of the shareholders in general and minority shareholders in 
particular.  
 
The management is meant to make decisions and conclude contracts in the best interest of 
the company. However, sometimes they may proceed for their own benefit at the cost of 
the company. They may enter into a transaction with a company that is beneficial to them 
at the cost of the company. Other possible conflicts of interest may be a situation in which 
insiders identify a business opportunity using the resources of the company but they 
exploit this opportunity for their personal benefit instead of offering it to the company. As 
every business activity is not a corporate opportunity that is the company’s right, the 
determination of a business opportunity is, therefore, important in the sense that once it is 
established that a business opportunity was, in fact, a corporate opportunity then directors 
must exploit the same for the company and not for their personal benefit. Corporate laws 
generally prohibit directors from taking corporate opportunities for their own benefit 
without offering them first to the company.56 The directors are considered in breach of 
fiduciary duty when they exploit corporate opportunities for their own personal benefit and 
not for the company whom they are supposed to serve.57 Corporate opportunities are 
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regarded as assets of the company in the sense that the directors are not allowed to exploit 
such opportunities for their personal gain.58 Therefore, it is important to see to what extent 
a business opportunity belongs to company and to what extent the same may be exploited 
by the directors without breach of fiduciary duty. As far as the UK corporate context is 
concerned, certain restrictions and safeguards have been developed in common law. The 
UK Companies Act, 2006 has now codified directors’ duties and further restricts directors’ 
powers of taking away corporate opportunities for their personal benefit.59 However, in 
Pakistan the law does not prohibit the controlling shareholders and the directors from 
exploiting a corporate opportunity for their personal benefits. The doctrine of corporate 
opportunity is important for concentrated ownership structures such as those in Pakistan. 
The corporate sector is dominated by families and the state.60 This highly concentrated 
ownership by families and the state necessitates proper legislation for controlling self-
interested transactions by the controlling shareholders and the directors for investor 
protection in general and the minority shareholders in particular.  
  
4B.6.3.2 Related party transactions 
 
Related party transactions are a major source of expropriation by insiders as these insiders 
are in a position to make decisions and take advantage of their decision-making power. 
They may enter into a transaction on behalf of the company with themselves or with their 
related business such as a private company established by them or with a public company 
in which they have more interest than the company concerned. Controlling related party 
transactions is an important minority protection device in which abusive self-dealing by 
insiders is avoided. There is a trend in advanced jurisdictions of controlling related party 
transactions that are not at arm’s length. Arm’s length transactions are those transactions 
that are not at prevailing market rates. Every transaction a company enters into with an 
insider does not amount to expropriation; rather, it may be beneficial to the company but 
there is a need to provide investors with safeguards.  
 
In common law the conflict of interest of the fiduciaries was required to be approved by 
the shareholders. The courts in the UK had remained very strict about the approval of the 
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fiduciaries’ conflict of interest, especially on the part of the directors of companies.61 They 
could obtain relief only after authorization from the shareholders.62 However, the problem 
with this common law rule was that even the courts ignored the good faith of fiduciaries in 
some cases. Therefore, in order to remove ambiguities, the UK codified directors’ conflict 
of interest. The Companies Act, 2006 deals with the conflict of interest on the part of 
directors in any transaction between the directors and the company.63 The directors are 
required to disclose to the board of directors the nature and extent of their interest in the 
proposed transaction or arrangement with the company.64 The conflicted director must 
make such disclosure before entering into the transaction with the company.65 The 
common law rule or equitable principle that may require approval of shareholders to 
authorize such related party transaction has been excluded effectively by the new Act.66 
However, this is not an absolute power of the directors as companies may provide in their 
constitution that these transactions be approved by the shareholders.67 Moreover, the Act 
has excluded certain transactions from the ambit of the board of directors and has provided 
that they be approved by the shareholders. Chapter 4 of the Act deals with those 
transactions that require members’ approval. These transactions include, but are not limited 
to, the long-term service contracts of directors;68 substantial property transactions,69 unless 
the company is in the course of winding up or is under administration under the Insolvency 
Act, 1986;70 loans; and a guarantee for a loan advanced to the directors.71  
 
The listing rules have further extended the scope of transactions for shareholders’ 
approval. The objective is to provide more minority protection in companies operating in 
the public domain. The listing rules of the FCA require that all listed companies that have a 
premium listing must obtain shareholders’ approval for major transactions72 and related 
party transactions.73 The listing rules define Class 1 transactions74 and related party 
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transactions. A related party is widely defined and may include a person who is a 
substantial shareholder, which means a person who has 10% or more voting powers or can 
exercise significant influence or a director or a shadow director or an associate of the 
aforementioned persons.75 Related party transactions include a transaction between the 
company and related party, or company and related party entering into an agreement with a 
third party.76 The related party and its associates are excluded from taking part in the 
voting of shareholders at a general meeting.77 However, they are not excluded from taking 
part in discussion for consideration and approval of such transaction. Excluding the related 
party and his or her associate from voting may be a good technique but allowing that party 
to attend the meeting and to take part in discussion may be problematic, as conflicted 
insiders may be in a position to pursue other shareholders to avoid raising their voice and 
vote in their favour. So, it may be better to exclude related parties from participating in that 
part of the meeting of shareholders that is to consider and approve a related party 
transaction. This may give shareholders an opportunity to raise independent views about 
the advantages and disadvantages of such transaction. Though the shareholders always 
have the option to turn to the courts, it may increase costs and consume much time, which 
affects the business of the company.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, related party transactions may not always be against the 
interest of the company; in fact, it may be beneficial to the company. As the courts have 
been reluctant to approve the conflict of interest of fiduciaries, an effective mechanism for 
approval will be beneficial to both the related parties and the company. A safeguard 
against misuse of related party transactions may be the approval mechanism of such 
transaction both from the directors and the shareholders.78 
 
Another option to protect minority shareholders may be to give an appraisal right to 
dissident shareholders. Under this right, the shareholders who do not agree with the 
decision of the majority to approve related party transaction, may be given the right to exit 
the company at a fair price. However, this mechanism may place a financial hurdle in the 
affairs of the company because the company or the controlling shareholders have to 
purchase these shares and the company or the controlling shareholders may not be willing 
to do so at that stage. As this provision may create problems in decision-making, minority 
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shareholders, therefore, do not have this appraisal right to exit from the company if they 
are not satisfied with the decision. This right is thus limited to the extent of the 
reorganization of the company in the UK.79  
 
Controlling related party transactions is also present in Asian countries where the focus is 
on the approval mechanism. Malaysia and Korea have clarified and extended the scope of 
related party transactions in their recent amendments to the company law and listing rules. 
Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, Vietnam, Singapore and China have introduced a disclosure and 
approval mechanism in related party transactions in their corporate laws. In India the 
newly drafted Company Bill 2012 has also provided some safeguards against related party 
transactions. This shows that both developed and developing jurisdictions are focusing on 
related party transactions as a minority protection mechanism.  
 
4B.6.3.2.1 Related party transactions in Pakistan  
 
In Pakistan the company law requires certain transactions in which the director or officer 
has some interest to be disclosed and approved by the board of directors. The directors80 
and officers81 of the company concerned are required to disclose their interest in any 
transaction to be made by the company. A director shall also be regarded as being 
interested in such transaction if relatives of such a director have some interest in the 
transaction.82 The interested director is prohibited from taking part in, and voting at, a 
meeting of the board of directors meant for consideration and approval of such transaction. 
Furthermore, the presence of such director will not be taken into consideration when it 
comes to determining a quorum.83 The Code requires that directors assess all related party 
transactions and determine their price. The Code further requires that related party 
transaction be placed before the audit committee, and on the recommendation of that 
committee the same shall be reviewed and approved by the board.84  
 
The term related party has not been defined in the company law, the Code and the listing 
regulations, which may create confusion. It is interesting to note that related party was 
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defined85 in the fourth schedule86 to the Ordinance and was deleted87 on the 
recommendation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan. The institute argued 
that it was difficult for SOEs to disclose their transactions with other SOEs and to do so 
was costly as well.88 International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 requires related party 
transactions to be disclosed, but after the objections raised by some quarters regarding the 
cost and difficulty in SOEs’ disclosure; the International Accounting Standard Board 
(IASB) recommended that certain detail be omitted, while still providing the shareholders 
with some information.89 The effect of such disclosure, inter alia, was to assess the 
influence of the state on SOEs. The SECP, instead of providing exemption to SOEs, 
abolished the definition of related party, which led to uncertainty among other companies. 
 
The scope of related party transactions in Pakistan is limited. The law includes only those 
transactions that fall within the meaning of related party transactions in which a director or 
officer has some interest. This does not include controlling shareholders, relatives, business 
associates and the friends of controlling shareholders. It is necessary to enhance the scope 
of related party transactions because majority shareholders may escape from prohibition. 
These shareholders may use their position to approve any transaction from the directors in 
which they have a personal interest. Family-owned enterprises in Pakistan have 
interlocking directorship and cross-shareholding. It is, therefore, not difficult for the 
controlling shareholders in such companies to get approval from the board. This provides 
them with an opportunity to abuse their majority power through the board. The nature of 
the corporate sector of Pakistan, therefore, suggests that it is necessary to subject the 
controlling shareholders and their associates to a fiduciary duty.  
 
Another problem is that of the approval mechanism which vests powers in the board of 
directors. There is a global trend of extending the nature, scope and approval mechanism of 
related party transactions. Many developed and developing jurisdictions have introduced a 
legal framework in this regard to provide minority protection. Related party transactions 
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can be controlled effectively in Pakistan when the scope and approval mechanism is 
changed according to the new trend prevalent in the world. The determination of price, 
consideration and approval of related party transactions from the board may not solve the 
purpose of minority protection. In Pakistan the corporate sector is concentrated where the 
directors are normally family members, relatives or close friends. The directors are under 
the direct influence of the controlling shareholders and may be biased in favour of their 
colleague director. Therefore, asking the board to consider, determine and approve related 
party transactions may not provide minority protection. The approval mechanism requires 
reconsideration. This may include transactions exceeding certain thresholds to be approved 
by the shareholders at general meetings. All related party transactions may be considered 
and approved by the board of directors but once the transaction exceeds a certain specified 
limit, then it may be forwarded to a general meeting for consideration and approval.  
 
Similarly, when the transaction is referred to a general meeting for consideration and 
approval, then the issue will be the approval mechanism at shareholders’ meetings. The 
interested director or dominant shareholder may be involved in and help to approve such 
transaction. As discussed above, it is possible that the conflicted director or the controlling 
shareholder may be influential enough to pursue other members to avoid raising his or her 
voice against the transaction or voting against such transaction. It is appropriate to exclude 
a related party from participating in that part of the meeting of shareholders which is to 
consider, discuss and approve related party transactions. This may give shareholders an 
opportunity to raise an independent view about the advantages and disadvantages of related 
party transactions, and to vote on the resolution. In the context of Pakistan, as the corporate 
culture is not used to this type of restrictions and authorization process, it is appropriate, in 
the first instance, to introduce such provisions applicable to listed companies through the 
code. Once they have been implemented successfully and accepted by the business 
community, they may be extended to all types of companies through company law.  
  
4B.6.3.3 Doctrine of corporate opportunity 
 
As discussed earlier, the corporate opportunity is another aspect related to the conflict of 
interest of the fiduciaries.  
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4B.6.3.3.1 Common law approach to corporate opportunity doctrine 
 
The doctrine of corporate opportunity was developed in common law with the passage of 
time. Some principles with reference to directors’ conflict of interest and the authorization 
process were developed.  
 
a. No profit rule 
 
The first common law principle of ‘no profit rule’ was established in Regal Hastings v 
Gulliver.90Regal (Hastings) Ltd, who owned a cinema in Hastings, was interested in 
acquiring leases for two more cinemas and, at the same time, was negotiating with a third 
party for the sale of all the assets of the company. The company formed a subsidiary 
company. As the company was not in a position to provide finance, therefore, the directors 
contributed £3,000 in equity of the subsidiary from their personal resources to satisfy the 
concerns of the lessor. In the meantime, the purchase of Regal Hastings was finalized with 
a third party, including all the assets of the subsidiary. The new directors of the company 
brought an action against the old directors for taking profit as a result of their buying and 
selling shares in the subsidiary company. The House of Lords said that no matter the fact 
that the company was not in a position to provide finance and take business opportunity, it 
was still a corporate opportunity and directors could not take profit from that opportunity. 
The decision of the House of Lords was harsh in the sense that it was not possible for 
anyone, including the plaintiff, to make profit without the personal investment of the 
directors.91 However, the decision might be based on the possibility that the directors could 
have taken a further loan for the company or given their personal guarantee for finance in 
order to benefit the company.92 However, the House of Lords did not take into account the 
consideration of good faith on the part of the directors.93 The strict approach on the part of 
the courts may lead to uncertainty and commercial inconvenience.94 This was a narrow 
approach taken by the House of Lords.  
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b. No conflict principle 
 
The second common law principle, namely ‘no conflict’, was established in Aberdeen Ry 
Co v Blaikie Brothers, where Lord Cranworth LC said that fiduciaries were not allowed to 
put themselves in a position where their interest conflicted or may possibly conflict with 
their duties.95 Lord Herschell in Bray v Ford said that it was an inflexible rule of equity 
that a fiduciary was not entitled to place himself or herself in a position where his or her 
interest conflicted with his or her duties, unless expressly provided otherwise.96 The House 
of Lords confirmed the same principle in Boardman v Phipps.97 This was a trust case but it 
applies both to trustee fiduciary and directors’ fiduciary as both directors and trustees 
manage the property of the others.98 In this case a family trust had a 27% shareholding in a 
company. Boardman (the solicitor of the trust) and Tim Phipps (the beneficiary of the 
trust) presented themselves as agents of the trust and participated in a general meeting of 
the company as proxies for trustees with signature and the consent of two trustees, 
excluding the plaintiff (John Phipps). They were not satisfied with the performance of the 
management of the company and became aware of the fact that the real value of the 
shareholding of the trust could only be realized by obtaining control of the company. They 
obtained inside and confidential information of the company by representing themselves as 
nominees of the trust. They purchased the majority of company shares from their own 
pocket and took control of the company. Later on, after realising that they could earn 
handsome profits, they sold one of the company’s undertakings in Australia and capital 
distribution was made thereafter. The profit was distributed between Tim Phipps 
(beneficiary), Boardman (solicitor) and trust (as a minority shareholder). John Phipps, 
another beneficiary, brought a case against Boardman and Tim Phipps to account for the 
profit. Wilberforce J99 said that the defendants were accountable for the profit attributable 
to the share of the plaintiff in the trust but subject to payment of allowance to Boardman 
for his work, skill and efforts. The decision of the High Court was confirmed by the court 
of appeal. The House of Lords dismissed the defendants’ (Boardman and Tim Phipps) 
appeal. The House of Lords said that the appellants had placed themselves in a special 
position which was of a fiduciary character. They were held accountable to the respondents 
as constructive trustees. The court said that they had breached their fiduciary duty by 
putting themselves where their interest conflicted with their duties. Therefore, they were 
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held accountable for the profit made by them. The decision was based on the Regal 
Hastings case. However, the principle to account for all profits established in the Regal 
Hastings case was modified in the Boardman v Phipps case, where Wilberforce J. allowed 
the defendants to be paid out of profit for utilising their skill and efforts, as the profit could 
not have been made by anyone without their skills and efforts.100  
 
The decision was complex and was decided through a majority vote. Lord Upjohn 
dissented from the decision and said that the rule of equity was stated in the most general 
terms and should be applied according to the circumstances of each case. He said that 
fiduciaries should not place themselves in a position where their interest conflicted with 
their duties but the rule might be departed from in certain circumstances. The rule is not 
founded on the principles of morality; rather, it is based on the nature of human beings that 
they should not prioritize their interest over their duties. It is possible that sometimes it 
might be advantageous for the beneficiaries when trustees act professionally.101 
 
The principle that was decided on by the majority of the House of Lords implies that the 
fiduciaries should not place themselves in a position where their interest conflicted with 
their duties. In the context of companies, the directors should not put themselves in a 
position where their interest conflicted with that of the company.  
 
c. In the line of business of the company 
 
The third common law principle, namely ‘in the line of business of the company’ was 
established in Re Bhullar Brothers. 102 In this case the objects of the company were to run a 
grocery shop but the memorandum of association also included the power to acquire 
property for investment purposes. As the members of company were involved in a dispute 
and were willing to part ways from their interests in the company, they were not interested 
in acquiring further properties. Two directors acquired a property adjacent to the property 
owned by the company through their own company. The shareholders, who were also 
directors, brought a case against the respondent directors on the basis that the affairs of the 
company were conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the members, and demanded 
that proceeding be brought as derivative action for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court 
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observed that ‘a reasonable man looking at the facts would think there was a real sensible 
possibility of conflict’, therefore, in these circumstances the respondent directors had 
breached their fiduciary duty. The court held that it was a corporate opportunity and the 
directors were not allowed to exploit the same for their personal interests. The respondents 
then filed an appeal against the order. The appellate court confirmed the order of the trial 
court. The court said that it was irrelevant whether or not the company was in a position to 
take that opportunity had it been informed. It was the duty of the appellants to inform the 
company, and not informing the company showed the existence of a conflict of duty with 
interest.  
 
Therefore, a director cannot take an opportunity that is in line with the scope of the 
business of the company. If a director exploits an opportunity that is within the line of 
business of the company then he or she will not be considered acting in the best interest of 
the company. However, a director may exploit any business opportunity that is not within 
the line of business of the company and has not used the resources of the company.  
 
The principle ‘within the line of business of the company’ is important in the context of the 
new Act in the UK. The Act has abolished business restrictions on companies.103 The 
business restrictions are subject to the articles of association. If it is not restricted by the 
articles, then the business of the company is unrestricted. Therefore, a company can 
undertake a business that is not authorized by its articles. Therefore, ‘within the line of 
business of the company’, a restriction established in the Re Bhullar case, has generally 
become redundant in the context of the new Act. Therefore, under the new Act a business  
opportunity that is not within the line of the business of the company may be considered a 
corporate opportunity because a company may undertake that business if it is not 
prohibited by its articles. So, a director is prohibited from taking it for his or her personal 
benefits as this opportunity may be exploited by the company after its discovery. The court 
in the Re Bhullar case has stressed the irrelevance of the capacity of the company to 
exploit the opportunity. The capacity of the company refers to both its authorization to 
undertake business through its articles of association and its financial position to undertake 
that opportunity. As far as the financial position of the company is concerned, the 
possibility exists that the company may exploit it after taking a loan from a bank if it is 
currently not financially in a position to exploit that opportunity. The third common law 
principle has become more restrictive in the context of new Act.  
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However, in Island Export Finance v Umunna, the court took a different view. 104 In this 
case the court said that since the company was not interested in taking the opportunity, it 
was, therefore, not a corporate opportunity. The directors may proceed to exploit it for 
their personal benefit. Both cases have different views but since the Re Bhullar case was 
decided at the appellate stage, that case may be considered the UK approach.  
 
The Court of Appeal in O’Donnell105 removed ambiguities concerning directorial 
entrepreneurship and confirmed the principle established in Re Bhullar.106 It further held 
that directors must inform the company regarding a corporate opportunity, whether or not 
the company would be interested or capable of taking advantage, and obtain authorisation 
from the company before exploiting the corporate opportunity for their personal benefits. 
A director cannot make decision at his or her own initiative that the company will not be 
interested and proceed at his or her own without informing the company.107 Section 175 (5) 
of the Companies Act, 2006 provides an authorisation process for directors. Therefore, a 
director must inform the company concerning corporate opportunity and obtain 
authorisation before exploiting the same for his or her personal benefits.  
 
Furthermore, under section 175 (2) of the Companies Act, 2006, it does not matter if the 
company is not in a position to take up the opportunity, it will still remain for the company 
to exploit that opportunity; an approach undertaken by the court in the Re Bhullar case and 
confirmed by O’Donnell.  
 
Therefore, the UK approach will be more restrictive after the enforcement of the new Act 
and O’Donnell case. 
 
d. Extension of the ‘no conflict principle’ to a director’s resignation from a post 
 
The important question with regard to the fiduciary duty of a director is the extension of 
the ‘no conflict’ principle after the resignation of the director. In IDC v Cooley, the court 
extended the principle after the resignation of the director. In this case the director 
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identified a business opportunity and took that opportunity for himself after resigning. The 
court said that since the opportunity was identified before resignation, the director was not 
entitled to take that opportunity. Roskill J said that the former director took significant 
steps towards obtaining the corporate opportunity while he was still a director of the 
company. Therefore, he was taking a corporate opportunity using the resources of the 
company but he was not entitled to take it for his personal interest. It was still the 
company’s opportunity.108 The principle ‘extension of no conflict rule to post resignation’ 
established in IDC v Cooley has been referred to frequently in later cases but the courts 
have not used it independently.109  
 
In Island Export Finance v Umunna, the court took a different view to that decided in the 
Cooley case. In this case the company had business in Africa and one of its ventures was to 
supply telephone boxes to Cameroon. One of its directors was not satisfied with his post 
and resigned. He formed his own company and obtained an order for supplying telephone 
boxes to former customers of the company. The court said that since the company was not 
interested in taking that opportunity, this was not a corporate opportunity, and the director 
had the right to proceed with his actions. Hutchinson J said that directors acquired a 
general fund of knowledge and expertise while working in a company and it was in the 
public interest that they should be allowed to exploit corporate opportunities.110  
 
Another rule that has been established in common law about a former director taking a 
corporate opportunity is the maturing business opportunity approach.111 The Supreme 
Court of Canada said that a former director was not allowed to exploit a maturing business 
opportunity that his or her former company was actively pursuing. This opportunity would 
be considered as if it were the property of the company which the directors – present and 
former – could not exploit. The court further held that the former director may, however, 
exploit a maturing business opportunity if his or her resignation was not prompted to 
exploit the opportunity.112  
 
Therefore, in this context, it can be concluded that former directors may only proceed to 
exploit a corporate opportunity if they had informed their former company about that 
opportunity identified during their position as director and they are either removed by the 
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company or resigned from their post for any reason other than the intention to exploit the 
corporate opportunity.113 
 
e. Common law approach to authorize conflict of interest 
 
The courts in the UK have been very restrictive in absolving fiduciaries from conflict of 
interest. The fiduciaries were not allowed to put themselves in a position where their 
personal interest conflicted with their duties. They were not entitled to make profits from 
their position unless so authorized by the shareholders.114 The only way for directors to be 
granted relief was to obtain the approval of the shareholders. The reason for such an 
authorization from the shareholders was that the shareholders were affected most in cases 
of conflict of interest.115 Therefore, the courts used to ask directors to obtain shareholders’ 
approval for such authorization.  
 
4B.6.3.3.2 Statutory requirement in the UK: The Companies Act, 2006 
 
Fiduciary duty has now been codified in the Companies Act, 2006. The new Act requires 
that directors avoid conflicts of interest with the company in whose employ they are. A 
director is required to avoid a situation where his or her interest conflicts with that of the 
company.116 The new Act has also put restrictions on directors exploiting corporate 
opportunity for their personal interest. The Act confirms the common law approach 
established in the Regal Hastings and Re Bhullar cases. It provides that it is immaterial 
whether or not a company can take that opportunity.117 So, a director cannot take any 
opportunity even if the company is not in a position to take that opportunity. The logic 
behind this provision is that if currently the company is not in a position to make use of an 
opportunity, it might have an interest in doing so in future. Therefore, the directors are 
prohibited from exploiting corporate opportunities. The directors are supposed to act in the 
best interest of the company and if they exploit any opportunity that belongs to the 
company, they will not be regarded as acting in the best interest of the company.  
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The ‘no profit rule’ of the common law118 has also been retained by s. 175 (2) of the Act. It 
states that directors are not allowed to exploit information, property or an opportunity of 
the company. They are not allowed to take profit from using the resources of the company. 
The opportunity belongs to the company and it is immaterial whether or not the company 
can exploit that opportunity. This is quite a strict approach adopted in the Act.  
 
Similarly, the new Act has explicitly excluded former directors from taking a corporate 
opportunity that was identified by them while in the position of a director;119 in other 
words, the principle ‘using the resources of the company’ established in the Re Bhullar 
case and the extension of the ‘no conflict’ principle to former directors established in IDC 
v Cooley are important in the context of new Act. Therefore, if a director has identified any 
opportunity by using the resources of the company, then such director is prohibited from 
exploiting it after resigning from the company. A summation of the above discussion is the 
establishment of three rules that regard the conflict of interest of the fiduciary in the 
context of the new Act and for the courts to interpret. The first rule is the utilization of 
company resources to identify business opportunity. The second rule is failure on the part 
of the fiduciary to disclose the business opportunity to the company. The third rule is 
resigning with the intention of exploiting that opportunity.120 
 
a. Approval mechanism in the Companies Act, 2006 
 
The Act also provides for an authorization process in the case of the conflict of interest of 
fiduciaries. The Act modified the old common law practice of authorization from the 
shareholders. Under the Act, the conflict of interest of a director can be authorized by the 
directors in the case of a private company, provided that it is not prohibited by the 
company’s articles of association.121 However, the conflict of interest of a director can be 
authorized by the directors in a public company if it is so provided in the constitution of 
the company.122 In private companies, the shareholders are normally directors and 
therefore any approval by the directors will be considered as approved by the shareholders. 
However, this may be problematic in big private companies where professionals are hired 
as directors. As far as public companies are concerned, since it is not feasible for their 
shareholders to be called frequently for every conflict of interest, the Act authorizes 
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companies to provide in their constitution that approval by the directors will be sufficient 
for authorising the conflict of interest. However, the power to authorize a conflict of 
interest by the directors is concurrent with the members. The members can also authorize a 
conflict of interest in addition to the board of directors as the members’ decision can 
override the decision of the board of directors. The members also have the power to amend 
the constitution and take back such authorization.  
 
In addition, when the directors are authorized to approve conflicts of interest of the 
directors, the shareholders may have other remedies other than amending the constitution, 
such as approaching the courts. However, this remedy may be costly and may adversely 
affect the business of the company; therefore, there is a need to make the authorization 
process more effective.123 Keay argues that the present process of authorization provided in 
the Act may be useful in the context of the UK. The process provides that the conflicted 
director will not be considered against quorum124 nor counted in voting in decision-
making125 but such director is allowed to participate in the discussion. Keay further argues 
that this authorization process can be further improved by excluding the conflicted 
directors from a meeting of directors discussing the issue, as the directors may be biased in 
decision-making in the presence of the conflicted director. Moreover, the possibility may 
exist that the conflicted director would use his or her dominance while present in the 
meeting.126 Keay further suggests that the family member of conflicted directors on the 
board of directors,127 if any, can also be excluded from the meeting and voting.128  
 
The outcome of the discussion on corporate opportunity in the UK, established through 
cases and intended in the Act, is that the directors should disclose all opportunities first to 
the company. A director can exploit it only when it is authorized by the directors or by the 
general meeting, as the case may be. A director is prohibited from making a decision on his 
or her own whether or not the company is in a position to take that opportunity. The UK 
approach is very strict when it comes to directors taking a corporate opportunity compared 
to the approached followed by its counterpart in the US, which is quite liberal.  
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4B.6.3.3.3 The US approach to the doctrine of corporate opportunity 
 
The US approach is much more liberal than its counterpart, the UK, when it comes to 
directors exploiting corporate opportunity.129 The laws on this doctrine in the different 
states in the US vary. The main reason for this variation is regulatory competition among 
the US states which has as its objective attracting more incorporation and, consequently, 
more franchise tax.130 More flexible rules may influence the management to shift to a 
jurisdiction that serves their interests. Therefore, US states try to provide more flexible 
rules to attract the management to shift their business.  
 
Important elements of the corporate opportunity doctrine developed in the US, or more 
specifically in Delaware, are whether the opportunity is in line with the business of the 
company; whether the company has an interest in that opportunity or has a reasonable 
expectancy in the opportunity; whether it was financially feasible for the company to 
exploit the opportunity; and whether the opportunity in question was encountered in the 
directors’ personal or professional capacity.131 Delaware provides directors with all 
opportunities that are not within the line of business of the company. It also focuses on the 
capacity of the company to exploit that opportunity.132 In the US context, if the company is 
not in a position to take up a business opportunity, then the director can take that 
opportunity personally. However, to check the ability of the company may be problematic 
because it is quite possible that the new opportunity may be carried out through new 
finance and engagement of the company. Therefore, it is difficult to judge whether the 
directors have acted in the best interest of the company. The approach developed in the UK 
is quite different: the ability of the company is excluded. The only way to exploit a 
corporate opportunity is to take authorization from the board of directors or through a 
general meeting. In the US context, if the opportunity is out of line with the business of the 
company, then it is not considered a corporate opportunity and the director can exploit that 
opportunity. In some circumstances, even if the opportunity is within the line of business 
of the company, it is still possible for the director to compete with the company for the 
opportunity. The focus of this approach is to see to whom the opportunity belongs or who 
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is entitled to exploit it.133 In the US context, if a company has no intention to pursue the 
business opportunity, then it is not considered a corporate opportunity. The directors may, 
therefore, exploit it for their personal benefit. The competition between the company and 
the director to exploit a business opportunity indicates that it has been focused in the US 
context as a personal right rather than a property or ownership right; a personal right in the 
sense that it is enforceable between the directors and the company and not against an 
unrelated third party.134  
 
4B.6.3.3.4 Comparison between the UK and the US approaches to corporate 
opportunity 
 
According to the US approach, the directors may proceed to exploit their office for 
personal benefits at the cost of the shareholders. The main focus of the UK approach is the 
‘no conflict principle’, which means that the directors cannot place themselves in a 
position where their interests conflict with that of the company. Therefore, they cannot use 
their office for personal gain. The common law developed some principles that restrict 
directors in their use of their office for personal benefits. The statue more or less retains the 
same principles. The directors have a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interest of the 
company. If they are using their office for their personal benefit, then they are not doing 
so. Therefore, the UK approach seems more logical than its counterpart the US approach.  
 
The US’ flexible approach may be due to a number of factors. Firstly, there is regulatory 
competition among the US states.135 The federal system of the US is the main reason for 
the free corporate mobility among states’ jurisdictions. Firms that are not satisfied with the 
corporate regulations of one state can easily switch over to another jurisdiction with 
reincorporation. This leads to regulatory arbitrage among US states.136 This corporate 
mobility is not common in the rest of the world. This is mainly because of the absence of a 
federal system such as that in the US. Some developed jurisdictions have a federal system 
(e.g., Australia and Canada) but there is no regulatory competition at corporate level.137 In 
the EU only limited competition is permitted due to the minimum standards prescribed by 
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the Council of the EU through its directives for member states.138 The states in the US 
compete to attract more incorporation and, consequently, more franchise tax.139 This 
regulatory arbitrage may lead to a race to the bottom, and offers more flexible terms and 
conditions.140 The managerial interests will be more in those jurisdictions where their 
interests are safeguarded. This regulatory competition attracts managers to incorporate or 
reincorporate in a state that is more favourable. This results in a flexible approach to 
restricting the exploitation of a corporate opportunity by the management in US states.  
Secondly, the flexible approach of the US is based on a normative approach. In the US 
director primacy norms are more prevalent than shareholder primacy norms. The interests 
of directors are weighed more heavily than that of the shareholders in the US. In contrast, 
in the UK shareholder primacy norms are prevalent. Therefore, in the UK the policy of 
shareholder primacy norms has directed a stricter corporate opportunity doctrine compared 
to the US.  
 
Thirdly, the entrepreneurial freedom of directors in the US results in a flexible approach in 
the country. However, property rights are more focused and protected in the UK than 
entrepreneurial freedom. Therefore, the corporate opportunity doctrine is more rigid than 
its US counterpart. In the US the entrepreneurial freedom of directors may help to develop 
business but, at the same time, there is a possibility of potential losses to the shareholders. 
The directors may, after gaining sufficient experience at the cost of the company, start a 
competing business or may benefit from the corporate opportunity after resigning from 
their directorship in the company concerned. The shareholders may suffer loss in these 
circumstances; in fact, there is a trade-off between the entrepreneurial freedom of directors, 
which may promote business, and the flexibility in offering corporate opportunities to the 
directors, which may cause losses to the shareholders.  
 
Fourthly, the competition aspect in business also causes jurisdictional preferences. In the 
UK there is limited scope for competition compared to the US, where there is free 
competition. This led to the flexible approach in the US and a rigid one in the UK.  
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4B.6.3.3.5 The doctrine of corporate opportunity and Asian jurisdictions 
 
The doctrine of corporate opportunity pervades in the Anglo-Commonwealth and in civil 
law jurisdictions.141 The recent trend has been to provide legal protection against the 
misuse of office by directors. Malaysia amended its company law to make the management 
accountable for improperly using the property and information of the company, and taking 
up corporate opportunities for their personal benefit. It has also barred management from 
engaging in personal business that competes with the business of the company concerned. 
The Philippines introduced and elaborated the specific duties and liabilities of the directors 
through a code of corporate governance. In China some developments have been witnessed 
on the issue. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzen Stock Exchange have introduced rules and guidelines for the 
conduct of the controlling shareholders.142 The nature and scope of directors’ duties are 
being enhanced in order to restrict directors and controlling shareholders from exploiting 
corporate opportunities for their personal benefit, and at the cost of company and its 
minority shareholders. Path dependency forces (i.e., families and the state) are the main 
hurdle in Asian countries to controlling conflict of interest. Though it is not yet common in 
Asian countries some ice breaking has started.  
 
4B.6.3.3.6 Pakistan and the doctrine of corporate opportunity 
 
Corporate law in Pakistan does not deal with the exploitation of corporate opportunity by 
the directors. In that sense, there has been no convergence to the approach adopted in other 
common law jurisdictions. The main reason is the absence of a UK type of codification of 
directors’ duties. The only provision that may be cited for this purpose is the prohibition on 
the chief executive officer (CEO) of a public company from engaging himself or herself, 
directly or indirectly, in any business that is of the same nature and directly competes with 
the business of the company or any of its subsidiaries.143 Indirect involvement includes 
business carried out by the spouse or minor children of the CEO.144 A person who is 
appointed as chief executive is required to inform the company forthwith of the nature and 
the extent of his or her interest in such business.145 Under company law, the CEO has the 
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status of a director146 but such director is not required to be a member of the company.147 
Therefore, the objective for such a prohibition is to inform the management and the 
shareholders of the possible conflict of interest involving the CEO but does not provide 
any mechanism to avoid such conflict of interest. The section appears to focus more on 
related party transactions than corporate opportunity. There is no provision that prevents or 
authorizes the conflict of interest by the CEO of public companies who explores business 
opportunities, using his or her office, and exploits the same for his or her personal benefit 
without offering the opportunity to the company first. In contrast, the chief executives in 
private companies are at liberty to exploit all business opportunities to their personal 
benefit. No safeguard is available for minority shareholders against misuse of office by the 
CEO in private companies. The violation of not providing information on the nature and 
extent of competing business may result in such CEO only paying a minor financial 
penalty and debarment from becoming a director or chief executive for three years.148 
Another important issue is that the prohibition does not apply to any director who is not a 
CEO. The directors, other than CEO, may conduct competing businesses and exploit their 
office for business opportunities that are otherwise available to the company. They are not 
prohibited from exploiting corporate opportunities.  
 
The directors, as fiduciaries, are supposed to act in the best interest of the company. If they 
act in their own personal interests, they are not acting in the best interest of the company. 
This conflict of interest is visible in the corporate sector of Pakistan. Families and the state 
control the corporate sector, which allows them to control the board. They consider even 
listed companies as their family business and do not hesitate to transfer business 
opportunities from one entity to another. The transfer of a business opportunity from one 
entity to another may benefit them in a way as they may gain more benefits from the entity 
in which they have more stakes. This phenomenon is harmful to the interests of the 
company and its minority shareholders. Therefore, the ownership structure in Pakistan 
requires suitable legislation to control the conflict of interest of the fiduciaries in exploiting 
corporate opportunities in order to protect minority shareholders. The judiciary in Pakistan, 
being a common law system, may obtain the advantage created by the common law 
developed in other common law countries. However, the common law approach may be 
problematic for Pakistan for two obvious reasons. First, the common law that developed 
over the centuries is scattered. The ability of the judicial system of Pakistan to apply this 
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scattered common law in an efficient way is questionable. Second, common law, being a 
foreign law, will be regarded as being merely persuasive in Pakistan under the principles of 
jurisprudence. 
 
The recent trend in developed jurisdictions is to codify the common law as is the case in 
the UK where directors’ duties have been codified in the Companies Act, 2006. The 
codified laws can present a clear picture of rights and obligations. This trend is also evident 
in regional jurisdictions. Therefore, the codification of directors’ duties and the mechanism 
of authorization of conflict of interest are important in the context of Pakistan. The UK’s 
strict approach in regulating fiduciaries’ conflicts of interest may be more suitable in the 
Pakistani context where families control the boards and misuse their office for personal 
benefit at the cost of the company and its minority shareholders. However, the 
authorization process codified in the Companies Act, 2006 may, to the extent of 
authorization by the board of directors, be problematic in Pakistan because of the 
concentration of the ownership structure. Dominant families also control the board of 
directors and, therefore, they may hijack any authorization. The shareholders may access 
courts for a remedy in the case of a conflict of interests authorized by the board of directors 
but that course may be problematic. Firstly, the minority shareholders may not be aware of 
the nature and the extent of the conflict of interest on the part of the director. Secondly, the 
courts’ ability to provide a remedy is questionable for a number of reasons such as 
inefficiency, corruption and the cost involved. 
 
The common law procedure of shareholders authorising a conflict of interest may be more 
suitable in the context of Pakistan because of the dominance of families on the boards of 
directors. One option may be to authorize the board of directors to approve the conflict of 
interest up to certain limits and, if such interest exceeds that limit, then refer the issue to 
the general meeting. The methodology for such an authorization process may be to exclude 
the conflicted director from participation in the meeting of directors and members, if such 
director is a shareholder as well, whatever the case may be. Since the conflicted director 
may use his or her position, relation or dominance to persuade other shareholders to avoid 
discussing matters that are not in the interest of the company and to vote in his or her 
favour, his or her exclusion from the meeting of directors or shareholders may allow other 
directors or shareholders to discuss and vote on the issue independently. This may provide 
minority protection against the misuse of office by the directors.  
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4B.6.3.4 Fiduciary duties and the shareholders 
 
Fiduciary duty applies to the directors and executive officers of the company so that they 
act for the benefit of the company and its shareholders. At least in the UK, it is supposed to 
be applied to the managers. Fiduciary duty was created for trusts in order to avoid the 
misuse of trust property at the hands of the trustees. The objective was to prevent the 
wastage of trust property by the trustees for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The courts in 
the UK applied the same duty to entrepreneurs to avoid the misuse of company assets at 
the hands of the directors for the benefit of the shareholders.  
 
In the US the common law courts have extended the fiduciary duty to the controlling 
shareholders in two situations: (1) in close corporations such as quasi-partnership 
companies and (2) in freeze-out mergers.149 The fiduciary duty has two aspects: (1) the 
duty of care and (2) the duty of loyalty.150 In the duty of care concept the directors are 
expected to take decisions with due care, skill and diligence, and not to act negligently.151 
The duty of loyalty requires that the directors do not put themselves in a situation where 
their personal interests conflict with the interests of the firm and its shareholders.152 
 
Quasi-partnership companies are formed and operate like partnerships where all the 
shareholders are involved in the management.153 If controlling shareholders act 
opportunistically, then this may be harmful to the minority shareholders,154 for example, in 
some cases joining a company may be for the remuneration for acting as a director. If 
controlling shareholders oust minority shareholders from the management, and also a 
dividend is not declared, then the minority shareholders will not get any return on their 
investment. The shares of the private company are not saleable on the market and, 
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furthermore, most of the time they are subject to the approval of the other shareholders 
who control the management. In this scenario the minority shareholders will be at the 
mercy of the controlling shareholders. The courts interfere in such situations and apply the 
duty of loyalty to the controlling shareholders. Similarly, in freeze-out mergers the 
controlling shareholders may act opportunistically to determine a price, which is normally 
below the market value, in order to benefit from purchasing the shares of the minority 
shareholders. The majority will sell their shares in a subsidiary target company at a lower 
price but they may get more benefits when the parent company purchases shares. Again, in 
this situation, the court will not hesitate to interfere and apply the duty of loyalty to the 
controlling shareholders.155  
 
4B.6.3.4.1 Fiduciary duties and the shareholders in Pakistan 
 
The US approach of extending the fiduciary duty to the controlling shareholders is relevant 
in the context of Pakistan. In a concentrated ownership jurisdiction, such as Pakistan, the 
controlling shareholders can effectively control private as well as public companies. The 
controlling families have control over the companies and the managers are appointed by 
these families. The managers may be family members, close relatives or friends. The 
managers, therefore, act for the benefit of the controlling families. The controlling 
shareholders may act in a dual character, both as shareholders and managers. Controlling 
shareholders are involved in taking decisions while acting as board members. They also 
have sufficient influence to get the decisions of their choice from the board even if they are 
not directly involved in decision-making.156 Therefore, in the context of Pakistan, the duty 
of care may be extended to controlling shareholders who act as shadow directors. The 
fiduciary duty in this respect would apply to the shareholders acting in this dual manner.  
 
In addition to this, the nature of the corporate sector in Pakistan is such that controlling 
shareholders control general meetings even in public companies. Therefore, the controlling 
shareholders may act opportunistically against the interest of the company and its minority 
shareholders. In these circumstances the duty of loyalty may also be extended to the 
controlling shareholders in public companies.  
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To avoid excessive litigation, the shareholders would have the same defences of ‘business 
judgement rules’ and ‘judicial test of fairness’ available to the managers in their duty of 
care and loyalty respectively in the US context. Under the business judgement rule, the 
directors are supposed to act carefully and in the best interest of the companies and its 
shareholders, and only gross negligence will attract liability on the part of directors under 
the duty of care.157 CLRC in its concept paper recommended defining the extent of 
directors’ duties which are not properly defined in Pakistan. It further recommended that 
the rule established in Smith v Fawcett158, which is functionally equivalent to the business 
judgement rule established in the US, which provides a strong presumption in favour of 
directors for possible liability for their decisions must also be introduced in Pakistan.159 
Therefore, the defences of business judgement rule or Smith v Fawcett should also be 
available to majority shareholders for their possible liability in their decision while acting 
as shadow director. 
 
In the judicial test of fairness, the court needs to determine whether or not self-dealing is 
fair to the company and its shareholders. For this purpose, the courts may also rely upon 
the test of approval of the transaction by the majority of disinterested directors and the 
shareholders.160This defence should also be available for majority shareholders in their 
duty of loyalty.  
 
4B.6.4 Intervention rights  
 
Decisions are taken by the board of directors and, in some instances, by the shareholders in 
general meetings. The practical difficulty in making a decision through consensus lies in 
decision-making through the principle of majority rule. Majority rule is applied in the 
decisions made by the directors in board of directors’ meetings and shareholders in general 
meetings. Majority rule allows controlling shareholders to make decisions of their choice. 
Minority shareholders do not have enough shareholding to affect the decisions taken in 
shareholders’ meetings. They also do not have enough votes to appoint directors to control 
directors’ meeting. This necessitates providing some kind of protection to minority 
shareholders against self-interested decisions taken by the board and majority shareholders 
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in general meetings. Company law provides minority shareholders with the rights to 
intervene in the decisions of the board of directors, general meetings and also third-party 
actions in certain circumstances. Corporate law tries to avoid deadlock and, therefore, puts 
some limitations on the right of intervention. It endeavours to strike a balance between 
excessive and frivolous litigation, and protection against the arbitrary discretion of the 
management and the controlling shareholders. Common law has developed two important 
intervention rights for the minority shareholders: (1) the right to intervene when the 
personal rights of the minority shareholders are infringed, and (2) the right to intervene on 
behalf of the company when the company is wronged and the company fails to take action. 
The first right is called the unfair prejudice remedy and the second is called derivative 
action. Both these remedies are important in the context of Pakistan due to the nature of its 
corporate sector. However, derivative action is not recognized and unfair prejudice is 
insufficient, out-dated and redundant, to some extent, in the context of the new corporate 
scenario.  
  
4B.6.4.1 Derivative action 
 
A derivative action is a mechanism by which the shareholders can take action on behalf of 
the company in the case of breach of fiduciary duty. The action is called derivative action 
as it is derived from the company. This is minority protection because the minority 
shareholders do not have enough votes to take direct action through a general meeting. 
Derivative action provides minority shareholder with an opportunity to take action for the 
wrong done against the company acting on behalf of the company. They have this right 
even if they have only one vote. Derivative action is a common law remedy established by 
the courts but the new trend is to make it a statutory remedy. Many jurisdictions, including 
the UK, are providing this remedy through commercial codes. There is a converging trend 
in derivative action around the globe.  
 
However, derivative action is not a popular remedy and not frequently used for a number 
of reasons.161 There are many hurdles in the path of bringing a derivative action. It is not 
easy for the minority shareholders to provide evidence for the breach of duty due to lack of 
access to the resources of the company. The violation may not be easily detectable even if 
they have access to information and minutes of the meeting. The minutes of the meetings 
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are sanitized and, furthermore, every decision is not required to be accompanied by reasons 
and justifications for such decision. The cost factor is also relevant in the sense that the 
minority shareholder may not derive a benefit that is commensurate with the cost of the 
case.162 Therefore, derivative action is an effective remedy but may only be used as a last 
resort.  
 
4B.6.4.1.1 Statutory derivative action in the UK 
 
The Companies Act, 2006 has affectively excluded common law derivative action.163 The 
Act has made this action part of the Act with certain amendments. This codification has not 
only combined together scattered and variable common law derivative action, but has also 
removed ambiguities in certain areas.  
 
a. Scope of a statutory derivative claim 
 
The Act has extended the scope of the cause of action in derivative claims. It has replaced 
the common law requirement ‘fraud on minority’ with the extended scope of derivative 
action, which may include corporate claims involving negligence, default, breach of duty 
or breach of trust by a director.164 The inclusion of negligence in the Act has avoided the 
complex common law distinction between negligence per se, which did not qualify as 
fraud,165 and negligence benefitting the wrongdoer, which qualified as fraud.166 Therefore, 
a director can be held liable under the statutory derivative action if such director fails in his 
or her duty of care and skill unless ratified subject to s. 239 of the Act.167 The inclusion of 
pure negligence has made it easy for shareholders to pursue directors. The old common 
law contained complex terminology. Common law courts looked beyond simple 
negligence when directors carried out their duties. It looked like something additional to 
negligence such as a fraudulent act or enrichment. Under the Act it is simply enough to 
bring derivative action if directors are negligent. However, the negligence will not be used 
in a loose sense, as the court in Iesini v Westrip Holding Ltd held that where the directors 
made decision by taking professional advice it would not amount to negligence.168 
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The extended cause of action allows taking action against a director or third party or 
both.169 As a director may conspire with a third party in the appropriation of company 
assets, the Act has extended the scope of cause of action. Justice requires bringing the 
director or third party or both within the ambit of derivative action.170 
 
b. Enhanced role of the court in new statutory derivative action 
 
Under the old common law, the role of the court was limited in the sense that the plaintiff 
had to show certain conditions such as fraud on the minority, wrongdoer control and 
disinterested majority but in the new derivative action the role of the court has been 
enhanced. The discretion is with the court to decide whether or not a derivative action can 
be taken.  
 
i. Avoiding frivolous and excessive litigation 
 
To avoid excessive and frivolous litigation, the Act requires that the member who intends 
to proceed with a derivative claim obtains the court’s permission. Therefore, in practice, 
there is two-phased litigation in derivative claims. In the first phase, an ex parte decision is 
made and the company is not a party at this stage. The court looks at the facts and 
circumstances of the case and decides whether there is a prime facie case. Once it is 
satisfied, it may grant the leave. In phase two there is detailed consideration of the merits 
of the case. At this stage an inter partes decision is made. The company is also a party at 
this stage. The objective behind two-phased litigation is to avoid frivolous and excessive 
litigation in the early stages. If the court goes straight into the merits of the case, it may 
cause disruption in the affairs of the company’s business.171 
 
ii. Grant of leave 
 
The Act requires that the litigating member obtains the permission of the court before 
proceeding with a derivative claim. There may be two situations where the permission of 
the court is required: (1) permission is required where action is to be taken by the member 
as an original claim, and (2) where action has already been taken by the company and the 
                                                 
169
 See s. 260 (3) of the Companies Act, 2006. 
170
 Pettet, Lowry and Reisberg (n 167) 228-9. 
171
 Jonh Birds (ed), Annotated Companies Legislation (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) 318-20 
159 
 
shareholder asks the court to continue with the claim as a derivative action. This may 
happen in circumstances where the member considers that the action by the company may 
amount to abuse of process, or the company fails to prosecute diligently or it is appropriate 
for the member to continue with the claim as a derivative action.172 
 
The court must refuse a derivative claim in three situations. First, it must refuse where it is 
satisfied that allowing a member to bring or continuing derivative action does not prioritize 
the interest of the company in terms of s. 172 (i.e., the duty to promote the success of the 
company);173 in other words, if the member is not acting in the best interest of the 
company, the court will refuse the action. Although the member has no duty under s. 172 
but is acting on behalf of the company, he or she must prioritize the interest of the 
company. In this role the member will be duty-bound to promote the success of the 
company as if such member was a director of the company. Second, where the cause of 
action arises from an act or omission that is yet to occur and such act or omission has been 
authorized by the company, the court will refuse the action. Third, where the cause of 
action arises from an act or omission that has already occurred and it was authorized by the 
company before it occurred or has been ratified by the company since it occurred.174 In the 
last two situations it will be regarded as if the directors had not wronged the company and 
the court must refuse permission in these situations.175 
 
The Act also provides the courts with the discretion to grant the litigating member 
intending to take derivative action permission to do so. The Act provides six circumstances 
that the court must take into account in deciding whether to give permission to continue 
with a derivative claim. First, the court must consider the good faith of the litigating 
member. The court may refuse derivative action if it is satisfied that the member is not 
acting in good faith. Second, the court must consider the success of the company as a 
whole. The court may refuse permission to a litigating member if it is satisfied that a 
person acting under s. 172, under similar circumstances, would not continue to take 
action.176  
 
Third, the court must consider the possibility and fact of authorization, and possibility and 
fact of ratification. The court must consider the fact that if the cause of action arises from 
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an act or omission that is yet to occur and whether the act or omission could be and, in the 
circumstances, would be likely to be authorized before it occurs or ratified after it has 
occurred. Fourth, the court must consider the fact that if the cause of action arises from an 
act or omission that has already occurred and whether the act or omission could be and, in 
the circumstances, would be likely to be ratified by the company.177 However, it is difficult 
for the court to determine the possibility of authorization and ratification as the court has to 
observe shareholders’ behaviour as regards the breach of directors’ duties. Nevertheless, 
the courts have been given wide discretion in granting leave to proceed but, at the same 
time, this discretion is not unconstrained.178  
 
Another interesting aspect of authorization prescribed in the Act is that the members can 
authorize a breach of duty before it takes place.179 The court must refuse appeal or 
permission in these circumstances.180 This is possible in certain circumstances, for 
example, where members envisage possible breach of duty and authorizes it ex ante or 
where there is a conflict of interest between a director and the company, and members 
authorize the director to continue as a director. The outcome of this authorization may be 
to authorize the director to take the corporate opportunity out of the company and pursue it 
for his or her personal interest. This may be more problematic in situations where the 
quantum of conflict of interest is not foreseen by the members. 
 
Fifth, the court must consider the fact that the company has decided not to take action.181 
Sixth, the court must also take into account the fact that the member could pursue a 
personal claim, such as the unfair prejudice remedy, instead of acting on behalf of the 
company.182 As derivative action is a last resort, the court will have due regard to 
circumstances where the petitioner might obtain relief through a personal claim rather than 
acting on behalf of the company. Therefore, the court may refuse leave in circumstances 
where an alternative remedy is available. In Franbar Holdings Ltd v Patel and Others, the 
court refused an application for permission to continue with a derivative action on the 
grounds that the alternative remedy in the form of the unfair prejudice remedy in terms of 
s. 994 was available to the petitioner. The petitioner also conceded that there was no aspect 
of derivative claim that could not be compensated through s. 994. The court said that in 
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those cases where the directors who were involved in breach of duty were also major 
shareholders, the best option was to pursue the unfair prejudice remedy.183 The court took 
into account the fact that the controlling shareholders may ratify the wrongdoing of their 
colleague and, therefore, held to take the unfair prejudice remedy instead of a derivative 
claim. However, the leave was granted in Wishart v Castlecroft Securities Ltd.184 In this 
case, the director breached his fiduciary duty and transferred a corporate opportunity to 
another company with the connivance of a third party. The court held that allegations 
might form the basis of a petition under s. 994 but that it was an indirect means of 
achieving something that could have been achieved directly through derivative action. The 
court also allowed involving a third party for the sake of a remedy against such party.  
 
c. Preservation of non-ratifiable acts of common law 
 
The common law distinction between ratifiable and non-ratifiable breaches established in 
Cook v Deeks is still significant in the new statutory derivative action.185 This does not, 
however, require wrongdoer control as was required under the old common law. The 
common law requirement of wrongdoer control is replaced with judicial discretion to grant 
leave under the Act. 186  
 
The Act provides safeguards to prevent invalid ratification. S. 239 provides limits on the 
ratification by the general meeting by excluding the votes of the director involved, if that 
director is a member of the company as well, and all the members connected to such 
director. In refusing permission in Franbar Holdings, the court also discussed different 
factors of ratifications. 187 The court said that leave may be granted where the purported 
ratification had improperly prevented the petitioner from taking derivative action. This 
decision shows that the ratification procedure provided in s. 239 was not a simple route by 
which the majority shareholders and directors could collude with each other to protect their 
colleague. The court would look at all the circumstances of the case and would not allow 
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ratification of breach of duty where ratification was not obtained through fair or proper 
means or was fraudulent or oppressive to the minority shareholders.188  
 
d. Approval of an independent organ of the company 
 
The Act provides that the court has to have particular regard to the views of members with 
no personal interest;189 a common law principle established in Smith v Croft (No. 2). The 
objective of bringing this principle in statutory derivative action may be to consider the 
broader interest of shareholders as a whole instead of persons bringing derivative action. 
The idea is to look into the willingness of the court to listen to the independent 
shareholders view instead of just looking at the views of the shareholders bringing action. 
This provision of the Act is different from the common law in the sense that the court may 
still allow derivative action in circumstances where some shareholders are willing to take 
action and some are not, depending upon the circumstances of the case.  
 
e. Disregard for interested directors’ vote 
 
Under the common law, the director was permitted to vote for a resolution to ratify his or 
her own breach of fiduciary duty. In the cases where a director, in the capacity as a 
member of the company, had voted to ratify his or her own breach of duty, the courts held 
that the director in such cases acted in two different capacities: (1) such director had acted 
as a director by virtue of his or her office and (2) such director had acted in the capacity of 
a shareholder. When a director voted as a shareholder, he or she was using his or her 
property right. Therefore, a director was allowed to exercise his or her voting power even 
to ratify his or her own breach of fiduciary duty. However, the courts disallowed 
ratification when fraud against the minority was perpetrated.190 
 
In North West Transportation Ltd v Beatty, J. H. Beatty, director and majority shareholder 
of the company, sold his steamship to the company and obtained the necessary approval 
for the contract by way of a general meeting using his dominant voting power. Henry 
Beatty brought a case against the company and J. H. Beatty to ratify the contract on the 
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basis that the director concerned was a majority shareholder who had disregarded the 
objections of the minority shareholders. The Supreme Court of Canada did not allow the 
approval of the transaction but the Privy Council held that J. H. Beatty was entitled to vote 
as a shareholder in a general meeting to ratify the contract.191 There have been discussions 
among commentators and the legislature over the decision of the Privy Council regarding 
the role of an interested director-cum-shareholder in voting to ratifying a transaction in 
which such director-cum-shareholder had an interest.192 The Companies Act, 2006 has 
modified the rule established in North-West Transportation Ltd v Beatty. S. 239 disallows 
the voting of an interested director in any resolution of a general meeting to ratify the act 
of such director, provided such director is also a member of the company.  
 
In principle, an ordinary resolution is enough to ratify a breach of duty193 but an interested 
director, who is also a shareholder and other members connected to such director, are 
barred from voting to pass a resolution to ratify his or her own breach of duty. However, 
such director and members are not excluded from taking part in the proceeding and 
counting towards the quorum of the meeting.194 They can take an active part in the meeting 
that is to consider and pass a resolution to ratify the breach of duty of such conflicted 
director. This process may be defective in the sense that the interested director may 
persuade other shareholders to favour such resolution or discussion and voting. The proper 
procedure may be to exclude the interested director and connected persons, who are also 
shareholders, from taking part in the meeting. Nevertheless, the exclusion of the interested 
director from voting has solved, to some extent, problems of wrongdoer control. 
 
4B.6.4.2 Derivative action in Pakistan 
 
In Pakistan derivative action suits are not recognized by law and there is no evidence of the 
acceptance of derivative suits in the courts. However, the courts have not ruled them out. 
In Sakina Khatoon v S.S. Nazir Ahsan, the honourable Sindh High Court highlighted 
certain principles of a derivative suit. 195 The case was not a derivative claim but the court 
observed the possibility of derivative action in certain circumstances. The court said that 
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shareholders could bring a derivative action under certain circumstances: (1) the company 
must be under the control of the majority shareholders who are abusing their position; (2) 
the abuse of power by the majority must be to defraud the company; (3) the company must 
be unable to bring action because of the control of the majority; and (4) the company must 
be impleaded in such a suit. The court did not elaborate and discuss these rules because the 
original case was not a derivative action. These principles appear to be mimicking the old 
common law developed in the UK. 
 
Pakistan is a common law country and a former colony of the Britain, therefore, the courts 
can take advantage of the common law derivative action developed in other common law 
countries especially of the United Kingdom and statutory derivative action codified in the 
Companies Act 2006.  Derivative actions are potentially important in the Pakistani context 
due to nature of ownership structure, prevailed bad corporate governance, inefficient 
judiciary and other supporting institutions. The ownership structure is highly concentrated 
with families, groups and state dominant in the corporate structure. These families appoint 
the family members or persons of their confidence on the board and therefore control the 
board. Similarly, the state appoints political affiliated persons on the board and thereby 
controls the board. They also have sufficient voting shares to control even the listed 
companies. The small and minority shareholders do not have enough voting shares to 
resolve the issues at the meeting of board of directors or the general meetings of the 
shareholders.  
 
In the cases where any wrong is committed against the company, the shareholders have 
two options to make good of the wrong committed. Firstly, they can resolve it at the 
shareholder meetings but the small and minority shareholders do not have enough 
shareholdings to take action against the directors at the meeting of shareholders. Secondly, 
they can approach the court of law for taking action against the directors. The problem 
with this forum is that the court has to rely on common law derivative actions. The 
common law derivative actions are scattered and change with passage of time. This 
variable common law is problematic especially for a judiciary such as Pakistan which is 
not efficient. The nature of common law is that it is not codified.  On the other hand, 
codified law can present clear picture of the law. Therefore, most of jurisdictions including 
the United Kingdom have codified the common law derivative action in order to remove 
ambiguities in the law. Pakistani courts could provide corporate remedy to the minority 
shareholders more effectively provided the derivative action is facilitated by codifying  the 
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company law.  CLRC196 has discussed the introduction of derivative action in Pakistan due 
to nature of corporate sector and international trend of codification of derivative actions in 
corporate laws by many countries including the UK and other major regional jurisdictions. 
In its preliminary report submitted to SECP, CLRC has  recommended to discuss further 
before  introducing  the statutory derivative actions in the company law of Pakistan.197 
However, it has not yet submitted its final report to SECP to date. 
 
There is a convergence trend to derivative suits. Most of the jurisdictions have introduced 
this remedy or at least recommended that it be included in their legislation. This remedy is 
available in the UK, the US, Australia and New Zealand.198 At the regional level, Malaysia 
introduced derivative suits in 2007, Hong Kong in 2009 and China in 2005. Thailand has 
also introduced derivative suits but with the restriction that shareholders must have at least 
5% shares to file a derivative suit.199 Derivative suits are also recognized by the courts in 
India.200 
 
The acceptance of derivative actions by both advanced and developing jurisdictions 
highlights the importance of derivative actions. The recent trend has been to bring 
derivative suits within the ambit of the statutory form. The corporate sector in Pakistan is 
concentrated in which directors are normally from among family members, relatives or 
persons who are in their confidence. In this scenario it is not expected that the controlling 
shareholders will bring an action against such directors for breach of duty. It is also 
difficult for the minority shareholders to pass a resolution in a general meeting in order to 
get a remedy. The nature of the corporate sector in Pakistan suggests that derivative suits 
must be introduced through statutory form. The UK statutory derivative action can be 
helpful for the legislature to introduce in the Pakistani corporate arena.  
 
However, two issues are important with reference to the introduction of statutory 
derivative action in Pakistan. First, the statutory derivative action can work properly if 
directors’ duties are also codified. There is a need to define the extent of directors’ 
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fiduciary duty, which is not properly defined in Pakistan.201 Two common law approaches 
to directors’ duties are relevant in this context. The case law in the UK established this 
fiduciary duty and provides two tests: (1) the objective standard and (2) the higher 
subjective standard. In the objective standard test, the requirement from a director is to 
provide the care that a reasonable person will apply. In the subjective standard test the 
requirement from a director is to apply particular care, where such director has a particular 
skill or expertise.202 The UK has codified detailed duties of directors, established through 
common law, in the Companies Act, 2006. These duties include, but are not limited to, the 
duty to act within the powers provided in the constitution of the company;203 to promote 
the success of the company;204 to exercise independent judgement;205 to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence;206 to avoid conflict of interest;207 not to accept benefits 
from third parties;208 and to declare any personal interest in the proposed transaction or 
arrangement.209  
 
In addition, to avoid disruption in the functioning of the company, the rule established in 
Smith v Fawcett,210 which requires that directors act with bona fides in the best interest of 
the company and also provides strong presumptions in favour of directors from possible 
liability for their decisions, must also be introduced in Pakistan. In Smith v Fawcett, a 
private company, namely Smith and Fawcett Ltd, had issued capital of 8,002 ordinary 
shares with two directors J.F and N.S having 4,001 shares each. The articles of association 
of the company provided that ‘the directors may at any time in their absolute and 
uncontrolled discretion refuse to register any transfer of shares and clause 19 of Table A 
shall be modified accordingly’. J. F died and his son, as executor, applied to the company 
to register shares in his name but N.S refused to register the shares in his name. N.S, 
instead, offered to register 2,001 and to buy 2,000 shares at a fixed price. The executor 
applied to the court to rectify register of the company and entering shares in his name. The 
court held that ‘the powers given in the articles are of a fiduciary nature and must be 
exercised in the interest of the company and there is nothing to show that they had been 
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otherwise exercised’. The executor appealed the judgement. The court of appeal upheld the 
decision of the trial court and said ‘the directors must exercise their discretion bona fide in 
what they consider – not what a court may consider – is in the interests of the company.’211 
 
Second, it is also important to enhance judicial capacity and efficiency for the effective 
application of derivative actions through the courts.212  
 
4B.6.4.2 The unfair prejudice remedy in Pakistan 
 
4B.6.4.2.1 Introduction 
 
The unfair prejudice remedy deals with circumstances where the membership or personal 
rights of shareholders are infringed. It is distinct from the derivative action where action is 
taken for the enforcement of corporate rights. In the unfair prejudice remedy members are 
the proper party for the enforcement of personal rights. However, in derivative action, the 
company is a proper party to litigate but a member could also litigate in derivative action, 
acting for, and on behalf of, the company. In the unfair prejudice remedy, the damages are 
given to the member concerned, whereas in derivative action the damages are given to the 
company. This remedy is specifically designed for minority shareholders. If the majority 
comes to court for an unfair prejudice remedy against the conduct of a director, the court 
can simply direct that a resolution be passed or that a director be removed for breach of 
duty.213 The unfair prejudice remedy has a wider scope than derivative action. The court 
may even demand that directors pay the shareholders.  
 
4B.6.4.2.2 The remedy against oppression and mismanagement by the controllers 
in Pakistan: An overview 
 
In Pakistan the oppressive remedy is provided both in company law and in case law. The 
prevention of oppression and mismanagement is provided under s. 290 of the Ordinance. 
This section is of a preventative nature and has as an objective the prevention of the 
                                                 
211
 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304. 
212
 This issue will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
213
 Ben Pettet, Company Law (Longman, Harlow 2001) 253; Clark Bryan, ‘Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct: A 
Pathway through the Maze’ (2001) 22 (6) Company Lawyer 170-7. 
168 
 
oppression and mismanagement of majority shareholders.214 This is considered a minority 
shareholders’ remedy because the majority may not be required to go to court for the 
remedy as they have the power to pass a resolution in a general meeting. Therefore, if the 
majority approaches a court for the remedy, the court may direct that a resolution be passed 
at a general meeting. In the context of Pakistan there may be circumstances where the 
majority may ask the court for a remedy against the oppressive conduct and 
mismanagement by the minority. However, this may be an exception rather than a norm. 
This scenario may develop in various circumstances. Firstly, this may happen if the 
minority shareholders have shares with enhanced voting powers.215 In this case, any 
resolution in general meeting may be controlled by such minority. The majority may not be 
able to resolve the problem in a general meeting and therefore have no option but to 
approach the court for a remedy. Secondly, the situation might arise where the minority has 
the power to control the management under a shareholder agreement. For instance, in 
WAPDA v KAPCO, the petitioner who held 64% of the shares approached the court for the 
remedy under s. 290 of the Ordinance. The petitioner, the Water and Power Development 
Authority (WAPDA), privatized one of its units, namely the Kot Addu Power Company 
(KAPCO) (Respondent No. 1) and sold its 36% shares in KAPCO to National Power 
International Limited (NPIL) (Respondent No. 2). The management and control of 
KAPCO was transferred to the NPIL, irrespective of its shareholding under the share 
purchase agreement, for twenty-five years. Under the agreement, the board of directors of 
KAPCO was to consist of nine directors, four of whom had to be appointed by the NPIL, 
including the chief executive, four independent directors and one director by WAPDA. 
After some time, NPIL entered into an agreement with one of its subsidiary companies to 
manage and operate the unit for a hefty payment. The maintenance cost that was paid to 
the new contractor was much higher than the price paid by another company for a plant of 
similar capacity and nature. The court held that the NPIL was conducting the affairs of 
KAPCO in a manner prejudicial to the public interest as well as oppressive to the 
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petitioner. The court ordered the appointment of a provisional manager in order to ensure 
the smooth running of KAPCO and restrained the NPIL from acting in a manner 
prejudicial to the public interest and detriment to that of the petitioner.216 This case is 
unique, as the majority shareholders had to approach the court for a remedy under the 
oppressive conduct of the minority. This may happen in country such as Pakistan where 
political decisions are taken in public sector companies. In this case the arrangement of the 
shareholder agreement was against the general principles where the minority was given 
control and management of the company. An apparent objective of the government, in 
transferring control and management to the minority, may be to attract foreign investment. 
Nonetheless, the majority had to approach the court for a remedy against the oppressive 
conduct of the minority. The remedy under oppressive conduct may be sought by both the 
majority and minority. It simply depends upon who controls the company.  
 
Moreover, the section provides the courts with vast and undefined powers.217 The objective 
of this section is to provide an alternative to winding up,218 which is not an attractive 
remedy. The winding up may be detrimental to both the respondents and the petitioners. 
The section provides that where the court is of the opinion that the winding up would 
unfairly prejudice the members or creditors, it may order that an end be brought to the 
matters complained of instead of issuing a winding-up order.219 In Registrar v PICLD, the 
court said that to apply for an oppressive remedy under s. 290, it was not necessary that the 
circumstances must be such that would justify the winding up. The winding up of 
companies is provided under s. 305 of the Ordinance.220 The court has been empowered to 
provide different remedial measures under oppressive conduct in Pakistan.  
 
4B.6.4.2.3 Who can apply for relief? 
 
Any member or members holding not less than 20% of issued capital may apply to the 
court where the affairs of the company are conducted or likely to be conducted in a manner 
oppressive to such member or any of the members.221 Likewise, creditors who have an 
interest equivalent to not less than 20% of the paid-up capital of the company may apply to 
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the court against oppressive conduct of controllers or mismanagement in the company. In 
addition to members and creditors, the power is also delegated to the registrar of 
companies222 and SECP to apply to the court against the oppressive conduct or 
mismanagement by the controller. 223  
 
4B.6.4.2.4 Nature and scope of the remedy under oppressive conduct or 
mismanagement 
 
The remedy under s. 290 can be invoked in the following circumstances: 
 
When the affairs of the company are conducted: 
i) In an unlawful manner; or 
ii) In a fraudulent manner; or 
iii) In a manner not provided in the memorandum of association; or 
iv) In a manner oppressive to members or creditors; or 
v) In a manner prejudicial to the public interest.224 
 
In Pakistan, the scope of the oppressive remedy is wider than in the UK in the sense that it 
covers the interests of the creditors and it may also be sought in the case where the conduct 
is against the public interest. There are some instances where the court has entertained 
petitions under s. 290 where a company operated against the public interest. In WAPDA v 
KAPCO the court held that the siphoning-off of money from a company belonging in the 
public domain amounted to conducting affairs of the company against public interest and 
was oppressive to the members. The court further said that this type of mismanagement 
caused the public to pay extra in the form of expensive electricity.225 Similarly, the 
creditors could also apply for a remedy under oppressive conduct.226  
 
Although the powers given to the court under s. 290 in Pakistan are wider than the 
corresponding powers in s. 994 of the UK Companies Act, 2006 and the Indian Companies 
Act, 1956,227 the remedy is more problematic in Pakistan than the corresponding remedy in 
the UK. Two issues are important with regard to the oppressive remedy for the minority 
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shareholders under s. 290 of the Ordinance. First, the stipulation of at least 20% 
shareholding to apply for the remedy is too demanding and many petitions have been 
dismissed by the courts ab initio for not meeting the qualifying number of shares.228 These 
petitions may not prima facie be bogus, lacking in evidence or without merit. The only 
reason for dismissal was the ownership of less than 20% shares. This strict requirement of 
locus standi has denied the remedy even to genuine complainants. Fixing the percentage of 
minority shareholding is problematic and misleading when it comes to the term minority 
shareholder. Minority shareholder may vary from 1% to 49.99% voting shares. This all 
depends upon the circumstances of each case. Suppose a hypothetical situation in which 
the members of a public listed company have a shareholding of, for instance, 1%, 5% and 
10%, and the rest of the shares are dispersed public shareholding. Suppose in a general 
meeting these were the only shareholders present to pass a resolution. In this situation, if 
two members joined forces to pass any resolution then the shareholder who holds 1% of 
the shares would be considered the minority shareholder. Similarly, suppose that in a 
company there are only two shareholders; one holding 49.99% and the other 50.01% of the 
shares. In this case the person who holds 49.99% of the shares will be a minority 
shareholder. Moreover, the minority shareholder concept fluctuates, depending upon the 
circumstances. One may be minority shareholder in one case and part of majority in 
another case.229 Therefore, any percentage of shareholding may constitute a minority 
shareholder and affectee of oppression and mismanagement by the controllers. Similarly, 
an individual shareholder who holds only one share may also be affected by oppression 
and mismanagement. This provision has effectively excluded shareholders who hold less 
than 20% of the voting shares and left them at the mercy of controlling shareholders and 
the management. Furthermore, in some instances, for example, in listed companies, 20% 
voting shares in itself may have substantial influence in the affairs of management and the 
company. This high threshold has made it difficult for the minority shareholders to apply 
to the court for relief against oppression and mismanagement. This is the main reason that 
there are a few instances where minority shareholders apply to the courts.230 The person 
with less than 20% voting has to approach the civil courts for civil litigation for tortuous 
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loss. The courts in Pakistan experience inherent problems of delay, cost and 
inefficiency.231 The other problem with approaching civil courts is that it may provide a 
remedy in the form of damages only and may not get a specific remedy that is corporate in 
nature. Moreover, as per routine, the decisions in such cases normally take four to six years 
in courts of first instance and subsequent appeals can extend this duration further.232 Such 
restrictions have effectively denied minority shareholders a remedy. The remedy can be 
only be effective when its provisions are independent of the percentage of shareholding 
needed to apply for the remedy.  
 
The Corporate Law Review Commission,233 in its concept paper, has recommended 
reducing the percentage needed to apply for the remedy under oppressive conduct, from 
20% to 10%. This recommendation still seems to be insufficient and may not solve the 
problem. In the UK there is no cap and an individual shareholder can apply to the court for 
a remedy. In India the Companies Act, 1956 used to have a cap234 for applying for the 
remedy against oppressive conduct, but the Companies Bill, 2012 has now removed it.235 
The reason for removing the cap is that any person, notwithstanding his or her capital, may 
be an affectee of oppressive conduct. The remedy against oppressive conduct can only be 
effective when the cap is removed. However, the removal of the cap may create problems 
of excessive and frivolous litigation by the individual shareholders. This litigation may 
create hurdles in the businesses of the companies. To avoid excessive and frivolous 
petitions and hindrances in the business of the company, the law can make a precondition 
of ‘leave to appeal’, which was introduced for statutory derivative action in the Companies 
Act, 2006 in the UK. 
 
The second issue is the word ‘oppression’ used in s. 290 of the Ordinance. The statute has 
not provided any guidelines for conduct that may be termed oppressive. Therefore, this 
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gives the courts the discretion to determine what kinds of conduct are oppressive. In 
common law it has been defined as ‘burdensome, harsh and wrong’.236 In the context of 
company law, it may be defined as ‘an act of management affecting the shareholders or 
creditors which is unjust and that deprive them of their rights’.237 There are some instances 
that may be termed oppressive conduct by the majority shareholders, for instance, where 
the majority attempt to force a new and risky venture on an unwilling minority; refusal to 
register the transfer or transmission of shares; omitting to do something that is otherwise 
just and beneficial to the company; and depriving members of their voting rights may be 
termed oppressive conduct by the majority.238 The courts in Pakistan have used this term 
with different meanings in different cases. In Registrar v PICLD, the court said that the 
intention of the legislature seemed to be that for individual violations of the Ordinance, the 
violator would be punished for that particular offence. However, if there is a series of 
violations and the same were not redressed, it amounted to oppressive conduct.239 This is a 
very restrictive explanation of the term oppressive conduct and may deny the minority 
shareholders a remedy in many instances of individual violations. However, in some cases 
the courts have given very liberal interpretation to the word oppression. In the Pfizer 
Laboratories case, the court said that non-payment of a return on investment to minority 
shareholders and a recession of the value of their shares over a period would be termed 
‘oppressive conduct’.240 In PSO v POPL, the court held that ‘an attempt to oust a 
petitioner or to induct any third party in its place behind the petitioners’ back by itself was 
an act of oppression’.241  
The word ‘oppression’ which developed at common law over a period in the UK had a 
very restricted meaning. It was transferred to the company law of Pakistan due to 
colonization.242 In the UK the term ‘oppressive conduct’ has been replaced with ‘unfair 
prejudice’ in order to enhance the scope of the remedy and also to provide an alternative to 
winding up. ‘Oppressive conduct’ was too restrictive and the UK courts preferred winding 
up to granting a remedy under oppressive conduct. In the UK, before the introduction of 
s. 210 of the Companies Act, 1948, the only remedy against oppressive conduct of the 
directors and the controlling shareholders was the winding up of the company on just and 
equitable grounds. Since the winding up was an expensive remedy, as the oppressed and 
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oppressor could both suffer, an alternative to winding-up petitions was needed.243 S. 210 of 
the Companies Act, 1948 provided an alternative to just and equitable winding up. The 
newly introduced remedy was against the ‘oppressive’ conduct of directors or the 
controlling shareholders. The Act, however, did not define the word ‘oppression’ which 
created problems of interpretation. It was interpreted differently in different judicial 
decisions. The word has been interpreted to mean ‘burdensome, harsh and wrong’244 and 
also ‘a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of some 
portion of its members’.245  
 
However, the floodgates of approaching the courts for a remedy for minority shareholders, 
which were closed by the ruling in Foss v Harbottle, could not provide sufficient remedy 
to the minority shareholders due to the strict interpretation of the term ‘oppression’ by the 
courts. The courts interpreted the term to mean conduct in the circumstances in which the 
company might be wound up on just and equitable grounds. The petitioners were required 
to establish ‘oppressive conduct’ which could form the basis for winding up. The courts 
preferred winding up on just and equitable grounds instead of providing a remedy for 
oppressive conduct due to its strict application. Therefore, the courts showed their 
reluctance to make good for the wrong committed.246 The other problem with this remedy 
was the refusal of the courts to grant relief for conduct regarded as oppressive that was not 
qua member. This meant that the harm must be associated with the right to membership. 
The courts did not consider the removal of an individual from directorship as oppressive 
conduct on the grounds that harm was qua director and not qua member. Therefore, no 
remedy was provided in such cases.247 This difficulty was realized by Parliament, 
therefore, s. 210 was replaced with s. 75 of the Companies Act, 1980, which was later 
replaced with s. 459 of the Companies Act, 1985.  
 
The scope of the remedy was enhanced by the Companies Act, 1985. This new remedy 
was slightly amended by the Companies Act, 1989.248 The Acts changed the idea of 
oppressive conduct to unfair prejudice conduct. The Jenkins Committee249 proposed the 
change of terminology because the courts had crafted an understanding that the word 
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‘oppression’ required proof from the petitioner showing an independent illegal act on the 
part of the defendant.250 The objective of the Jenkins Committee was to provide a remedy 
beyond the breach of the right.251 The new terminology was better and capable of 
providing the courts with an opportunity for flexibility in interpreting the term and 
providing a remedy to the affected minority. This also enabled judges to be more flexible 
and innovative in providing petitioners with a remedy through the new statutory remedy.252 
The remedy with minor amendment was retained in the Companies Act, 2006 (ss. 994 to 
999). The remedy provided in the Act conferred rights on the shareholders that were 
‘inalienable and cannot be diminished or removed by contract or otherwise’.253 Therefore, 
this put restrictions on the controllers of companies to amend or cut these rights either 
through the articles of association or through mutual agreements.254 The legislature in the 
UK is responsive to changed circumstances and to providing a remedy to the oppressed. 
However, the legislature in Pakistan is too slow in revamping the company law to cope 
with the fast-changing circumstances in corporate law and also in the technological world. 
It has passed only one company law in over 66 years and that too was copied the Indian 
Companies Act, 1913. The existing law has been changed through minor amendments a 
number of times but there is a need for the overall revamping of the company law to meet 
the demand of new needs and circumstances. Pakistani courts are still interpreting the word 
oppression in the same way as was interpreted by the courts in the UK years ago. It is 
suggested that minority protection should be made more viable. As far as the oppressive 
remedy is concerned, it is suggested that it be redefined to enhance its scope.  
 
4B.6.4.2.5 Statutory remedies under oppressive conduct  
 
a. Alternative to winding up 
 
Under the company law of Pakistan, the remedy under oppressive conduct is an alternative 
to winding up. S. 290 of the Ordinance provides that if the winding up of a company 
unfairly prejudices the members or creditors of the company, the court, instead of ordering 
the winding up ‘may make such orders as it thinks fit’. This provides wide discretion to the 
court to provide petitioners with a remedy. In this context the court may order financial 
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penalties to be paid to the petitioners. The court may also insist that the directors pay the 
shareholders. The Ordinance further states that the court may order the manner in which 
the affairs of the company will be conducted in future.255 Therefore, the court may order 
the management to perform or abstain from doing certain acts.  
 
In the UK the Companies Act, 2006 provides the courts with more discretion than the 
corresponding powers in the Ordinance in Pakistan. S. 996 of the Companies Act, 2006 
provides very wide discretion to the court in providing remedies. The sub-sections state 
that ‘it may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters 
complained of’256 and also ‘authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on 
behalf of the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may 
direct’.257 These are open-ended and the court may provide any remedy it thinks fit. In 
addition to the remedies discussed above in the context of Pakistan, the court may also 
order that derivative action be brought on behalf of the company as a relief for the unfair 
prejudice petition. A successful derivative action may be beneficial to all shareholders, 
including the petitioners. However, a problematic situation may arise where the court 
provides corporate relief in an unfair prejudice petition. The unfair prejudice is a personal 
remedy, whereas a corporate remedy is for the company. This situation may occur in cases 
where remedies are sought for the breach of directors’ duty. In Kung v Kou the court said 
that it could order both unfair prejudice and derivative action, and both could be tried 
together and corporate relief could also be provided in unfair prejudice action.258 In 
Anderson v Hogg259 a similar decision was made and a corporate remedy was provided in 
an unfair prejudice claim in which the wrongdoers were ordered to pay the company. 
These decisions have created confusion, to some extent, as they have intermingled the 
unfair prejudice with derivative actions. Nevertheless, this may be beneficial to the extent 
of avoiding wasting time and money in bringing a separate derivative action.  
 
b. Buyout or exit remedy 
 
The buyout or exit is an important remedy for the minority shareholders provided in the 
Ordinance. The court may order the purchase of shares by other members or by the 
company. In case the shares are purchased by the company, the court may order a 
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reduction in the share capital of the company.260 In Israrul Haq v Al-Tahir Industries (Pvt) 
Ltd, Israrul Haq owned 42.32% shares in Al-Tahir Industries (Pvt) Ltd. Haq was not 
included in the management despite the fact that he had 42.32% shares in the company. He 
brought a petition against the controlling shareholders for mismanagement of the company 
under s. 290 of the Ordinance. He pleaded that the company had never paid a dividend nor 
was he allowed to sit in management and that the company was managed in manner that 
was oppressive to the minority shareholder. He prayed for the regulation of the company in 
accordance with the Ordinance or, alternatively, that the respondent be directed to purchase 
the shares of the petitioner. The High Court observed that the parties mistrusted each other, 
therefore, it was not just or proper that the capital of the petitioner remained locked. The 
court ordered the respondent to purchase the shares of the petitioner at par value.261 The 
court did not order the valuation of the shares. The shares were originally purchased in 
1990 and, on the order of the court, sold at the same price in 2002 despite the fact that 
dividends were never paid by the respondents. As the formation of a private company is 
normally based on mutual trust and confidence, once that trust and confidence are broken, 
the courts would normally allow either winding up or order the respondent to purchase the 
shares of the petitioner. In this case the court, instead of regulating the affairs of the 
company, ordered the buyout of the minority shares by the majority shareholders.  
 
As the court also has the power to order the company to purchase the shares held by the 
minority shareholder and reduce the capital of the company, the courts must consider other 
factors before ordering such reduction in the capital of the company as such reduction may 
be problematic as far as the financial aspects of the company are concerned. The survival 
or existence of the company, after reduction in the capital, may be at risk. The courts must 
consider this before ordering a reduction in the capital of the company.  
 
i Determination of price in buyout offers 
 
In the context of the UK, Lord Hoffmann discusses the buyout offer at fair price in the 
Phillip case. 262 He discusses at length the circumstances and consequences of a fair offer. 
He suggests that a petition might be struck down if the respondent had already made a fair 
offer to the petitioner. As regards the circumstances in which a fair offer should be made, 
he distinguishes between a company and a quasi-partnership company. A quasi-
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partnership company may be defined as a company, though still a legal entity, formed on 
mutual understanding and promises, by words or conduct, either at the time of entering into 
association or developed later on. He says that it would be unfair for the members to ignore 
these understandings and promises. He further explains that though such a promise may 
not be enforceable at law as regards a third party, such a promise may be binding as a 
matter of justice and equity between the members. If a member is removed from the 
management by the majority on the breakdown of relations between them without serious 
wrongfulness or unfair conduct on the part of any member, in such a situation it is not fair 
that the capital of the removed member remained locked in the company.263 In such a 
situation, the removed member should be offered a fair price for his or her shares. He 
further explains that it is also unfair for any member to declare unilaterally that trust and 
confidence had broken down, and to demand that his or her shares be bought at a fair value 
unless such member is removed from the management. According to him, unfairness does 
not lie in exclusion but exclusion without a fair offer.264  
 
The Companies Act, 2006 does not provide any mechanism for determining price. This is 
left to the court to determine. The Law Commission proposed the determination of fair 
value on a pro rata basis unless the court directed otherwise. As the minority shareholders 
do not have control over the company, the court may direct that the shares held by the 
minority shareholders be discounted in those cases where the shares are held by the 
majority in the form of a block which carry control of the company. Therefore, such 
controlling shares have more value than shares without such control.265 However, there is a 
problem in determining the price for private companies as the shares of private companies 
are not traded on the market and it is difficult to determine the discount for the minority 
shares.266 Lord Hoffmann is of the view that this could either be determined by mutual 
agreement or by an expert agreed to through mutual consent. For this purpose, all the 
parties should be given equal opportunities to access the information of the companies in 
order for the experts to determine a fair price.267 
 
The company law in Pakistan does not provide guidelines for determining the price of the 
shares to be purchased by other members or the company. As far as listed companies are 
concerned, the shares are traded on stock markets and the share price can be ascertained 
                                                 
263
 Re A Company (No. 006834 of 1988) (1989) 5 BCC 218. 
264
 O’ Neill (n 153) per Lord Hoffmann. 
265
 Law Commission Report on Shareholders’ Remedies of 1997 (paras 3.8, 3.57-62). 
266
 O’ Neill (n 153). 
267
 Ibid. 
179 
 
easily. However, the problem arises in the case of private and non-listed public companies 
as their shares are not traded and there is no mechanism for determining the share price of 
such companies. The valuation of the share price for such companies may be problematic 
and a cause for dispute. The other problem is the determination of discount on the shares 
held by the minority shareholders in those companies where there are controlling blocks. 
Purchasing the shares of such companies pro rata does not solve the problem as the 
controlling shares have more value than non-controlling shares. The shares will only be 
pro rata in those circumstances where there are no controlling shares. In Pakistan, where 
ownership is concentrated, there are fewer chances that the shares are without controlling 
blocks. In view of this, the valuation mechanism is very important in the context of 
Pakistan. For instance, in Associated Biscuits International Limited [ABIL] v English 
Biscuits Manufacturers Limited (EBM) the petitioner raised the issue of determining the 
price. 268 In this case ABIL owned 40% of the shares in EBM without any representation 
on the management in EBM. Respondent No. 2 was the managing director, while 
respondents Nos 3 to 7 were directors and shareholders of EBM. Respondents Nos 4, 5 and 
6 were relatives of respondents Nos 2 and 3. EBM formed a subsidiary company, namely 
Coronet Foods (Pvt) Limited (CFL) with 51% shares held by EBM while the remaining 
49% shares were held by respondents Nos 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. Respondents Nos 2 and 3 were 
the managing director and director respectively in CFL. In order to make CFL a wholly 
owned subsidiary of EBM and to avoid conflict of interest, it was decided at the AGM of 
EBM that it would acquire 49% of the shares owned by respondents Nos 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 in 
CFL. In order to finance the purchase, it was also decided to issue rights shares in EBM. 
The auditors of EMB were assigned the task of valuating the price for the rights issue and 
shares of CFL. The representative of ABIL, a minority shareholder in EBM, principally 
accepted the decision, in order to end the conflict of interest, on behalf of ABIL but 
requested the valuation of the shares in a transparent manner. Before finalising the reports 
by the auditors, the board of directors of CFL (who were also directors in EMB and 
relatives of other directors of EMB) and the board of directors of EMB (who were also 
managing director and director respectively in CFL) decided to acquire the shares of CFL 
with 100% premium. This decision of the board of director of EBM compelled EBM to 
purchase the shares of CFL at a highly inflated price in order to give the benefit to 
respondents Nos 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. CFL brought a petition on the grounds that the decision of 
the board of directors of EBM to acquire CFL shares at a ridiculously inflated value was 
mala fide, oppressive and fraudulent under s. 290 of the Ordinance. The court observed 
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that the valuation was manoeuvred by the board of directors and the auditors of EMB. The 
valuation was made on the basis of a future forecast prepared by respondents Nos 2 and 3. 
The Sindh High Court rejected the valuation of CFL shares made by the board of directors 
of EBM. It appointed an official assignee as commissioner in order to revaluate the shares 
of CFL by appointing an independent valuator or auditors.  
 
Another aspect of the valuation of shares may be the determination of the control premium. 
It is not necessary that only the majority purchases the shares of the minority. There may 
also be a possibility, though in exceptional cases, that the minority may be in a position to 
purchase the shares held by the majority. Therefore, the minority shareholders may also be 
given equal opportunity to purchase shares held by the majority if they can afford to do so. 
The oppressor should not be at liberty to remain in management and exclude the 
oppressed. If oppressive conduct is proved, then the minority may also be offered shares 
held by the majority to purchase. In this case the valuation of the control premium becomes 
necessary.  
 
It is, therefore, vital to provide a procedure for valuating shares. This may be provided that 
the valuation will be conducted by experts in the field with the mutual consent of the 
parties or by an order of court in a case of disagreement. The SECP may be empowered to 
grant valuators a licence and to maintain the list of such valuators.  
 
ii Cost of litigation in buyout offers 
 
Another aspect of the buyout offer is the cost of litigation. Lord Hoffmann says that the 
objective of a fair offer is to avoid the cost of litigation. He further says that if the 
petitioner insists on the petition, after the respondent had made a fair buyout offer and the 
decision by the court is also the fair offer, then the petitioner should not be paid the cost of 
the litigation. Similarly, if the petitioner was in hurry to file the petition, without giving 
reasonable time to the respondent, in this case too, the petitioner should not be paid the 
cost of litigation.269  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
269
 O’ Neill (n 153).  
181 
 
iii Implications of fair buyout offers 
 
As litigation takes too much of the court’s time and in most cases the outcome is a fair 
offer, Lord Hoffmann discusses the consequences of a fair offer. He says that the petition 
should be struck down when a fair offer was made by the respondent and the court’s 
decision is a fair offer. He further explains that the petitioner will not be paid the cost of 
litigation if he or she was in hurry to file the petition and court’s decision is a fair offer.270  
  
One of the advantages of a fair buyout offer, discussed by Lord Hoffmann, is that it avoids 
unnecessary litigation which may save time and cost.271 However, the fair buyout offer has 
implications for the minority shareholders. Firstly, if the minority shareholders reject the 
fair offer by the majority and insist on the petition, the court may dismiss the petition in 
this case. They may lose the remedy that they would have received without a fair buyout 
offer from the majority.272 Secondly, this may give the majority shareholders a free hand to 
act unfairly. The majority shareholders may offer the minority a price that is otherwise fair 
and the court strikes down the petition on the basis of a fair offer. The petition might not be 
to exit from the company due to the successful business of the company, it might be to 
discipline management or to obtain certain protection from the majority shareholders. 
Therefore, striking down the petition on a fair offer by the majority may not be a 
favourable result for the minority shareholders. Thirdly, there is no guideline to deal with 
the cases where the majority does not make a fair buyout offer within a reasonable time. In 
this case, in order to strike down the petition on the basis of a fair offer, the fair offer must 
also include the cost of the litigation.273 Fourthly, depriving the petitioner of the cost of 
litigation if a fair buyout offer was made may be problematic for the petitioner. It is quite 
possible that a petition by the minority may be to mend the ways in which the company is 
being run by the majority and to avoid future unfair prejudice. However, the petitioner may 
arrive at a conclusion that it is better to quit the company instead of disciplining the 
management. Therefore, denying the cost of litigation to the petitioners, on the 
presumption that a fair buyout offer was made, may not be justified.  
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4B.6.4.2.6 Oppression, mismanagement and the creditors 
 
The creditors can also apply for a remedy against oppression and mismanagement by the 
controller, provided that their interest in the company is not less than 20% of the paid-up 
capital of the company under s. 290 of the Ordinance. The creditors, however, have 
another remedy under s. 295 of the Ordinance. The creditors who have an interest 
equivalent to an amount not less than 60% of the paid-up capital of the company may 
apply to the SECP274 to seek relief from the mismanagement of the company. The 
commission may appoint an administrator to manage the affairs of the company.275 The 
administrator works until the objective has been reached. The commission may permit the 
company to appoint directors if it is satisfied that the purpose has been achieved.276 The 
section provides certain instances of mismanagement upon which the creditors can apply to 
the Commission for mismanagement of the company and appointment of the administrator. 
These include the following:  
 
(i) The affairs or business of the company are or have been conducted or managed in 
a manner likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the company, members or 
creditors;  
(ii) If the director or any officer of the company is guilty of breach of trust, 
malfeasance or other misconduct towards the company, members or creditors; 
(iii) The affairs of the company are or have been conducted or managed with the intent 
to defraud members or creditors; 
(iv) The affairs of the company have been so conducted or managed as to deprive the 
members thereof of a reasonable return; 
(v) An industrial project or unit to be set up or belonging to the company has not been 
completed; 
(vi) The accumulated losses of the company exceed 60% of its paid-up capital.277  
 
It is interesting to note that the members are not allowed, under the Ordinance, to apply to 
the commission if they have been deprived of a reasonable return on their investment, as a 
result of mismanagement. The section further explains that the members shall be 
considered to have been deprived of reasonable return if, having regard to enterprises 
similarly placed, the company is unable to pay or does not declare any or an adequate 
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dividend for a period of three consecutive years.278 The members, in this case, have to wait 
for action by the creditors for the remedy against non-payment of a dividend. The 
important question is why a creditor should apply for non-payment of a dividend to the 
members as the non-payment does not affect the creditors adversely. In fact, this may be 
rather beneficial for them because the non-payment of a dividend enhances the value of the 
company and protects the interests of the creditors. This suggests that there will hardly be 
an instance where the creditors will apply for mismanagement under this clause. Therefore, 
the members should also be given rights to apply for mismanagement if they do not receive 
a reasonable return on their investment.  
 
Similarly, many other instances of mismanagement that affect members fall under the 
jurisdiction of the creditors. The members affected by mismanagement do not have the 
right to apply for the appointment of an administrator. So, again, the minority interests are 
subject to action by the creditors. Therefore, there is a need to give powers to the members 
to apply against mismanagement in circumstances affecting members directly. 
Mismanagement that affects a company or all the members of the company may be 
included in the statutory derivative action. The other important point is the threshold for 
the creditors to apply for mismanagement which is too high. The creditors’ threshold 
should be reduced in order to safeguard their interest. 
 
In the context of the UK, the statutory unfair prejudice remedy can be sought as a member 
only and not as a creditor. The reason why the creditors are not protected under the unfair 
prejudice remedy is the concept of unfair prejudice attached to membership rights. The 
remedy under the unfair prejudice conduct is available qua members only. The reason is 
the incomplete contractual nature of the relation of members with the company. However, 
the nature of the contract with the creditors is complete in all respects. They can negotiate 
the terms of their contract; they can, therefore, protect themselves by different techniques 
which include, but are not limited to, disclosure through different periodical reports, right 
of reorganization and liquidation, and a governance mechanism. In the governance 
mechanism, the creditors may have the right to appoint a nominee director by virtue of the 
contract with the company or may also limit the payment of dividends. These may be the 
main reasons why the creditors were not protected under the unfair prejudice remedy. 
However, some references can be found, under the common law, where the remedy other 
than qua member was provided to the petitioner. Lord Hoffmann in the Phillips case says 
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that ‘the requirement that prejudice must be suffered as a member should not be too 
narrowly or technically construed’.279 Moreover, in recent years, the common law courts 
have taken quite a flexible view in granting the unfair remedy and have extended the same 
to the creditors. Lord Scott of Foscote said that where a petitioner was involved in different 
capacities such as a member and a creditor, such petitioner may be given a remedy in his or 
her non-member capacity.280 This is the Jersey unfair remedy which is similar to the UK 
remedy281 to the extent that the remedy may be sought for other than a qua member. As the 
member of the company was also a creditor in this case, the court extended the unfair 
remedy to the creditor in his dual capacity. Nevertheless, the remedy was extended qua 
creditor.  
 
In the UK creditors do not have access to the remedy under unfair prejudice conduct. They 
can invoke s. 993282 of the Companies Act, 2006 or ss. 213283 and 214284 of the Insolvency 
Act, 1986 (IA) to protect their rights. S. 993 is too demanding, as it requires proving fraud 
in the criminal meaning. As the penalty is severe, in the form of imprisonment, the 
requirement of evidence will also be strict. Therefore, the chances are slim that the 
creditors will invoke the remedy under s. 993 due to the strict requirement related to the 
evidence. However, ss. 213–14 of the IA that protect creditors’ rights are less demanding 
than s. 993 of the Companies Act, 2006. As there is only a financial penalty, under 
ss. 2013–14, the requirement of evidence is not as strict as in a criminal offence under 
s. 993. If creditors fail under ss. 213–14 of the IA, practically, they will not succeed under 
s. 993 as this section is more demanding than ss. 2013–14 of the IA. The question is 
whether the creditors should wait for the insolvency of the company to obtain a remedy 
under the IA. Most of the time the winding up is not a favourable option for all the 
stakeholders, therefore, the courts and the legislature try to solve the issue without 
liquidating the company. As the winding up is a last resort, therefore, the unfair prejudice 
remedy may solve the problem with ease and without going for winding up. As the demand 
for a remedy, at first instance, under s. 993 may be problematic due to the strict 
requirements of the evidence, this may not provide a remedy of the kind that is possible 
under unfair prejudice.  
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4B.6.4.2.7 Non-payment of dividends and oppressive conduct 
 
Investment by the small shareholders in public companies is based on their expectation of 
being paid a dividend. They are not interested in participating in the management or have 
concerns about the other affairs of the company. The other possible return on their 
investment is capital gain. To earn money through the sale and purchase of shares is not a 
simple way to share in the profit. In underdeveloped markets special expertise is required 
to earn money through the sale and purchase of shares. In an inefficient market, a sudden 
and frequent fluctuation may harm, in most of the cases, small shareholders. Although, 
according to the Modigliani–Miller theorem, non-payment of dividends does not cost the 
shareholders much as this may increase the share value.285 However, this theorem is 
dependent upon the presence of an efficient market. In Pakistan the stock market is 
inefficient, volatile and controlled by powerful brokers. On a number of occasions the 
small shareholders in the stock market had to suffer due to manipulation by these brokers. 
Therefore, the focus of small shareholders is on getting a dividend as a return on their 
investment rather than focusing on capital gain. However, it is normal phenomenon in 
Pakistan that the companies do not pay a dividend or pay a smaller dividend compared to 
their earnings. The reason for such conduct is the control of the families over the listed 
companies. They focus on empire building, which allows them to accommodate their 
family members, relatives and friends in key positions rather than focus on the payment of 
dividends. Their interests are focused on the private benefit of control rather than cash-
flow payments through dividends. A basic source of earning for the controlling 
shareholders is the pay and privileges they receive by hanging on to their management 
positions.286  
 
In this context, it is therefore suggested that non-payment or low rate of dividend, for 
specific continuous periods, may be considered oppressive conduct, when the companies 
are in a better financial position and are earning good profits. These companies should give 
solid reasons for the non-payment of dividends as a defence against oppressive conduct. 
This can be useful in the Pakistani environment as under the company law the dividend is 
to be declared by the directors and the shareholders have to give ex post facto approval 
only. They can decrease a dividend but cannot enhance it. Furthermore, the minority and 
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small shareholders do not have enough shares to influence and lobby against non-payment 
or a lesser payment of dividend in a general meeting. Therefore, the discretion to declare a 
dividend on the part of the directors may not be a good idea in the context of the family-
controlled market in Pakistan. The idea of non-payment of a dividend as oppressive 
conduct may be introduced through company law or, at least, through the code of corporate 
governance.287 This may encourage rather than force companies to decide in favour of the 
payment of a dividend whenever there is a possibility of providing cash-flow rights to the 
minority shareholders due to the better financial position of the company. 
 
4B.6.5 Just and equitable winding up in the UK 
 
4B.6.5.1 Nature and scope of the remedy 
 
The just and equitable winding up of a company is a residual remedy.288 The just and 
equitable winding up and unfair prejudice remedy are interrelated in the sense that both are 
an alternative to each other. The unfair prejudice remedy has been developed as an 
alternative to winding up, and just and equitable winding up is sought as an alternative to 
unfair prejudice. The principles such as bond of trust and good faith established for just 
and equitable winding up are often considered and applied to the unfair prejudice 
remedy.289 The scope of the just and equitable winding up has been established by the 
courts over a period. The basis was the breakdown of the necessary bond of trust, co-
operation and good faith between the partners of the partnership. These principles are also 
applied in companies that are quasi-partnership companies.290 Small, private limited 
companies operate like partnerships where the ownership and the management are not 
separated. In such types of companies, the relations between the members are not limited 
to articles of association but may also be based on other things such as legitimate 
expectations291 and equitable considerations. Consider a hypothetical example292 of a small 
private company where there are four members who each holds a 25% shareholding and is 
also a director. Suppose the only way of getting profit is the remuneration as a director 
without payment of a dividend. There may be two worse case situations. First, they are 
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divided into two groups with two members in each group. This may create a deadlock293 
and difficulty in running the company. Second, when three dismiss the fourth member 
from the directorship, the dismissed director will not get any remuneration after being 
removed from the directorship and therefore no profit. The capital of such removed 
director will be locked. It will be difficult for such director to sell his or her shares to a 
third party as the shares of private companies are not traded on the market. However, there 
may also be some restrictions on the transfer of shares in private companies.294 If such 
director receives the consent of the board of directors for selling shares, then it is quite 
possible that no one will give a reasonable price. This is a breakdown in the legitimate 
expectation and mutual trust, the proper way out is, therefore, to wind up the company.  
 
4B.6.5.2 Implications  
 
The just and equitable winding up is not an attractive remedy as compared to the unfair 
prejudice remedy as far as the financial aspects of the company are concerned. In winding 
up all parties, including the petitioner and respondents, may suffer. In unfair prejudice the 
company remains a going concern with damages being paid to the affected party but in 
winding up what is left are only the assets of the company. After liquidation, it is quite 
possible that everyone gets less than their due shares as the shares normally do not 
represent the true proportion of assets of the company. Secondly, as a director one may 
lose continuous profits in the form of dividend or remuneration while the company is a 
going concern. Thirdly, if the business of the company is based on profits from its know-
how and personal contacts then winding up may not be an attractive remedy.295 
Nevertheless, this is a minority protection in the sense that it provides a bargaining chip to 
control the corporate powers of the controlling shareholders, which can otherwise be 
destructive for the minority shareholders.296 
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4B.6.5.3 Grounds for just and equitable winding up 
 
In the Ebrahimi case, Lord Wilberforce said that it was neither feasible nor desirable to 
define the circumstances in which a just and equitable remedy could be given. 297 This 
depended upon the circumstances of each case. However, he discussed some of the 
grounds in the Ebrahimi case. In this case there were three members in the company who 
had a mutual understanding that they would all be directors with remuneration as profit 
without declaration of dividends. Two members, who were father and son, removed 
Ebrahimi from the directorship. Therefore, he lost remuneration as a director and, 
consequently, received nothing against his investment. He was left with no option except 
to go for just and equitable winding up. Lord Wilberforce said that a company that was 
formed on the basis of a relationship, mutual confidence, on the understanding that 
everyone would participate in the management and impose restrictions on the transfer of 
interest was like a partnership. Therefore, the principles of partnership such as ‘probity’, 
‘good faith’ and ‘mutual confidence’ would apply. He further said that although removal 
from the directorship was their legal right, the equity consideration went beyond legal 
rights and there were, therefore, valid grounds for just and equitable winding up.  
 
4B.6.5.4 Role of unfairness  
 
An important question with reference to just and equitable winding up is whether there is a 
need to show unfairness on the part of the defendants. One view is that one must show 
unfairness on the part of defendants in order to obtain a just and equitable remedy. In the 
Re Guidezone case the judge denied winding up on the basis that the act of the majority 
was not a breach of good faith.298 The other view is that when a company is established on 
mutual trust and confidence, and once that trust and confidence are broken, then there is no 
need to show unfairness. In the Ebrahimi case the winding up was ordered on the 
breakdown of mutual trust and confidence. As it is not possible to show unfairness every 
time, therefore, it is enough if it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that trust and 
confidence, on which the company was formed, had broken down. This provides wide 
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discretion to the courts, which can provide relief without showing unfairness on the part of 
the respondent.299  
 
4B.6.5.5 Requirement of clean hands 
 
The unfair prejudice remedy, and just and equitable winding up are alternatives to each 
other but both can be differentiated on the basis of legal rights and equitable rights. The 
unfair prejudice remedy is a legal remedy, therefore, it is not necessary to come with clean 
hands.300 However, just and equitable winding up is an equitable remedy, therefore the 
petitioner, as per the principles of equity, should come with clean hands; in other words, a 
petitioner can ask for an unfair prejudice remedy in cases of contributory harm, otherwise 
winding up in cases of breaches of trust and confidence. 
 
4B.6.5.6 The unfair prejudice remedy and just and equitable winding up  
 
The unfair prejudice remedy was to provide an alternate to the winding up of a company 
because winding up may be unattractive and costly for a number of reasons, which are 
discussed above.301 The winding up remedy is a residual remedy, in other words, the just 
and equitable winding up is a last resort and if another remedy is available, then the court 
will not go for winding up. A problematic situation may be where a petitioner fails in 
obtaining the unfair prejudice remedy, and intends to file just and equitable remedy. In the 
Re Guidezone case the petitioner, after failing to obtain the unfair prejudice remedy asked 
the court to convert the petition for unfair prejudice to just and equitable winding up. The 
court refused the application on the grounds that ‘if the conduct by the majority relied on 
by s. 459 was not unfair for the purposes of s. 459 it could not found a case for a winding-
up order on just and equitable grounds: the winding-up jurisdiction was not wider than s. 
459 jurisdiction since a winding-up order was, as it were, the death sentence for a 
company’.302 
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In other words, the court said that the jurisdiction of the court under winding up on a just 
and equitable ground was no wider than jurisdiction under the unfair prejudice remedy. 
The decision may be problematic for a petitioner in the sense that failure in unfair 
prejudice may put up a barrier to the just and equitable winding up. The IA, 1986 provides 
that winding up is a residual remedy.303 The winding up remedy can only be sought when 
there is no other remedy available. If any party goes for winding up, then the court may 
direct him or her to proceed first with seeking the unfair prejudice remedy. If a petitioner 
fails in unfair prejudice, then, according to the Re Guidezone case, this will debar the 
petitioner from proceeding with winding up on a just and equitable ground. Therefore, 
proceeding first with an application for an unfair prejudice remedy is risky because this 
may shut the doors to winding up on just and equitable grounds. In fact, the court had 
closed the door, to some extent, for the remedy of winding up on just and equitable 
grounds. The decision of Re Guidezone is overturned by the Court of Appeal in Re Neath 
Rugby. The court expressed doubts on the correctness of the decision of Parker J in Re 
Guidezone case.304 
 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the remedy under unfair prejudice may be sought for 
infringement of legal rights. However, the remedy under just and equitable winding up 
may also be pursued in the instances where there is a break down in mutual trust and 
confidence.305 Therefore, the jurisdiction of the court under just and equitable winding up 
will be much broader than the unfair prejudice remedy.306  Therefore, a  person may be 
allowed to pursue the remedy  in addition to, or in lieu of, the unfair prejudice remedy. A 
person may be allowed to claim damages for unfair prejudice conduct and if there is a 
breakdown in relations, mutual trust and confidence, and be allowed to pursue the winding 
up remedy.307  
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4B.6.5.7 Just and equitable winding up in Pakistan 
 
Company law provides courts with the power to order the winding up of a company on just 
and equitable grounds. Just and equitable winding up is provided as an alternate remedy. 
The law gives the court the power to refuse winding up if other remedies are available and 
the petitioner is pursuing winding up unnecessarily.308 As private companies are formed 
and operated like partnerships, the principles of dissolution of partnerships also apply in 
the winding up of private companies if the apparent structure of the company is not the real 
structure and on piercing the veil it is revealed that in reality it is a partnership.309 So, 
private companies may be wound up on just and equitable grounds in circumstances that 
are considered valid for dissolution of partnerships such as exclusion of a member from the 
management, the existence of a deadlock and lack of confidence in the management.310 
However, this is not an exhaustive list. It is neither possible nor desirable to enumerate all 
circumstances in which the winding up on just and equitable grounds may be made by the 
court.311  
 
4B.6.5.7.1 Oppressive remedy and winding up in Pakistan 
 
The oppressive remedy, and just and equitable winding up are independent and alternative 
to each other. However, in ABIL v EBM, the High Court said that ‘the remedy under 
oppressive conduct or mismanagement can only be sought if the affairs of the company are 
conducted in a manner oppressive to the members and that facts justify winding up but at 
the same time making such winding up order would unfairly prejudice such members’.312 
The court said that remedy under oppressive conduct could be pursued only under those 
circumstances that led to winding up; in other words, the jurisdiction of the court in 
oppressive remedy was not different from winding up on just and equitable grounds. In 
these circumstances a party who failed to secure an oppressive remedy will also fail in 
winding up. The decision limited the scope of the remedy on just and equitable grounds. 
The winding up can be effective only when it has a wider scope than the remedy under 
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oppressive conduct. A party who failed to acquire an oppressive remedy may be allowed to 
proceed for just and equitable winding up as a last resort. 
The other aspect of just and equitable winding up is that the oppressive remedy is too 
demanding in Pakistan and it may not be feasible for the minority shareholders to pursue. 
Therefore, they may be left with no other option but to ask for just and equitable winding 
up. Winding up is not an attractive remedy it is, therefore, necessary to make the 
oppressive remedy feasible for minority shareholders so that the winding-up remedy would 
only be pursued as a last resort.  
 
4B.7 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this  chapter was to discuss the application of the convergence theory in 
Pakistan. The objective was to explore techniques to improve the investor protection 
mechanism, especially the minority shareholders in the context of Pakistan. The focus of 
this chapter was on minority protection that includes pre-emptive rights, cumulative voting 
rights, the conflict of interest of the fiduciaries, derivative action, unfair prejudice remedy, 
and winding up on just and equitable principles.  
 
The investor protection mechanism in Pakistan is weak. The corporate law of Pakistan 
provides some minority rights but most of the important rights are still missing. The 
majority of the rights that have been provided were transferred in the corporate law of 
Pakistan due to colonization. At the same time, some important minority rights that are 
provided in the corporate law of Pakistan are inefficient, out-dated and need restructuring 
or improvement.  In order to improve the investor protection mechanism, there is a need to 
improve minority shareholders’ rights through reforms. The theory of convergence may 
help to improve these rights. International norms especially those of the United Kingdom 
may be standards for reforms in minority protection mechanism in Pakistan. Corporate law 
of Pakistan may possibly converge to international norms in order to improve investor 
protection.  
 
The extent to which the convergence in minority rights may take place depends upon the 
possibility and effectiveness of convergence in these rights in Pakistan. On the basis of the 
degree of possibility and effectiveness of convergence in minority rights in Pakistan, the 
same may be divided into three forms: strong, moderate and weak convergence.  
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Strong Convergence 
 
Convergence can be regarded as strong where it is most likely to occur. For instance, 
convergence in the unfair prejudice remedy and just and equitable winding up is most 
likely due to the nature and development of these remedies. The reason is that both these 
remedies were transferred into the corporate law in Pakistan due to colonisation. These are 
more or less old versions of the remedies provided in the corporate law of the United 
Kingdom. Also, families and the state may not resist reforms in the unfair prejudice 
remedy as this remedy in the context of Pakistan can be sought both by the majority and 
minority. This is primarily due to the presence of different shareholding structures in 
Pakistan. Such situations may occur in the following circumstances: (1) it may occur when 
the minority shareholders have shares with enhanced voting powers and (2) it may also 
occur when minority shareholders have the power to control the management under a 
shareholder agreement. In these situations, any resolution in a general meeting may be 
controlled by such minority. Therefore, the remedy against oppression and 
mismanagement may be sought by any investor irrespective of the fact that such investor is 
a minority or a majority. It all depends upon who controls the management.  
 
As far as just and equitable winding up is concerned, it was also transferred into the 
corporate law of Pakistan from the United Kingdom through colonisation. However, the 
problem with this remedy is that the courts in Pakistan has intermingled it with the unfair 
prejudice remedy. The other problem is that the unfair prejudice remedy in Pakistan is too 
demanding and may not be feasible for the minority shareholders to pursue. Therefore, 
they may be left with no other option but to ask for just and equitable winding up. Winding 
up is not an attractive remedy; therefore, it is necessary to make the unfair prejudice 
remedy feasible for minority shareholders so that this remedy could only be pursued as a 
last resort. 
 
Therefore, as a result of historical linkage there is a strong possibility of convergence in 
these rights to the UK system of corporate governance. 
 
Moderate Convergence 
 
Convergence can be regarded as moderate where it is likely but there are chances that the 
path dependent forces may possibly resist reforms. For instance, convergence in pre-
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emption rights, CVS and the derivative action appears moderate. Pre-emption rights and 
CVS are provided in the corporate law of Pakistan. There is only need to improve these 
rights. Pre-emptive rights are provided as a default rule in the company law of Pakistan and 
companies can exclude these rights by special resolution. The threat of dilution of minority 
shareholders exists if pre-emptive rights are retained as a default rule. As families, the state 
and interest groups have leverage to issue shares without pre-emptive rights to increase 
their shareholding, therefore, there are chances that they may resist reform in this direction. 
 
The second minority protection mechanism is the CVS. The CVS is a mechanism that 
enhances the powers of the minority and reduces the power of the majority shareholders. 
The system is a mandatory provision in the company law of Pakistan but it is not being 
implemented in its spirit even by the listed companies. The other problem is the presence 
of one share, one vote as a default rule. Companies can issue shares with enhanced voting 
rights and may thereby frustrate the potential benefits of CVS. In order to obtain the 
potential benefits of the CVS, one share, one vote should be made a mandatory provision. 
However, the possibility exists that the path dependent forces may possibly resist reform to 
this right as this will limit their leverage to issue shares with enhanced voting rights and 
thereby control the company with less shareholding. 
 
On the other hand, the derivative action is not provided in the company law but it is 
recognised by the courts in Pakistan, being a common law country. Many developed and 
developing jurisdictions, including the UK, provide the remedy through commercial codes. 
The Companies Act, 2006 has effectively excluded the common law derivative action. This 
codification has not only combined together scattered and variable common law sources 
related to the derivative action, but has also removed ambiguities in certain areas. As the 
corporate sector in Pakistan is concentrated, families hold the majority of shareholding and 
appoint directors from their family, relatives or persons in whom they have confidence. In 
this scenario, it is not expected that they will bring any action against directors for breach 
of duty. It is also difficult for the minority shareholders to pass a resolution in general 
meetings and to get a remedy. Minority shareholders can approach the court for a remedy 
through common law derivative suits but this may be problematic for them. Firstly, foreign 
common law decisions can only have persuasive authority. Secondly, the common law is 
scattered and it may be problematic for courts to interpret this scattered law. Thirdly, there 
is a recent trend to bring derivative suits into statutory forms in order to remove 
uncertainty in these suits because of the scattered common law. Convergence to introduce 
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derivative suits in statutory form is also evident in regional jurisdictions. It is, therefore, 
advisable that a derivative action be introduced in a statutory form. This will help the 
courts to provide minority shareholders with remedies and protection. Once again the 
problem with this remedy is that the path dependent forces and interest groups may 
possibly resist reforms as there are chances that the minority may get some power of 
accountability which may restrict the discretionary powers of the families and interest 
groups. 
 
Weak Convergence 
 
In a similar fashion, the possibility of convergence will be weak where it is less likely in 
the present circumstances.  For instance, convergence in controlling the conflict of interest 
of the fiduciaries - related party transactions, doctrine of corporate opportunities and 
fiduciary duties of the controlling shareholders- appears weak.  
 
Firstly, the scope of related party transactions is limited in Pakistan. The law includes only 
those transactions within the meaning of related party transactions in which a director or 
officer has some interest. This does not include controlling shareholders, relatives, business 
associates and friends of controlling shareholders. The majority shareholders may use their 
position to approve any transaction from the directors in which they have a personal 
interest. Family-owned enterprises in Pakistan have interlocking directorship and cross-
shareholding; therefore, it is not difficult for the majority shareholders in such companies 
to get approval from the board. This provides them with an opportunity to abuse their 
majority power through the board. It is necessary to enhance the scope of related party 
transactions because majority shareholders may escape from such prohibition.  
 
Secondly, the approval mechanism of the related party transaction is problematic as it vests 
powers in the board of directors. There is a global trend of extending the nature, scope and 
approval mechanism of related party transactions. Many developed and developing 
jurisdictions have introduced a legal framework in this regard to provide minority 
protection. Related party transactions can be controlled effectively in Pakistan when the 
scope and approval mechanism is changed according to the new trend prevalent in the 
world. The determination of price, consideration and approval of related party transactions 
from the board may not solve the purpose of minority protection. In Pakistan the corporate 
sector is concentrated where the directors are normally family members, relatives or close 
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friends. The directors are under the direct influence of the controlling shareholders and 
may be biased in favour of their colleague director. Therefore, asking the board to 
consider, determine and approve related party transactions may not provide minority 
protection. The approval mechanism requires reconsideration. This may include 
transactions exceeding certain thresholds to be approved by the shareholders at general 
meetings. All related party transactions may be considered and approved by the board of 
directors but once the transaction exceeds a certain specified limit, then it may be 
forwarded to a general meeting for consideration and approval.  
 
Similarly, when the transaction is referred to a general meeting for consideration and 
approval, then the issue will be the approval mechanism at shareholders’ meetings. The 
interested director or dominant shareholder may be involved in and help to approve such 
transaction. As discussed above, it is possible that the conflicted director or the controlling 
shareholder may be influential enough to pursue other members to avoid raising his or her 
voice against the transaction or voting against such transaction. It is appropriate to exclude 
a related party from participating in that part of the meeting of shareholders which is to 
consider, discuss and approve related party transactions. This may give shareholders an 
opportunity to raise an independent view about the advantages and disadvantages of related 
party transactions, and to vote on the resolution. In the context of Pakistan, as the corporate 
culture is not used to this type of restrictions and authorization process, it is appropriate, in 
the first instance, to introduce such provisions applicable to listed companies through the 
code. Once they have been implemented successfully and accepted by the business 
community, they may be extended to all types of companies through company law. 
 
Thirdly, the doctrine of corporate opportunity has not developed in Pakistan. The concept 
is important for a concentrated ownership jurisdiction such as Pakistan. The controlling 
shareholders act in a dual character: as shareholders and as directors. The majority 
shareholders dominate the corporate boards. The directors may be involved in diverting 
corporate opportunity for their personal benefits at the cost of the company and its minority 
shareholders. Another recent trend in the developed and developing jurisdictions is to 
codify the common law. The codified law can present a clear picture of rights and 
obligations. Therefore, there is a need to codify the directors’ duties and mechanism of 
authorization of conflict of interest of the fiduciaries in Pakistan.  
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Fourthly, as the majority shareholders dominate the corporate boards, controlling 
shareholders may get authorization for conflict of interest from the board. Similarly, the 
controlling shareholders also control the general meeting even in listed companies. They 
may act opportunistically in their own interest at the cost of the company and its minority 
shareholders. Therefore, the nature of the corporate sector in Pakistan suggests extending 
the fiduciary duties to the controlling shareholders in order to control the conflict of 
interest against the interest of the company and its minority shareholders. In order to avoid 
excessive litigation, the controlling shareholders will have the same defences of the 
business judgment rule and judicial test of fairness available to the directors for breach of 
fiduciary duties.  
 
However, the problem is that reforms in these remedies will definitely challenge 
unchecked discretionary powers of families, politicians and interest groups. These path 
dependent forces and interest groups might have strong resistance to reforms in these 
rights. Therefore, convergence in these rights is less likely. 
 
To avoid resistance from path dependent forces there is a need to reform the system in a 
piecemeal, systematic and through a pragmatic approach. Therefore, in the context of 
Pakistan, as the corporate culture is not used to this type of restrictions and authorization 
process, it would be appropriate, in the first instance, to introduce such provisions 
applicable to listed companies through the code. Once these are implemented successfully 
and accepted by the business community, they may be extended to all types of companies 
through the company law. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ENFORCEMENT IN RELATION TO CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  
The previous chapter (Chapter Four) was limited to the application of the theory of 
convergence in relation to the agency problem and the rights of minority shareholders in 
Pakistan. Chapter Five discusses the application of the theory with respect to enforcement 
in corporate governance in Pakistan. The concept of effective enforcement rather than 
merely the provision of the law in books is not new in theory.1 Scholars of corporate law 
have been discussing the issue for quite a long time. In the new world scenario, this has 
become more relevant than it was before. The enforcement of laws is very important in an 
era of globalization and competition2 where cross-border investment has increased. This 
phenomenon highlights the importance not only for domestic investors, but also to attract 
foreign investors.  
 
This chapter discusses two issues with reference to the enforcement of corporate 
governance in Pakistan. The first is the role of the courts in corporate governance in 
Pakistan. The general courts are the main source for the enforcement of rights. These 
courts have failed to resolve corporate disputes by enforcing the corporate laws in 
Pakistan. Therefore, there is a need to enhance the judicial capacity to do so.  
 
Enforcement may also come through other means and, in fact, these alternatives are 
embedded in the system. The capital market plays an effective role in enforcing corporate 
laws. Therefore, the second issue to be considered is the role of the market in the 
enforcement mechanism. The market in Pakistan failed to implement rules and 
regulations. Some initiatives were undertaken by the regulator and the state but they could 
not produce optimum results due to the vested interests of those who did not welcome 
even limited reform. Therefore, there is a need to reform the market keeping in mind the 
prevailing circumstances of the country.  
 
The focus of this chapter is on applicability, possibility and effectiveness of convergence 
in enhancing the enforcement mechanism in Pakistan in the light of global trends, and 
                                                 
1
 Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12.  
2
 Luca Enriques, ‘Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence from Milan’ (2002) 3 European 
Business Organization Law Review 812. 
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particularly in countries that have similar social, cultural, economic and political 
conditions. However, the main focus will remain on the British corporate governance 
system as the Pakistani system was borrowed from Britain, its former colonial power. In 
particular, the focus will be on the form of convergence that may help to improve 
enforcement mechanisms in Pakistan.   
  
5.2 Enforcement issues in corporate governance 
 
In recent years globalization and competition have brought about the trend in corporate 
governance to converge. The transplantation of foreign corporate governance features has 
remained a main phenomenon. In this process the home countries tried to adapt these 
features according to their circumstances but a weak enforcement mechanism did not 
produce optimum results. LLSV have discussed in detail the protection of investors, 
especially minority shareholder, and described them as the main reason for the 
development of the market and good corporate governance. They further emphasized the 
fact that the enforcement mechanism can be effective only when there are good laws.3 The 
focus of LLSV was on the provision of the rights of the investors. The ‘law in books’ is, 
therefore, important in the first phase of reform, even if there is a weak enforcement 
mechanism; for instance, EU accession in central and eastern European countries suggests 
that features of foreign corporate governance can play at least a positive role on reform 
agendas and in their implementation.4 In the second phase the law in action can be ensured 
by enhancing institutional capacity.5 Therefore, host jurisdictions must improve their 
enforcement mechanism in order to make the transplanted laws more effective. The mere 
provision of good laws in books cannot substitute weak enforcement mechanisms; for 
example, transitional economies transplanted laws from advanced jurisdictions, including 
the US, but weak enforcement mechanisms allowed the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. The transplantation of ‘law in books’ without ‘law in action’ from more 
developed jurisdictions may be counterproductive. Therefore, for an effective system of 
corporate governance, rights must be protected and enforced; in other words, both good 
laws and an effective enforcement mechanism complement each other. In the absence of 
                                                 
3
 LLSV, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) LII (3) The Journal of Finance 1131-50; LLSV, 
‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 (6) Journal of Political Economy 1113-55. 
4
 Erik Berglof and Stijn Claessens, ‘Enforcement and Corporate Governance’ (2004) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3409, p 41, available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=625286&download=yes> Accessed 20.12.2013. 
5
 Robert Cooter, ‘Expressive Law and Economics’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 585. 
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good laws, enforcement will not be successful and, conversely, in the presence of a weak 
enforcement mechanism mere good laws cannot protect investors.6  
 
Reforms in enforcement mechanisms have been on the agenda of both developed and 
developing countries in the recent past. Developed countries had taken the initiative long 
before developing countries; in fact, enforcement is embedded in the system that 
developed over time. Developed jurisdictions have strong enforcement mechanisms due to 
their ability to enforce the rights provided in their laws; in other words, the ability of the 
system to enforce laws is directly proportional to compliance with the regulations that 
provide the rights,7 for example, the US has the powerful Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to provide investors with protection. It has a strong judicial system 
and a developed market that enforces the rights provided in the laws. In the UK supporting 
institutions such as the stock market, institutional investors, laissez-faire, professionals 
and a developed judicial system have provided sufficient investor protection, which has 
developed the system of corporate governance.8 The problem of enforcement is more 
severe in developing countries than in developed countries. The problem does not lie with 
the ‘law in books’ but with the ‘law in action’ in developing countries.9 Many developing 
countries have laws that are transplanted through globalization, colonization or other 
financial interests. Despite this transition of good laws, enforcement remained a core issue 
in these countries. Systems of enforcement have also been reformed in developing and 
emerging economies; for example, India has taken some initiative to reform its 
enforcement mechanism. It recently proposed new legislation in Parliament with many 
important proposals regarding enforcement on its agenda. It has introduced quasi-judicial 
authority to enhance the enforcement mechanism in the corporate sector.  
 
In Pakistan there have been some reforms during the past three decades. International 
financial institutions were involved in forcing the state to reform its corporate sector. 
These institutions provided a series of loans to the government with a reform agenda as a 
condition of a loan. They also set international standards as an ideal for reforms in order to 
enhance the enforcement mechanism in Pakistan. The reform agenda started with the 
                                                 
6
 Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser and Stanislaw Gelfer, ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ (2000) 
8 (2) Economics of Transition 356. 
7
 R. Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2004) 219-20. 
8
 Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Law, Economics and the UK’s System of Corporate Governance: Lessons from 
History’ (2001) 71 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 86-9. 
9
 Berglof and Claessens (n 4) 1-3.  
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enhancement of the regulator’s capacity in corporate law. The establishment of the SECP 
through the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 (the SECP Act, 
1997) was the first step on this agenda. The SECP made some laws and amended existing 
laws, rules and regulations to provide investors with rights and to safeguard them. Formal 
and functional convergence was dominant in these reform agendas by introducing new 
and altering existing laws, rules and regulations.  
 
Many SOEs were privatized and the state disinvested some of its shareholding to the 
general public. This phenomenon stimulated family-owned enterprises to disinvest some 
of their shareholdings to the general public. These reforms caused a boom in the stock 
market but the market crashed in March 2005 and small, dispersed shareholders lost their 
life savings. The regulator and stock market failed to avoid the market crash and, 
subsequently, also failed to identify and punish the culprits. Stock brokers had 
manipulated the market and derived undue advantage from their position.10 Pakistan’s 
weak enforcement mechanism failed and the inefficient judicial system could not provide 
affectees with a remedy  
 
According to LLSV, as Pakistan is a common law country, its enforcement mechanism 
should be better than in civil law countries.11 Theoretically, this may be true, but in reality 
the situation is different. The Pakistani judicial system lags behind that in many developed 
civil law countries. In Pakistan some shareholders’ rights are provided in the corporate 
law.12 However, minority rights are good on paper only.13 The lack of enforcement 
mechanism is a basic issue in the context of Pakistan. The problem is also severe due to 
lack of judicial capacity to enforce these rights. Inefficiency, corruption, judicial cost and 
extra-ordinary delays are the main problems facing the judiciary. The regulator is also not 
efficient enough to ensure these rights. Most officials at the SECP are not efficient, and 
lack knowledge about, and expertise in, the corporate sector.14 Other supporting 
institutions such as the stock markets, financial institutions and institutional investors are 
                                                 
10
 I. A. Khawaja and A. Mian, ‘Unchecked Intermediaries: Price manipulation in an Emerging Stock 
Market’ (2005) 78 Journal of Financial Economics 203-41. 
11
 LLSV (n 11) 1131-50. 
12
 Attiya Y. Yavid and Robina Iqbal, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Corporate Valuation, Ownership 
and Financing’ (2010) Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Working Paper Series 2010:57, p 10.  
13
 Ali Cheema, Faisal Bari and Osama Siddique, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Issues of Ownership, 
Control and the Law’ in F. Sobhan and W. Werner (eds) A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance 
in South Asia: Charting a Road Map for Bangladesh (Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, Dhaka 2003).  
14
 Jaweria Ather, ‘Ensuring Capacity, Integrity and Accountability of Regulators and Supervision’ (6th Asian 
Roundtable on Corporate Governance, Organised by OECD, Seoul 2004) 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en_2649_37439_33962850_1_1_1_37439,00.html> Accessed 
03.09.2013. 
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also not performing. Corruption, nepotism, feudalism and inefficiency are inherent in the 
system and the regulator, judiciary and other supporting institutions are not exempted.15  
 
5.3 The role of the judiciary in corporate governance 
 
In companies decision-making is based on the democratic principle of majority rule, that 
is, the majority vote. However, it is quite possible that some members may benefit through 
illegal means or by using their dominant power at the cost of the minority. These acts may 
sometimes be legal and within their mandates but the output may be the expropriation of 
minority shareholders, which is illegal. Many instances can be quoted for this purpose. 
Firstly, using voting powers to make decisions whose objective is to squeeze out or dilute 
minority shareholders’ voting right. Secondly, using their dominant position to appoint 
directors or other executives whose objective is to give incentives and privileges to family 
members. Thirdly, entering into contracts with other firms or private companies in which 
the dominant shareholders have more interests, on some favourable terms. The question of 
what is legal and what are legal means is not straightforward, and is always left to the 
courts to decide. 
 
An enhanced role for courts can be viewed against the backdrop of the development of 
fiduciary duty. The way in which fiduciary duty has developed in common law countries 
highlights the importance of the judiciary. Fiduciary duty was created for trustees who 
were not entrepreneurs. The objective of fiduciary duty was to avoid the wastage of trust 
assets in the hands of trustees. To achieve this objective, the trustees were prevented from 
acting in their own personal interest at the cost of the beneficiaries. Fiduciary duty 
requires selflessness and a duty of loyalty on the part of the trustees. When the company 
form was modernized, the courts extended the same duty of loyalty to the directors. 
Fiduciary duty was not actually developed for companies, it was developed by the courts 
in common law countries. This phenomenon highlights the importance of the role of the 
courts in corporate governance. Some countries have codified fiduciary duties; for 
example, the UK has introduced fiduciary duty in the Companies Act, 2006. Although 
fiduciary duties have been codified, there may be gaps which the courts would have to fill. 
In Pakistan fiduciary duty is not codified and the country still relies on scattered common 
                                                 
15
 Sikander A. Shah, ‘Mergers and the Rights of Minority Shareholders in Pakistan’ (2005) Centre for 
Management and Economics Research (CMER) Working Paper Series No. 04-31, Lahore University of 
Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan. 
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law. Therefore, the courts have to play an enhanced role in determining fiduciary duty in 
Pakistan.  
 
Another factor that highlights the importance of the judiciary is the interpretational role of 
the court. The dilemma of the legislature in providing accurate legislation enhances the 
role of the judiciary in corporate governance. Therefore, the inability of the legislature to 
foresee all possible future problems enhances this judicial role.16 The courts are to 
interpret the statutes where the statutes are silent on a particular point of law or where the 
language of the statutes is not clear. This interpretational role of the courts highlights the 
importance of the courts in corporate governance. 
 
The main advantage of common law countries is that their judges have the discretion to 
decide matters even in those areas in which the law has not provided a solution to a 
specific problem, that is, they have the discretion to fill in the gaps in the laws. This role 
of the courts is significant for two reasons: (1) it highlights the influential role of the 
courts in common law countries and (2) the court’s decisions have a direct impact on 
further decisions. These decisions become precedent, which is a source of law in common 
law countries. These precedents are binding on lower courts, and persuasive for equal 
courts and for foreign courts. The domestic courts in common law jurisdictions can benefit 
from the decisions of foreign courts. The capacity of judges to interpret those decisions 
and apply them to their own conditions may be problematic in the context of an inefficient 
judicial system. The problem may be more severe when applying specialized laws such as 
corporate laws. The courts in Pakistan are inefficient17 and lack expertise in corporate and 
commercial matters. They intentionally keep the case law vague due to lack of expertise in 
legal and analytical reasoning, and writing skills.18 The weak and inefficient judicial 
system in Pakistan is the main problem when it comes to enforcement, which is one of the 
reasons for the weak corporate governance system, and a hurdle in attracting foreign and 
domestic investment.  
 
                                                 
16
 Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Courts and Corporations: A Comment on Coffee’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 
1698-9. 
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 Waqar A. Ghani and Junaid Ashraf, ‘Corporate Governance, Business Group Affiliation, and Firm 
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5.4 Judicial structure in Pakistan 
 
5.4.1 Regular court structure in Pakistan 
 
Pakistan is a common law country and a former British colony. Its judicial system evolved 
through various stages starting with the Hindu kingdom, and moving to Muslim rule, the 
British colonial administration and post-independence developments. The judicial system 
that has developed throughout the centuries is flavoured by foreign transplantation, 
Islamic norms, as well as local norms and conditions.19 The latest version of the judicial 
structure is enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.20 
Under the constitution, the Supreme Court of Pakistan is the highest appellant forum for 
civil and criminal matters in the whole of Pakistan. The Supreme Court has one main 
sitting at Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, and one registry in each of the four provinces, 
including Lahore (Punjab), Karachi (Sindh), Peshawar (Khyber Pakhtwoonkha) and 
Quetta (Baluchistan). The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in intergovernmental 
disputes21 and enforcement of fundamental rights.22 It has appellate jurisdiction in both 
civil and criminal matters.23 It also has advisory jurisdiction in respect of giving opinions 
to the government on questions of law referred to it by the President of Pakistan.24  
 
In addition, there is the Shariat Appellant Bench of the Supreme Court whose function is 
to deal with and hear appeals on matters decided by the Federal Shariat Court (FSC).25 
The objective of the FSC is to decide whether or not any law is repugnant to the 
injunctions of Islam.26 The FSC has appellate and revision jurisdictions27 over criminal 
matters relating to Hudood laws.28 
                                                 
19
 Faqir Hussain (Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan), ‘Judicial System of Pakistan’ (2011) available 
at the Supreme Court of Pakistan’s website at <http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=594 > 
Accessed 20.12.2013. 
20
 Part VII, articles 175-212, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973; See also 
Annexure II. (Judicial Structure in Pakistan). 
21
 Art. 184(1) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 (the Constitution, 1973). 
22
 Art. 184(3) of the Constitution, 1973. 
23
 Art. 185 of the Constitution, 1973. 
24
 Art. 186 of the Constitution, 1973. 
25
 Art. 203F of the Constitution, 1973. 
26
 Injunction of Islam means the rules in accordance with the Holy Qur’ān or Sunnah (‘Practice’) of Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him).  
27
 Art. 203G of the Constitution, 1973. 
28
 ‘Hudood laws’ relates to those offences for which fixed punishment has been prescribed by the Holy 
Qur’ān and Sunnah. These offences include zina and zina bil jabr (‘sexual intercourse’ and ‘rape’ 
respectively), qazaf (‘false accusation’ of zina (sexual intercourse)), sariqa and haraabah (‘offence against 
property’: ‘theft’ and ‘robbery’ respectively) and intoxication (consumption of alcohol). These offences are 
punishable under the hudood laws in Pakistan.  
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In each of the four provinces and Islamabad capital territory there is a High Court29 which 
has a principal seat in each of the provincial capitals and may also consist of such benches 
at such places as the Governor may determine on the advice of Cabinet and in consultation 
with the Chief Justice of the respective High Courts.30 The High Court exercises original 
jurisdiction in the enforcement of fundamental rights (concurrent with the SC),31 and 
appellate jurisdiction in matters decided by the subordinate courts acting as civil and 
criminal courts. The High Court supervises and controls all courts subordinate to it,32 and 
hears appeals against decisions of the District and Sessions courts, including Additional 
District and Session courts.33 There are also civil34 and criminal courts35 comprising civil 
judges and judicial magistrates to hear matters relating to civil and criminal offences 
respectively. They work under the supervision of district and session judges and the 
respective High Court.  
 
5.4.2 Administrative courts in Pakistan 
 
The Government of Pakistan establishes special courts and tribunals under the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to deal with different administrative 
matters of a civil and criminal nature.36 The Federal and respective provincial 
governments have established special courts, tribunals and ombudsmen for different 
objectives through statutes.37 The executive has established special courts, tribunals and 
ombudsmen in those areas that are technical in nature. These fields require judges to have 
special knowledge and experience to understand these issues. The competency of the 
judges, appointed through general criteria, to handle these issues is doubtful. That is why 
the executive attempts to appoint special judges in specialized courts to handle cases 
involving technicalities.  
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 Art. 198 of the Constitution, 1973. 
30
 Art. 198 (4) of the Constitution, 1973. 
31
 Art. 199 (2) of the Constitution, 1973. 
32
 Art. 203 of the Constitution, 1973. 
33
 Hussain (n 19) 14. 
34
 The West Pakistan Civil Court Ordinance, 1962. 
35
 The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. 
36
 See Annexure III (Administrative Courts’ Structure in Pakistan). 
37
 After the 18th amendment to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the provincial 
autonomy has been increased. The concurrent list has been abolished and all matters that do not fall within 
the federal list are to be dealt with by the provincial governments. The provincial governments can also 
establish special courts and tribunals under different statutes which fall within the jurisdiction of the 
provincial governments. See Annexures IV and V for the structure of the Federal and Provincial 
Administrative Courts in Pakistan respectively).  
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Cost-effective and speedy remedies may be another reason why administrative courts have 
been established. This shows that the executives are not satisfied with the lack of timely 
disposal of cases by the general courts. The administrative courts have their own 
advantages as compared to general courts in dealing with cases. The administrative courts 
are not required to go through technicalities of the law of evidence which is required for 
cases in general courts. They can proceed without fulfilling the formalities of the 
procedure that is inherent in general court procedure. This helps to dispose of cases in less 
time. The cost of the cases in general courts is always high. Litigants have to pay a court 
fee, lawyer’s fees and other incidental costs of the cases. Specialized courts are cost-
effective because there are fewer formalities in their procedures.  
 
Another aspect of administrative courts is the appeal mechanism. The judges of 
administrative courts see the complaints in the light of their technical expertise and then 
give their independent decision at the trial stage. The general courts look at the appellate 
stage which may help to check the legal aspects of a case.  
 
5.4.3 Judicature in the context of corporate law in Pakistan 
 
The judicature for corporate matters is established under the Ordinance, the SECP Act, 
1997 and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Aggrieved parties in 
corporate matters may lodge a complaint or file a petition in two forums: (1) the SCEP 
and (2) general courts. The basic forum for filing a complaint is the SECP, which can 
entertain complaints in two circumstances: (1) where the SECP is mentioned as the proper 
forum for lodging any complaint and (2) where there is a violation of any of the provisions 
of the Ordinance and no forum is mentioned and the penalty for the violation is a fine only 
without imprisonment. The second forum is a general court in two circumstances: (1) 
where the court is mentioned as the proper forum and (2) where the penalty for any 
violation includes imprisonment with or without a fine.38 
  
5.4.3.1 Judicature within the SECP 
 
The Ordinance provides that in cases where the penalty is a fine only, the officers of the 
SECP have the jurisdiction to hear these cases depending upon the scale of the fine. A 
                                                 
38
 See s. 476 (1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (the Ordinance); See Annexure VI : Penalty structure in 
the corporate law of Pakistan. 
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revision application against the decisions of the assistant registrar, deputy registrar, joint 
registrar and additional registrar can be filed to the Registrar of Companies.39 Similarly, a 
revision application against the decision of a registrar, authority and any officer authorized 
by the SECP may be filed with the commission.40 The commission has the power to revise 
any decision of any officer of the SECP, and the decision of the commission shall be 
final.41 Similarly, the commission and registrar have the power to review any decision 
made by them and such order shall be final.42 An aggrieved party may prefer an appeal to 
the High Court instead of review, revision or appeal by the SECP.43  
 
5.4.3.2 Appellate benches in the SECP 
 
The SECP may establish Appellate Benches authorized to hear an appeal within the 
SECP.44 If any decision is made by the commission comprising one commissioner, then 
the right of appeal is to the Appellate Bench comprising commissioners other than the 
commissioner who had made the original decision. An appeal against an order of the 
Appellate Bench shall be to the courts as per Part II of the Ordinance within 60 days.45  
 
5.4.3.3 General judicature of corporate matters 
 
Part II of the Ordinance defines the judicature of corporate matters. The Ordinance 
delegates jurisdictions in corporate matters to the High courts. The Chief Justice of the 
respective High Court is authorized to order company benches to hear cases concerning 
corporate matters. The federal government may also empower any civil court to hear the 
cases within its jurisdiction. The appeal mechanism is the same for corporate matters as is 
prescribed for general judicial hierarchy. An appeal against the decision of the civil court 
and criminal courts shall be to a district court and session court respectively. An appeal 
against the order of the district court or the Court of Session shall be to the High Court, 
and against the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court. However, an appeal in 
winding-up matters to the Supreme Court is restricted. In cases where the company being 
wound up has share capital less than one million Pakistani rupees or where the company 
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 See s. 477 (1) (a) of the Ordinance. 
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 See s. 477 (1) (b) of the Ordinance. 
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 See s. 484 (1) of the Ordinance. 
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 See s. 484 (2) of the Ordinance. 
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 See s. 485 (1) of the Ordinance. 
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 See s. 33 (2) of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act 1997 (the SECP Act, 1997). 
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being wound up has no share capital, the appeal will lie only when the Supreme Court 
grants leave to appeal. 46 
 
The Ordinance provides that cases that fall under the Ordinance will be dealt with by the 
courts under summary proceeding and will be disposed of within 90 days. Adjournment of 
cases may not be for more than 14 days at any one time or more than 30 days in all, except 
for sufficient cause. 47 The spirit of the law is to dispose of corporate matters expeditiously 
but, as in practice, the courts do not follow these provisions. Delay in disposing of cases is 
a routine matter. Courts do not follow the mandatory nature of the provision and regard it 
as being of only recommendatory nature.48 This shows the non-serious attitude of the 
courts towards deciding these cases expeditiously. The other reason why cases are not 
dealt with quickly may be the burden on the courts which makes it impossible for them to 
decide the cases within the timeframe set by the Ordinance.  
 
5.5 The judiciary and its problems in Pakistan 
 
The judicial system of Pakistan has failed to provide justice to the people of Pakistan. The 
rulers of the country have seriously compromised the stature, independence and integrity 
of the courts49 for a number of reasons. Pakistan became independent in 1947 but, 
unfortunately, since independence more than half of the political rule consisted of 
dictatorships.50 In different periods dictatorial rulers tried to control the judiciary in order 
to expand their dictatorial regimes. They issued Provisional Constitutional Orders to 
control the judges of the apex courts. They suppressed the superior judiciary to legitimize 
their unconstitutional rules. They removed the judges of the apex courts who posed a 
threat to their unconstitutional political takeovers. These efforts led to the destruction of 
the judiciary as an institution.  
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Another problem with the judiciary in Pakistan is inefficiency.51 The judicial procedure is 
complicated, which causes monstrous backlogs which, in turn, cause delays in the disposal 
of cases. Other reasons for these delays are the inefficiency of judges in handling cases, 
and a shortage of judges, facilities and support staff. Delays are normal phenomena but 
sometimes inordinate delays become unusual. Some cases may take 5, 10 or even 20 years 
to resolve, and other cases drag on from generation to generation.52  
 
Some judicial reform has been undertaken but it has been insufficient to dismantle the 
status quo. In December 2001 the ADB allocated US$350 million under the ‘Access to 
Justice Program’,53 which focused on backlogs and reducing delays by increasing the 
number of judges in the courts. The programme was not effective as the judicial problems 
of Pakistan may not be resolved by increasing the number of judges and the budget of the 
judiciary.54 The corruption in society in general and in the judiciary in particular is the 
main problem in providing justice to the masses. The reform process failed to achieve its 
objective. The Government of Pakistan could only affect a change in policy because it had 
to meet a condition of the loan. However, as far as progress made with the implementation 
of these policies is concerned, the same could not be achieved. Nevertheless, this was at 
least a start with judicial reform.55  
 
The second major initiative in the judicial reform process was the 2009 United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) programme ‘Strengthening Justice with 
Pakistan’ involving US$90 million. The objective of the programme was to strengthen the 
judiciary with enhanced judicial efficiency, transparency, accessibility, independence and 
accountability. The programme further extended its underlying goals which included 
protection of private businesses and foreign investment.56 The objective of this 
programme was political in the fast-changing global environment. The 9/11 incidents in 
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the US and the ‘Talibanization’ in Pakistan were the main stimulants for these series of 
reforms. Global powers, especially the government of the US, believed that weak social 
justice may lead to people’s support for the Taliban who could establish their own 
Islamic-based justice system in some parts of the country. Mistrust of the judiciary may 
lead people to look towards alternatives such as the Islamic legal system established by 
the Taliban.57 One of the reasons for Taliban support in some parts of the country may be 
linked to the weak social and legal justice system of Pakistan. First of all, the Taliban 
established a so-called Islamic social justice system to obtain the support of the people. 
This phenomenon attracted suppressed and weak people to them because they believed 
that they would at least have access to legal justice. The Taliban managed to attract 
supporters in northern parts of the country. Although the Taliban are no longer in power, 
chances of such support in case of complete failure of the judicial system in Pakistan 
exist.58 Though these reforms were based on the political hold of the state, this could have 
a direct impact on the corporate sector as this would enhance judicial capacity which, in 
turn, could help in enforcing corporate laws.  
 
However, this programme also failed and was shelved for an indefinite period due to the 
differences between the Government of Pakistan and USAID on its design and ambit. 
However, it may be revived in future once these differences have been resolved.59 The 
failure on the part of the international organizations and the government of Pakistan to 
reform the judicial system of the country may lead the people to distrust the judiciary. The 
lack of enforcement capacity on the part of the judiciary is one of the main reasons for the 
corruption in society which leads to unrest and support for terrorist elements. This lack of 
enforcement affects every sector of society, including corporate law. The rights of the 
shareholders, especially the minority shareholders, are worse in a weak judicial system. 
The weak enforcement mechanism affects the whole economy of the country.  
 
5.5.1 Recent trends in the judiciary in Pakistan 
 
The judiciary has been very active in recent years, especially after the activities of the 
lawyers’ movement. The movement started after the suspension of the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan (CJP) by the then dictator, President Pervez Musharraf, on 9 March 2007. The 
thirteen-member bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reinstated the CJP on 
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20 July 2007. The dictator again suspended the CJP and other judges of superior courts by 
declaring a state of emergency in the country on 3 November 2007. This act rejuvenated 
the movement. Lawyers, civil society and political parties protested against this act and 
forced Musharraf to resign. The movement did not stop as the new civil government did 
not restore the judges formally. The lawyers, civil society, political parties, media and the 
nation put pressure on the state to reinstate the CJP and the other judges dismissed by the 
former dictator. On 16 March 2009 the Prime Minister of Pakistan issued an executive 
order and the judges were reinstated.60 The restoration of the judges to the superior courts 
rejuvenated the hopes of the Pakistani people. They expect speedy and cost-effective 
justice, literally on their doorstep, from the judiciary. The lawyers’ movement revitalised 
the judiciary which, in turn, injected judicial activism. Unfortunately, this was limited to 
constitutional petitions and suo moto actions against acts of the state, the prime minister 
and the ministers. The judicial activism could not be transferred to the lower levels of the 
judiciary. This phenomenon created unrest among the general public. One renowned 
columnist, Javed Chaudhry, wrote in a famous daily newspaper that ‘the Judges were 
restored but justice is still suspended’.61 At several public meetings Iftikhar Muhammad 
Chaudhry, after his reinstatement as CJP, promised the people of Pakistan a reformed and 
effective judicial system according to their aspirations.62 The CJP promised effective 
monitoring of the lower judiciary,63 and took some steps towards achieving the objective 
of providing speedy and cost-effective justice for the people. Unfortunately, these efforts 
were insufficient to provide true justice. The CJP admitted on a number of occasions that 
corruption in the judiciary had to be eradicated.64 In the absence of speedy and cost-
effective justice, the recurrence of unrest among the masses loomed. 
 
In 2009, after the recent judicial crisis, the restored and revitalized judiciary of Pakistan 
issued the National Judicial Policy (NJP). This was the latest act by the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan in reforming the country’s judicial system. The NJP was revised in 
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February 2011. The NJP focuses on the independence of the judiciary, eradication of 
corruption and the expeditious disposal of cases by the courts. The disposal of backlogs, 
the speedy resolution of cases and a reduction in delays through the appointment of new 
judges are the main short-term goals of the policy. In the long term the focus is on the 
provision of government funds; the framing of an equitable, consistent and coherent policy 
by the respective High Courts; the appointment of judicial officers on an ad hoc basis until 
they are duly appointment by the respective authorities, to avoid a shortage of judicial 
officers; and the provision of essential paraphernalia. However, the NJP is defective in the 
sense that it has not mentioned the nature and quality of justice that it wished to deliver to 
the people of Pakistan. The policy focuses excessively on the disposal of cases and speedy 
justice, which may compromise the quality of justice. No doubt, the reduction in delays is 
an essential part of the justice system, as the famous quotation ‘justice delayed is justice 
denied’ speaks so eloquently to this phenomenon. Ignoring quality and an overwhelming 
focus on ‘speed’ may, therefore, be problematic.65 The basic drawback is in the system 
itself which is corrupt and inefficient. The whole judicial system needs to be overhauled. 
The present focus of the SC is not on the lower courts and that is why the judicial system 
is not delivering. Reform of the judicial system should target the lower courts. The 
elimination of corruption, the enhancement of judicial efficiency and the enforcement 
mechanism are, thus, the major problems that need to be addressed. An improved 
enforcement mechanism can ensure people the protection of their rights enshrined in the 
constitution. This can also protect investors, especially minority shareholders, which can 
improve corporate governance. There is thus a need to reform the institutions that provide 
the enforcement mechanism in corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
5.6 Reform 
 
Corporate governance is regarded in the same way as economic and legal institutions that 
can be reformed but it requires political support.66 Reforms are necessary for 
underdeveloped jurisdiction such as Pakistan where corporate governance institutions are 
weak and fail to protect investors. In order to enhance the enforcement mechanism and 
improve corporate governance, the system needs to be reformed. The state may reform the 
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system for investor protection in general and minority shareholders in particular.67 This 
will enhance investor confidence, which may be beneficial to the economy in general. 
This reform should take place in three core institutions of corporate governance in the 
context of Pakistan: (1) legislation, (2) the judiciary and (3) the market.  
 
5.6.1 Legal reform 
 
Pakistan is an underdeveloped country with complicated, cumbersome and out-dated 
statutes.68 Most of the laws are based on those dating back to the British colonial era. 
Company law, which is the core corporate law, is based on pre-independence company 
law issued by the British rulers for their former colonies. Similarly, other corporate laws, 
including securities laws and listing rules, are also out-dated. The regulator is slow in 
reforming the statutes. Pakistan has made only one company law since its independence in 
1947 and the same was based on the colonial company law of 1913. Other jurisdictions 
revised their company laws rapidly and brought them into the realm of modern needs and 
requirements, for example, the UK introduced at least seven new versions of, or 
substantial amendments to, its company laws since 1947.69 Corporate laws in Pakistan 
must be reformed to meet the changed circumstances and new needs. The SECP 
established the Corporate Laws Review Commission in November 2005 to make 
recommendations to amend the existing company law or to draft new company law. It 
published a concept paper for the development and regulation of the corporate sector. 
However, the commission has failed to draft new company law after almost eight years. 
This slow process of reforming the law affects investment from both domestic and foreign 
investors. The dearth of research is a major problem in Pakistan. Chapter Four (Parts A 
and B) of this research is, therefore, an attempt to suggest possible legal reforms in the 
corporate sector of Pakistan: holistic research was undertaken in analysing shareholder 
rights and in suggesting improvement in the context of Pakistan. The research can provide 
the regulator, the legislature and policymakers with a guideline on how to improve 
investors’ rights, especially that of minority shareholders, in corporate law in order to 
improve corporate governance in Pakistan.  
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Formal convergence will definitely dominate such reforms and investor rights will be 
incorporated in the corporate law of Pakistan. Functional or contractual convergence can 
be a precursor to formal convergence in some of the investor rights, which may be 
incorporated through a code of corporate governance or through incorporation into the 
constitution of companies. Once these reforms are effective and have been accepted by the 
business community, they can be converted into the formal legal system.  
 
However, the mere creation of laws does not solve the problem. Those laws and rules are 
best that can be enforced. Legal convergence is effective only when there is a sound 
enforcement mechanism in place, otherwise any reform may be counterproductive.70 
Therefore, a reformed judiciary and capital market are needed to enhance the enforcement 
mechanism.  
 
5.6.2 Judicial reform 
 
To attract external finance, outside investors need protection against expropriation of their 
funds. Investor protection may be provided by the courts, government agencies and other 
market participants.71 The judiciary is considered to be the main actor in providing 
investor protection. There may be fewer burdens on the judiciary if other institutions are 
strong enough to provide this kind of protection. The regulator, stock exchanges, financial 
institutions, institutional investors and professional experts may support to improve the 
corporate governance and enforcement mechanism. However, even if other supporting 
institutions are made strong, the importance of the judiciary cannot be ruled out. The legal 
aspects and interpretation of the law require the role of the judiciary. Therefore, reforming 
the system but ignoring the judiciary may not yield the desired results.  
 
However, reforming the judiciary may not be an easy task. It may be difficult, lengthy, 
and require the support of politicians and other interest groups.72 Political and economic 
constraints can hurt reform efforts and improvement in the enforcement regime due to 
vested interests.73 Business and politics are intermingled; the interests of business tycoons 
and the politicians are connected. A further obstacle to reform may be opposition from 
entrenched economic interests, including those families who hold and control the 
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corporate sector in most of the countries in the world, and who are politically powerful as 
well. Therefore, reform is only possible if opposition to such reform is 
circumvented.74Pakistan started reforming its judiciary in 2002. The ADB provided a loan 
of $350 million under ‘Access to Justice Programme’ in 2001 to reform the judicial 
system of Pakistan.75 The programme failed to achieve its objective. The focus of the 
reforms was on speedy disposal of cases and not on enhancing the efficiency in the 
judicial system. The programme was started only to fulfil the condition of loan.76  Another 
reform process started in 2009 with the help of USAID but this programme also failed due 
to political differences between the government of Pakistan and USAID.77 Therefore, the 
reforms were not sufficient to dismantle the status quo.  
 
In history, there have been different factors that have inhibited reforms of the judicial 
system in Pakistan due to their vested interests. In the context of Pakistan, dictators have 
been a basic hurdle in reforming the judiciary through the connivance of political forces. 
In Pakistan more than half of the political regimes consist of dictatorship. These dictators 
used the judiciary to expand their unconstitutional regime. They issued provisional 
constitutional orders to control the political and judicial institutions. They removed the 
judges whom they considered as a threat for their unconstitutional takeovers. These trends 
compromised the independence of the judiciary. They did not allow reforms in the 
judiciary as a reformed and independent judiciary may be a threat for unconstitutional 
takeovers. These acts destroyed the judiciary as an institution. This led the judiciary to be 
inefficient and a corrupt institution. 
 
In addition to this, families, state and interested groups have been another hurdle in 
reforming judiciary. As discussed in Chapter Two, families and the state control the 
corporate sector in Pakistan. They expropriate minority shareholders and the firms. 
Therefore, they resist reforms whose objective is to improve investor protection and 
enhance enforcement mechanism as prevailing circumstances favour them. They resisted 
initiatives to reforms in Pakistan whose objective was to improve investor protection. A 
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reformed judiciary may limit their prospects of expropriation; therefore, they oppose 
reform agendas with connivance of the political forces. The powerful families are either 
involved in politics themselves or finance major political parties to obtain undue favours 
from the government. These families are, therefore, politically influential to get political 
favours.  
 
Although, IFIs have been involved in reforming the judiciary through a series of loans 
with condition of reforming the judiciary, their efforts failed due to political differences 
between the Government and the IFIs.78 The apparent objective of these hurdles by the 
government is to preserve the status quo as a reformed judiciary may be a threat for the 
politicians for their corruption. Pakistan has been ranked high in corruption by the 
Transparency International (TI) for many preceding years. It also ranks public offices in 
Pakistan with regard to level of corruption in these institutions. It has ranked Police, 
Public Officials and Civil Servants, Political Parties and Parliament as most corrupt 
institutions in Pakistan in its report published in 2013.79Therefore, their interest is to keep 
status quo and to obstruct reforms in the judiciary. An independent and reformed judiciary 
may be problematic for corrupt public office holders; therefore, they do not allow the 
judiciary to be reformed. This phenomenon did not allow reforms in the judiciary. 
Therefore, there is a need to circumvent opposition from these vested interest groups in 
order to reform the judiciary and to improve the enforcement mechanism in Pakistan.  
 
Klapper and Love suggest an alternative to the judicial enforcement mechanism.80 
According to them, one option may be to improve firm-level governance by adopting 
charters with more disclosure and minority shareholder rights, and adopting good 
governance practices in a country. They argue that firms with a well-established 
governance mechanism may not need recourse to a judicial enforcement mechanism. This 
assumption of an alternative to a judicial enforcement mechanism may not be a good 
option as corporate conflict cannot be ruled out by the mere presence of shareholders’ 
rights, disclosure and the adoption of good governance practices in the constitution of 
companies. Because of the way in which corporate decisions are made and firms are 
operated, the possibility of conflict between the parties will always exist. In the case of a 
dispute, the parties may have recourse to a neutral forum. Since well-established 
governance systems have also witnessed corporate conflicts, there is a need for a strong 
                                                 
78
 See text to n 49-59 in Chapter Five. 
79
 For this see TI website available at <http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=pakistan > 
Accessed 20.05.2014. 
80
 Klapper and Love (n 72) 723. 
217 
 
judicial mechanism to enforce the available laws. Private enforcement may be an effective 
tool but it would depend upon public enforcement.81 Firm-level governance can be 
effective only when there is a well-established judicial or institutional mechanism of 
enforcement. Firms have to rely on public enforcement in cases of conflict.  
 
Another major problem with enforcement in corporate governance may be the judicial 
infrastructure. The judges in general courts do not have the necessary expertise and special 
qualifications to deal with matters that are technical in nature, such as company law, 
accounting, finance, insider trading, mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, listing rules, 
securities laws and other corporate laws. One way to overcome this obstacle is to train 
them in these fields. The cost of this process will be very high when weighed against the 
potential benefits that the process may yield. As only a small portion of judges’ duties 
concerns corporate matters, it is not advisable that money and effort be spent on such 
training.82 Furthermore, this will be an uphill task. It is better to have a separate, 
specialized court that can deal exclusively with corporate matters. This will enhance the 
enforcement mechanism in corporate law. The mechanism can work well when the 
regulatory agencies are not dependent upon the traditional judiciary. The judges of these 
specialized courts can be trained for this purpose so that they have a basic knowledge of 
corporate finance, accounting and business administration.83 The role of general courts 
will be limited and these courts should not interfere unless there is a legal defect. This 
legal defect can be removed by filing an appeal before general courts.84  
 
The other aspect of the enforcement mechanism is the link between fiduciary duties and 
the enforcement mechanism. According to LLSV, common law systems have better ‘law 
in action’ than civil law countries.85 The development of fiduciary duty in common law 
countries is significant in ‘law in action’. The development of fiduciary duties in a 
particular jurisdiction also depends upon the ability of the courts to understand and to 
interpret corporate laws in a given situation. Fiduciary duty will be more developed in 
jurisdictions where there is an efficient judicial system or where there are specialized 
courts that deal with corporate matters. For example, fiduciary duties as law in action have 
been developed and enforced more in the US than in other major jurisdictions because of 
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the operation of specialized courts and other specialized institutions that encourage 
investors to litigate in cases of wrongdoing. These institutions also have the capacity to 
enforce court decisions.86This highlights the importance of specialized courts for 
enhancing the enforcement mechanism. 
 
In the corporate context, some reforms were undertaken by the government and the SECP 
to enhance enforcement mechanism in Pakistan. The reform agenda started with 
transferring powers to the regulator. The regulator was also given some adjudicating 
powers through the Act, 1997. Some of the powers of the court were transferred to the 
SECP through amendments to the Ordinance at different stages. However, these were not 
significant transfers of powers. The following powers were transferred to the SECP:  
 
i) In cases where the directors refuse to transfer shares, the proper forum to launch a 
complaint was the court. 87 This power has now been delegated to SECP.88 
ii) Companies are empowered to purchase their own shares under certain conditions 
and restrictions.89 In case of default, the power was with the court to punish the 
culprits. Now, this power is delegated to the SECP which may punish the 
defaulting director or officer of the company. 
iii) A company is required to file, with the registrar, every mortgage and charges 
over the assets of the company.90 The power to rectify the register of such 
mortgages and charges, where the default was unintentional, inadvertent, 
accidental or due to sufficient cause was with the court.91 This power has now 
been transferred to the SECP.92  
iv) The securities law was amended to enhance the definition of insider trading and 
punishment for its violation. The punishment of insider trading was converted 
from imprisonment and financial penalty to heavy financial penalty only.93 The 
objective was to divert power from the court to the SECP. 
As the weak enforcement mechanism may allow the expropriation of outside investors, 
judicial reform is important for investor protection. Restructuring the whole judicial 
                                                 
86
 R. Kraakman et al., (n 7) 219. 
87
 A. G. Chowdhry, Company Law in Pakistan (A Commentary on the Companies Ordinance, 1984) 
(Reprint edition 2011-2012, Khyber Publishers, Lahore 2012) 91. 
88
 See s. 78A of the Ordinance. 
89
 See s. 95A of the Ordinance. 
90
 See s. 121 the Ordinance. 
91
 See s. 131 (1) of the Ordinance. 
92
 The Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 2002. 
93
 See ss. 15A to 15C of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969. 
219 
 
system in Pakistan may not be an attractive option as far as the corporate sector is 
concerned due to the high cost involved in training the judges compared to the ratio of the 
cases that the judges have to decide. Therefore, there is a need to enhance judicial capacity 
to enforce at least corporate matters without changing the overall structure of the judiciary. 
This can be done by establishing separate specialized courts to deal with corporate 
matters.  
 
The phenomenon of creating specialized courts, and/or establishing agencies, quasi-
judicial authorities or tribunals in order to enhance enforcement capacity has already 
started in a number of jurisdictions in Asia94 and in other parts of the world. The Financial 
Court in China, commercial courts in Malaysia, the Financial Reporting Council in Hong 
Kong, the Corporate Governance Office in the Philippines Stock Exchange, the 
Enforcement Division in Bursa Malaysia, and the Audit Oversight Boards in South Korea 
and Malaysia are examples of enhancing enforcement mechanism separately or within 
existing institutions.95 The ‘economic courts’ in Russia,96 ‘labour courts’ in Germany97 
and the ‘tribunals’ in India dispose of matters in specialized fields. The Federal securities 
law in the US also contemplates administrative courts to enhance the enforcement 
mechanism.98 
 
The specialized courts may resolve the enforcement mechanism or at least enhance 
capacity to enforce corporate laws. India has proposed establishing tribunals to deal with 
corporate matters in its new Company Law Bill, 2012. This practice has already been 
introduced in Pakistan in different fields. The administrative courts, tribunals and the 
ombudsmen99 are involved in providing relief to the public in different areas, and are 
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performing better than the judiciary.100 Dealing with corporate matters requires expertise 
and special knowledge, therefore, employing specialists can avoid delay and expense. A 
quasi-judicial authority along the lines of that in India may be a better option with a right 
of appeal to the High Court on legal aspects only in order to have a second, independent 
and judicial opinion. A formal and functional convergence in establishing special courts 
on the pattern of India and other countries may resolve the problem of judicial 
enforcement of corporate matters. 
 
5.6.3 Market reform 
 
The other area of concern for effective enforcement of rights or law in action is the market 
in Pakistan. The market is inefficient,101 and fails to sanction non-performing firms and 
managers. A weak enforcement mechanism through market forces allows market 
manipulation and expropriation of minority shareholders by dominant business groups. In 
Pakistan market reform started with the establishment of a powerful regulator. The 
establishment of the SECP was the first step on this agenda.102 However, failure on the 
part of the market to enforce the investor protection mechanism and sanction non-
performing firms is the main concern about good governance in Pakistan.  
 
5.6.3.1 Stock market reform 
 
The state and regulator undertook some reform in the stock markets.103 In the first phase 
the central depository company (CDC) was formed for the central handling of securities 
under the Central Depositories Act, 1997 and the Central Depository Companies 
(Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 1996.104 In the second phase the decision was made 
to demutualise the stock market by converting it from a company limited by guarantee to a 
company limited by shares and to enlist on the stock market for public trade. Under the 
rules, the stock markets were required to be corporatized, demutualised and integrated by 
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the end of 31 December 2006.105 The legislative process is too slow in Pakistan that the 
same has not yet been finalized. The President of Pakistan approved the Stock Exchanges 
(Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act on 7 May 2012. The Act set 
another deadline for completion of the process by September 2012 but this is still pending. 
In the third phase the rules for insider trading were changed. The definition of insider 
trading was enhanced and clarified in the securities law.106 The punishment for insider 
trading was converted from imprisonment and financial penalty to a heavy financial 
penalty only. The objective of this change was to convert criminal liability to civil 
liability. As the nature of evidence in criminal cases is stricter than in civil cases, trial 
courts in criminal offences require from the prosecution evidence beyond doubt, which 
may not be feasible in most of the cases involving corporate offences and white-collar 
crimes.  
 
In a further step the SECP issued the Code of Corporate Governance and made it part of 
the listing regulations in 2002. This was a major breakthrough in the efforts to achieve 
good corporate governance. However, the business community received it lukewarmly. 
Many companies delisted in 2002 and in subsequent years.107 They had originally listed to 
derive certain benefits, which included tax incentives and fulfilling licensing requirements 
for different businesses. Many companies do not know the potential benefits of good 
governance and, therefore, do not observe the code in its true spirit. Some companies, 
including multinationals, do observe the Code due to reputational concerns. However, the 
real problem was the implementation of the Code in its true spirit.108  
 
These reforms were insufficient to develop the market and improve corporate governance. 
Therefore, there is a need to reform the market in a way that could improve corporate 
governance. One option to reform the market may be the phased implementation of the 
rules, regulations and the Code. For this purpose, the stock market can be divided into 
different segments, each with its own requirements depending upon the nature of the 
listing. This may circumvent resistance from the families and interested groups.  
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a.  London Stock Exchange 
 
The phenomenon of dividing the market into segments is already in operation in different 
parts of the world. The LSE is an important example. The LSE covers different segments 
of the market. In the main market, companies can have different types of listing: UK and 
overseas companies, including the European Economic Area (EEA), may have premium 
and standard listing, and GDRs on the official list.109 It all depends upon the choice of the 
issuer and, subsequently, the different requirements have to be fulfilled according to the 
nature of the listing. 110  
 
There are two broad categories of listing on the main market with premium and standard 
listing. The premium listing is only for equity shares of trading companies, and closed and 
open-ended investment entities, whereas standard listing includes the issuance of shares, 
depository receipts, debts and securitized derivatives.111 
 
i Premium listing 
 
Premium listing does not mean ‘first listing’ or ‘sole listing’, rather, it means that 
companies are required to meet the highest standards of regulation and disclosure in 
Europe; in other words, they have to meet the UK’s gold standards – described as ‘super-
equivalent requirements’ that are over and above the ‘directive-minimum’112 requirements. 
Companies that have premium listing on the main market are potentially eligible for the 
FTSE UK Index Series, one of the most recognized in the world, which includes the well-
known FTSE 100 Index.113 
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The companies that have premium listing are required to comply with the following 
requirements: 
 
i) A three-year revenue earning record, an independent audit within six month from 
the date of the prospectus and an unqualified working capital statement 
(Chapter 6)114 
ii) The prior approval of shareholders before the cancellation of their listing by the 
FCA (Chapter 5) 
iii) Compliance with six listing principles introduced in 2005 with emphasis on 
directors’ responsibility, an adequate system, integrity towards investors, timely 
communication, equality of treatment of shareholders and dealing co-operatively 
with the FCA (Chapter 7) 
iv) The appointment of a sponsor to advise on key transactions (Chapter 8) 
v) After premium listing the company remains subject to continued obligations 
which include the following: 
 
a. Provision of notifications to the FCA and market about changes in the 
company (Chapter 9) 
b. Provision in the annual report and financial statements regarding 
compliance with the UK Code of Corporate Governance (Chapter 9) 
c. Information relating to directors’ remuneration in the annual report and 
financial statements (Chapter 9) 
d. Application of pre-emption rights for UK companies unless dis-applied in 
accordance with ss. 570-1 of the Companies Act, 2006 (Chapter 9) 
e. Prior approval of shareholders regarding the disposal or acquisition of 
businesses or assets which reach certain thresholds (Chapter 10) 
f. Prior approval of shareholders for related party transactions (Chapter 11) 
g. Observance of buyback of shares rules (Chapter 12).115 
 
ii Standard listing 
 
A standard listing on the LSE does not necessarily mean a company’s second listing, 
rather, it signifies that the company has chosen to meet EU harmonized standards as 
                                                 
114
 The chapter number refers to the relevant chapter of the listing rules. 
115
 FSA (n 110) 21-3. 
224 
 
opposed to the UK super-equivalent standards required for a premium listing. Overseas 
companies seeking standard listing were required to have a primary listing in their home 
jurisdictions until July 2005 but this condition has now been waived. Before 
6 October 2009 standard listings were allowed only to equity securities of overseas 
companies but now UK companies are also given the option of standard listing.  
 
Companies with a standard listing have to meet the ‘directive-minimum’ standards.116 
Also effective from 6 April, 2010, the standard listing and GDR are required to comply 
with the EU Company Reporting Directive which requires, among other things, that a 
corporate governance statement be provided, and that the main features of the internal 
control and risk management systems be described.117 The following are the requirements 
for a company with a standard listing: 
 
The requirements for standard listing stem from the Prospectus and Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules (DTRs). The principal additional provisions relating to listing rules 
are as follows: 
 
1. The company must satisfy the Consolidated Admissions and Reporting Directives 
(CARD)118 requirements 
2. All circulars, notices, reports and resolutions must be published through the 
Regulatory Information Services (RIS)119 in the UK.120 
 
Some concessions were made to overseas companies with regard to premium and standard 
listing. Overseas companies with a premium listing were not required to ‘comply or 
explain’ the UK Code of Corporate Governance and to offer pre-emption rights.121 The 
overseas companies were only required to disclose in their annual reports and financial 
statements that they were complying with the corporate governance regime in their 
country of incorporation and also to disclose to what extent this was different from the UK 
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code.122 However, effective from 6 April 2010, the overseas companies with premium 
listing are now required to ‘comply or explain’ the UK code123 and to offer pre-emptive 
rights.124 However, effective from 6 June 2011, overseas issuers are exempted from the 
requirement of pre-emptive rights subject to the condition that the shareholders have 
allowed dis-application of pre-emptive rights equivalent to the authority given under 
ss. 570 or 571 of the Companies Act, 2006 or in accordance with the law of the country of 
incorporation, provided that it has implemented Chapter 29 of Directive 77/91/EEC.125 
Furthermore, effective from 6 April 2010 overseas companies with a premium listing are 
exempted from the application of LR 9.3.9R which empowers the issuer to impose 
sanctions on shareholders who fail to respond to notice to disclose their interest in shares 
under s. 793 of the Companies Act, 2006.126 More concessions are made to overseas 
companies with a standard listing than overseas companies with premium listing.  
 
iii Global depository receipts  
 
GDRs are negotiable securities that represent a company’s equity issued by a depository 
bank on behalf of a company, which is normally an overseas company. The purposes of 
issuing GDRs is to broaden the shareholder base, raise capital, enhance the company 
image globally, increase the visibility of its products and services, and to facilitate mergers 
and acquisitions.127 GDRs are intended to be purchased by sophisticated or professional 
investors in the primary market. Retail investors are unlikely to access them in the primary 
market but it is possible for them to purchase GDRs in the secondary market. The 
prospectus clearly states that ‘the securities should only be bought and traded by investors 
who are particularly knowledgeable in investment matters’.128  
 
The GDR market is a specialist market. New admissions are often offered to institutional 
investors. These securities are not included in the FTSE UK index series.129 GDR listings 
are normally available to overseas companies and are required ‘directive-minimum’ 
standards. UK companies can also be GDR-listed, provided that their underlying equity is 
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a premium listing.130 From 2000 onwards, overseas issuers are not required to have 
primary listing in their home jurisdiction.131 The following are the key requirements for 
company with a GDR listing: 
 
Most of the requirements for GDR listing stem from the Prospectus and Disclosure and 
Transparency Directives. It also requires satisfying the following requirements of CARD: 
 
i) The depository must be authorized and regulated by the FCA or a financial 
institution accepted by FCA and must hold the certificate on trust (or other 
equivalent legal instrument) for the sole benefit of the certificate holder. 
ii) The issuers of GDR are expected to comply with all the continuing obligations of 
the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTRs), if they are admitted to trading on 
a Regulated Market. 
iii) If these are admitted to the PSM (Professional Securities Market) then they are 
required to comply with the provisions relating to the disclosure and control of 
inside information (DTR 2) and the dissemination of information (DTR 6.3).132 
 
iv Professional Securities Market 
  
The PSM is an integral part of the LSE and is operated within the scope of its status as a 
Recognized Investment Exchange. The PSM enables companies to raise capital through 
the listing of specialist securities, including debt and depositary receipts, to professional 
investors.  
 
v  Alternative investment market 
 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is the LSE’s international market for smaller 
growing companies. A wide range of businesses, including early stage, venture capital and 
more established companies join AIM seeking access to growth capital.133 It is a non-
listed market.134 The companies who are admitted to trading but are not admitted to the 
official list can trade on AIM. This is not a regulated market and it provides companies 
with a different trade market. AIM does not require the UK Code of Corporate 
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Governance. The companies that are eligible to trade on AIM are required to comply with 
sub-directive standards.135  
 
vi PLUS Quoted Market 
 
The PLUS Quoted Market is not a regulated market and is also called a ‘non-listed 
market’ as is AIM.136 Companies that trade on the PLUS Quoted Market are required to 
comply with sub-directive standards.137 
 
vii  Specialist Fund Market 
 
The Specialist Fund Market (SFM) is a specialist regulated fund market of the LSE. This 
market targets institutional, professionals and knowledgeable investors.138 
 
b. Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
 
The Neuer market is a segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FWB) in Germany. This 
market segment was created especially for listing new firms under the Deutsche Borse (an 
operator of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange). These companies were required to follow 
international accounting and greater disclosure standards as compared to existing listed 
firms. In the early stages it proved to be very successful in Germany with many new IPOs. 
The German business community accepted it because it had not directly affected them.139 
Later development, however, showed that this was not a successful experience. However, 
failure cannot be attributed to regulatory dualism, but rather to its design, management and 
the circumstances under which it operated.140 
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c.  Novo Mercado (New Market) of BM&F (Brazilian Mercantile and Future 
Exchange) Bovespa, Brazil 
 
The Brazilian Stock Exchange also established a separate segment of the stock exchange 
to facilitate new growing firms along the lines of regulatory dualism. This proved to be a 
stunning success as it had learnt lessons from the failure of the Neuer market. The 
regulator was successful in breaking the deadlock in reforms by creating a new segment of 
the stock exchange in which new and growing firms may adopt stringent requirements in 
addition to the existing lightly regulated regime in order to attract more external 
investment opportunities.141 This regulatory dualism may be a successful avenue for those 
jurisdictions where path dependency forces resist reform. This may be a suitable case for a 
jurisdiction such as Pakistan where path dependency forces such as families and vested 
interests resist reform.  
  
d. Stock exchanges in Pakistan  
 
The regulatory dualism experience can be effective in Pakistan. The stock exchange in 
Pakistan may be divided into segments with primary and secondary listing. Companies 
with primary listing may be required to follow international accounting standards, more 
disclosure requirements and mandatory compliance with the Code. Companies with 
secondary listing may be allowed to follow domestic accounting standards with lower 
disclosure requirements and optional compliance with the Code. This regulatory dualism 
may not harm families and vested interests. Families and interest groups who have 
reservations about compliance due to their vested interests might not be directly affected 
by this kind of reform. They may carry on their listing in the secondary market and may 
move towards the primary market once they realize the potential benefits of primary 
listing with its enhanced requirements. This may be helpful in developing the market and 
creating good governance in the corporate sector of Pakistan.  
 
The primary market may be attractive to multinational, big, existing and new companies. 
In this way, these companies can convey the message to investors that they are willing to 
comply with higher disclosure requirements. This may attract other companies who have a 
secondary listing to move towards primary listing. The bonding will play a major role in 
moving companies from secondary to primary listing. Small existing and new companies 
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can enlist on the secondary market where there will be lower disclosure requirements as 
well as non-binding compliance with the Code, and fewer requirements for compliance 
with rules and regulations. This will provide these companies with some exposure in the 
public sector. Compliance with fewer requirements may induce management to think 
about moving to the strict compliance regime of primary listing. Reputation, bonding and 
enhancing the shareholder base may be the stimulants for primary listing. In this way, 
companies may create their own culture of compliance. After maturing, companies may 
seek entry into the primary listing. This movement of companies from secondary to 
primary market will assure investors of their commitment to compliance with higher 
standards. This may improve the companies’ share price, which will help companies to 
raise equity finance and debt financing at lower cost. Investor confidence will be increased 
and good governance will be ensured. Individual investors may find it beneficial to invest 
in the primary market, whereas institutional investors may invest in both the primary and 
secondary markets. As the institutional investors have experience and expertise in 
investing, they can, therefore, invest in both markets. However, the primary market may 
be helpful for small investors as only highly reputed companies will go for primary listing. 
 
5.6.4 Other segments of the market in Pakistan 
 
There are other ways to enhance the enforcement mechanism too. One may be the role of 
intermediaries such as institutional investors, including banks and mutual funds.142 These 
institutions can ensure company compliance with regulations. They can use their position 
to force companies to comply with the rules and regulations through participation in 
general and board meetings. They can also negotiate with portfolio companies for 
compliance with the rules and regulations instead of participating in the management. 
Institutional investors are working well in advanced jurisdictions such as the UK and the 
US. In Pakistan the fund industry is not yet developed and that may be one reason for the 
underdeveloped market. The industry may play its role in enforcement, but reforms are 
needed in this sector as well. The UK Stewardship Code may provide Pakistan with 
guidelines on how to development the fund industry. There are other benefits for 
institutional investors such as safe investment for the small financier. These investments 
provide diversified investment through professionals. Reforming the institutional 
investment industry in the country may thus help to develop the market and enhance the 
enforcement mechanism. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed enforcement or ‘law in action’ in corporate governance in Pakistan. 
It sought to examine the ways in which the law in action can be effective in the country. It 
demonstrated that the ‘law in books’ was important in the first phase of reform but that 
‘law in action’ must be improved in the second phase for better corporate governance and 
investor protection. This chapter also recommended different means of improving the law 
in action through reforms in Pakistan.  
 
The enforcement mechanism is embedded in the system where the courts and market play 
an important role. The judiciary has a significant role to play in the law in action. 
Therefore, an efficient judiciary is a key to good corporate governance. The judicial 
system of Pakistan is inefficient and failed to provide the public with justice, even in 
general civil and criminal matters. Corporate matters are considered technical in nature 
and, therefore, to deal with it, special knowledge and experience are required. The judges 
who preside in general courts are normally not expert in corporate matters, which is the 
main cause of the inefficiency in the judicial system. There are two solutions to this 
situation. First, the judges of the regular court system should be trained in corporate 
matters so that they can deal with them in addition to dealing with other civil and criminal 
matters. However, the problem with this solution is that substantial cost will be incurred to 
train them when weighed up against the number of cases with which such judges have to 
deal. Second, the other solution is to establish specialized courts with persons who have 
special knowledge and experience in corporate matters as judges of such courts. This will 
reduce the burden on the general courts and may enhance judicial capacity as far as 
corporate matters are concerned.  
 
The state has established a number of specialized courts and tribunals in many fields in 
Pakistan which are performing better than the general courts. The phenomenon of 
establishing specialized courts is also evident in developed, developing and regional 
jurisdictions. Therefore, establishing specialized courts to deal with corporate matters with 
judges having special knowledge and experience of corporate, accounting, finance and 
economics may be the answer. This will reduce the burden on the general judiciary and 
ensure efficiency in corporate matters. Ultimately, it may enhance the enforcement 
mechanism of Pakistan as far as corporate governance is concerned.  
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The other important aspect of law in action is the market in Pakistan which is 
underdeveloped. The capital market of Pakistan failed in compliance and enforcement. 
The institutional investors are passive and the takeover market is not performing due to an 
illiquid market. There is a need to reform the market keeping in mind the particular 
circumstances prevailing in Pakistan. Families are dominant and may resist any reform 
agenda as the status quo favours them. This resistance from families and vested interests 
can be overcome through piecemeal reforms in the market. The market can be divided into 
two segments: (1) the primary market and (2) the secondary market. The primary market 
may require more disclosure and compliance than the secondary market. International 
accounting standards, compliance with the code of corporate governance, controlling 
related party transactions and other disclosure may be mandatory features of this market. 
The secondary market may require less disclosure and compliance. International 
accounting standards, compliance with the Code and related party transactions may be 
optional. The primary market may be attractive to multinational, big, existing and new 
companies. Reputational concerns will attract them to enlist on this market. This market 
will be useful for small and dispersed investors. Institutional investors may invest in the 
primary and secondary markets as they have experience in, and knowledge of, where to 
invest. They can also use their position and voting power to ensure compliance. The 
secondary market may be attractive to small, existing and new companies. Once they get 
exposure and know the potential benefits to be gained from the primary market, they may 
enlist on the primary market. The bonding mechanism will be the stimulant for them to 
shift to the primary market. This may ensure compliance and enforcement through the 
market.  
 
In addition, as the reform process moves towards convergence to international norms, the 
process may face resistance from religious norms in Pakistan. This is basically due to the 
multifunctional role of the religion of Islam. It focuses not only on worships, but also on 
the day-to-day affairs, including financial matters, of its subjects. Islam is the state 
religion in Pakistan. Therefore, any convergence to international norms has to face the 
litmus test of Islamic norms.  
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CHAPTER SIX: ISLAMIC INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN PAKISTAN 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters were dedicated to examining the possible convergence to the 
Western form of corporate governance in Pakistan. This chapter examines the extent to 
which Islamic norms may act as a barrier to convergence to international norms in 
corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
The development of the corporate governance system of a particular country depends 
upon the country’s political and ideological conditions.1 The culture and ideology of a 
country also determines the choice of corporate law and governance mechanism.2 Islam is 
a practical religion that involves and guides its subjects in each and every aspect of their 
life, including financial matters and the governance mechanism. Pakistan, being an 
ideological country with Islam as its state religion, may drive its corporate governance 
mechanism from the basis of Islamic norms. Therefore, convergence of any feature of 
corporate governance to international norms in Pakistan may have to be subjected to the 
litmus test of Islamic norms.  
 
Islamic finance remained stagnant and has developed very slowly over the past centuries 
for reasons that may be associated with the colonization of the Muslim world and the 
triumph of capitalism in the Western world. Islamic finance has only recently developed 
more rapidly, especially after the recent financial crisis. Muslim jurists were forced to 
keep abreast of modern techniques of financing and tried to synchronize them with Islamic 
norms. This can be attributed to the different developments that occurred in recent years. 
Firstly, the rapid growth of capitalism all over the world in the recent past acted as catalyst 
in the finance industry. Capitalism invented different techniques of financing with which 
classical Muslim jurists were not familiar. Secondly, after gaining its independence from 
the colonization of Western powers, Muslim countries automatically adopted the legal and 
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financial structures of their masters. However, later development saw a thrust in Muslims 
to adopt religious norms, even in financial matters. Thirdly, the recent global financial 
crisis highlighted the importance of an alternative financial system that may respond more 
appropriately to financial distress, which capitalism failed to do. Fourthly, globalization 
during the past 40 to 50 years has stimulated adaptation and convergence to a Western 
model of financing from more developed countries to less developed countries. The 
challenges for Muslim jurists are to develop an Islamic finance system that provides an 
alternative to modern financing modes, which is borrowed from the West and also 
compatible with basic Islamic norms.  
 
This chapter discusses one important issue, namely the extent to which Islamic norms may 
act as barrier to convergence of corporate governance to international norms in Pakistan. 
The issue has two aspects: (1) the extent to which convergence to business norms within 
the Muslim world may take place and (2) the extent to which Islamic norms may affect 
convergence to the Western model of corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
However, before discussing and answering to the sole issue of convergence in corporate 
governance to International norms in Pakistan, the discussion will focus on the nature and 
sources of Islamic law, reasons and causes of emergence of different schools of Islamic 
law, and nature and purposes of Islamic law and finance. This will help to understand how 
and why there is divergence within the Muslim world and up to what extent the same may 
be converted into convergence with regard to Islamic Law and finance. In addition, this 
will also illustrate the degree of divergence between Islamic law and finance to the 
western system of corporate finance and governance. In particular, this will help us to see 
the possibility and effectiveness of convergence to western system of corporate 
governance in Pakistan. 
 
6.2 Ideology of Pakistan 
 
Pakistan is an Islamic Republic.3 After independence in 1947, it adopted the Government 
of India Act, 1935as its constitution with some necessary amendments. A Constituent 
Assembly was formed in 1947 to draft a constitution for the new state of Pakistan. On 
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12 March 1949, the Constituent Assembly passed the ‘Objective Resolution’.4 The 
resolution, inter alia, states that 
  
wherein sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty (God) and the 
authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being 
exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust . . . wherein the Muslims 
shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance 
with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’ān and the 
Sunnah.5 
 
The ‘Objective Resolution’ was made the preamble of all the former and present 
constitutions of Pakistan, namely those enacted in 1956, 1962 and 1973 respectively. The 
‘Objective Resolution’ formed a substantive part of the present Constitution in 1985.6 
 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution, 1973) 
provides that Islam is the state religion.7 Furthermore, the Constitution provides two 
safeguards for protecting the Islamic spirit of the country. First, it provides that all existing 
laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the 
Qur’ān (‘Holy Book’) and Sunnah (an explanation, interpretation and elaboration of the 
Qur’ān). Similarly, it also provides that no law shall be enacted that is repugnant to such 
injunctions.8 To check the conformity of laws with the injunctions of Islam, the Council of 
Islamic Ideology was established.9 The objective of this council is to advise governments 
on how to bring existing laws into conformity with Islamic injunctions.10 The government 
may also refer a question to the council for advice on the point at issue, that is, whether or 
not a proposed law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.11 Second, it established the 
Federal Shariat Court (FSC) whose function includes examining and deciding whether or 
not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.12 The FSC is 
empowered to declare any law that is contrary to the injunctions of Islam and may set a 
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deadline for its abolition.13 The government is required to take the necessary steps to bring 
the law into conformity with the injunctions of Islam. If the government fails to provide an 
alternative to the impugned law or provision of law, declared being against the injunctions 
of Islam, the same shall be considered abolished from the date on which the decision of 
the court became effective.14 The court may also review its own decision.15 A decision of 
court can be appealed to the SC of Pakistan16 and for this purpose the Constitution, 1973 
has established a separate Shariat Appellate Bench within the SC to hear appeals against 
such decisions.17  
 
6.3  Shariah (Divine law) and fiqh (Islamic law) 
 
The terms Islamic law and Shariah are used interchangeably but there is a difference 
between these two terminologies. Shariah means the Divine law that is revealed in the 
form of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.18 As Divine law is from God, it is considered perfect 
and immutable, and is not subject to change. However, Islamic law, which is also called 
fiqh,19 means the law developed through human intellect from the Shariah. As this law is 
arrived at through human intellect, it may contain errors or be defective.20  
 
Usul al-fiqh is a methodology used to derive Islamic law (fiqh) from the Divine law 
(Shariah). The human intellect is used to develop Islamic law and the process used to 
apply independent reasoning by a qualified religious scholar is called ijtihad (‘legal 
reasoning’). Different schools of Islamic law have different rules of interpretation of the 
Shariah within the Muslim community; therefore, there are chances of difference of 
opinion among them. This led to the development of Islamic law (fiqh) according to each 
school of thought.21  
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6.4 Sources of Islamic law 
 
The sources of Islamic law can be divided broadly into two categories: (1) primary 
sources and (2) secondary sources. Primary sources are those that are unanimously 
accepted as sources of Islamic law by all the schools of Islamic law. However, the 
secondary sources are those on which the Muslim jurists have differences of opinion 
regarding their acceptance as sources of Islamic law.  
 
6.4.1 Primary sources 
 
The majority of Muslim jurists regard the Qur’ān, the Sunnah and the ijma (‘consensus of 
opinion’) as primary sources of Islamic law. However, some jurists (who are in the 
minority) consider the Qur’ān and the Sunnah as the only primary sources of Islamic law.  
 
6.4.1.1 The Qur’ān (‘Holy Book’) 
 
The Qur’ān is a holy book. It is part of the ‘iman’ (‘belief’) of the Muslims that this book 
is from God and was revealed to the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). No 
rule can be derived that is in conflict with this book. The problem with this book is that it 
does not provide detail on each and every aspect of life. It provides general principles. The 
detailed rules were left to the Prophet. He elaborated, interpreted and provided details of 
the verses of the Qur’ān in his capacity as a judge and as a Prophet. This established the 
Sunnah as a parallel primary source with the Qur’ān.22 
 
6.4.1.2 The Sunnah  
 
The Sunnah is also a primary source of Islamic law. It denotes sayings, other than what is 
revealed in the Qur’ān, and practices of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). It 
also includes the Prophet’s tacit approval of acts of others in worship and daily life.23 It is, 
in fact, an explanation, interpretation and elaboration of the Qur’ān.24  
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6.4.2 Secondary sources (rational sources) 
 
The secondary sources are based on ijtihad. Ijtihad is applied when primary sources do not 
provide an explicit view on any issue. Ijtihad is a process of deriving a rule using human 
intellect. This is a process through which a qualified Muslim scholars arrived at some 
conclusion that is in accordance with the essence and spirit of the primary sources of 
Islamic law.25 
 
6.4.2.1 Ijma (‘Consensus of legal opinion’) 
 
If all the qualified Muslim jurists of one time agree on a certain issue after jtihad (‘legal 
reasoning’) ijma26 (‘consensus of legal opinion’) will become a binding rule. However, its 
biding nature may be overruled by subsequent jurists with similar conditions.27  
 
6.4.2.2 Qiyas (‘Analogy’) 
 
Qiyas (‘analogy’) is an extension of an existing rule to a new issue for which no rule is 
available in the existing texts of primary sources.28 Jurists try to find an underlying cause 
for the existing rule and then extend the rule to a new situation. As an example, the saying 
of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) ‘a murderer will not be inherited’ may be 
used. The Sunnah is silent on the prohibition that a murderer may not be a beneficiary of 
the will of the victim. Therefore, by analogy, the rule of inheritance is extended to 
bequest. The underlying cause for the first case, determined by jurists, is ‘hastening the 
benefit prior to its appointed time by a criminal act’ and the same is extended to a bequest 
by qiyas.29 Qiyas is similar to ijma in a sense that both are an interpretation of primary 
sources. However, qiyas is an individual interpretation of the rule whereas the ijma is an 
interpretation of a rule through the consensus of all the jurists of one time.  
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6.4.2.3 Istihsan (‘Juristic preference’) 
 
The literal meaning of the word istihsan is something that is preferred by someone or 
something towards which one is inclined. In its technical meaning, it means an exception 
to a general principle established through analogy, provided stronger evidence is available. 
The objective behind the application of istihsan is to provide relief to the people. For 
example, Islamic law does not allow the selling of something that does not exist at the 
time of the contract, but the contract of hire (ijarah) is allowed. In this contract the 
services or benefits do not exist at the time of the contract. The contract is allowed on the 
basis of necessity as an exception to the general rule and on the basis of evidence found in 
the Qur’ān in which Prophet Jacob entered into a similar contract.30 Istihsan is similar to 
the concept of equity in the West as both are based on fairness and good conscience.31 
 
6.4.2.4 Istishab or ibahah (‘presumption of continuity’)  
 
Istishab or ibahah means the presumption of continuity of the status quo with respect to a 
rule. Therefore, an existing rule will prevail unless overruled through the sources of 
Islamic law;32 in other words, everything is permissible unless prohibited by Islamic law. 
So, in the absence of a prohibition of any act by the Islamic law, the act will be considered 
permissible. This is analogous to common law as both focus on the continuity of a rule 
first established unless over turned.33 
 
6.4.2.5 Maslahah mursalah (‘Extended analogy’) 
 
Maslahah mursalah means the preservation of the purpose of Islamic law in the settlement 
of legal issues; for example, the rule provides that for intentional murder, the life of one 
person will be taken for one murder. However, jurists have decided that if more than one 
person were involved in the killing of a single person, then all those who were involved in 
the murder may be sentenced to death. The objective was to preserve the purpose of 
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Islamic law, that is, the preservation of individual life.34 This is also termed public interest 
as it allows following a particular course of action in the public interest.35  
 
6.4.2.6 Qawl al-sahabi (‘Opinion of a companion’) 
 
A companion (sahabi) is a person who was Muslim during the lifetime of Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) and also met or saw the Prophet in life. Any saying by a 
companion is also considered a source of Islamic law by some schools of Islamic law. The 
reason for the acceptance of this as a source of law is that such persons were in close 
association with the Prophet. They, therefore, had a better understanding of the spirit of 
the Shariah.36  
 
6.4.2.7 Sadd al-dhar’i (‘Blocking the legal means to an illegal end’) 
 
Sadd al-dhar’i means if the outcome of a legal act is illegal and harmful to society, then it 
will be prohibited; for example, the cultivation of poppies is not illegal in itself but as they 
are used to make heroin, which is harmful to society, their cultivation is, therefore, not 
allowed.37  
 
6.4.2.8 Urf (‘Custom’) 
 
Urf is similar to a custom that is considered a source of law in the Western world. Earlier 
Muslim jurists used custom as a source of law but did not focus on it. Later jurists, 
however, has given it importance. This may be due to the Western influence 38 as the same 
is considered a source of law. The basic difference between urf and custom in the Western 
world is that urf should not be contrary to the Shariah.39  
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6.4.2.9 Islamic legal maxims  
 
Islamic legal maxims play an important role in Islamic law. They have developed over a 
period, and show the spirit of Islamic law and are guiding principles in Islamic law.40 
These maxims help jurists to arrive at a conclusion when there is a problem with the 
interpretation of the sources of Islamic law, for example, ‘the removal of hardship’ (raf al-
haraj), ‘prevention of harm’ (daf al-darar),41 and ‘doubt does not make an end to 
certainty’ (Al-yaqinu la yazulu bish-shakk) are important maxims under Islamic law. They 
have been derived from principal sources of Islamic law but are not sources of Islamic 
law. Rather, these maxims only explain the ideology of Islamic law and science of 
jurisprudence.42 Different schools of law have different opinions on the applicability of 
some of the maxims.43 There are two important legal maxims relating to corporate 
finance: (1) ‘the benefit of a thing is in return for the liability for loss from that thing’ and 
(2) ‘the detriment is in return for the benefit’. These maxims signify that accepting 
liability justifies making profit. In business, if one does not accept liability for a loss, one 
is not entitled to a legitimate profit under Islamic law. Therefore, interest-bearing 
transactions are prohibited because the debt provider does not take liability for potential 
loss. These two maxims of Islamic law, coupled with a prohibition on interest, clearly 
refer to equity investment.44  
  
6.5 The purposes of Islamic law (Maqasid al-Shariah) 
 
Al-Ghazali45 has defined five purposes of Islamic law, which have been accepted by the 
majority of Muslim scholars. These purposes are called primary purposes of Islamic law 
and are as follows:  
 
1. Preservation of religion  
2. Preservation of life 
3. Preservation of progeny 
                                                 
40
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4. Preservation of intellect 
5. Preservation of wealth. 
 
All these purposes have positive or aggressive, as well as negative or defensive, aspects. A 
positive/aggressive aspect of the ‘preservation of religion’ means to create conditions that 
facilitate worship, and a negative/defensive purpose implies that it is the duty of every 
Muslim to defend his or her religion. The positive/aggressive aspect of the ‘preservation 
of life’ means to create such facilities that ease life, whereas a negative/defensive aspect is 
prevention as well as a penalty for taking others’ life without legal justification. The 
positive/aggressive aspect of ‘preservation of progeny’ means to facilitate family life and 
the negative/defensive aspect is the prohibition on, and punishment for, illegal sexual 
intercourse. The positive/aggressive aspect of ‘preservation of intellect’ prescribes the 
provision of education and its growth, whereas the negative/defensive aspect is the 
prohibition on the consumption of liquor and other substances that destroy intellect, and 
entails a penalty for its violation. The positive/aggressive aspect of ‘preservation of 
wealth’ means to provide proper conditions for the growth of wealth and the 
negative/aggressive aspect is the prohibition on taking away others’ property illegally, and 
prescribes punishment for theft and robbery.46  
 
These purposes are prioritized according to the order in which they are stated. Jurists have 
defined some of these rules according to their applicability to Islamic law. The first rule is 
that the stronger interest will prevail, for instance, under ‘preservation of intellect’ 
consumption of liquor is prohibited but, at the same time, as life has priority over 
‘preservation of intellect’ (consumption of liquor), therefore, if a person’s life is being 
threatened, he/she may take some wine to save his/her life. The second rule is that public 
interest will prevail over private interest. Therefore, levying tax for public welfare is 
justified under this rule.47 Another example may be that ‘preservation of life’ has priority 
over ‘preservation of progeny’ but the death sentence may be imposed under certain 
circumstances on culprits, which means ‘preservation of progeny’ is given priority over 
life. This is so because public interest will prevail over private interest. Here taking the life 
of a culprit is a private interest, whereas saving society from the evil effects of sexuality is 
a public interest.  
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6.6 Applicability of the purposes of Islamic law in corporate governance 
 
The objectives of Islamic law imply that no one can do any act whose objective is to 
defeat the intention of the lawgiver. In the context of corporate governance, the managers 
have to set their priorities in a way that preserves the purposes of Islamic law.48 Therefore, 
a firm cannot complete any activity whose objective is prohibited by Islamic law 
irrespective of the quantum of profit it can yield. Therefore, the firm’s activities must not 
be to produce alcohol, as this is against the ‘preservation of intellect’. Similarly, the 
purpose of Islamic law ‘preservation of life’ prohibits all those products that harm life 
such as tobacco, heroine and other illegal drugs. Under the ‘preservation of progeny’ all 
materials that induce illegal sexual intercourse will be prohibited, such as producing 
pornographic films and other materials. The ‘preservation of wealth’ as an objective of 
Islamic law means to create conditions that help the growth of wealth, therefore, 
establishing a firm with a view to growing wealth is within the limits of the Islamic law. 
This implies that the interests of the investors have priority in business decisions. 
However, Islamic law is not limited to the interests of shareholders or stakeholders but it 
covers society in general. The rule ‘public interest will prevail over private interest’ 
implies that the interest of investors is subordinate to the interest of society. Therefore, 
this requires from the managers that they avoid such decisions that may be beneficial for 
the shareholders and stakeholders, but that damage society and the general public. Hence, 
this rule will prohibit certain kinds of businesses, such as gambling which may be 
beneficial to investors but is harmful to society and, therefore, prohibited under Islamic 
law. In general, managers are duty-bound to take decisions that do not in any way defeat 
the objectives of the Shariah; for instance, managers should not take decision to invest the 
surplus of a firm’s money in any interest-bearing investment or to indulge in an activity 
that promotes Shariah-prohibited activities. These purposes of Islamic law are called 
primary purposes.  
 
After achieving the primary purposes, managers may proceed further to take guidance 
from the secondary purposes developed by jurists. The first category of secondary 
purposes is called ‘needs’ by the jurists. These secondary purposes may be required to 
fulfil the primary purposes.49 In the context of corporate governance, managers, after 
fulfilling the primary purposes (e.g., providing employees with fair pay and safety in the 
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workplace), may proceed further and provide training to enhance human quality. This will 
enhance human capacity to perform the primary purposes more efficiently.50 Jurists call 
the second category of secondary purposes ‘complementary purposes’. These purposes are 
meant to establish ease and facility. After attaining the primary purposes and the first 
category of secondary purpose, the managers may go further and discharge their social 
responsibilities such as donating to charity and to other institutions; providing needy 
students with scholarships; providing sufficient, correct and clear information regarding 
products offered to customers;51 or providing accurate information and disclosure to the 
shareholders and to the general public for the issuance of shares. This may help to attain 
the highest degree of social responsibility. In corporate governance, priorities in Islamic 
law help managers to decide what course of action they can take in case of a conflict of 
interest between different stakeholders.52 In this way, the purposes of Islamic law can be 
achieved in corporate governance. 
 
The above implies that corporate governance is more important in firms that operate under 
Islamic law. The Islamic law will put more responsibilities on the managers because they 
will be required not only to act for the benefit of investors, but also to society and to 
preserve the objectives of Islamic law. Therefore, as the firms move towards an Islamic 
mode of conducting business, more focus will be on corporate governance. In the context 
of Pakistan, corporate governance will feature more in policy as soon as the state moves 
towards Islamizing the economy.  
 
6.6.1 Public Interest and Convergence Theory 
 
To determine what is ‘public interest’ is not an easy task. Feintuck writes that ‘the public 
interest will often appear to be an empty vessel, to be filled at different times with 
different content.’ The term varies from society to society, discipline to discipline, 
ideology to ideology and religion to religion. The reason may be the priorities set by each 
society, discipline, ideology and religion. For instance, political science may have 
different meaning than the economics. Capitalism may have different meaning than 
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Socialism due to priorities set by each ideology.53 Similarly, the capitalist western world 
may have different meaning for the term which is understood in Islamic finance.  
 
The nature of public interest depends upon the nature of a society. This difficulty becomes 
more challenging in new world order where capitalism has dominated the world but still 
some capitalist countries such as Pakistan prescribe Islamic injunctions as its 
‘Grundnorm’54. The problem is historical where most of the Muslim countries including 
Pakistan remained a colony of the western world where capitalism was dominant. After 
independence these countries adopted the legal, regulatory, financial and institutional 
structures of their colonial masters. However, later development especially after the recent 
financial crisis highlighted the importance of alternative financial systems which could 
have responded more appropriately to which capitalism failed to respond.55 The other 
development was trust in the Muslim world to revive their own Islamic identity in 
financial matters which provides alternative to products introduced and developed by 
capitalism. The challenge for modern Muslim scholars is to develop Islamic financial 
products which are compatible to modern needs and requirements and which are not 
against the Islamic injunctions. In this scenario to determine what is public interest is a 
methodological and an empirical challenge56 especially when capitalist world and Islamic 
world have different Grundnorms. For example, Islamic injunctions are a Grundnorm in 
Pakistan whereas in most of the western world it may be constitutional law. 
 
The other difficulty with the term public interest is its overlapping with private interest. 
Sometimes it becomes difficult to set boundaries for both terms. In other words, it is not 
easy to define up to what extent pursuit of private interest will not infringe public interest. 
For example, a professional may not focus on welfare of the society in his professional life 
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while in pursuit of return on his investment made in getting education and skill 
development.57 
 
A distinction between private interest and public interest and the extent to which a private 
interest may be pursued without infringing public good depends upon the ideology of a 
particular society. Capitalism focuses more on private rights than society as a whole 
whereas in Islamic economics the focus is on the society as a whole. No doubt a capitalist 
society may also focus on the welfare of the society but an individual may pursuit his / her 
private interest irrespective of quantum of negative impact on the society. He / she may 
pursue his/ her private interest unless such acts are not unlawful. For example, it may 
allow businesses which have a moral negative effect on the society such as businesses 
relating to gambling, alcohol and pornography. On the other hand, Islam is a practical 
religion which provides complete guideline through its revealed sources even in business 
and commercial dealings. It does not allow immoral and unethical businesses. Therefore, 
an Islamic society will not allow pursuit of private interest which in any form is immoral 
or harmful for the society as a whole. The emphasis of Islam is on ethical business 
conduct which does not allow dominance of private interest over public interest. 
Therefore, it does not allow business of alcohol, gambling or pornography and other 
immoral businesses.58 
 
In the realm of Islamic economics, the private and public interest are better defined than in 
its counterparts capitalism and socialism. Although the term public interest is a modern 
terminology but classical Muslim jurists have discussed this terminology in interpreting 
the basic sources of Islamic law in defining the nature and philosophy of Islamic society 
and in establishing Islamic law.  The sources of Islamic law such as Maslahah mursalah 
(extended analogy or public interest), Istihsan (Juristic preference), Sadd al-dhar’i 
(Blocking the legal means to an illegal end) and Urf (Custom)59 have been used by the 
Muslim jurists to define the nature and extent of Islamic law. While using these sources, 
Muslim jurists used public interest as a yardstick to define the Islamic law.  
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Muslim jurists have also defined the purposes of Islamic law in order to interpret the 
primary sources of Islamic law. This provides a guideline to future jurists in pursuit of 
their interpretation of primary sources for finding a solution in present times. As discussed 
earlier, preservation of religion, life, progeny, intellect and wealth are basic purposes of 
Islamic law. These purposes have priority in the same order in which these are stated. 
Therefore, a purpose ranked high will have priority over the purpose ranked below. These 
purposes have also objective of pursuing public interest. For example, life has priority 
over progeny but the death sentence is prescribed under certain circumstances to a person 
who has unlawful sexual intercourse. In this case, progeny has been given priority over 
life due to prevalence of public interest over private interest. In this case, preservation of 
life of culprit is private interest whereas preservation of society from evil effect of 
unlawful sexual intercourse is a public interest. Islamic law, therefore, not only defines the 
nature of public interest but also gives priority to it over private interest.  
 
Before exploring the extent to which public interest under Islamic law acts as a barrier to 
convergence to western model of corporate governance it is important to see the Islamic 
view point about core issues of corporate governance discussed in this study: Agency 
Cost, Minority Shareholder Rights and Enforcement Mechanism. These three core 
corporate governance issues have the common objective that is investor protection and 
especially the minority shareholders protection. As discussed earlier, preservation of 
wealth is one of purposes of Islamic law. The preservation of wealth has two aspects: 
positive and negative. The positive aspect of preservation of wealth means that it is the 
duty of the state to provide such facilities to the individuals which are conducive for the 
growth of wealth. On the other hand, the negative impact is to provide protection to the 
wealth of the individuals. Islam provides punishment for stealing the wealth of 
others.60Therefore, investor protection is one of the basic objectives of the Islamic law.  
 
There are many instances in the primary sources of Islam which provides protection to the 
investors especially the minority stakeholders.61 Here only few are narrated to explain the 
objective of the Shariah to explain the investor protection. Qur’ān says: 
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‘And do not swallow up your property among yourselves by false means, neither 
seek to gain access thereby to the judges, so that you may swallow up a part of the 
property of men wrongfully while you know’62 
 
This verse clearly provides protection to the property rights of the others. Similarly, the 
Sunnah also provides protection to the property of the others: 
 
‘…A Muslim …does not oppress his brother nor abandon or humiliate…every 
Muslim is protected, his blood, his wealth, and honour’.63 
 
Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) has also been quoted as saying that God says: 
 
‘I am a third partner of those who form partnership; unless one of them betrays the 
other, I leave them alone’64 
 
This Sunnah indicates that one, who betrays the other partner, will lose blessings of God. 
It is also part of religious duty to be faithful to other partners in business. These references 
clearly provide that protection to the property is given high importance in the religion of 
Islam. In entrepreneurship, the weaker party is mostly at risk of being dealt unfairly, 
exploited and expropriated by the stronger party. Therefore, the focus of the Shariah is to 
provide protection to the weaker party in commercial dealings.65 
 
Investor protection has been considered as a key factor in recent research on corporate 
governance. It creates an environment which is conducive for investment and which 
encourages business activities. The whole society gets benefits in the form of better 
quality products. This also provides to the society an environment which is conducive for 
investment and provides opportunities to increase their wealth through legal business 
means. In the context of corporate governance, the protection of the investors is a public 
interest because this provides a sense of protection to the investors and they can invest 
without any fear of expropriation by the dominant party and management. This public 
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interest has been given high priority in Islamic law. Therefore, an individual is prohibited 
to pursue his / her private interest which is harmful to the society as a whole. Islamic law 
also protects the minority shareholders in entrepreneurships. These two principles clearly 
refer to the good corporate governance concept which is understood in west. Therefore, as 
to form of protection to the investors, the public interest is not in any way a barrier to 
convergence to western model of corporate governance. However, the problem is the 
mechanism to achieve this objective. As discussed earlier, Islamic law puts certain 
restrictions on the way in which businesses are to be run by the managers. Islam prohibits 
certain kind of business activities which it considered against the Shariah. The basic 
difference between the Islamic law and western law of capitalism is the way in which 
business is to be run. As far investor protection through reducing agency cost, minority 
shareholders protections and enforcement mechanism is concerned both have same 
objectives. Therefore, convergence in corporate governance to western model is possible 
subject to the condition that it is not against the fundamental principles of Islam.  
 
As to way the convergence to western model of corporate governance may take place, 
there are three principles of Islamic law which can facilitate convergence to western 
model of corporate governance. Firstly, western corporate governance features can be 
adopted that are not against the Shariah under the principle of ‘presumption of continuity’. 
Under this principle, all those features which are not against the Shariah, can be adopted 
under Islamic law even if there is no evidence under the Shariah. This will allow adopting 
any feature even if it is taken from the western system. Secondly, the features that have 
some kind of defect may be restructured in a way that they are made compatible with 
Islamic finance. The Islamic method of ‘ruses’ (hila) may help to remove this defect. 
Under this principle, if there is any defect in any feature which makes it against the 
Shariah, then this can be restructured by removing defect and can be made compatible 
with Shariah. For example, conventional Insurance and Bonds have been reconstructed in 
a way to made compatible with Islamic law. Takaful (Islamic Insurance) and Sukum 
(Islamic bonds) have been developed by the Muslim scholars to provide alternatives to 
conventional Insurance and Bonds.66 Thirdly, the features that have minor defects may be 
adopted under the principle of ‘necessity’ (darurah). Muslim jurists apply these three 
principles for providing relief to the people when there is no evidence in the primary 
sources of Islamic law. They used public interest as a basic feature in these principles for 
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the welfare of society as a whole. Therefore, public interest is not a barrier to convergence 
to western system of corporate governance rather it will facilitate convergence which 
might otherwise cause divergence in some cases. 
 
6.7 Precepts of Islamic finance 
 
Islamic finance is based on certain fundamental elements, which are as follows: 
 
6.7.1 Prohibition on riba (‘interest’)  
 
Prohibition on riba is a basic precept of Islamic finance. It is the basic principle that 
differentiates the Western financial system from Islamic finance.67 Riba is considered 
exploitive in nature and, therefore, causes injustice to one or both the parties.68  
  
6.7.2 Avoiding uncertainty (or speculation or chance)69  
 
Uncertainty is a wide term which may take different forms such as uncertainty in the 
contract itself or the subject matter.70 The objective of this prohibition is fair play, which 
means all parties to a transaction are well informed before entering into the transaction. In 
essence, it prohibits conventional insurance, future sales, credit transactions, gambling, 
and speculative and future trading in the market. However, there are some exceptions to 
the general rule of prohibition on future trading where the subject matter does not exist or 
is uncertain, for example, salam (‘credit sale’) and istisna (‘manufacturing contract’) are 
allowed on the basis of social necessity.71 
  
6.7.3 ‘Profit and loss’ sharing or risk sharing 
 
‘Profit and loss’ sharing is another important aspect of Islamic finance. Islam requires that 
all parties to a transaction should take part in an activity where the risk is shared. If risk is 
undertaken by one party, then may it be an injustice to the party who takes the risk.72  
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6.7.4  Asset-backed transactions 
 
Avoiding uncertainty requires that a financial transaction be backed by identified and 
tangible assets. When financial transactions are backed by assets uncertainty in 
transactions may be removed and real economic activity may be developed. 
 
6.7.5  Prohibition on certain business activities  
 
Islamic finance is based on ethics. Therefore, it prohibits all business activities that are 
considered immoral and harmful to society, such as gambling, pornography and alcohol.73  
 
6.8 Schools of interpretation in the Muslim world 
 
There are five basic schools of interpretation of legal rules in the Islamic world. They 
involve different methodologies of interpretation. The basic difference among them is the 
recognition of sources of Islamic law which affect the rules of interpretation. These 
schools spread all over the world for local, historical, occupational and political reasons. 
This gave rise to different faiths, which causes differences among Muslims all over the 
world and has divided Muslims socially and politically.74 
 
6.8.1 Shia School 
 
The Shia school is based on political differences among Muslims. The followers of this 
school are found in Iraq, Iran, the Gulf States,75 India and Pakistan.76 As regards the 
interpretation of legal rules, they do not consider secondary sources as valid sources of 
Islamic law.77  
 
6.8.2 Hanafi School 
 
The Hanafi School dominates in the Muslim world. The followers of this school comprise 
almost one third of the total Muslim world. The majority are found in South Asia, 
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including Pakistan and India; the Middle East; and Central Asia.78 Their methodology of 
interpretation revolves around logic.79 They prefer analogy over the opinion of 
companions (qawl al-sahabi) as a source of Islamic law.80  
 
6.8.3 Maliki School 
 
This school was founded in the city of Medina. The followers of this school are mostly 
found in Eastern Arabia, and North, Central and West Africa. The distinctive feature of 
interpretation of this school is that they prefer the practice of the people of Medina 
(custom found in Medina) over qiyas (‘analogy’). They also consider maslahah mursalah 
(‘extended analogy’) and opinions of companions as valid sources of Islamic law.81  
 
6.8.4 Shafi School  
 
The founder of this school was a pupil of Imam Malik, a founder of the Maliki School. 
The followers of this school are considered modernist and have discussed the Sunnah 
more critically than other schools. 82 The reason for such an approach might be to remain 
within the ambit of the Qur’ān as long as possible. They also do not accept maslahah 
mursalah (‘extended analogy’), opinion of companions (qawl al-sahabi) and istihsan 
(‘juristic preference’) as valid sources of Islamic law.83 Followers are mostly found in 
South East Asia and Saudi Arabia.84  
 
6.8.5 Hanbali School 
 
This school is considered traditionalist and has strict views regarding the interpretation of 
the law. They are mostly found in Saudi Arabia.85 However, the majority of Saudi 
Arabians are followers of the Shafi School. The Hanbali School considers analogy (qiyas) 
as a last resort in order to arrive at a conclusion.86 
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6.9  The nature of Islamic law 
 
Islamic law is developed by jurists and scholars of Islamic law. The role of the state is to 
enact the laws in the light of jurists’ and scholars’ interpretation of primary and secondary 
sources of Islamic law.87 This is also visible in the context of Pakistan where legislation is 
subject to scrutiny by the superior courts. As the nature of the Pakistani constitution is 
Islamic, different bodies have therefore been established to guide the state to check the 
compatibility of the existing laws as well as new legislation according to the Shariah.88  
 
Jurists develop Islamic law from its primary sources such as the Qur’ān and Sunnah. The 
Quean is unique all over the world. However, it provides only general principles but no 
detail on each and every matter. The Sunnah provides details of the general principles 
provided in the Qur’ān. The problem with the Sunnah is its compilation after the death of 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). His death led to the creation of many fabricated 
Sunnahs. Early jurists tried to compile the Sunnah but ambiguity remained with regard to 
its authenticity. Therefore, each Sunnah has force according to its authenticity.  
 
Political and social factors also divided Muslims soon after the death of the Prophet, 
which led to the establishment of different schools of interpretation.89 Different schools 
were established in different parts of the world at different points in time and have 
different interpretational rules for deriving Islamic law. As far as acceptance of primary 
sources of Islamic law is concerned, there is no difference of opinion but for secondary 
sources there is difference of opinion among the different schools. Acceptance of one 
source by one school may be rejected by another. Another problem area is giving 
importance to one source of Islamic law over another. This may lead to differences of 
opinion in developing Islamic law in general and acceptance of features of Islamic finance 
in particular. Therefore, divergence may be visible in the existing scenario in the Muslim 
world.  
 
Some modern jurists have introduced different methodologies to establish consensus 
among the Muslim world. These methodologies include ‘choice and selection’ (iktiyar and 
takhayyur), ‘amalgamation or patching’ (talfiq), ‘necessity’ (darurah) and ‘ruses’ (hila).90 
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In the ‘choice and selection’ methodology, a contemporary jurist of one school may refer 
suitable evidence from another school to arrive at some conclusion. In the ‘amalgamation 
or patching’ methodology, a jurist may combine different rulings from other schools to 
arrive at a conclusion. ‘Necessity’ is an important principle of Islamic law which allows 
otherwise prohibited acts in cases of dire need; for instance, pork and wine are strictly 
prohibited in Islam but when it is a question of saving a Muslim’s life, then they are 
allowed to the extent of saving the life only. So, in a similar fashion, ‘necessity’ can also 
be used in financial matters to allow disapproved acts in cases of dire need; for example, 
debt may be allowed but in dire need only. ‘Ruses’ is a methodology in which any 
transaction, which is otherwise prohibited, may be constructed in such a manner so as to 
avoid prohibition;91 for example, modern jurists have constructed Islamic insurance. 
 
Istishab or ibahah (‘presumption of continuity’) is an important source of Islamic law 
which may be used to legitimize Western laws transmitted to colonial nations such as 
Pakistan. The spirit of this principle is that every contract, rule or feature of corporate 
governance will be considered permissible by default and only explicit prohibition from 
the Shariah will make it void.92 Nyazee argues that ‘the principle of Istishab requires that 
the continuance of a rule is conditional upon the fact that it was originally established by 
the evidence from the Shariah’93 He further argues that an existing law should not be 
allowed merely on the presumption that it is not against the Shariah. This is a very strict 
approach and may create problems in developing corporate governance. The very spirit of 
Islamic law is to check conformity with the injunctions of Islam. Habib also 
acknowledged this fact.94 Therefore, there seems no reason to accept Western legal rules if 
they are not against the injunctions of Islam. A strict approach followed by classical and 
some modern jurists may cause divergence even within the Muslim world.  
  
6.10 Shariah-compliant products 
 
Jurists involved in Islamic finance have developed different modes of financing keeping in 
mind the basic ingredients of Islamic law. Here the discussion is limited to those forms 
that are directly related to corporate governance.  
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6.10.1 Musharakah (‘Partnership’) 
 
The word musharakah is derived from the Arabic word shirkah which means ‘sharing’95 
or ‘becoming partners’.96 This may be used as an ideal alternative to interest-bearing debt 
financing.97 However, there is disagreement between classical jurists regarding the correct 
definition of the term musharakah. In simple terms, musharakah is like a kind of 
partnership in the Western system of finance.98 It may also be termed a company subject to 
the condition that Islamic law recognizes its fictitious legal personality and limited 
liability, which are main features of the modern form of a company.99  
 
The musharakah comes into existence by mutual contract between all parties involved. 
The objective is to conduct business where the parties have certain rights and liabilities.100 
As far as the rights and liabilities of the parties are concerned, there is disagreement 
between classical jurists. The Maliki and Shafi schools consider the distribution of profit 
strictly according to the ratio of investment made by the parties. The Hanbali School 
prefers contractual agreement between parties for the distribution of profit. The Hanafi is 
school has an intermediate view that relies on the role of the partners in the business.101 
The Maliki and Shafi view does not seem appropriate as this practice may discourage 
entrepreneurs in business activities who are more active and contribute more in the 
business by way of their skills, efforts, knowledge and experience. This contractual 
agreement may be a useful methodology as it may encourage partners with expertise and 
skills to run the business. Partners who are more active and contribute more in the form of 
skills, efforts, experience and knowledge may be allocated a higher percentage of the 
profits compared to those who are not active and skilful.  
 
However, there is no disagreement with regard to sharing in business losses. According to 
them, every partner will share in a loss strictly according to his or her investment.102 This 
view needs some consideration by modern jurists. A point to be considered is that if profit 
can be contractual, then why not the loss? If some partners get more shares from profit 
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because they are more active and take business decisions, they should also take more 
responsibility for losses. The sharing of profit and loss on equal footing may be more 
helpful for business development.  
 
As far as the nature of capital is concerned, again there is disagreement between classical 
Muslim jurists. Some favour money and exclude commodities as capital. However, others 
favour any kind of capital, including exclusively money or commodities or a mixture of 
both.103 In modern business forms there seems no reason to exclude commodities as an 
alternative to capital because it is much easier now to evaluate the market price of any 
commodity.  
 
As far as the management in musharakah is concerned, a general rule of Islamic finance 
developed by the jurists is that the management in musharakah will be shared by all the 
partners. However, one or more partners may be sleeping partners, in which case their 
share in profit will not exceed the ratio of their investment.104 
 
The termination of musharakah may be in the same way in which the modern form of 
partnership is terminated. As far as the question of the continuity of musharakah is 
concerned, there is no guideline in classical Islamic jurisprudence on excluding those 
partners who are not willing to carry on the business and want to withdraw their 
investment. However, modern scholars are of the view that since huge business 
investment normally calls for continuity of business, this can be done on the basis of the 
nature of the business conducted in modern times. So, if any partner is not willing to carry 
on the business, his or her investment and share of profit, if any, accrued until his 
disinvestment may be returned.105 This supports the idea of establishing a modern form of 
a company that can handle huge investment with multiple forms of investments and 
frequent transfer of investment without liquidating the company.  
 
6.10.2 Mudarabah (‘Partnership’) 
 
Mudarabah is another form of doing business in Islamic finance. In mudarabah the capital 
is invested by one party while the business is conducted by another party. The first party 
only contributes capital and does not participate in the management, whereas the second 
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party does not invest in, but carries on, the business. The first party is called rabb ul-mal 
(‘investor’), whereas the second party is called mudarib (‘the manager’).106 The ratio of 
profit is determined in advance by the mutual consent of the parties. Islamic law does not 
prescribe any fixed profit.107 If both parties invest money, this will not be a mudarabah 
business it will amount to a musharakah business. In a mudarabah business, loss of the 
investor is monitory, whereas the manager loses potential benefits that he or she might 
have obtained had the business earned profit. The loss of the manager is, therefore, in 
terms of his or her loss in efforts and skills. The liability of the investor is limited to the 
extent of his or her share in the business.108 Therefore, a mudarabah business is like a 
modern form of partnership with limited liability where an investor is a sleeping partner. 
The only difference between it and a modern form of partnership is that the manager is not 
an investor. Even in modern forms of partnership, the law of partnership does not prohibit 
some of the partners from investing. Such partners may contribute their skills, expertise 
and knowledge, and thereby share in the profit. The only problem will be in sharing in 
losses. However, this can be resolved through contractual arrangement. Mansoori writes 
that mudarabah may also be equated with the Western form of a company as under 
Islamic law there is no difference between a partnership and a company.109 However, 
again, the question is acceptance of the separate legal personality and limited liability in 
Islamic law which are the main ingredients of the company under the Western form of a 
company.  
 
As a general rule, the liability of the investor is limited to the extent of his or her share in 
the business but if he or she had allowed the manager to incur debts on his or her behalf, 
then his or her liability will be unlimited. The manager is also supposed to work with the 
due care and diligence that is normally required for that kind of business. If, however, he 
or she fails to exercise due care and diligence, then he or she is accountable for his or her 
misconduct.110  
 
It is possible to combine both mudarabah and musharakah business in one contract. In 
this scheme, some parties only invest money without the right to take part in management, 
and some investors and non-investors are involved in the management. In this case a 
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business will be run as a combination of both mudarabah and musharakah.111 This is like 
a modern, complex form of a company where some investors and some non-investors run 
the company, whereas others are only investors without taking active part in the 
management. 
 
6.10.3 Salam (‘Advance payment’) 
 
Islamic law prohibits selling something that does not exist or is possessed by someone or 
whose delivery is uncertain. This rule is based on the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him) which says, ‘do not sell which you do not possess’. However, a salam 
contract is an exception to the general principle of Islamic law. This is allowed bearing in 
mind the social needs of farmers and traders but with certain conditions. In a salam 
contract the seller agrees to sell specified goods to a buyer. The payment must be made in 
advance in full and on the spot, whereas delivery of the commodity is deferred. To avoid 
conflict, a salam contract is allowed only in those commodities whose quality, quantity 
and identity can be determined or whose supply is certain. The objective is to avoid 
uncertainty and conflicts, for example, a salam contract can be entered into for the sale of 
wheat, flour or rice. To some jurists, domestic animals can also be the subject of such a 
contract provided it is determined by specification and identification. As far as the 
presence of the commodity is concerned, it must be in existence both at the time of the 
contract and at the time of delivery. However, some jurists follow a liberal interpretation 
and say that a commodity that is habitually available at the time of delivery may be a valid 
subject of a contract.112 The Shariah also prohibits concluding a salam contract involving 
those commodities that it requires to be delivered on the spot, for example, the exchange 
of currencies.113 For the exchange of currencies, there is a separate contract of sale 
regulated by Islamic law as discussed below.  
 
6.10.4 Sarf (‘Money exchange’)  
 
Under Islamic law money can be used as a medium of exchange and measure of value 
only. It cannot be used as a commodity for business purposes. Money exchange is allowed 
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only with certain conditions to avoid an element of riba.114 As a general rule, money 
cannot be sold for money but, as an exception, money exchange is allowed under certain 
conditions. This is like the conventional exchange of money with one basic difference 
which is the prohibition on an element of riba. The exchange of money under Islamic law 
has to follow two basic conditions prescribed by the Shariah. First, if both currencies are 
the same, then they must be exchanged in equal quantity and on spot. If there is either 
inequality or delay from one side, it will amount to riba, which is not allowed. Second, if 
the currencies are different, then equality is not required but a spot transaction is 
necessary. Delay from any side will attract prohibited riba which is also not allowed.115  
 
6.10.5  Sukuk (‘Islamic or revenue bonds’) 
 
Sukuk or Islamic bonds are new products in Islamic finance. This product seems to have 
been introduced to provide an alternative to bonds issued by conventional finance. ‘Sukuk 
are the certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible 
assets, usufruct and services or (in the ownership of) the assets of particular projects or 
special investment activity’.116 Bondholders are entitled to claim financial rights attached 
to these bonds. In conventional finance the bonds are issued representing debt certificates 
which mature after a certain period, with interest. Sukuk, however, are not debt 
instruments. They are a kind of equity investment. The objective is to avoid the 
prohibition imposed by the Shariah regarding interest. These bonds resemble mudarabah 
business but this is a special kind of mudarabah investment in which an existing company 
raises funds for an economic activity other than its normal running business, for instance, 
to build a bridge, tunnel or tool plaza or even to invest in securities. Investors (rabb-ul-
mal) purchase bonds and the company acts as the manager (mudarib). After completion of 
the project, the profit is shared according to the predetermined ratio. It is also sometimes 
provided in the contract, though non-bindingly, that these bonds may be retired in future 
before the maturity date at the market price but payment may be made periodically out of 
the profits of the manager (mudarib) in stages.117 
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6.10.6 Takaful (‘Islamic insurance’)  
 
Insurance is also a new industry in Islamic finance. It is the fastest-growing sector of the 
global insurance market. Insurance is an alternative to conventional finance and is based 
on the Shariah concept of ‘mutuality and co-operation’.118 This concept in Islamic law is 
different from conventional finance for two reasons. First, in conventional finance 
uncertainty is inherent in the insurance contract, which is strictly prohibited in Islamic 
law. Second, insurance companies employ funds in interest-bearing investments, which is 
also not allowed under Islamic law.  
 
Muslim jurists disagree on whether or not insurance is permitted under Islamic law. Some 
jurists allow this contract for two reasons. First, they state that insurance can be allowed 
provided it is not composed of a bilateral agreement as this will contain excessive amounts 
of uncertainty. To avoid this uncertainty, an insurance company can be a multilateral 
institution in which all members contribute funds in the form of instalments. This 
charitable collective enterprise helps those who form part of it in case of any casualty or 
loss to any member. This help will be considered a gift from fellow members. However, 
uncertainty will remain even in a collective enterprise but it can be tolerated on the basis 
of gratuitous acts over uncertainty. Second, the funds should be invested only in an 
Islamic way of financing.119 This contract is gaining acceptance among jurists, therefore, 
Islamic financial institutions employ takaful contracts in their operations.120 However, 
there is still a need for further research and consensus on its operations under Islamic law. 
 
6.11 The concept of a company under Islamic law 
 
Musharakah and mudarabah under Islamic law resembles a partnership in conventional 
finance. However, musharakah and mudarabah can be equated with the Western form of a 
company, provided all basic characteristics of a company are also acceptable under 
Islamic law. The acceptance of the concept of a company under Islamic law is significant 
because it may resolve many problems involving finance under Islamic law.  
Kraakman et al. describe five basic characteristics of a company: (1) legal personality, (2) 
limited liability, (3) transferable shares, (4) centralized management under a board 
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structure and (5) investor ownership.121 These features can be tested with Islamic forms of 
business organizations.  
 
6.11.1 Legal personality  
 
Legal personality means the existence of an entity that is separate from its members. It can 
sue and be sued in a court of law. It can own and transfer property in its own name. It can 
delegate powers to agents and can also enter into contracts in its own name. Though all 
these functions are performed by the directors on behalf of the company, the company is 
liable for these acts unless directors act beyond their powers. This legal personality 
concept is, in fact, entity shielding, which means that it protects the assets of the company 
from the creditors of the owners.122 According to classical jurists of Islamic law, there is 
no concept of a fictitious legal entity. Under Islamic law, the objective of any legal person 
is to perform duties as well as to worship. Since a fictitious legal entity cannot worship, 
these jurists did not recognize this entity under Islamic law.123 Usmani believes that the 
concept of a fictitious legal personality, as is understood in the West, was not known to 
classical jurists. Though they did not discuss it, they were aware of the concept. He writes 
that the classical jurists considered and treated waqf (‘trust’), bait-al-mall (‘exchequer of 
the Islamic state) and the joint stock of different investors as separate entities.124 
Therefore, a fictitious personality concept in the form of a company is not against Islamic 
law. This can also be rationalized under the Islamic principle of ibahah (‘presumption of 
continuity’). Under this principle, as the concept of creating a legal entity is not against the 
Shariah, it may be allowed under Islamic law.125 Nyazee considers that the only reason for 
creating a corporation under the Islamic concept may be to provide a social device for the 
growth of the wealth of the Muslim community as a whole.126 This may be one ground for 
creating a company but this is a very restricted approach. The objective of the Shariah is 
not just the growth of wealth. Had the growth of wealth been the basic objective of the 
Shariah, then other sources of creating money, such as interest and debt, might also have 
been allowed under Islamic law. There may be more appropriate grounds to create a 
company under Islamic law, other than the growth of the Muslim community’s wealth. 
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The principle of darrurah (‘necessity’), such as modern business requirements, the 
welfare of society, the continuity of big business enterprises, economic growth and the 
principle of ibahah (‘presumption of continuity’) are more appropriate grounds for 
creating a company under Islamic law.  
 
6.11.2 Limited liability  
 
Limited liability is an important characteristic of the modern form of a company. Under 
this concept, the liability of the equity holders is limited to their investment in the 
company or guarantee given by them to contribute towards the assets of the company at 
the time of winding up. This is, in fact, owner shielding which protects the assets of the 
shareholders from the creditors of the company.127 Acceptance of the limited liability of a 
fictitious legal personality is important under Islamic law. Usmani writes that the classical 
jurists were aware of the limited liability but this concept was not associated with a 
fictitious person. As far as limited liability of a natural person is concerned, Usmani gives 
the example of a deceased natural person who dies indebted. In this case the creditors of 
the deceased cannot claim from the family of the deceased more than what was left by the 
deceased. The creditor can claim only what is left by the deceased. This shows acceptance 
of the concept of personal liability of a natural person by Islamic law. On the same 
grounds, this concept can be extended to an artificial legal person.128  
 
Modern jurists consider limited liability according to the Shariah using the same 
reasoning as for accepting the concept of a corporation. Therefore, it may be allowed 
keeping in mind the needs of modern financing. The separation of ownership and 
management necessitates limited liability of the investors. The liability created by the 
management, more than what has been invested, may restrict the public from making an 
equity investment in corporations. Furthermore, the involvement of the general public and 
freely transferable shares are other reasons for the introduction of limited liability. If 
Islamic law does not allow limited liability, then big projects that require large-scale 
public investment may not be feasible. However, as far as creditors’ rights are concerned, 
Usmani writes that this concept needs more ijtihad in view of the potential dangers for the 
creditors.129 This concern about creditors’ interest may not be as strong as it appears. 
Modern finance, as well as Islamic finance, provides more security to the creditors than 
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the shareholders. Islamic law will give the creditors priority over the owners in cases of 
liquidation of companies. This premise is based on the priority rights of the creditors of 
the deceased natural person over the heirs in the inheritance at the death of the debtor. 
Another important point in this regard is that Islamic law allows creditors to take collateral 
from debtors. Therefore, limited liability cannot be a potential threat to the creditors as far 
as their security is concerned. Vogel acknowledges this concept of limited liability under 
Islamic law by providing a solution to the problem. He writes that Islamic finance may 
limit the ratio of debts to the equity of the company and may also allow vigorous piercing 
of the corporate veil in cases of excess loans taken by the managers.130  
 
There is also disagreement on the extent of the application of limited liability of 
companies under Islamic finance. Usmani considers that as limited liability is injurious to 
creditors, it should be allowed only in public companies. He asserts that the public cannot 
be held responsible for the day-to-day affairs conducted by the management. He further 
suggests that this should not be allowed in private companies and partnerships. According 
to him, an exception can be extended to those shareholders or partners who are not 
involved in the management of companies or partnerships respectively. The rest of the 
members will be responsible for unlimited liability. He further explains that the objective 
to restrict limited liability to public companies and sleeping partners is to avoid the 
cheating of investors and creditors.131 There does not seem to be any cheating if all the 
stakeholders, including the creditors, are aware of the fact that the liability of the company 
is limited. They should also be vigilant about the financial position of the company while 
advancing loans or credit to a company. Similarly, allowing limited liability only to large 
public companies vis-à-vis the interests of the creditors is not justifiable as this interest 
may be more exposed in big public companies than in small companies. Large companies 
have huge capital investments, and large numbers of shareholders and creditors. This 
situation may be more dangerous than in small companies where assets and liabilities can 
be determined more easily than in large public companies. So, public interest and welfare 
necessitate extending limited liability to small companies and partnerships as well. This 
concept may not be against the principles of the Shariah and may be allowed keeping in 
mind the welfare of the nation and the principle of ibahah. Nyazee also favours extending 
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the concept of limited liability to all forms of business enterprises. 132 He writes that if the 
concept is beneficial to large-scale investors, then it should be beneficial to sole 
proprietors, partnerships and companies, including both private and public companies. 
This will allow small investors an opportunity to do business that includes the benefit of 
limited liability.  
 
6.11.3 Transferable shares 
 
A transferable share is also a basic characteristic of the modern form of business 
corporation that distinguishes a company from partnerships and other forms of enterprises. 
It means an interest in a company is fully transferable without interruption in the business. 
However, some restrictions may be imposed in private companies, where the transfer of 
interest remains within the limited group of persons or subject to approval of the board of 
directors.133 This concept can also function in Islamic finance if interests in enterprises are 
securitized. Islamic finance does not prohibit converting interests in business 
organizations such as musharakah and mudarabah into small units that represent the ratio 
of investment in the business.134 As musharakah is a kind of investment where investors 
may have limited liability and the right of participation in the management, shares in 
musharakah will represent shares with voting rights. Voting rights provide the right to 
participate in the affairs of the company which is a basic requirement for a musharakah 
form of business. However, securitization in mudarabah would be like the shares of a 
company with limited liability without voting rights. As the nature of mudarabah business 
is such that investors do not have the right to participate in the management, therefore, 
shares in mudarabah will be without voting rights. The rights of management remain with 
the manager who does not invest. A combination of musharakah and mudarabah is 
allowed under Islamic law; a company may issue some shares with voting rights and some 
shares without voting rights. Therefore, according to Islamic law, there is no harm in 
securitizing investments in musharakah and mudarabah or a combination of both into 
shares that are tradable in the secondary market. The general public can invest through the 
purchase of shares on the stock market and may get profit and can take part in the 
decision-making by the right of vote attached to these shares. They can also sell their 
shares once they want to disinvest from the company. The seller may incur a capital gain 
or capital loss depending upon the performance of the company. In an ideal market the 
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price of a share is directly connected to the real value that represents the assets of the 
company. If the company is earning profit, then this may increase the assets of the 
company and the share price. However, if it is not performing, then the value of assets 
may decrease and, consequently, the price of the shares may also decrease. Investors may 
get profit either in the form of a dividend or capital gain and may also share loss in the 
form of capital decrease. This will fulfil the Shariah requirement of sharing in profits and 
losses. The market and good governance mechanism will play a major role in this process.  
 
The issuance of preference shares under Islamic law is debatable. Nyazee asserts that the 
issuance of preference shares is not against Islamic law. He explains that if the preference 
shareholders are contracted to a 12% dividend and the board decides on a 15% dividend 
for ordinary shareholders, then the extra 3% can be retained to provide a cushion for 
payment of dividends to preference shareholders for the next years.135 This interpretation 
clearly shows a misunderstanding of the nature of preference shares in the modern form of 
a company. This presumption does not seem to fulfil the requirements of Islamic law due 
to the nature of preference shares. Preference shares are normally of four categories. The 
first category is preference in the profit of the company over ordinary shareholders by 
inserting a condition in the contract that the preference shareholders will be paid a 
dividend at a fixed rate. The second category is where preference shareholders may have 
enhanced voting rights over ordinary shares. The third category is where preference 
shareholders enjoy preference in the capital return at the time of winding up or reduction 
of share capital.136 In the fourth category the nature of some preference shares may also 
contain a condition that if the profit is not paid out in one particular year, but that the same 
amount will be accumulated for the next year and so on unless fully paid. These are called 
accumulative preference shares. The question here is whether Islamic law allows fixed 
return. As far as the fixing of the ratio of profit of any business is concerned, there seems 
to be no prohibition, for example, suppose A and B start a business with £10,000 and 
£20,000 respectively and agree on 30:70 profit ratios. A may be a sleeping partner and B 
an active partner to carry on the business. This may not be problematic for Islamic law as 
profit ratio is quite legal in Islamic law. However, if the parties stipulate that A will get 
30% of his investment, A’s investment will amount to a debt to B at 30% interest. In 
preference shares the stipulation of a condition that the parties will get a fixed rate of 
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return that is directly related to the ratio of their investment and not to the ratio of profit, 
amounts to a kind of debt. However, if a condition in the contract stipulates that the 
preference shareholder will get 30% of the profit of the business, this may be a valid 
condition. No doubt, a declaration of a dividend is related to the realization of profit but 
fixing of a profit ratio to the parties’ investment is like a debt to the company with interest.  
Sometimes a company may yield such an amount of profit that could only satisfy the 
claims of the preference shareholders and the ordinary shareholders get nothing. If a 
dividend paid to preference shareholders is fixed to some ratio to profit earned by the 
company, it may be an Islamic mode of financing. As regards the second type of 
preference shares, namely of giving enhanced voting rights, as discussed earlier, there 
seems to be no problem under Islamic law. The third kind of preference share, namely of 
giving preference over capital return vis-à-vis ordinary shareholders at the time of the 
reduction of capital or winding up resembles preference shares with debt security. This 
kind of investment through preference shares is a kind of debt to the company. The fourth 
category of preference shares, namely accumulating profit for subsequent years in cases 
where company fails to pay dividend resembles preference shares with debt security.  
Therefore, the issuance of preference shares may not be in accordance with the Islamic 
mode of financing.  
 
The problem with preference shares is the nature of preference shares themselves. The 
rights attached to preference shares are based on the contract, regulations of the company 
and court decisions in common law jurisdictions. Most of the problems of preference 
shares stem from the absence of clear provisions as regards the rights attached to these 
shares. No doubt, preference shareholders have certain advantages over ordinary 
shareholders but it is quite possible that they are at a disadvantage in certain cases. For 
instance, preference shareholders may be at a disadvantage as compared to ordinary 
shareholders in cases of surplus profit at the time of winding up or the declaration of more 
profit to ordinary shareholders than fixed profit paid to preference shareholders. 
Preference shareholders are also normally at a disadvantage in relation to other debt 
security holders in the absence of express provisions to the contrary. Debenture holders, 
for instance, normally have charge over the assets of the company and also priority of 
capital return at the time of winding up. Therefore, debenture holders have an advantage 
over preference shareholders. These abnormalities can be resolved only by equating 
preference shareholders with debenture holders or fixed income securities. The other 
option may be to clearly define the rights attached to these shares as preferred in respect of 
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dividends or participating shares in respect of voting rights.137 These problems may limit 
external finance through preference shares. However, this may be resolved by constructing 
preference shares in a way that can attract external finance.  
 
Preference shares can also be constructed in Islamic finance within the limits prescribed 
by the Shariah. The Shariah does not prohibit variation in the percentage of a share in 
profit. This could be any proportion of profit, irrespective of the share in the investment, 
as long as the contract is drafted in accordance with requirements of Shariah. One option 
may be that the preference shareholders are given a higher rate of profit than the ordinary 
shareholders, for instance, this could be provided in the terms of the preference shares, 
namely that the holders of these shares will be given 10% more profit than ordinary 
shareholders. Furthermore, for instance, whenever ordinary shareholders are paid a profit 
at a rate of 20%, the preference shareholders will get 30% shares in dividends. Another 
option may be that the terms of the preference shares may be constructed in this way that 
if preference shareholders and ordinary shareholders have 10: 90 ratios in equity, then the 
share in profit may be fixed at 20% for preference shareholders and 80% for ordinary 
shareholders. This will not violate the conditions of the Shariah.  
 
However, as the condition of giving preference shareholders priority in liquidation 
violates a Shariah requirement, the preference shareholders must share in the loss of the 
company according to their investment or contractual rights and duties (if allowed under 
Islamic law). Preferences shares may, therefore, be issued under Islamic finance provided 
the above conditions are met. Vogel acknowledges that preference shares that are issued in 
terms of conventional finance are against Islamic norms. He suggests that preference 
shareholders may be given more dividend rights as compared to ordinary shareholders 
subject to their sacrificing rights in the management. According to him, the preference 
shares can be issued with enhanced dividend rights but without voting rights attached to 
them.138 However, there seems no reason to object to the issuance of preference shares that 
have voting rights with enhanced dividend rights.  
 
As to trading in shares under Islamic finance, there does not seem to be a prohibition 
under Islamic law. However, this is permissible under certain conditions. Some jurists put 
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a condition on the trading of shares of a company to the general public.139 They argue that 
the shares of a public company can be traded among the general public. However, it is 
necessary that the company owns some non-liquid assets before starting to trade the shares 
in the market. The OIC Academy has also approved the trading of shares for those 
companies in which the value of real assets is greater than cash and debts. The reason is 
that if all the assets of the company are in liquid form, then shares will represent money 
and, according to Islamic law, money cannot be traded for money except when it is 
exchanged in equal amount and on the spot.140 This condition may not be a problem under 
Islamic law as provision may be made in company law for the shares of the company to be 
transferable when some of its assets are in non-liquid form.  
 
6.11.4 Delegated management with board structure 
 
In the modern form of corporations, as it is not feasible to invite all the members to make 
day-to-day business decisions, the power of making decisions is delegated to the board of 
directors, who are elected periodically, exclusively or primarily by the shareholders.141 
There appears to be no reason why this cannot be done under Islamic finance. Islamic law 
allows the delegation of management to certain persons nominated by the owners; for 
example, mudarabah allows managers to carry on with the business excluding the 
investors. Similarly, under musharakah business, there may be sleeping partners who are 
not involved in the business affairs. So, a board structure with delegated management is 
very much Islamic. 
 
6.11.5 Investor ownership 
 
Investor ownership under conventional finance has two aspects: (1) the right to participate 
in the management and (2) the right to participate in the net earnings of the corporation. 
The right to participate in the management means the right to contest the election of a 
director, the right to exercise voting powers to elect the board of directors and the right to 
participate in major decisions of the company. The right to participate in the net earnings 
in the corporation means to share in the profit and claim residual earnings.142 Both these 
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rights have exceptions as well, for instance, the right to participate in the management 
may be restricted when the company issues shares without voting rights. Similarly, the 
right to participate in the profit may be restricted when the company is formed to carry on 
a charity or co-operative objects. As discussed earlier, investor ownership is a basic 
characteristic of business corporations under Islamic law. Therefore, Islamic law does not 
prohibit the investor ownership requirement of the modern form of a company.  
 
Therefore, the formation of the modern form of a company is not prohibited under Islamic 
law. However, there may be some restrictions on the activities of the company under 
Islamic law.  
 
6.12 Functioning of a company under Islamic law 
 
As discussed earlier, the modern form of a company can conduct business with the Islamic 
mode of financing and its shares can be traded in the market. However, a major difference 
between the conventional form of a company and Islamic finance is the restriction of the 
activities under Islamic law. Islamic law does not allow certain kinds of activities that are 
otherwise allowed under the Western model. These activities include, but are not limited 
to, businesses involving the production of alcohol, opium and pork; gambling; 
pornography; and other immoral businesses. Some other business activities, such as 
interests, uncertainty and future trading in shares, are also not allowed under Islamic 
finance. 
 
In a system that is not pure Islamic or where two parallel systems are operating, it will 
hardly be possible for a company, operating under Islamic finance, to keep out of interest-
bearing transactions because the company has to deal with financial institutions, banks and 
other companies involved in interests-bearing transactions. Therefore, companies that 
operate under Islamic finance may involve some kind of activities based on interest-
bearing transactions. Therefore, a part of the profit of the company may also represent 
interest-baring profit which, under the strict prohibition on interest under Islamic finance, 
is not allowed. Usmani has proposed a way out to avoid such interest-bearing profit.143 He 
writes that suppose a company has declared a dividend but the company has accrued most 
of its profit through Shariah-compliant businesses but some of its profit is earned through 
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interest-bearing transaction. The shareholders must segregate such proportion of the 
dividend that is earned by the company through the interest-bearing transaction. To avoid 
interest, the amount of profit that represents interest must be given to a charity. This will 
purify the profit from the interest. However, as regards purification of the capital gain, 
there is divergence of opinion. Some jurists consider that a portion of the capital gain 
should also be given to charity as a portion of the company’s assets may represent assets 
obtained through interest-bearing transaction. However, other jurists are of the view that 
there is no need to purify capital gain as the majority of the assets of the company are 
composed of legitimate business and only a negligible portion is composed of interest-
bearing profit.144 If this plea is good for the capital gain, then the same may also be 
applied to the dividend. However, implementing pure faith requires avoiding such kinds of 
earnings. Therefore, corporate governance requires from the firms operating under Islamic 
finance to disclose separately the amount and percentage of profit earned through interest-
bearing transactions.  
 
Islamic financial institutions use musharakah and mudarabah as modes of financing 
which are alternatives to interest-based financing. Islamic financial institutions establish 
Shariah boards to guide them to check whether a particular mode of financing is 
according to the Shariah. The Sharaih boards consist of Muslim scholars who 
synchronized Western forms of financing and the Islamic mode of financing. However, 
the problem is that there are differences of opinion in their own ranks regarding 
compliance with these modern modes of financing according to the Shariah. The reason is 
that they belong to different schools of interpretation, which results in the differences of 
opinion. Members of Shariah boards never make uniform or absolute decisions as they 
sometimes take back their earlier decisions.145 This causes divergence in Islamic finance 
within the Muslim world.  
 
As the creation of a company is a relatively new concept in Islamic finance, there is a 
scarcity of investor protection mechanisms. The kind of protection available to investors 
that is commensurate with Western forms of rights and protection can encourage an 
Islamic mode of financing. The Islamic method of interpretation of ijtihad can help to 
provide investors with such protection.146 The reason for the absence of such investor 
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protection is that Islamic finance has shown its presence quite recently. Most of the 
Islamic law developed in the early periods of Islam when the modern techniques of 
financing were not developed. Therefore, classical jurists were not aware of the 
contemporary techniques of financing which developed during the previous century. The 
other reason is that Muslim countries remained under the influence of Western powers due 
to colonization. These countries adopted the Western model of legal, regulatory, financial 
and governance mechanisms after independence. This might be the main reason for the 
stagnancy of Islamic finance in the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in particular. 
However, during the past century the situation was changing. The financial crisis all over 
the world during the last part of the previous century stimulated the introduction of an 
alternative model of financing. Islamic finance, which was not practised in modern times, 
is considered to have the potential to show its presence and to solve problems. Research 
has also been carried out in the West regarding the scope and potential of Islamic finance. 
In recent times modern jurists have been giving due attention to Islamic modes of 
financing.  
 
6.13 Definition of riba (‘interest’) 
 
The literal meaning of the term riba is ‘excess’.147 However, it is difficult to define the 
term in its technical meaning. This difficulty lies in the history of Islamic law and the 
same is still prominent among Muslim jurists.148 Riba is considered analogous to the 
modern concept of interest but, technically, it has wider implications.149 It signifies excess 
not only in loan and debt transactions, but also in that found in barter trades. The rules of 
riba have been derived from the Qur’ān and Sunnah. In this context it can be divided into 
two kinds. 
 
6.13.1 Riba al-Qur’ān (riba al-nasiah or riba by delay) 
 
Nasiah literally means ‘delay’. This is found in transactions of loans with interest. A 
creditor charges extra money for delay in the repayment of a loan.150 This definition is 
very similar to the modern concept of interest. There are many verses in the Qur’ān that 
talk about riba but here only two are referred to: 
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The Qur’ān says:  
 
‘O those who believe do not eat up riba doubled and redoubled’151 
 
‘Those who take interest will not stand but as stands whom the demon has driven crazy 
by his touch. That is because they have said: trading is like riba. And Allah has permitted 
trading and prohibited riba . . . Allah destroys riba and nourishes charities . . . O those 
who believe, fear Allah and give up what still remains of the riba if you are believers. But 
if you do not, then listen to the declaration of war from Allah and His Messenger. And if 
you repent, yours is your principal. Neither you wrong, nor be wronged’152 
 
These verses only talk about exorbitant doubling of money and differentiate between 
charity and riba,153 sale and riba, and declare charging riba as the worst kinds of acts. The 
Qur’ān did not explain riba in its technical sense as the Qur’ān provides only general 
principles. Another reason may be that this kind of riba was very much in practice in 
Arabs in those days.154 The Sunnah explains riba in more detail.  
  
6.13.2 Riba al-Sunnah (or riba al-fadl) 
 
The rules have been drawn from the famous tradition of Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him): 
 
[G]old for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates 
for dates, salt for salt, like for like, same for same, hand to hand. But if 
these commodities differ, then sell as you like, as long as it is hand to hand. 
 
Muslim jurists have derived the following rules from tradition:155  
 
Firstly, if commodities are of the same genus, they must be exchanged in equal quantity 
and on the spot, for example, where gold is exchanged for gold.  
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Secondly, if commodities are (different) species of the same genus, then equality is not 
required but a spot transaction is necessary, for example, where gold is exchanged for 
silver or wheat is exchanged for rice.  
 
Thirdly, if the genus is different, then both equality and a spot transaction are not 
necessary, for example, where gold is exchanged for wheat.156  
 
To make things easily understandable, riba in loans, debts and barter trade can be 
explained by the following examples: 
 
i) If dollars are exchanged for dollars, and they are exchanged on the spot but are 
unequal, then this will amount to riba 
ii) If dollars are exchanged for dollars, and they are equal but delayed from one side, 
then this will amount to riba. 
iii) If dollars are exchanged for pounds, equality is irrelevant and the only issue is the 
spot transaction, and if there is a delay from one side, then this will amount to 
riba. 
iv) If wheat is exchanged for wheat, then both equality and a spot transaction are 
necessary, otherwise this will amount to riba. 
v) If wheat is exchanged for rice, then equality is not necessary and the only 
requirement is a spot transaction, otherwise this will amount to riba. 
vi) If dollars are used to purchase wheat or rice, then both equality and a spot 
transaction are not necessary. This is so because both are different genera. The 
payment may be made in advance and delivery of the commodity may be after 
some time. This is a kind of credit sale or advance payment, which is allowed 
under Islamic law.157  
 
Some rules or situations look absurd and meaningless on the face of it, such as the 
exchange of dollars for dollars in equal amounts and on-the-spot transactions or exchange 
of wheat for wheat in equal amounts, and on-the-spot transactions. In the researcher’s 
view, the objective of Shariah is to set rules to avoid riba and injustice to either party. 
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This can be explained as follows: as no one will exchange dollars for dollars or gold for 
gold or wheat for wheat in equal amounts and in on-the-spot transactions, riba will be 
avoided. Any violation of these rules will amount to riba, for example, if A gives US$100 
to B with the condition that B returns US$110 after one year, the extra US$10 amounts to 
riba. Similarly, if A gives US$100 to B and B returns the same amount after one year, this 
transaction will be called an interest-free transaction but, according to Islamic law, this is 
prohibited because B has taken undue advantage by utilizing the money for one year. As 
regards doing an injustice against any party, if a creditor charges extra amounts, then he or 
she will do the debtor an injustice and if the same amount is returned after delay then this 
will amount to an injustice against the creditor. This does not mean that Islam prohibits 
any money transaction or giving people loans. In individual cases it discourages taking 
loans but allows it only in circumstances of dire need. The creditor may give a loan as a 
qard hassan (‘charity’) and without demanding extra money or other benefits. In 
commercial transactions, it encourages partnerships and discourages loan but allows loans 
only in circumstances of dire need and as a last resort. This will also amount to qard 
hassan to save someone from business collapse.158  
 
Islamic law also allows demanding security or collateral for debts but the creditor is not 
allowed to take advantage from that collateral. The reason for such a prohibition is that 
such advantage will amount to riba. However, there is one exception to the general rule. If 
the collateral is something that requires cost to preserve it or to feed it, as in the case of 
livestock, then the borrower is allowed to take the cost incurred for its preservation or 
food. To avoid riba, it is necessary to return the excess amount to the debtor or it may be 
debited to the capital. 
 
Another way to protect commercial loans under the Islamic regime may be the recently 
developed bail-in mechanism. In this mechanism, when banks are on the verge of 
insolvency, the regulator, instead of bailing them out using taxpayers’ money, uses the 
mechanism of bail-in. In this mechanism the claims of equity holders and some junior 
creditors are written off. Similarly, a part of the claims of senior creditors is written off 
while the remaining part is converted into equity. The objective is to avoid total damage 
and to provide an opportunity to the senior creditors to save the banks and try to recover as 
much money as possible. The creditors step into the shoes of the equity holders, and try to 
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run the bank and make it a going concern. This technique is hybrid in the sense that 
initially the contract is made privately while the regulator, a public institution, has the 
power to write off claims and convert the debts into equity.159 This technique may be 
utilized in Islamic finance. It is not clear whether Islamic law will allow the writing-off of 
some creditors’ claims while giving equity rights to others. An appropriate way under 
Islamic law may be to convert all debts into equity when the company is in distress 
without writing off the claims of junior creditors. It may not be feasible to convert all 
debts into equity at the face value of the shares but this can be done by converting debts 
into equity according to the ratio of debts to the equity capital. This technique may 
provide a kind of security to the debtors without violation of the Shariah.  
 
6.14 Prohibition on riba  
  
Islam has a direct effect on the day-to-day life of Muslims and it is considered a divine 
command to spend one’s life according to its orders.160 Islam is applicable even in 
Muslims’ commercial dealings161 and provides detailed regulations in this regard.162 Riba 
is prohibited by Islam in every form in personal or in commercial transactions.  
 
Riba is prohibited irrespective of whether or not it is in manifest or concealed form; 
manifest in the sense that it is clear from the face of a transaction that it is riba but some 
transactions may also contain an element of riba but it does not appear on the face of it. 
For example, if, A sells his watch to B for US$100 and immediately repurchases the same 
watch for US$120 on the spot with deferred payment to be made after one year, prima 
facie these are two independent transactions but, in fact, there was only one transaction 
and that was a transaction of loan. B has advanced a loan of US$100 to A with 20% 
interest to be paid after one year. These transactions are regarded as being against the 
spirit of Islamic law as the intention was to bypass the prohibition on riba by involving a 
commodity. A tradition (Sunnah) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) 
says ‘acts depend on intentions’. Therefore, all those transactions will be prohibited where 
the intention is to enter into a transaction involving riba.  
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As to the wisdom or logic behind the prohibition on riba, there is dispute among jurists. 
Nyazee does not agree with the prohibition on riba based purely on religious grounds or 
even injustice as necessary conditions for prohibiting riba forwarded by some jurists.163 
He regards distributive justice as the logic behind the prohibition on riba. He argues that 
distributive justice prevents the accumulation of wealth in a few hands. Distributive justice 
provides social justice and fair distribution of wealth among the masses. However, 
Usmani does not consider wisdom a necessary condition for the prohibition on riba.164 He 
observes that riba is prohibited irrespective of any wisdom visible in such prohibition. He 
considers prohibition purely on a religious basis. He writes that there is a difference 
between wisdom and the basic feature (illat) of any order in Islamic law. According to 
him, the law will apply in the presence of a basic feature (illat) irrespective of wisdom. He 
gives an example of the traffic law that requires stopping at a red traffic light. Here the 
basic feature or illat is the red light and the wisdom is to prevent an accident. He says that 
this does not mean that when the red light is on and there is no chance of an accident 
happening, then one may pass through it. One has to stop irrespective of absence of the 
wisdom of avoiding an accident. He further explains that as far as injustice (zulm) as 
wisdom or philosophy of prohibition is concerned, this is not a basic feature of the 
prohibition on riba. Injustice is a relative term which varies from person to person and 
system to system, and cannot be termed a basic feature (illat) of the prohibition of riba. 
According to him, the basic feature of the prohibition on riba is excess claimed over and 
above the principal in the transaction of a loan, irrespective of the presence of the 
philosophy of law.165 However, a more plausible explanation regarding the prohibition on 
riba is forwarded by a renowned Muslim scholar Imam Al-Ghazzali.166 He believes that 
riba is prohibited as it prevents individuals from undertaking real economic activities. If 
people are allowed to earn money over money on the basis of interest without undertaking 
a real economic activity, then this may be harmful to society, and hamper economic 
growth and development. Islamic law prohibits interest-bearing transactions and 
encourages equity investment in the form of partnership. It envisages that both parties 
should participate in profit and loss. One should not free ride on the efforts of others and 
no one should take more than what he or she deserves. 
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The Constitution of Pakistan imposes a duty on the state to eliminate riba as early as 
possible. Pakistan was the first Muslim country that declared riba against the injunctions 
of Islam. 167 The FSC declared riba against the Shariah on 14 November 1991. However, 
this was challenged in the Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in the form of 67 
appeals, including the federal government, banks and financial institutions. The Appellate 
Bench disposed of all these appeals and upheld the decision of the FSC in 1999. It set 30 
June 2001 as the deadline for the elimination of riba which was later extended to 30 June 
2002. The appellants then filed a review petition to the Appellate Bench who stayed the 
order on 24 June 2002. It is still pending in the Appellate Bench. 168  
 
As far as the implementation of the decision of the Supreme Court is concerned, Nidaa is 
of the opinion that the landmark decision of this court to Islamize the economy could not 
achieve its objectives because the decision was not based on a democratic process, but 
rather that it was an outcome of judicial activism only. She further argues that the people 
of the subcontinent have a quest for a distinct identity in the name of religion and this led 
to their will to Islamize the economy.169 Her observation is true to the extent that this 
wholesale change in the economy requires political, democratic and institutional support. 
However, the real problem is not the judiciary, but rather political parties who failed to 
implement decisions despite getting votes from people in the name of Islam. There are 
public sentiments in Pakistan to Islamize the economy and political parties exploit these 
sentiments. The constitution makes provision for the Islamization of the economy but the 
executive failed to take the necessary steps in this regard. Public sentiments may be the 
driving force behind the implementation of the Islamic economy in Pakistan but this 
requires the will of the politicians and institutions as well. Similarly, her observation that 
the people of the subcontinent desire a distinct identity is the reason why they want to 
Islamize the economy does not seem cogent. Islam is part and parcel of life for Muslims. 
Therefore, they want to implement Islamic injunctions in their commercial dealings as 
well. Since riba is considered a declaration of war against God and His Prophet by the 
Qur’ān, religious duties, therefore, seem more logical than simply the desire to show a 
distinct identity.  
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6.15 Nature of the Islamic financial system 
 
Islam is a practical religion that guides its subjects in each and every field, including 
financial matters.170 A basic difference between the conventional financial system and 
Islamic finance is the treatment of interest. The debt is not considered a legal, profitable 
economic activity under Islamic finance.171 Conventional finance is based on interest-
bearing transactions, whereas Islamic finance prohibits interest from personal as well as 
commercial loans. There is a misconception with regard to Islamic finance that this system 
prohibits all modern transactions. In reality, this is only half of the story. Islam provides 
an alternative to debt and loan financing. It prohibits interest, uncertainty and immoral 
business activities. As far as interest is concerned, Islam regards it as exploitative and the 
circulation of money among the rich only. The Qur’ān prohibits riba by providing a 
justification for its evil effects: it states that ‘it [wealth] may not [merely] make a circuit 
between the wealthy among you’.172 Interest is, in fact, earning money over money and 
this may provide opportunities to rich people to enhance their money without getting 
involved in real economic activities. The Islamic finance system is based on distributive 
justice, which means the distribution of wealth, goods and resources among the rich and 
the poor.  
 
In addition to this, it prohibits certain businesses which it considers immoral, unethical or 
religiously prohibited, for example, gambling; the preparation of alcohol and its related 
products, and pork products; and pornography. The other difference between conventional 
finance and Islamic finance is uncertainty. Some financial transactions of conventional 
finance, such as the futures market, short selling and gambling businesses, are not allowed 
under Islamic finance on the basis of inherent uncertainty.  
  
The Islamic financial system is characterized as based on ethics and morality. It prohibits 
risk-free return on finance.173 The prohibition on riba is one manifestation of this 
characteristic. Riba provides one party with an undue advantage over another; for instance, 
A gives a loan of US$100,000 to B for two years with interest of 10% per year. B starts a 
business with US$150,000 and suffers a loss of US$50,000. B now has to return 
US$100,000 to A as the capital return and US$20,000 as interest. B is left with only 
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US$100,000 in business. This means that B has to pay US$20,000 from other sources. In 
this situation, it will be an injustice against B. However, suppose B earns profit amounting 
to US$100,000. B will pay US$120,000 (US$100,000 as capital and US$20,000 as 
interest) to A and will retain US$80,000 as profit for himself. B has earned profit of 
US$80,000 with only a US$50,000 investment, whereas A has earned US$20,000 with a 
US$100,000 investment. The profit ratio for B will be 160%, whereas it is only 20% (in 
the form of interest) for A. In this situation it is injustice against A. This is the main reason 
for the prohibition on interest (riba) as this may cause an injustice to both or one party. 
Islam prohibits interest as one may have an advantage without taking risk, and sharing in 
profit and loss. Interest-bearing transaction may encourage the earning of money without 
taking part in actual economic activity. It, therefore, encourages equity financing. In 
equity financing there may be less injustice against any one or more parties as all will 
share in the profit and loss. Islamic finance provides different techniques for carrying on 
businesses that may be used as alternatives to conventional financing. Modern Muslim and 
non-Muslim jurists are trying to provide alternatives to the conventional finance system. 
The provisions of Shariah-compliant products as an alternative to conventional financial 
products are the main features of recent research in Islamic finance. Modern jurists are 
trying to synchronize Islamic finance with conventional finance. Synthesis is possible 
between Islamic finance and conventional finance to a certain extent, with the exception of 
interest, uncertainty and certain businesses, which are not allowed under Islamic law. 
 
6.16 Equity versus debt financing 
 
Islamic finance deals with both equity and debt finance in different ways. Islamic finance 
encourages equity financing and discourages debt financing. The nature of debt financing 
is contractual. This is more secured financing in which the creditors receive predetermined 
amounts in the form of interest and capital irrespective of any profit gained by the debtor 
in the business. This amount is to be paid within the framework determined in the 
contract. If a debtor fails to pay interest or return capital, then the creditor has the right to 
enforce this under the terms of the contract as well as under different laws. As the paying 
of interest or capital becomes difficult for the debtor in the case of financial difficulty, the 
nature of debt financing is, therefore, a kind of exploitation in most cases. The creditor has 
the right of reorganization and liquidation in the case of failure to pay interest or capital. 
However, the nature of the equity investment is participation in the business. The investor 
shares in the profit, which is not predetermined. The investor gets a return on investment 
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only when there is a profit in the business. Therefore, there is less of an element of 
exploitation in the equity investment. The investor has the right to participate in the 
management, except in those cases where he or she relinquishes this right by acquiring 
shares without voting rights.  
 
The problem with debt financing is that more debt financing provides the firm with 
leverage that may be beneficial to it up to a certain level but this leverage may be 
dangerous when it goes beyond certain limits. This means enhanced leverage is a risky 
venture.174 The recent global financial crises are associated with, inter alia, bad 
governance and unbridled debt financing by banks. The debt ratio was increased and 
debtors were unable to repay their debt. There was not enough equity which could have 
avoided the crisis. This caused huge financial uncertainty and resulted in a crisis.175  
 
Debt financing has structural advantages over equity financing as debt is given more 
security and the right to recover a loan as per a contract. Equity financing is, however, not 
secure for individual investors but as far as the corporate structure is concerned, it avoids 
potential corporate risks. Equity financing requires some assurance to avoid individual 
risk. This risk can be minimized when there is good governance associated with equity 
financing. To share the burden of risk, it is necessary that equity holders be given 
decision-making power and management rights; in other words, the nature of equity 
financing is to take part in management by contesting the election of directors or voting to 
elect directors, to make major decisions, and to share in profit and loss. More equity 
financing in firms will trigger more good corporate governance. As Islamic finance 
encourages equity, good corporate governance is, therefore, exactly in accordance with the 
spirit of Islamic finance. 
 
6.17 Evolution of Islamic finance 
 
A presumption about Islamic finance is that it was introduced in the early ages of Islam 
and that it was not a flexible system that would cater to the needs of modern times. This is 
an incorrect assumption. Islamic finance is currently still relevant and is ever developing. 
The role of Muslim scholars is very important in this regard. The new products introduced 
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through conventional finance can be checked in the light of Islamic law due to the 
flexibility available in Islamic law. Modern scholars have worked on Islamic finance, and 
have discussed its feasibility according to modern needs and requirements. Islamic finance 
was central in religious teachings for two reasons. First, religion is integral to the day-to-
day life of Muslims and in their financial matters. Second, the Prophet Muhammad (peace 
be unto him) was himself a merchant; therefore, financial dealings were central to the life 
of the Prophet. The recent focus on Islamic finance caught the attention of financial 
experts for two reasons. First, the emphasis on Islamic finance in the Muslim world, which 
forms a substantial part of the world economy. This phenomenon started in Egypt in 1963 
through the introduction of the Mit Ghamr savings project, a social banking initiative176 
and later developments such as the establishment of the first Islamic bank in the mid-
1970s. Second, when there was a recession in the world and conventional finance failed to 
respond appropriately.177 
 
In modern times in the Muslim world, Pakistan was the first country that declared that it 
would Islamize all its banks. It did so in in 1979. Iran and Sudan followed, and in 1983 
they declared that they would Islamize their banks. Malaysia, instead, introduced a parallel 
banking system in 1983.178 In recent times Islamic finance has been the most dynamic and 
fastest-developing financial system. Both Muslim and non-Muslim countries have 
introduced it in their financial system. The focus is on introducing this system parallel to 
the existing financial system.179 The introduction of two parallel financial systems may 
have some legal and regulatory barriers as both conventional and Islamic finance have 
different natures and, to some extent, are rival systems. This rivalry is based on two 
important issues: (1) riba (‘interest’) and (2) gharar (‘uncertainty’). Islam provides an 
alternative to interest by emphasising profit and the sharing of business activities. It 
discourages loans but allows them under conditions of necessity and on humanitarian 
grounds but without interest. It also prohibits uncertain transactions. Both conventional 
finance and Islamic finance may not be a major problem as both can be synchronized and 
implemented on the basis of the nature of the products involved. However, this requires 
the state’s commitment to implementing Islamic finance in its true spirit.  
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6.18 Islamic finance as an alternative financial system 
 
The recent financial crisis, which was linked to excessive leveraging, highlighted the 
importance of an alternative financial system that may respond more appropriately in 
times of financial distress.180 Islamic finance prohibits excessive leveraging and focuses 
on trust building. It focuses more on the ethical realm of business than a sole financial 
aspect which is dominant in conventional finance.181 Islamic finance has shown its 
presence against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis and urges scholars to provide 
an alternative. One advantage of Islamic finance is that it is an emerging system that has 
not yet been utilized in modern finance.182  
 
The Islamic financial system is different from capitalism and communism. Capitalism is a 
market-based financial system that provides the freedom of having private ownership, 
whereas communism provides a controlled economy with the state controlling all 
economic activities and restricting private ownership by individuals. Capitalism 
reconfigures existing economic and social arrangements; develops according to market 
needs; and focuses on individual self-interest and privileged rational utility over traditional 
ethical norms.183 Such an ideology was alien to Islam.184 Islamic finance is based on a 
different ideology. Its thrust is on ethics and morality. It restricts the free flow of wealth in 
a few hands,185 and provides detailed guidelines in the financial matters of its subjects. It 
prohibits interest-bearing and uncertain transactions. It encourages equity-based financing, 
sale and leasing contracts.186 The prohibition on interest-bearing transactions is a major 
difference between capitalism and Islamic finance.187 Islamic finance requires real asset-
based transactions,188 and links financial transactions to the real economy, which is 
governed by the principle of sharing in profit and loss. It prohibits interest (riba) and 
uncertainty (gharrar), and encourages equity financing backed by real assets.189 
Capitalism emphasizes individual rights which allow the unbridled accumulation of 
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wealth, whereas Islamic finance focuses on the welfare of the whole of society which does 
not allow the exploitation of others.190 Another major difference includes the prohibition 
on excessive leveraging and imprudent risk taking by Islamic finance. Similarly, paper 
money is not considered a commodity in Islamic finance. It is considered a medium of 
exchange and therefore cannot be utilized to increase purchasing power without involving 
a commodity and a productive activity that is beneficial to society.191  
 
The failure of communism in the 1990s and the economic meltdown in last part of the 
twentieth century and the early part of the twenty-first century has highlighted the 
importance of an alternate financial system in the world. Islamic finance received attention 
in the recessions. It has been the most dynamic and fastest-growing economic system in 
the recent past. There has been extensive academic research on Islamic finance both in the 
East and West.192 Products based on Islamic finance are being introduced not only in the 
Muslim world, but also in non-Islamic countries such as the UK193 and the US. 194 Islamic 
finance may not be an ideal financial system for the West as it is not familiar with such a 
system and it is considered directly related to religion. However, Islamic finance is not 
restricted to Muslims. It is open to everyone, including non-Muslims. The choice is with 
the consumers based on pure competition. If Islamic finance provides better options and 
products to investors and consumers, they will definitely derive an advantage from it. The 
new economic world scenario is based on pure efficiency and competition, and religion 
has a very limited role to play, at least in the Western world. Ethics may also be another 
reason why non-Muslims would be attracted to Islamic products. Ethical finance, such as 
the prohibition on financing in businesses relating to alcohol, gambling and pornography 
may also attract non-Muslim who have religious beliefs in this regard.195However, Islamic 
financial transactions may be undertaken on a purely religious basis in the Muslim world 
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in general and Pakistan196 in particular where religion dominates in the social, political 
and economic life of the masses.  
 
Pakistan is a leading country in the Muslim world when it comes to Islamizing its 
economy.197 It was a difficult task for Pakistan as there was no successful model to 
follow.198 Nevertheless, it started Islamizing its economy through the introduction of 
Shariah-compliant products in the early 1980s. The first step was to change the banking 
laws through change in the Banking Companies Ordinance 1962 and introducing profit 
and sharing accounts. The other major steps included permission to do business through 
the mudarabah form of business. The introduction of the Mudarabah Companies and 
Mudarabah (‘Flotation and Control’) Ordinance 1984 allowed the establishment of Islamic 
financial institutions that allowed the conduct of business through the mudarabah form of 
business. In 1991 the government promulgated the Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991 to 
Islamize the economy and industry. This paved the way for the introduction of Islamic 
mutual funds, Islamic insurance (takaful), leasing (ijarah) and licensing of Islamic 
commercial banks.199  
 
The major breakthrough in this regard was the decision of the Shariah Appellate Bench of 
the Supreme Court in 1991 that declared riba against the injunctions of Islam and set 
June 2001 as the deadline for the elimination of riba from the economy. The government 
filed a review petition. The decision was stayed and is still pending. This shows lack of 
interest both at government and institutional level to eliminate riba, and to Islamize the 
economy. This is a dilemma for the government. On the one hand, it has shown some kind 
of efforts to Islamize the economy and, on the other hand, it is not willing to implement a 
decision prohibiting riba, which is a major cause for concern in Islamic finance. There 
may be three reasons for this decision. First, there have been frequent changes in 
governments in Pakistan. Sometimes the leftist and sometimes the rightist dominate the 
political scenario. Pure Islamic parties also have a say in each government. The successive 
governments may not have the intention to implement pure Islamic finance, rather these 
parties may have made provision for it in their manifesto to obtain political advantages by 
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exploiting the sentiments of the people to get their votes. Second, in the new era of the 
global economy it may not be feasible to prohibit riba unilaterally when countries have 
debts of billions of dollars brought about by global forces. However, the elimination of 
riba at the domestic level may not be a major problem. This needs some kind of 
commitment from the government and financial institutions. Third, lack of legal, 
regulatory and institutional infrastructure may be another cause for the failure in 
implementing the Supreme Court decision to Islamize the economy.200 The decision 
cannot be implemented without proper homework.  
 
In Pakistan mudarabah business flourished to some extent but the way in which it was 
operated was not purely Islamic.201 This disappointed the people who intended to do 
business in an Islamic way and for those with an awareness of Islamic finance. 
Corruption, bad governance, scarcity of a regulatory framework and lack of human 
resources were the main barriers to the success of Islamic finance in Pakistan. The 
intentions of most of the entrepreneurs were not to do business in accordance with the 
Shariah but they started businesses just to enjoy the tax incentives provided by the 
government for mudarabah businesses and to exploit general public sentiments. It was an 
easy way to get finance from the general public in the name of Islam.202 All this caused 
the failure of mudarabah business in Pakistan and shed doubts on Islamic finance 
flourishing in Pakistan. Islamic finance can be successful only if a good corporate 
governance mechanism is established. This would require the government, regulators and 
other institutions to take a number of steps.  
 
In Pakistan Islamic banking business is not much different from the conventional system. 
It amounts to a change of nomenclature and most of the transactions conducted by the 
banks in leasing and murabahah were viewed as suspicious by scholars on the grounds 
that the objective of these transactions was to defeat the Islamic prohibitions of riba.203 In 
reality, these transactions were more or less like interest-bearing transactions. Islamic 
finance can be successful only if there are serious efforts and change in mind set at 
government level as well as entrepreneur level. 
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Failure of mudarabah business triggered regulator’s attention to improve mudarabah 
business in Pakistan. In 2008 the SECP and Mudarabah Association of Pakistan conducted 
research to obtain the Shariah board of mudarabah’s approval for the new Shariah-
compliant products to enhance the scope of mudarabah business. They approved 
12 products204 to enhance the scope of mudarabah and other Shariah-complaint 
businesses in Pakistan.205 This is another effort at institutional level to Islamize the 
economy. The question is whether it will change the existing image of the failed 
mudarabah business introduced in the early 1990s?  
 
The few efforts by the government to Islamize the economy were just the start of a long 
journey. More needs to be done in this regard. It may not be useful merely to declare 
something Islamic or un-Islamic. First there is a need to provide an alternative to existing 
financial products. The existing system cannot be changed overnight. Scholars of Islamic 
law should try to synchronize texisting financial products with Islamic norms keeping in 
mind the basic precepts of Islam. Different schools of law in the Muslim community have 
different interpretations of sources of Islamic law, which may create divergence. This may 
not be a major problem. Divergence can be converted into convergence but this needs 
some kind of flexibility in the rules of interpretation to the extent that the interpretation of 
other schools that is appropriate is adopted and that modern financial products be accepted 
rather than rejected. Secondly, the scarcity of human resources is another problem in this 
regard. Some institutions are engaged in Islamic research but they are not enough to cater 
for the needs of Islamic finance on a larger scale. There is a need to encourage Islamic 
research at institutional level that can produce scholars who are acquainted with both the 
modern form of business and the Islamic form of business. Thirdly, corporate governance 
needs to be strengthened. An inefficient corporate governance system is a major problem 
in any kind of business. In Pakistan bad governance is a barrier to the healthy growth of 
the market in general and the economy in particular. As discussed in earlier chapters, there 
is a need to improve the governance mechanism in Pakistan. Enforcement is a key to good 
governance. The judiciary, market and regulatory framework need to be improved in order 
to enhance enforceability in the corporate sector. As far as Islamic finance is concerned, as 
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it encourages equity financing and prohibits interest-bearing transactions, good corporate 
governance will be a key to its success.  
 
Some efforts have also been made at international level. The establishment of the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) in 2002 was a major step towards this development. It 
started its operation from 10 March 2003. The board sets standards for regulatory and 
supervisory agencies involved in Islamic finance, including banking, capital markets and 
insurance. Its objectives are to promote the development of Islamic industry and to 
recommend new or adopt existing international standards after adaptation to injunctions of 
the Shariah. The board also guides regulatory agencies for effective supervision and 
regulations of institutions offering Islamic products. It plays a liaison role among 
institutions involved in standard setting. So far, the board has issued 19 standards, guiding 
principles and technical notes for the Islamic financial services industry, including guiding 
principles on corporate governance for institutions offering only Islamic financial services 
(excluding Islamic insurance (takaful) institutions and Islamic mutual funds). It has issued 
separate guidelines for insurance and mutual funds.206 The IFSB takes guidance from 
other institutions involved in standard setting for banking, finance and governance, for 
instance, the IFSB has considered standards issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, and the International Organization for Securities Cooperation for investment 
and securities markets in order to set its own standards for Islamic banking and finance207 
but subject to the condition that they are not against the Shariah. The IFSB issues guiding 
principles and they are subject to approval at national level. As these principles do not 
have binding force, the possibility of divergence at international level exists.  
 
The International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) is a constituent part of the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The objective of the academy is to find solutions to 
contemporary problems according to the Shariah and to guide the Muslim community to 
conduct their life according to the Shariah at individual, social and international level. The 
academy is involved in research in Islamic law and issues Islamic legal opinions (fatwas) 
for guidance to the Muslim community.208 The scope of research and opinion includes 
Islamic finance so that the Muslim community could convert their conventional finance to 
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Islamic finance. The rulings of IIFA are guiding principles only and do not have any kind 
of binding force. This may also lead to divergence in the Muslim world.  
 
The commonly approved Shariah products and market can facilitate convergence in 
Islamic finance at international level in the Muslim world. This could be achieved when 
there is consensus between Islamic scholars themselves. Once the Islamic form of 
business is accepted and implemented at national level, some kind of consensus at global 
level would be required. Consensus in OIC countries that is commensurate, at least to 
some extent, with EU efforts is also needed. 
 
It is widely accepted that Islamic finance is not immune to financial crises. However, an 
important question is the extent to which financial crises may impact on Islamic finance. 
Venardos warns that Islamic finance may be affected indirectly in any turmoil in the 
world. 209 According to him, the slower economic growth may affect real estate and asset 
finance. He further warns that reduction in prices of real estate may indirectly affect 
Islamic financial institutions as their business activities are directly connected to real 
assets. According to him, this may decrease their assets and affect business. However, this 
observation should be hedged with other aspects of Islamic finance. Islamic finance is not 
entirely related to real assets. Islamic finance focuses on ethical business. It prohibits 
interest-bearing transaction, excessive leveraging and avoiding uncertainty. It encourages 
sharing in profit and losses, and carry on business based on mutual trust and confidence.  
 
Venardos is also concerned that Islamic financial institutions may pursue aggressive 
speculative investment strategies with higher risk and higher expected returns in economic 
stress without adhering to fundamental and sound risk management standards.210 The 
IFSB is working towards providing guidelines to avoid such situations. These concerns 
highlight the importance of good corporate governance strategies to avoid such situations. 
Another important point in this regard is that Islamic finance does not encourage 
speculative business strategies. Corporate governance under Islamic finance may not 
encourage strategies on the part of the managers that are highly speculative irrespective of 
the quantum of profit they may yield.  
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Whether Islamic finance will be effective and can provide an alternative financial system 
at international level in general and Pakistan in particular is a difficult and premature 
question. However, the principles of Islamic finance cannot be ignored as they focus on 
ethical business and preach social responsibility.211 Islamic finance has gained the 
attention of the world after the recent global financial crisis. The Muslim world has started 
converting its conventional finance to Islamic finance. Recent research in the Muslim 
world in general and the Western world in particular shows that Islamic finance has made 
its presence known and may be considered an alternative financial system. This is a 
difficult task and requires extensive research in the field. As far as the recent financial 
crisis is concerned, it is widely accepted that as Islamic finance relies on asset-backed 
financing, it might have responded more appropriately than capitalism.212 No doubt, this 
system is gaining importance in the Muslim world on the basis of religion but it has 
potential due to its very nature. However, it can be considered in the non-Muslim world 
only when it is devised beyond the religious aspect and shows its strength as a better 
financial system than the conventional financial system. It can be introduced in the Islamic 
world generally and in Pakistan in particular. Once it shows its acceptance and success in 
the Muslim world, the non-Muslim world may take advantage of it to avoid uncertainty 
inherent in conventional finance. Globalization has integrated markets and survival of any 
system depends upon the provision of competitive products.213 Therefore, Islamic finance 
can provide an alternative only when gaps in Islamic finance are filled in order to compete 
in the global economy. This is an uphill task for researchers in general and jurists in 
particular. 
 
6.19 Islamic finance and stock market indices 
 
Muslim and some non-Muslim countries have introduced stock market indices in their 
jurisdictions. In non-Muslim countries this may not be on the basis of its success or pure 
competition, but rather to attract Muslim customers residing in their jurisdiction, for 
example, the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index in Bahrain, the FTSE Global Islamic Index 
in the UK214 and the Shariah-compliant index of the KSE in Pakistan. 
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6.19.1 Shariah-compliant index of the Karachi Stock Exchange 
 
In pursuit of government efforts to Islamize the economy, the stock exchanges in Pakistan 
introduced a stock market index for those companies who are engaged in Shariah-
compliant products. The KSE introduced the Islamic index with the co-operation of Al-
Meezan Investment Management Limited. The Index is called the KSE–Meezan Index or 
KMI–30 Index and includes those companies who qualify to be the companies engaged in 
business according to Islamic norms. For this purpose, 30 companies are selected on the 
basis of the free float methodology out of those companies who fulfil certain conditions 
prescribed by scholars with expertise in Islamic law.  
  
The objective of the KMI–30 Index is twofold: (1) the index serves as a gauge for 
measuring the performance of Shariah-compliant equity investment and (2) it provides 
information to investors about the companies engaged in business according to the 
Shariah. The index provides some relief to those investors who intend to invest in 
securities of companies operating under Islamic finance. 
 
The conditions prescribed by Islamic scholars for listed companies to be included in 
Shariah-compliant companies or screening filters are as follows:215 
 
i) The business of the company must be according to the injunctions of Islam. 
ii) Companies must not engage in conventional banking; financial institutions 
engaged in interest-related activities; conventional insurance; gambling; alcohol; 
cable networking; entertainment channels; advertising and media, with the 
exception of business and news dissemination; arms manufacturing; non-halal 
(‘impermissible’) foods; tobacco; pork production; and pornography. 
iii) The debt-to-asset ratio in the company should be less than 37% (the formula is 
interest-bearing debt to total assets < 37%). Debt includes every interest-bearing 
investment, including preference shares. 
iv) The ratio of non-compliant investment to total assets should be less than 33% (the 
formula is non-compliant investment to total assets < 33%); 
v) The ratio of non-compliant income to total revenue should be less than 5% (the 
formula is non-compliant income to total revenue < 5%); 
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vi) The ratio of illiquid assets to total assets should be at least 25% (the formula is 
illiquid assets to total assets > 25%). The illiquid assets include the assets that the 
Shariah permits to be traded at value other than at par.216 
vii) The market price per share should be at least equal to or greater than  net liquid 
assets per share calculated as total assets–illiquid assets–total liabilities to number 
of shares outstanding.217 
 
This index provided some relief to those investors who intended to invest in securities of 
companies operating under Islamic finance. However, this is a liberal interpretation of 
Islamic finance but as a first step it is encouraging, at least towards the final destination.  
At present there are 112 Shariah-compliant companies on the KSE.218 The ratio of these 
companies to total number of companies is low. This shows that Islamic finance has not 
gained its footing in Pakistan. Bad governance, accompanied by a lack of legal, regulatory 
and institutional infrastructure, is a major problem in the flourishing of Islamic finance in 
Pakistan. Therefore, the improvement of the governance mechanism is essential for the 
success of companies involved in Islamic finance.  
 
6.20 Convergence to Islamic finance and corporate governance within the 
Muslim world 
 
The recent phenomenon of utilizing Islamic finance as an alternative or parallel to the 
conventional financial system in Muslim countries in general and Pakistan in particular 
has raised different issues. There is a possibility that different countries may have different 
modes of financing which may conflict with each other as far as their forms and 
conditions are concerned. This premise is based on the very nature of Islamic law. Though 
Islamic law provides a degree of flexibility to cope with modern needs and requirements, 
the problem with Islamic law is that the Qur’ān provides general principles only. The 
book is not composed of detailed rules. These principles were practised and explained by 
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the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and companions. The other problem was the 
compilation of the Sunnah of the Prophet quite a long period after his death which allowed 
fabrication of the Sunnah. This created differences of opinion among Muslim jurists 
regarding acceptance and the degree of force that such Sunnah may exert on the creation 
of rules.  
 
The other problem is the interpretational rules of different sects of Muslim jurists. Islamic 
law provides jurists with leverage to explain modern problems in the light of existing 
principles. The sources of Islamic law other than the Qur’ān and Sunnah provide this 
leverage to interpret primary sources. This may lead to different interpretations which, in 
turn, may lead to different forms of businesses and governance mechanisms that may 
cause barriers to convergence to a single model in the Muslim world.  
 
Globalization has triggered convergence of different corporate governance norms due to 
the inter-related interests of the countries, competition and cross-border investment. This 
phenomenon raised enforcement issues in corporate governance. The Islamic world 
realizes this difficulty and established the IFSB in order to ensure common Shariah-
compliant products and regulations. However, a rigid interpretation of the sources of 
Islamic law by jurists had been the main cause of concern which has led to divergence of 
fiqh within the Muslim world. This may create problem in the development of unique 
Shariah-compliant products, market and corporate governance. Therefore, there is a need 
for jurists to show some kind of flexibility in interpreting sources of Islamic law. Modern 
jurists have developed techniques to overcome this difficulty. As discussed earlier, ‘choice 
and selection’, ‘amalgamation or patching’, ‘necessity’ and ‘ruses’219 may be utilized to 
redefine the fiqh according to modern requirements. This may help to unify different 
interpretations of Islamic law and converge to unique corporate governance and corporate 
finance, at least within the Muslim world. This will also help Pakistan to converge to 
Islamic finance in the Muslim world.  
 
6.21 Convergence to Western corporate governance 
 
There are basic differences between Islamic finance and Western financial systems. 
Islamic finance emphasizes ethical norms and focuses on the purposes of Islamic law both 
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in the context of corporate law and corporate governance. It does see the interest of 
investors but looks beyond the sole interest of investors. It wants to achieve the objectives 
of society as a whole and to safeguard the religion as well. However, the Western model 
of corporate governance focuses on individual interests and tries to achieve what is 
demanded by the market. It does focus on society as far as business and corporate 
governance are concerned but that may not be the primary priority as against the 
individual interests in the businesses.220 Managers in the Western form of corporate 
governance may not be duty-bound to preserve religion which is the basic thrust of 
Islamic law. This disparity between Islamic finance and the Western financial system may 
be minimized provided the objectives are clearly defined and some level of flexibility is 
shown at least by the Muslim jurists in their interpretational rules. 
 
In the context of Pakistan it is important to synchronize existing Western forms of 
business practices, corporate law, corporate governance objectives and trading in shares 
with Islamic norms. The basic difference between the Western forms of business practices 
and Islamic finance is the prohibition on interest. As far as form of business is concerned, 
most conventional forms of business are very much Islamic but a few are prohibited by 
Shariah, and must be avoided in order to create system that is in accordance with the 
Shariah; for instance, businesses of gambling, preparation of alcohol and pornography 
may be banned. Trading in stock exchanges is very much Islamic. However, trading in 
debts, debt securities, forward and future contracts, and short selling must be avoided. As 
far as corporate governance is concerned, the rights and the protection of investors are as 
important in Islam as they are in the Western form of corporate governance.  
 
As far as good corporate governance is concerned, it is more important in Pakistan than in 
any other jurisdiction. Firstly, the prevailing bad governance requires improvement. 
Secondly, as the thrust of Islamic finance is on equity financing, good corporate 
governance will be important for Pakistan as the country moves towards Islamic finance. 
Thirdly, as Islamic finance is new to modern financing techniques, it has not developed 
investors’ rights and their protection.221 The Western form of corporate governance has 
developed these rights and protection. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it inherited the 
British legal and regulatory system, therefore, Pakistani policymakers and legislature may 
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benefit from the Western form of corporate governance in general and the UK system of 
corporate governance in particular.  
 
Islam has to play an important part in the corporate sector of Pakistan. Any future 
convergence to a Western form of corporate governance may be affected by Islamic 
injunctions. The barrier of Islamic finance to the Western form of corporate governance 
may not be as strong as it appears at first sight. Islamic law is also not as rigid as it 
appears. It has some inherent flexibility in its nature. Some sources and principles of 
Islamic law such as ‘presumption of continuity’, ‘ruses’ and ‘necessity’ may help to 
bridge the gaps between Islamic and Western forms of corporate governance. The Western 
form of corporate governance may be adopted in Pakistan after adaptation in the light of 
the above-mentioned principles and subject to the objectives of Islam highlighted in this 
chapter.  
 
6.22 Conclusion 
  
Pakistan is an Islamic republic. The constitution prescribes Islam as the state religion. It is 
a practical religion which guides its subjects in all spheres of life, including financial 
matters. Globalization, competition and inter-related financial interests have stimulated 
convergence from more developed countries to less developed countries all over the 
world. Pakistan, being a developing county, has been the recipient of foreign governance 
features. As both conventional and Islamic financial systems have different objectives, 
convergence to a Western corporate governance feature in Pakistan has to pass the Islamic 
litmus test.  
 
As far as convergence in corporate governance to international norms in Pakistan is 
concerned, there are two aspects involved. First is the unique convergence to Islamic 
finance and corporate governance within the Islamic world. This will also affect Pakistan. 
The evolution of different schools of thoughts within the Muslim world may lead to 
divergence in Islamic finance among Muslims. This divergence may be overcome but 
there is a need to show some kind of flexibility in interpretation by Muslim jurists. There 
are different techniques in Islamic law that can help to bridge the gap between different 
interpretational rules and to come to some consensus. Principles such as ‘choice and 
selection’ (iktiyar and takhayyur), ‘amalgamation or patching’ (talfiq), ‘necessity’ 
(darurah) and ‘ruses’ (hila) may be utilized to redefine the fiqh according to modern 
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requirements. This may help to unify different interpretations of Islamic law, and 
converge to unique corporate governance and corporate finance, at least within the 
Muslim world. This will also help Pakistan to converge to the Muslim world’s Islamic 
finance and corporate governance. 
 
The second aspect is convergence to the Western model of corporate governance in 
Pakistan. Pakistan is an Islamic country but, being a former British colony, it has adopted 
the conventional financial system based on the British system. As Pakistan is an Islamic 
country and people’s thrust was towards Islamizing its economy, the government took 
steps to do so. However, it has not been successful for different reasons such as bad 
governance; a weak enforcement mechanism; lack of human resources and state 
commitment; the absence of a legal and regulatory framework; and institutional 
incapacity. The problem with using Islamic finance in Pakistan is its utility in modern 
times as the same has not been used before. Furthermore, there is no successful model for 
Pakistan within the Muslim world. According to classical Muslim jurists, there is a stark 
difference between the conventional and Islamic financial systems as both have different 
objectives. Modern jurists are working on Islamic finance to make it an alternative 
financial system. These efforts of providing an alternative financial system may only be 
successful when gaps in Islamic finance are filled in order to compete in the global 
economy.  
 
Globalization has forced convergence of different corporate governance features where 
survival of any system depends upon the provision of competitive products. In order to 
improve corporate governance in Pakistan, convergence to Western corporate governance 
features but within the limits prescribed by the Shariah is needed. Firstly, as an abrupt 
overnight change from the conventional to Islamic financial system is not feasible, the 
system needs to be changed through a pragmatic approach. Therefore, instead of changing 
the whole system, the existing system needs to be synchronized with the Islamic financial 
system. A synthesis is possible to the extent that Western governance features can be 
adopted that are not against the Shariah under the principle of ‘presumption of continuity’. 
Secondly, the features that have some kind of defect may be restructured in a way that 
they are made compatible with Islamic finance. The Islamic method of ‘ruses’ (hila) may 
help to remove this defect. Thirdly, the features that have minor defects may be adopted 
under the principle of ‘necessity’ (darurah).  
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This whole process needs substantial research and some kind of flexibility on the part of 
Muslims jurists. The role of Muslim jurists will dominate the process. The conclusion of 
the discussion is, therefore, that in convergence to Western corporate governance features 
in Pakistan, Islamic norms may act as a litmus test which may not be as problematic as it 
appears at first sight.  
 
296 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This thesis discussed adaptation and convergence in corporate governance to international 
norms in Pakistan. In recent years the features of corporate governance have been 
transplanted from more developed jurisdictions to less developed jurisdictions. Despite the 
presence of barriers to convergence such as path dependency forces; and differences in 
culture, religion, politics, ownership structures, corporate governance norms and 
institutional structures, the process of convergence is still in progress. Globalization, 
efficiency and competition are the main stimulants for convergence. 
 
Different governance systems have developed around the world as a result of specific 
political, cultural, social and religious norms. Different theories have emerged, each 
claiming the dominance of one system of corporate governance over others. Convergence 
towards a single model is a remote possibility due to the presence of path dependency 
forces, and cultural, social and religious norms. Therefore, partial convergence in 
corporate governance is more likely than unique convergence. In this process, a feature of 
corporate governance of one system converges on another system, possibly on the 
presumption that it is the most efficient, but it may be discontinued or abolished, and the 
old system be reverted to if it is not compatible with existing infrastructure or simply falls 
into oblivion. Alternatively, the system may again converge on a corporate governance 
feature of some other system. This process may continue indefinitely. This all depends 
upon the quality of adaptation and compatibility of the recipient system with a new feature 
of corporate governance.  
   
Convergence in corporate governance takes place in three basic forms: (1) formal 
convergence, (2) functional convergence and (3) contractual convergence. Formal 
convergence occurs where the legal framework is changed according to some other legal 
framework. Functional convergence occurs where formal legal change is not possible but 
the system is flexible enough to respond to changed circumstances. In this process, the 
system starts functioning differently without change in the legal framework. Contractual 
convergence takes place where firms adopt the regulatory framework of other jurisdictions 
in order to raise finance from overseas stock exchanges under the terms of a contract. 
There may be practical difficulties in formal change due to the presence of vested interests 
that may resist any formal change. Therefore, functional and contractual convergence may 
dominate the process of convergence. There are some advantages to contractual and 
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functional convergence. Firstly, these forms of convergence can avoid possible resistance 
to formal change in the legal and regulatory framework. Any change that may be 
introduced in a formal way may be resisted by vested interests such as families, groups 
and politicians as the status quo may benefit them. Secondly, these forms can be 
economically efficient as they can reduce the cost of change that may be incurred through 
formal changes in the rules and regulations. To attract capital, companies can adopt some 
foreign good practices through alteration in their articles. Once this practice is successful, 
other companies may follow, which may lead to formal action by the regulator and 
legislature. This will not be too costly for the regulator to introduce through the legal 
framework. Thirdly, functional convergence can be used on a trial basis as a test case. If it 
is successful, then it can be incorporated formally and, if not, the change will not cost too 
much. This may also provide managers, regulators, policymakers and other corporate 
actors with opportunities to access the compatibility of the new governance feature and, 
once this is successful and these corporate actors become familiar with the change, this 
form of convergence may be formally incorporated. Therefore, functional and contractual 
convergence may provide a road map for policymakers towards formal convergence. 
Fourthly, contractual convergence leads to functional convergence which, in turn, leads to 
formal convergence. 
 
Pakistan is an underdeveloped country but an emerging market. Inefficient legal, 
regulatory, judicial, institutional and governance norms are basic problems experienced in 
the country. The regulator, legislature and policymakers have undertaken some reforms 
due to global forces and competition but a dearth of research has been the main hindrance 
in developing the system. Therefore, the focus of this thesis was on the application and 
prospects of convergence in corporate governance in Pakistan. The theory was applied in 
the context of Pakistan in order to improve corporate governance according to 
international norms and in accordance with the prevailing circumstances of the country. 
To this end, the thesis was divided into four core chapters, each discussing one aspect of 
corporate governance and concluding with recommendations.  
 
Chapter Three discussed the application and prospects of convergence in the context of 
Pakistan. Path dependency, complementarity institutions, interested families and groups, 
ideology, politics, and religion may be barriers to convergence in corporate governance in 
Pakistan. However, global competition, efficiency, international organizations, 
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international investors and foreign listing are all elements that are involved in improving 
corporate governance in Pakistan.  
 
Convergence in corporate governance in Pakistan gained some momentum in the early 
1990s after the economic meltdown in Pakistan in the context of the global recession and 
nuclear explosion in 1998, and subsequent world sanctions. In order to improve corporate 
governance, some changes were made to the legal and regulatory framework. Most of 
these amendments were restrictive in nature to provide rights to investors, especially 
minority shareholders. A major initiative was the introduction of the Code, but it was not 
successful due to weak compliance and enforcement. The problem lay in the nature of the 
Code itself. The Code was implemented through listing regulations, which provided non-
listing as the only penalty for non-compliance. The introduction of the Code as a soft law 
on a self-regulatory basis may be a good idea in the context of Pakistan where the 
corporate sector is not accustomed to good corporate governance practices, especially 
foreign corporate governance features. Phased implementation may, therefore, be a good 
idea. Alternatively, as the Code forms part of listing regulations, the enforcement of listing 
regulations must be ensured through a penalty that must be commensurate with the 
quantum of non-compliance. This will ensure compliance with both the listing regulations 
in general and the code in particular.  
 
Chapter Four is divided into two parts. The first part discussed agency problems in 
Pakistan. The corporate sector in Pakistan is highly concentrated and controlled by 
families and the state. Though separation of ownership and control is a problem in 
dispersed ownership, the agency problem is also visible in the conflict between 
management and the shareholders in concentrated ownership. The agency problem in 
Pakistan may be resolved, or at least reduced, by different techniques. Firstly, the 
separation of control and monitoring through the representation of minority shareholders 
and institutional investors on the board of directors may reduce the agency problem in the 
country. Non-executive and independent directors can also play an effective role in this 
regard. Secondly, the institutional investor industry in Pakistan is underdeveloped due to a 
lack of proper regulations and the excessive role of the state. Privatization of state-owned 
funds may foster competition, which may help to develop the industry.  
 
Part two of Chapter Four discussed minority protection in the context of corporate 
governance in Pakistan. The chapter examines six minority protection mechanisms in the 
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context of Pakistan: (1) pre-emptive rights, (2) cumulative voting rights, (3) the conflict of 
interest of the fiduciaries, (4) derivative action, (5) the unfair prejudice remedy and 
(6) winding up on just and equitable grounds. The objective of this part was to explore the 
possibility and effectiveness of convergence in order to improve minority protection. 
 
Pakistan adopted a legal framework inherited from its former British rulers. The present 
company law of Pakistan mimics the company law made by the British rulers for the 
subcontinent. Provision is made for the protection of minority rights in the company law 
of Pakistan. However, some important minority rights, such as derivative action and the 
controlling exploitation of corporate opportunities, are not catered for in the corporate law 
of Pakistan. However, some rights that are provided in company law, such as pre-emptive 
rights, CVS, RPTs, the unfair prejudice remedy, and winding up on just and equitable 
grounds, are insufficient, out-dated and redundant, to some extent, in the context of the 
new corporate scenario. Therefore, there is a need to revamp company law in general and 
the specific remedies to ensure minority rights, discussed in this thesis, in particular in 
order to enhance investor protection and to improve the corporate sector in Pakistan. 
 
Chapter Five focused on the improvement of the enforcement mechanism in Pakistan in 
the light of convergence theory. Investor protection is not merely the provision of rights, 
but the quality of enforcement as well. The ‘law in books’ is important in the first phase of 
reforms but ‘law in action’ must be improved in the second phase for better corporate 
governance and investor protection. This chapter analysed and examined the ‘law in 
action’ in Pakistan. It recommended different means of improving ‘law in action’ through 
reforms in Pakistan.  
 
The enforcement mechanism is embedded in the system where the courts and market play 
an important role in corporate governance. The judiciary has a significant role to play in 
the ‘law in action’. Therefore, an efficient judiciary is the key to good corporate 
governance in a given system. The judicial system in Pakistan is inefficient, and fails to 
provide justice to the general public even in general civil and criminal matters. The 
situation is worse when it comes to issue relates to corporate matters that are considered 
technical in nature. Corruption, inordinate delays in disposing of cases, judicial cost, lack 
of expertise on the part of judges and the inefficiency of the whole judicial system are the 
main problems. Reforming the whole system is not only lengthy and costly, but may not 
solve the problem of corporate matters as this will require further special training of 
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judges. The state has established a number of specialized courts and tribunals in many 
fields that are performing better than the general courts. The phenomenon of creating 
specialized courts, or establishing agencies, quasi-judicial authorities or tribunals in order 
to enhance enforcement capacity has already started in a number of jurisdictions in Asia 
and other parts of the world. Therefore, specialized courts may be established in Pakistan 
to deal with corporate matters presided over by judges with special knowledge and 
experience of corporate law, accounting, finance and economics. This may reduce not 
only the burden on the general judiciary, but may ensure efficiency in corporate matters as 
well, which may enhance the enforcement mechanism of Pakistan as far as corporate 
governance is concerned.  
 
The other important aspect of law in action is the capital market of Pakistan which is 
underdeveloped. This market failed to adhere to compliance and to exercise enforcement. 
Institutional investors are passive and the takeover market is not performing due to an 
illiquid market. There is a need to reform this market in Pakistan, bearing in mind the 
particular circumstances prevailing in the country. Resistance from families and vested 
interests can be overcome by piecemeal reforms in the market. The market can be divided 
into two segments, namely (1) the primary market and (2) the secondary market. The 
primary market may require more disclosure and compliance than the secondary market. 
International accounting standards, compliance with the Code, controlling related party 
transactions and other disclosure may be mandatory features of this market. The secondary 
market may require less disclosure and compliance. International accounting standards, 
compliance with the Code and related party transactions may be optional. The primary 
market will be attractive to multinational companies and big public companies. 
Reputational concerns may attract them to enlist on the primary market. This may be 
useful to small and dispersed investors who wish to invest in the primary market. 
Institutional investors may invest in both the primary and secondary market as they have 
experience in, and knowledge of, where to invest. They can also use their position and 
voting power to ensure compliance. The secondary market may be attractive to small and 
new firms, and once they get exposure and know the potential benefits of the primary 
market, they may enlist on this market. The bonding mechanism will be a stimulant for 
them to shift to the primary market, which may ensure compliance and enforcement. 
 
Chapter Six dealt with the role of religion in the application of convergence theory. The 
Constitution of Pakistan prescribes that Islam is the state religion. Islam is a practical 
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religion which guides its subjects in each and every field, including financial matters. 
Therefore, any convergence to foreign corporate governance features in Pakistan has to 
pass through the Islamic litmus test.  
 
Convergence in corporate governance has two aspects. First, is the convergence to 
corporate governance in the Islamic world. The evolution of different schools of thoughts 
in the Muslim world may lead divergence in corporate finance and corporate governance. 
This is primarily due to the nature of interpretational rules of Islamic law. However, this 
divergence may be overcome but there is a need to show some kind of flexibility in 
interpretation by the jurists. There are different techniques in Islamic law that can help to 
bridge the gap between different interpretational rules and to come to some consensus. 
Principles such as ‘choice and selection’ (iktiyar and takhayyur), ‘amalgamation or 
patching’ (talfiq), ‘necessity’ (darurah) and ‘ruses’ (hila) may be utilized to redefine 
Islamic law (fiqh) according to modern requirements. This may help to unify different 
interpretations of Islamic law and converge to unique corporate governance and corporate 
finance, at least within the Muslim world. This will also help Pakistan to converge to the 
Muslim world’s Islamic finance and corporate governance. 
 
The second aspect is convergence to a Western model of corporate governance in 
Pakistan. Pakistan is an Islamic country but it has adopted a conventional financial system 
based on the British system as a former British colony. As Pakistan is an Islamic country 
and its people were forced to Islamize its economy, the government took some steps to do 
so. However, these efforts were not successful for different reasons such as a dearth of 
research; human resources; a legal and regulatory framework; institutional incapacity; and 
of the state’s commitment. The problem with using Islamic finance in Pakistan is its 
application in modern times. Furthermore, there is no successful model within the Muslim 
world that may be applied in Pakistan.  
 
In order to improve corporate governance in Pakistan, there is a need to converge to 
Western corporate governance features but within the limits prescribed by the Shariah. As 
an abrupt overnight change from a conventional financial system to an Islamic system is 
not feasible, the system needs to be changed through steps. In the first step, instead of 
changing the whole system, the existing system needs to be synchronized with the Islamic 
financial system. A synthesis is possible to the extent that Western governance features 
can be adopted that are not against the Shariah under the principle of ‘continuity of 
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permissibility’. In the second step, features that have some kind of defect may be 
reorganized in such a way that they are made compatible with Islamic finance under the 
methodology of ‘ruses’. In the third step, some features that have minor defects may be 
adopted under the ‘principle of necessity’. This whole process requires substantial 
research and some kind of flexibility on the part of Muslims jurists. Islamic norms may 
not act as a strong barrier, as it is normally conceived, for convergence to a Western form 
of corporate governance.  
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure I: Pyramiding structure and its effects on control 
  X 
        
  
 
        L                  M    N 
 
Suppose X is a holding company with the following shareholdings: 
 
Shareholders 
Percentage 
in shareholding 
(%) 
X1 51 
X2 20 
X3 10 
X4 10 
X5 9 
 
Also, suppose X has three subsidiary companies such as L, M and N with the following 
shareholdings: 
L = subsidiary 
Shareholders 
Percentage 
in shareholding 
(%) 
L1=X 75 
L2=X1 1 
L3 10 
L4 10 
L5 4 
 
 
M = Subsidiary 
Shareholders 
Percentage 
in shareholding 
(%) 
M1=X 51 
M2=X1 24 
M3 10 
M4 10 
M5 5 
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N = subsidiary 
 
 
Explanation: 
 
1. X1 having 51% shareholding in holding company X controls the company and 
consequently controls all the subsidiary companies L, M and N in the following 
way: 
 
a. In subsidiary company L, X1 haves 1% direct control and 75% indirect control 
through holding company X, which has 75% shareholding in L. As X1 
controls X by having 51% shareholding in X, X1 therefore has indirect control 
in L. 
b. In subsidiary company M, X1 has 24% direct control and 51% indirect control 
through holding company X, which has 51% shareholding in L. As X1 
controls X by having 51% shareholding in X, X1 therefore has indirect control 
in M. 
c. In subsidiary company N, X1 has 1% direct control and 51% indirect control 
through holding company X, which has 51% shareholding in L. As X1 
controls X by having 51% shareholding in X, X1 therefore has indirect control 
in N. 
 
 
Shareholders 
Percentage  
in shareholding 
(%) 
N1=X 51 
N2=X1 1 
N3 30 
N4 10 
N5 8 
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Annexure II: Judicial structure in Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II.1: The judicial structure of Pakistan 
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(Civil, criminal and 
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Senior Civil Judge 
Court of Civil Judge 
1st, 2nd and 3rd Class 
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1st, 2nd and 3rd Class 
 
Special and 
Administrative Courts 
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Courts under 
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District Court 
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Annexure III: Administrative court structure in Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
     
    
   
 
 
            
   
 
            
  
 
 
 
Figure III.1: Administrative court structure in Pakistan 
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Annexure IV:  Federal Administrative Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan 
 
Table AIV.1:  Federal Administrative Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan 
S. no. Name of court Relevant law Objective and forum for appeal 
1 Banking 
Courts 
 
The Financial 
Institutions 
(Recovery of 
Finances) 
Ordinance, 2001 
To recover loans from defaulters.1 Appeal 
against the decision of the Banking Court 
can be filed with the High Court within 
30 days.2 
2 Special Courts 
for Banking 
Offences 
 
The Offences in 
Respect of Banks 
(Special Courts) 
Ordinance, 1984 
To conduct a speedy trial of certain 
offences committed in respect of banks.3 
Appeal against the decision of the Courts 
can be filed with the respective High 
Court within 30 days.4 
3 Anti-Terrorism 
Courts 
 
The Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 
To provide for the prevention of 
terrorism, sectarian violence and for a 
speedy trial of heinous offences and for 
matters connected therewith and 
incidental thereto.5 Appeal against the 
order of the Court can be filed with the 
High Court within seven days.6 
4 Accountability 
Courts 
 
The National 
Accountability 
Bureau Ordinance, 
1999 
To provide for effective measures for the 
detection, investigation, prosecution and 
speedy disposal of cases involving 
corruption, corrupt practices, misuse? 
abuse of power, misappropriation of 
property, kickbacks, commissions and for 
matters connected and ancillary or 
incidental thereto.7 An aggrieved person 
may file an appeal against the order of the 
Court with the respective High Court 
within 10 days.8 
5 Drug Courts 
 
The Drugs Act, 
1976 
To regulate the import, export, 
manufacture, storage, distribution and 
sale of drugs.9 Appeal against the 
                                                 
1
 See preamble to the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001. 
2
 See s. 22 (1) of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finance) Ordinance, 2001. 
3
 See preamble to the Offences in respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984. 
4
 See s. 10 of the Offences in respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984. 
5
 See preamble to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
6
 See s. 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
7
 See preamble to the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. 
8
 See s. 32 of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. 
9
 See preamble to the Drugs Act, 1976.  
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S. no. Name of court Relevant law Objective and forum for appeal 
decision of the Court can be filed with the 
respective High Court within 30 days.10 
6 Special Courts 
for Emigration 
Offences 
The Emigration 
Ordinance, 1979 
To deal with emigration matters. Appeal 
against the order of the Court can be filed 
with the respective High Court within 30 
days.11 
7 Labour Courts The Industrial 
Relation 
Ordinance, 2002 
To deal with the law that relates to the 
formation of trade unions, regulation and 
improvement of relations between 
employers and workmen, and avoidance 
and settlement of any differences or 
disputes arising between them.12 An 
aggrieved party may prefer any appeal to 
the High Court13 within 30 days.14 
8 Court of 
Special Judge 
(Customs, 
Taxation and 
Anti-
Smuggling) 
 
The Customs Act, 
1969 
To levy and collect customs duties, fee 
and service charges, and other allied 
matters that may include taxation and 
anti-smuggling.15 Appeal against the 
order of the Special Judge can be filed 
with the Special Appellate Court within 
60 days.16 Similarly, an appeal against an 
order of the officer of customs can be 
filed with the Collector (Appeal) within 
30 days17 and an appeal against the order 
of the Collector (Appeal) can be filed 
with Customs Appellate Tribunals.18 The 
ag-grieved person or any officer 
authorized by the Collector may refer a 
question of law arising from the order of 
the Tribunal to the respective High Court 
within 90 days.19 
9 Income Tax 
Appellate 
Tribunals 
 
The Income Tax 
Ordinance, 2001 
To entertain appeals against the orders of 
the Commissioner of Income Tax. There 
is limited right of appeal against the order 
of these tribunals. Any party can ask the 
                                                 
10
 See s. 31 (7) of the Drugs Act, 1976. 
11
 See s. 24-A of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 
12
 See preamble to the Industrial Relation Ordinance, 2002. 
13
 See s. 48 of the Industrial Relation Ordinance, 2002. 
14
 See s. 47(3) of the Industrial Relation Ordinance, 2002. 
15
 See preamble to the Customs Act, 1969. 
16
 See s. 185F of the Customs Act, 1969. 
17
 See s. 193 (1) of the Customs Act, 1969. 
18
 See s. 194-A of the Customs Act, 1969. 
19
 See s. 196 of the Customs Act, 1969. 
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S. no. Name of court Relevant law Objective and forum for appeal 
tribunal to file a reference to the High 
Court to clear up any question of law.20 
An appeal can also be filed with the 
Supreme Court against an order of the 
High Court on such reference.21 
10 Environment 
Appellate 
Tribunals 
 
The Pakistan 
Environment 
Protection Act, 
1997 
The objective of the Act is the protection, 
conservation, rehabilitation and 
improvement of the environment; 
prevention and control of pollution; and 
the promotion of sustainable 
development.22 These tribunals are final 
fact-finding authorities in cases related to 
the environment. These tribunals also 
entertain complains, and appeals against 
legal action of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Private individuals 
are also eligible to approach the tribunals 
to seek relief for their grievances against 
the alleged polluters. Appeals against the 
order of the Federal Agency or Provincial 
Agency can be filed with the 
Environment Tribunals23 and an appeal 
against the final order of the tribunal can 
be filed with the High Court within 30 
days.24 
11 Insurance 
Appellate 
Tribunals  
 
The Insurance 
Ordinance, 2000 
Jurisdiction of these tribunals is to judge, 
adjudicate on/or to determine claims and 
disputes relating to insurance business. 
The appeal against the decision of these 
tribunals are to the High Court only when 
the claim amount is equal or more than 
R100,000, otherwise no appeal lies 
against decisions of these tribunals.25 
Further-more, an appeal is not to 
Appellate Bench of the SECP as per 
section 33-34 of the SECP Act 1997.  
12 Service 
Tribunals 
Article 212 of the 
Constitution of the 
These tribunals have exclusive 
jurisdiction with respect to terms and 
                                                 
20
 See s. 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001. 
21
 See s. 134 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. 
22
 See preamble to the Pakistan Environment Protection Act, 1997. 
23
 See s. 22 of the Pakistan Environment Protection Act, 1997. 
24
 See s. 23 (1) of the Pakistan Environment Protection Act, 1997. 
25
 See s. 124 (2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. 
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S. no. Name of court Relevant law Objective and forum for appeal 
 Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan through 
the Services 
Tribunals Act, 
1973 
conditions of the service of civil 
servants.26  
13 Special Courts 
(Control of 
Narcotics 
Substances) 
 
The Control of 
Narcotics 
Substances Act, 
1997 
To control the production, processing and 
trafficking of narcotics drugs and 
psychotropic substance.27 Appeal against 
the order of the Special Court comprising 
a judicial magistrate will be to the Special 
Court comprising a Session Judge or 
Additional Session Judge.28 Appeal 
against the order of the Special Court 
comprising Session Judge will be to the 
High Court.29 
14 Federal 
Ombudsman 
(Wafaqi 
Mohtasib) 
 
The Establishment 
of the Office of 
Wafaqi Mohtasib 
(Ombudsman) 
Order, 1983 
The objective of the Ombudsman is to 
diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify 
any injustice done to a person through 
maladministration by persons holding 
public offices.30 Any party aggrieved by 
the order or decision of the Mohtasib may 
prefer representation to the President of 
Pakistan within 30 days.31 
15 Federal Tax 
Ombudsman 
 
The Federal Tax 
Ombudsman 
Ordinance, 2000 
To entertain complaints against the 
officer of the Federal Bureau of Revenue 
(FBR) collecting income tax, sales tax, 
customs duties and federal excise duty. 
Any party aggrieved by the order or 
decision of the Mohtasib may prefer a 
representation to the President of 
Pakistan within 30 days.32 
16 Federal 
Insurance 
Ombudsman 
 
The Insurance 
Ordinance, 2000 
This is an autonomous dispute resolution 
authority that resolves insurance disputes 
between policyholders and participating 
companies independently and impartially. 
The objective of the office of the 
                                                 
26
 See preamble to the Services Tribunals Act, 1973. 
27
 See preamble to the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. 
28
 See s. 48 (1) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. 
29
 See s. 48 (2) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. 
30
 See preamble to the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983. 
31
 See s. 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983. 
32
 See s. 32 of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000. 
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S. no. Name of court Relevant law Objective and forum for appeal 
Ombudsman is the quick disposal of the 
grievances of insurers.33 Appeal against 
the order of the Ombudsman can be filed 
with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan within 30 days.34 
17 Commercial 
Courts 
 
The Import and 
Export (Control) 
Act, 1950 
The objective of the Act is to control the 
import into, and export from, Pakistan.35 
Appeal against the decision of the 
Commercial Court can be filed with the 
High Court within 30 days.36 
18 Integrated Utility 
Courts 
Proposal to 
incorporate through 
the amendment of 
the Gas Utility 
Companies Act, 
2010 
The purpose of these courts is to deal 
with defaulters and theft of electricity and 
gas.37  
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 See website of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan available at 
<http://www.secp.gov.pk/ID/id_complaints.asp> Accessed 04.12.2013. 
34
 See s. 130 (2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. 
35
 See preamble to the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950. 
36
 See s. 5A (8) of the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950. 
37See the daily English newspaper ‘Dawn’ available at < http://www.dawn.com/news/1033228/cci-approves-
national-power-policy-2013> Accessed 04.12.2013. 
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Annexure V:  Provincial Administrative Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan  
 
Table AV.1:  Provincial Administrative Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan 
S. no. 
Name of 
court Relevant law Objective and forum of appeal 
1 Revenue 
Courts 
 
The West 
Pakistan Land 
Revenue Act, 
1967 
The objective of the Act is to create and maintain 
the record of rights, assessment and collection of 
land revenue.1 The courts consist of officers 
appointed by the government in the revenue 
department. These include Assistant Collectors, 
Collectors, Commissioners and the Board of 
Revenue. The law prescribe their powers and 
functions.2The order of the Assistant Collector is 
appealable to the Collector and order of the 
Collector is appealable to the Executive District 
Officer (EDO) (Revenue) and order of the EDO 
(Revenue) is appealable to the Board of Revenue. 
The appeals are subject to conditions that if 
original appeal is confirmed on first appeal then 
there will be no further appeal. Similarly, if on 
appeal, the order of revenue officer (Assistant 
Collector) is reversed or modified by the 
Collector, then the order made by EDO 
(Revenue) shall be final. Appeal to Board of 
Revenue can only be on point of law.3 
2 Consumer 
Courts 
 
These courts are 
established by 
provinces under 
their respective 
consumer 
protection Acts. 
In Punjab there is 
the Punjab 
Consumer 
Protection Act, 
2005. In Khyber 
Pakhtoonkhawa, 
there is the 
The objective of the courts is to provide 
protection and promotion of the rights and 
interests of the consumers and speedy redress of 
consumer complaints.4 Appeal against the order 
of the Consumer Court can be filed with the 
respective High Court within 30 days.5 
 
                                                 
1
 See preamble to the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967. 
2
 Faqir Hussain (Registrar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan), ‘Judicial System of Pakistan’ (2011) available 
at Supreme Court of Pakistan’s website at <http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=594 > 
Accessed 20.12.2013. 
3
 See s. 161 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967. 
4
 See preamble to the Consumer Protection Acts. 
5
 See s. 33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005.  
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S. no. 
Name of 
court Relevant law Objective and forum of appeal 
NWFP Consumer 
Protection Act, 
1997. In 
Islamabad and 
Baluchistan there 
is the Islamabad 
Consumer 
Protection Act, 
1995 and the 
Baluchistan 
Consumer 
Protection Act, 
2003 
respectively. To 
date there has 
been no 
consumer 
protection Act in 
Sindh.  
3 Rent 
Tribunals 
 
The Punjab 
Rented Premises 
Act, 2009  
The objective of the Act is to regulate the 
relationship between a landlord and tenants, and 
to provide a mechanism for settlement of their 
disputes in an expeditious and cost-effective 
manner.6 An appeal against the order of the 
Tribunal can be filed with the District Court.7 
4 Family 
Courts 
 
The West 
Pakistan Family 
Courts Act, 1964 
The objective is to provide the expeditious 
settlement and disposal of disputes relating to 
marriage and family affairs.8 Appeal against the 
order of the Family Court lies with the High 
Court. In some cases the appeal may be filed 
with the District Court when the order is passed 
by any judge below the rank of District Judge.9 
5 Services 
Tribunals 
 
The Punjab 
Service Tribunals 
Act, 1974 
The objective of the establishment of these 
tribunals is to exercise jurisdiction regarding 
matters relating to the terms and conditions of 
services of civil services.10 Appeal can be filed 
with the District Judge within 30 days.11 
6 Anti- The Anti- The objective of these courts is to prevent 
                                                 
6
 See preamble to the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. 
7
 See s. 29 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. 
8
 See preamble to the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964.  
9
 See s. 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. 
10
 See preamble to the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974. 
11
 See s. 28 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. 
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S. no. 
Name of 
court Relevant law Objective and forum of appeal 
Terrorist 
Courts  
 
Terrorist Courts 
may also be 
established by the 
respective 
Provincial 
Governments in 
addition to the 
Federal 
Government 
under the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 
1997.12 
terrorism, sectarian violence and the speedy trial 
of heinous offences.13 Appeal against the order of 
court can be filed with the High Court within 
seven days.14 
 
7 Drug 
Courts  
The Drugs Act, 
1976.15  
The objective of these courts is to regulate the 
import, export, manufacture, storage, distribution 
and sale of drugs.16 Appeal can be filed with the 
High Court within 30 days.17 
 
                                                 
12
 See s. 13 (1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
13
 See preamble to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
14
 See s. 25 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
15
 See s. 31 of the Drug Act, 1976. 
16
 See preamble to the Drug Courts Act, 1976. 
17
 See s. 31 (7) of the Drug Courts Act, 1976. 
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Annexure VI: Penalty structure in corporate law in Pakistan 
 
 
Figure VI.1: Penalty structure in corporate law in Pakistan
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Annexure VII: Corporate judicature in Pakistan  
 
Figure VII.1: Corporate judicature in Pakistan 
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Annexure VIII: Listing structure in the United Kingdom 
 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
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  UK Main   International Main Market 
            
     
Figure VIII.1: Listing structure in the United Kingdom 
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